

TERA

POOR ORIGINAL

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



IN THE MATTER OF:

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY,)
et al.)
[Three Mile Island Unit 1])

Docket No. 50-289
[Restart]

Place - Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Date - Saturday, November 17, 1979

Pages 1286 - 1507



1379 220

Telephone:
(202) 347-3700

ACE - FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Official Reporters

444 North Capitol Street
Washington, D.C. 20001

NATIONWIDE COVERAGE - DAILY

7911210 469 T

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

-----X
:
In the matter of: :
:
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, : Docket No. 50-239
:
et al. : [Restart]
:
[Three Mile Island Unit 1] :
:
-----X

POOR ORIGINAL

The Forum, Education Building
Commonwealth Avenue & Walnut St.
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Saturday, November 17, 1979

The special prehearing conference in the above-
entitled matter was resumed at 9:00 a.m., pursuant to
adjournment.

BEFORE:

IVAN W. SMITH, Esq., Chairman,
Atomic Safety & Licensing Board.

DR. WALTER H. JORDAN, Member.

DR. LINDA W. LITTLE, Member.

Appearing for the Licensee, Metropolitan Edison:

GEORGE F. TROWBRIDGE, ESQ.,
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
1800 M Street Northwest
Washington, D.C.

1379 ?21

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

[Appearances, continued:]

Appearing for the NRC Regulatory Staff:

WILLIAM FATON, Esq.
LUCINDA SWARTZ, Esq.
JAN MORRIS
Office of the Executive Legal Director
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C.

* * * *

1379 222

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25C O N T E N T SLimited Appearance Statement of:Page:

Congressman Allen E. Ertel	1295
Dianna Wells	1304
Don Hassler	1308
Susan Shetrom	1322
Mary Hartnett	1325
Fran Stein	1328
William Buskirk, Jr.	1335
Michelle Siewert	1343
Jeffrey Palmer	1347
Barbara Heivly	1349
Andrea Chesman	1355
Ray C. Hearne	1357
Jim Gormley	1364
Terry Roth	1366
Toni Brink	1369
Nicholas Brink	1377
Robert Donnelly	1383
Ron Davis	1384
Jim Buzan	1391
Bernard August	1393
William Stevens	1406
Daniel Greenberg (Age 9)	1407

1379 223

	<u>Page:</u>
1 [Limited Appearances, continued:]	
2 Pat Street, and Jennifer Street (Age 7)	1408
3 Philip Nester	1411
4 Georgianna Myce	1415
5 Robert Pittman	1421
6 David Creasey	1426
7 Pat Sgrignali	1429
8 Louise Fleck	1430
9 Russell Myers	1436
10 Stephen Brooks	1443
11 Warren L. Prelesnik	1448
12 Larry Arnold	1461
13 Paul Nolan	1473
14 Ed Walsh	1479
15 Ms. Prelesnik	1483
16 Ted Keck	1494
17 Erica Keck	1497
18 Sandra Nevius	1498
19 John Aldman	1499
20 Warren L. Prelesnik	1500
21 Barbara Light	1502
22 Joan Petrosky	1507

1379 224

23
24
25

WBeach#1 1

P R O C E E D I N G S

SATURDAY* 2

(9:10 a.m.)

3 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Ladies and gentlemen, this is
4 the third day of special sessions in a prehearing
5 conference set aside to receive statements from members of
6 the public concerning this proceeding, which I'm sure you
7 all now know concerns the proposed reopening of the Unit 1
8 of the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station operated by the
9 Metropolitan Edison Company.

10 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has ordered
11 that TMI 1, as we all refer to it as, remain closed until
12 a hearing can be conducted on many issues pertaining to that
13 plant, and we have been appointed as the Nuclear Licensing
14 and Safety Board designated to preside over the hearing.

15 To my left is Dr. Linda Little, who is an
16 environmental scientist. Traditionally these Boards have
17 an environmental scientist on them.

18 Dr. Little is an Adjunct Associate Professor
19 of Environmental Biology at the University of North
20 Carolina in Chapel Hill. She has instructed there -- it's
21 where she has earned her Ph.D. and she has instructed there
22 in the field of public health.

23 Dr. Little is President of L. W. Little Associates,
24 which is a consulting firm in the field of environmental
25 sciences. She belongs to many professional societies and

1 has extensively published in the field of environmental
2 biology, and in particular waste water treatment.

3 She has been a part-time member of the Atomic
4 Safety and Licensing Board Panel since 1974.

5 To my right is Dr. Walter Jordan, who is a
6 nuclear physicist and has been for many years. He's
7 retired as the Assistant Director of the Oak Ridge National
8 Laboratory, and he's also retired as a Professor of Nuclear
9 Engineering, the University of Tennessee.

10 He has been a specialist in the field of nuclear
11 safety for many years. He's Advisory Editor of the Journal
12 of Nuclear Safety, and he has published extensively on that
13 subject.

14 Dr. Jordan has served as a part-time member of
15 the Panel since 1970.

16 My name is Evan Smith. I'm an attorney, a member
17 of the Ohio Bar, and I have been a full-time member of the
18 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel since 1975.

19 The only job that I have is to preside over and
20 be Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards,
21 presiding over hearings such as this.

22 In its order directing this hearing, the Commission
23 stated, as I said, that TMI 1 must remain shut down until
24 the further order of the Commission. The Commission's
25 decision will depend largely upon the results of the hearing

1 that we are going to conduct.

2 We have been told that we must decide whether
3 certain short-term actions proposed to be taken at TMI 1
4 are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance
5 that TMI 1 can be operated safely without endangering the
6 health and safety of the public, and whether those short-
7 term actions should be required.

8 Now those short-term actions pertain to a large
9 array of technical changes, analyses which would be required;
10 some of the technical considerations relate to Babcock &
11 Wilcox Reactors in general, and some of them relate to the
12 situation at Three Mile Island 1 in particular.

13 There are quite a few of them, and they are
14 largely technical and related to the various components of
15 the nuclear reactor.

16 Other short-term actions pertain to reactor
17 operator training, emergency preparedness, the possible
18 effect upon TMI 1 from restoration and cleanup operations
19 at TMI 2. One of the issues that we must consider is whether
20 the licensee has the management capability and technical
21 qualifications to operate TMI 1, and we must also consider
22 whether Metropolitan Edison has the financial qualifications
23 relevant to the safe operation of the -- the proposed safe
24 operation of TMI 1.

25 The Board has a second responsibility. That is,

1 if we should determine that TMI -- that Metropolitan Edison
2 has proved that those short-term actions will satisfactorily
3 be done -- those that we find are necessary -- we must then
4 consider whether additional long-term actions are necessary
5 and sufficient; and whether Metropolitan Edison has made
6 reasonable progress in fulfilling these long-term respon-
7 sibilities.

8 When this is done, if the evidence so warrants,
9 we may recommend to the Commission in a decision that TMI 1
10 may be operated. If the record indicates that these condi-
11 tions have not been met, our initial decision may be that
12 TMI 1 may not be operated.

13 In addition to the matters that I've just
14 discussed, the Commission has also for the first time
15 provided an opportunity for intervenors to raise issues of
16 psychological distress arising from the possible operation
17 of TMI 1.

18 We do not have now the jurisdiction to decide
19 whether psychological stress issues will be heard. We will
20 refer the matter to the Commissioners after the parties have
21 had an opportunity to argue and brief the issue. The
22 Commissioners will then decide whether psychological issues
23 may lawfully be heard, and then advise us accordingly.

24 Perhaps it may be helpful to explain what we're
25 not here to do, because there is widespread misconceptions

1 on what our authority is.

2 First, we are not here to investigate once again
3 the accident at TMI 2. This has been investigated and is
4 being investigated. However, we are interested in the
5 accident at TMI 2 as it might relate to the safe operation
6 of TMI 1.

7 So some of the same issues will be considered by
8 us.

9 We are not here to consider in general whether
10 nuclear fission is an appropriate energy source. That is
11 a matter entirely in the hands of the United States Congress.

12 We are not here to investigate general nuclear
13 safety, except as it relates to the issues at TMI 1 and TMI 2.

14 The Commission has summarizes basically what it
15 expects of us. That is, we must give consideration to the
16 overriding need to promote adequate protection for the
17 public health and safety.

18 We have advance requests. Parsons have signed
19 up for an opportunity to make limited appearance
20 statements, and the first person to make such a request
21 is Congressman Ertel from this District who is here and on
22 hand.

23 We will now hear from Congressman Ertel.

24

25

1379 229

1 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN
2 ALLEN E. ERTEL, HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA.

3 CONGRESSMAN ERTEL: I do say good morning to you
4 Chairman Smith, and members of the Committee. I appreciate
5 the opportunity to testify here today on this important
6 issue.

7 Since March 28th, the Nuclear plant at Three Mile
8 Island has dominated the lives of hundreds of central
9 Pennsylvanians. It has been a traumatic experience.

10 I am here to testify on behalf of many of my
11 constituents in the 17th Congressional District. I regret,
12 though, that this hearing is even taking place -- not
13 because I support the reopening of Unit No. 1 at Three Mile
14 Island. That I do not -- but because now is not the time
15 to begin considering the future reopening of TMI 1.

16 The reasons for which I think this proposal
17 is premature are:

18 Number one, the cleanup of the contamination and
19 damage at Unit No. 2 has not been completed.

20 Two, the President's Commission on the accident
21 at Three Mile Island just came out with a report on the
22 accident.

23 Three, there is no evidence that Met Ed has made
24 major changes in its operating procedures.

25 Four, a comprehensive nuclear plant operator

1 training program I proposed for the Department of Energy
2 has not been implemented. Operators have not been trained
3 or retrained in accordance with that program.

4 Four, the President's Commission has raised
5 serious questions about the competence of the Nuclear
6 Regulatory Commission, the nuclear industry, and specifically
7 Metropolitan Edison.

8 And five, finally I'm appalled you will not be
9 taking into account the psychological impacts of the
10 accident at TMI 2 in your considerations.

11 The cleanup of radioactive contamination to Unit
12 No. 2 at Three Mile Island has only just begun. Within the
13 past two weeks, for the first time clean up workers were
14 able to insert a camera inside the reactor building and get
15 a view of the inside of the containment.

16 Just several weeks ago the slow process of
17 removing radioactivity from hundreds of thousands of
18 water from the auxiliary building at Unit 2 began -- and
19 that is a process that is expected to take several months.

20 There are still hundreds of thousands of gallons
21 of highly contaminated water inside Unit 2, not to mention
22 the large amounts of radioactive gases that somehow have
23 to be disposed of.

24 It seems incongruous to me that Metropolitan
25 Edison wants to restart its other reactor at Three Mile

1 Island at the same time it is cleaning up and evaluating
2 the damage from the Nation's most serious civil nuclear
3 accident at little more than a stone's throw away.

4 I have had time to study and examine much of
5 the material that has been prepared on the accident at Unit 2:
6 the competence of Met Ed, the competence of the Nuclear
7 Regulatory Commission, and the relative safety of nuclear
8 power in the United States today.

9 Given the existing situation at Three Mile
10 Island, one must be extremely skeptical. I am not sure it
11 would be in the best interest of the Nation for it to reopen.
12 I think anyone who has read the recent report of the
13 President's Commission on the accident at Three Mile Island
14 must have an uneasy feeling about the safety of nuclear
15 power in the United States today.

16 I will not attempt to cite chapter and verse
17 from the President's Commission's report, but I am going
18 to refer to several of its findings which I find alarming.

19 They reaffirm many of the points I presented in
20 my testimony to the Commission last spring. Met Ed was
21 basically unable to cope with the incident at Unit 2. Met
22 Ed did not have the needed technical expertise to safely
23 operate that reactor, and in my judgment Met Ed is still not
24 capable of handling the operation of a nuclear power plant.

25 I have called for review of the company's license

1 to operate nuclear plants. I suppose that is one of the
2 reasons you are here today, with an eye towards revoking
3 that license.

4 I also understand the Pennsylvania Public Utility
5 Commission has ordered the utility to show cause why its
6 license should not be revoked.

7 The President's Commission's report is also
8 sharply critical of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and
9 I quote: "With its present organization, staff and attitudes,
10 the NRC is unable to fulfill its responsibility for providing
11 an acceptable level of safety for nuclear power plants."

12 That is a rather shocking statement. If the
13 NRC cannot guarantee safety, on whom does the American
14 public rely? Are we now unguarded?

15 The President's Commission recommends major
16 changes for nuclear safety, but these recommendations are
17 controversial and will take legislation to implement. It
18 may be years before the recommendations are implemented,
19 if at all.

20 What happens in the meantime to ensure that TMI
21 will be safely operated?

22 The President's Commission emphasized the lack
23 of emergency procedures in case of an accident. Met Ed, the
24 NRC, and the State of Pennsylvania were not equipped to
25 respond in a quick or coordinated manner when the accident

1 happened. It was hours -- in fact, days -- before we knew
2 the extent of the accident, and there's still not an approved,
3 coordinated emergency plan for the area around Three Mile
4 Island.

5 How then can we even consider putting Unit 1 back
6 on line in this situation?

7 Finally, I was appalled to read that psychological
8 impact of the reopening of Unit 1 is not going to be
9 considered. I believe it is a serious mistake to ignore
10 the psychological effects of starting Unit 1. Haven't we
11 learned anything from this incident?

12 There are lessons that must be heeded. I see
13 the refusal of the NRC to allow stress on local residents
14 to be considered as just another example of the narrow
15 "public be damned" mindset that has marked public regulators
16 for many years.

17 This is exactly what the President's Commission
18 condemned. The accident at TMI 2 did occur. The damaged
19 reactor is still there. The NRC does not have to live in
20 Middletown, Harrisburg, Hershey, or Highspire. Many of my
21 constituents do. I just do not see how you can fail to
22 consider the impact upon their health and well-being from a
23 psychological point of view in your deliberations.

24 I realize psychological impact is difficult
25 to assess. There is no yardstick by which to measure.

1 However, I've been contacted by thousands since this accident.
2 It is obvious there is a lingering effect from the accident
3 at Three Mile Island.

4 I must ask you to think: How would you feel if
5 you lived next to TMI? How would you feel if TMI was
6 reopened without a competent guardian of the public safety?

7 Let me conclude by saying that the public is
8 not well served by this premature hearing. The only ones
9 who make profits from this premature activity are the
10 stockholders of General Public Utilities, the parent firm
11 of Metropolitan Edison. They are the ones who stand to
12 gain, despite the fact that their negligence and the
13 incompetence of the regulators and the overall apathy of
14 the nuclear industry contributed to or caused the accident
15 at TMI Unit 2.

16 Can we trust Met Ed to operate a reactor again?

17 I think not.

18 Thank you.

19 (applause.)

20 CONGRESSMAN ERTEL: Thank you very much, and I
21 would be happy to respond to any questions you might have
22 of me.

23 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Well, Congressman Ertel, I am
24 very pleased that you have raised the question of psycholo-
25 gical stress, because it is a subject that has received

1 widespread misinformation. I think that this is a good
2 opportunity to clarify it.

3 One, this Board, this Atomic Safety and Licensing
4 Board has not decided that psychological stress issues are
5 outside the scope. In fact, we are in the process now of
6 receiving and reviewing arguments why those issues should be
7 in the scope of the hearing. We have also asked to be advised
8 as to the nature and availability of evidence.

9 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has not decided
10 to eliminate psychological distress issues. In fact, they
11 have advised us that they wish to consider the feasibility
12 of psychological distress issues.

13 There has indeed been some misreporting on that
14 issue, and I am glad that you gave us the opportunity to
15 clarify it.

16 CONGRESSMAN ERTEL: I am certainly glad that
17 you clarified that, because I was definitely of the opinion
18 that they had ruled out the psychological impact. But since
19 it has not, it seems to me that possibly we should have had
20 a ruling first, before you had these hearings, as to whether
21 or not it would be considered, so people could develop it
22 in its fullest extent at this hearing, so that you would --
23 I am assuming you are taking testimony on it, anyway,
24 subject to a ruling of the full NRC?

25 CHAIRMAN SMITH: We are trying to put into the

1 framework of this proceeding a structure in which, as
2 quickly as the Commission can rule that psychological
3 distress evidence will be received, assuming they eventually
4 do permit that issue to be heard.

5 CONGRESSMAN ERTEL: Well, I would certainly hope
6 they would. I guess one can argue whether the cart should
7 have been which place, before the horse or behind it, and
8 that that's just a question of judgment. But I would have
9 hoped, you know, that they would have made their ruling
10 first and then have taken full testimony on it, rather
11 than maybe take the testimony subject to a ruling
12 subsequent. That would be my preference, but I can under-
13 stand the other position as well.

14 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Further, I would like to point
15 out that some of the concerns you have raised in your
16 remarks are also concerns of this Board and will in fact be
17 addressed in the hearing. You may be assured of it.

18 There is no use detailing them, but some of your
19 concerns are remarkably parallel to the issues which this
20 Board is going to be hearing.

21 CONGRESSMAN ERTEL: I appreciate that. Of
22 course the one -- and I know it reflects directly upon the
23 Board, because you are certainly part of the entire
24 regulatory scheme -- is the real problem as a result of the
25 President's Commission report, and the basic position that

1 they took in regard to the NRC. It makes it a very
2 difficult situation with this hearing, and I can understand
3 that, based upon their conclusion.

4 They filed a finding in their report, and then
5 subsequently, if you look at their legislative recommendations,
6 there was no followup on that finding. Your being a lawyer,
7 you understand the way judges find findings of fact and
8 conclusions of law. Usually for every finding of fact, you
9 would weave that into a conclusion of law.

10 In the Presidential Commission they had a finding
11 of fact which was never woven in in any way shape or form to
12 an intermediate solution for a legislative recommendation.
13 That was the one that I cited here in its entirety.

14 That gives me a great deal of pause, and I thought
15 you might be interested in that. Because even though it is
16 adverse to the NRC, it is something that the public has to
17 be concerned about.

18 I thank you very much. If you have any other
19 questions, I will be glad to respond.

20 CHAIRMAN SMITH: We appreciate very much your
21 attendance here.

22 CONGRESSMAN ERTEL: Thank you, and I appreciate
23 your courtesy in having me.

24 (Applause.)

25 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Dianna Wellz, please?

1 Dianna Wells will be followed by Don Hassler,
2 who will be followed by Susan Shetrom. If those persons
3 could be prepared, it would be helpful.

4 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF DIANNA WELLS,
5 LEWISBERRY, PENNSYLVANIA.

6 MS. WELLS: Good morning.

7 I have come to voice my objections to the
8 reopening of TMI No. 1, first of all as a wife who is
9 interested in protecting the property that my husband and
10 I have worked for for 16 years, second of all as a mother
11 of three daughters whos health is of most importance to me,
12 and their future wellbeing, their future plans to perhaps
13 have a family if they choose, and to be assured of having
14 the same chance of having a normal, healthy child that other
15 women across the country do have; and as a professional
16 nurse. I'm concerned with the health of the entire
17 community.

18 The operation of a nuclear power facility is a
19 privilege, a privilege and an awesome responsibility that
20 was granted to the Metropolitan Edison Company. I feel
21 they failed miserably to meet this responsibility.

22 The people who work, live, and raise their
23 families in this area live in the shadow of the cooling
24 towers of TMI. Many people look out their kitchen windows
25 every morning and see the towers in the background. We have

1 to know that if these towers are again operating, that
2 there would be primary concern over public health and
3 safety.

4 What we have already learned is that the company
5 did not have the knowledge to recognize an accident when it
6 occurred, or to recognize the scope of the accident. We
7 know that they did not have the technology to correct the
8 problem when it was identified, and we know that they did
9 not have the concern for public welfare to inform us of the
10 scope of the accident so that we could make appropriate
11 decisions for the wellbeing of ourselves and our families.

12 We had to operate totally in the dark. This
13 lack of responsibility has violated the public trust, and
14 therefore I do not believe that we can again live in the
15 shadow of those towers with the knowledge that Metropolitan
16 Edison is again operating the plant with its first regard
17 profit, and as a last consideration the wellbeing of the
18 people who must live as neighbors to them.

19 I am also concerned that we must live with the
20 stress today of knowing that there is a vast amount of
21 radioactivity present in those buildings; that there is no
22 place in the country that wants our radioactive waste.
23 Therefore, for the next five years we must live as neighbors
24 to that contaminated plant and fear for our safety and a
25 possible accident during the cleanup process.

1 There was no evacuation plan provided for us
2 prior to the accident. The primary reason, many of us feel,
3 that an evacuation was not called for was because there was
4 no feasible evacuation plan. There is still today, months
5 after the accident, no feasible evacuation plan.

6 What did health professionals learn during the
7 accident? They learned that it would take much more notice
8 than they had to evacuate hospitalized patients -- those
9 who had to be carried by litter, removed by helicopter.

10 We have not even considered, or do not know
11 today, the number of homebound individuals, bedbound indi-
12 viduals, who would have to be evacuated if there were
13 another accident.

14 This has not been solved. To many it seems an
15 insolvable problem. And yet we are considering reopening
16 TMI No. 1.

17 We do not know what effect on our health low
18 levels of radiation have. There are no facts as of yet to
19 support that there has been any harm from the radioactivity;
20 but there are many, many facts relating the correlation of
21 psychological stress to our physical well being.

22 As a nursing instructor, there is no condition,
23 no disease state that we talk about within the human body
24 that does not have a correlation to the psychological
25 social needs of the individual. So there can be no discussion

1 of public health and public welfare, public safety, without
2 consideration of the psychological stress that is involved
3 in living near a nuclear plant, one that has had the Nation's
4 worst disaster.

5 I thank you.

6 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, ma'am.

7 (Applause.)

8 . END JWB#1

9 AR #2f1s

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1379 242

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mr. Hassler.

2 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF DON HASSLER.

3 MR. HASSLER: I have a series of three areas,
4 gentlemen, I'd like to talk about. The first one is just
5 some personal sidelights, and second of all I have some factual
6 things that perhaps the utility and maybe the NRC Staff may be
7 able to answer, and the third thing is I have some questions
8 for the Atomic Safety & Licensing Board.

9 I live in Middletown, where I have a home and a
10 family. I live about three miles from Three Mile Island, and I
11 think it's fair to say that prior to 3/28, few people knew or
12 understood the risks of living near a nuclear plant, and on 3/28,
13 ofcourse, the accident occurred, and on 3/30, I was working
14 about 10 miles from home, and just to share a small personal
15 side with you, and I heard on the radio there might be a
16 possible evacuation, so I immediately drove -- or I immediately
17 left where I worked and ran about seven blocks to a place --
18 to some people that I carpool with, not knowing exactly where
19 they worked in the building. I had a terrible time finding
20 them, and then had to get home, and finally I drove about 70
21 miles to get home, and we got home and said, you know, what
22 are we going to do? The governor's advisory had already come
23 out to evacuate. Where do we go? What do we take? I went to
24 the bank, got \$300, because all I had was a couple of gas
25 credit cards, living from paycheck to paycheck.

1 You know, we didn't know what to do. It was a
2 very serious situation to us, and one that -- I had a knot
3 in my stomach for just about the whole month of April, and it
4 continues today with the clean-up of Three Mile Island.

5 So moving on to some factual areas which I think
6 perhaps the Board might be interested in, I'd like to know --
7 and perhaps the Board might be able to answer this -- I wonder
8 how safe is the stainless steel pipe used in the reactors that
9 carry water?

10 I have read where intergranular stress corrosion
11 occurs frequently because of residual weld stress, and I'm
12 wondering if this could not be a significant factor that
13 should be investigated in terms of all reactors, and if it is
14 a serious problem.

15 Another technical situation: There is a reservoir
16 below Three Mile Island. It's called York Haven Dam, which is
17 75 years old, and recently the newspaper report saying that
18 the dam was not in very good condition.

19 Also the newspaper article stated that the pumps
20 which are used to carry water from the river are located on
21 the top of the river, or very close to the surface, rather
22 than the deepest channels, and if these dams would give way,
23 which are 75 years old, I wonder if there would be sufficient
24 water available to be pumped into the water supply.

25 Another question: Did the plant No. 2 actually

1 begin producing electricity before serious mechanical
2 problems were totally figured out? And I think this relates
3 to technical competence in running a nuclear generating
4 facility. One that has a psychological impact on the
5 residents in the area.

6 Has Met Ed fulfilled its recreation plan for the
7 Three Mile Island area? You talk to some people who are --
8 live in the area and do a lot of boating, recreational; you
9 may find out that a lot of the things which they promised,
10 they have not done, or done rather poorly.

11 Can the Three Mile Island nuclear plant survive
12 the impact of a large aircraft wing weighing 200,000 pounds?

13 Right now the airport, which is located right by
14 Three Mile Island, that airport is expanding. Three Mile
15 Island is 10 miles away from the state capitol. I wonder,
16 you know, how important it is to put a reactor so close to a
17 largely expanding airport which has C-5As and Boeing 747s
18 coming into the state capital, only 10 miles away.

19 What is the status of irregularities found in 63
20 welds at TMI No. 1 as reported in the media on April 17th,
21 1979?

22 Just to show you what the psychological impact has
23 done to the Middletown community: The Middletown Borough
24 Council has passed a resolution which, among other things,
25 says that the only way they will advocate the reopening of

1 No. 1 is if the nuclear hazard exclusion is removed from all
2 insurance policies.

3 Another area: GPU, I feel, through the months
4 has demonstrated a definite deficiency in the understanding
5 of human feelings. Once again, the psychological thing.

6 Let me give you some examples:

7 There is a videotape being shown at the observation
8 center six days a week. It premiered in July. Back in July
9 the videotape said the plant is in a cold shutdown. The
10 tape relies heavily on a preliminary ad hoc report which
11 says that the radiation effects were minimal.

12 Anybody who reads that report carefully will soon
13 find out that that report is very skeptical and I'm not
14 really sure there's a lot backing that up, because it's based
15 on calculations more than actual monitoring doses.

16 Also the entire videotape fails to talk about the
17 evacuation, the confusion, the terror and the anxiety, and
18 also the clean-up, which must occur. And this videotape, as I
19 understand it, may be circulated to schools. People come from
20 all over the U.S. to see this videotape.

21 The second example: Met Ed ran advertisements in
22 the newspapers over the past three months, and at the conclusion
23 of each advertisement, the advertisements were to conserve
24 energy -- at the conclusion of each advertisement, in quotes,
25 it said, "Conserving energy has always made sense, but it's

1 especially important now, while TMI is temporarily out of
2 service."

3 Once again, this works on the psychological
4 effect of the accident on the people living in this area.

5 Another example: Met Ed and GPU placed ads in
6 local daily papers regarding a public hearing that the NRC
7 held in October. The meeting was held on October 17th. The
8 first ad appeared in the morning and evening editions of the
9 October 17th papers.

10 You know, once again, I wonder, you know, what's
11 going on here.

12 Another example: The acting president of GPU
13 has made several questionable statements, on October 9th, and
14 I have the newspaper report, he says that if citizens vote
15 to close TMI, they should agree to compensate the owners.

16 On June 18th, 1979, he in effect said that if
17 someone opposes the reopening, they can move.

18 And another most recent quote that I have came on
19 October 26th, where the president, acting president of Met
20 Ed said the accident also displayed -- "The accident also
21 displayed great ignorance on the part of the public about
22 nuclear power. There is too much uncertainty. If we are to
23 enjoy the benefits of nuclear, we are going to have to
24 have better informed public on the problems and hazards."

25 Another example: The editor, executive editor of

1 the Harrisburg Patriot News told the Pennsylvania House
2 Select Committee on September 21st that we were prevented
3 from reporting fully and accurately by Met Ed, which did
4 everything in its power to minimize the accident and the
5 potentials of the accident.

6 And finally, another area which I think is very
7 important, is that right after Babcock & Wilcox reactors were
8 temporarily shut down several months ago, Met Ed was kind of
9 walking around and saying, you know, why can't we reopen?

10 I'd like to quote something from Congressman Ertel's
11 letter to Mr. Deickamp, the president of GPU back on June 11th:

12 "To Mr. Deickamp: I was angry and alarmed by a
13 recent news story that General Public Utilities plans to reopen
14 Three Mile Island Unit 1 in August of 1979. On May 23rd,
15 you yourself sat in my office and told me that Unit 1 would
16 not be reopened until January of 1980, at the earliest."

17 Congressman Ertel goes on to say:

18 "In addition, there is one outstanding factor
19 that separates TMI from all other reactors and does in fact
20 make those deficiencies particularly acute in this case.
21 The people" -- this is in comparing them to other B&W reactors --
22 "The people living in the vicinity of those other reactors
23 have not just gone through the most harrowing psychological
24 devastating experience of their lives. The residents of TMI
25 area have."

1 I can tell you that it would tax the psychological
2 well being far beyond what we can reasonably ask anyone to endure
3 for the sake of financially rescuing a utility and providing a
4 psychological boost to the company and the nuclear industry in
5 general.

6 I am shocked that your company would have so little
7 regard for the community surrounding TMI that you would place
8 finances before all other considerations in making this decision.

9 So, finally, I would just like to say that during
10 the course of the hearing next year, you might hear some
11 economic and technological things like the operating record
12 of TMI was number one, and that hundreds of new technical
13 people have been added to the staff. But that doesn't really
14 matter. I think there is a severe human factor here that
15 must be paid attention to, and the penalty must be something
16 more than a slap on the wrist.

17 I feel the nuclear industry, the NRC and Met Ed
18 must be shown that an error like this cannot be allowed to
19 happen again, and as a consequence I feel that the nuclear
20 power plant should be shut down as an example to the nuclear
21 industry and the entire world.

22 The best thing that could happen would be, number
23 one, convert it to coal, and I think then we could all be
24 friends again, as long as they maintain the scrubbers and
25 those kinds of things.

1 Finally, in my questions that I had for the
2 Atomic Safety & Licensing Board, I'd like to know who does
3 the make final decision? I assume that you will say yes, it
4 can reopen, and then if the NRC Commissioners decide that,
5 they have to take a vote, or how does that work?

6 The second thing, if the Board should decide to
7 allow Met Ed to reopen the facility, and it as satisfied
8 short term areas, can they reopen it right away? This is not
9 clear to me. Or must they wait until the NRC Commissioners
10 make a decision?

11 And then the third -- I have two more -- what effect
12 does the modification of the license have? Supposedly Mr.
13 Denton was going to modify the license of Three Mile Island
14 regarding, I believe, dumping the materials and things like
15 that. What effect does this have on reopening of the plant?

16 In other words, if the NRC says it can reopen, is
17 it just a matter of paper work to modify the license, or what-
18 ever?

19 Also, will the hearings be held five days a week
20 during February, March and April? Or will they be held a
21 couple of days a week?

22 And I'd like to advocate that you make it evenings
23 as much as possible so that you can get attendance by a lot
24 of the interested people.

25 That's all I have.

1379 250

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: You had four questions of the
2 Board, and I'm not sure I can recall them all.

3 Number one, the first one is, this Board will issue
4 an initial decision, which may or may not authorize the
5 operating of TMI-1.

6 That initial decision will immediately go to the
7 Commissioners. It is not until the Commission accepts
8 our decision or rejects it that it becomes the final decision
9 of the Commission.

10 Whatever that decision is, is also subject to
11 court review.

12 No. 2, you asked us to accept a hypothesis that
13 we have decided that TMI-1 may operate, and the question is,
14 does that mean that it would operate immediate?

15 The answer is specifically no. If our decision
16 should be that TMI-1 can operate under certain prescribed
17 circumstances, the Commission will then consider perhaps
18 interim reports that those conditions have in fact been met.

19 It will also review the complete adequacy of
20 our record and our decision before it would allow TMI-1 to
21 operate. That's two.

22 What was your third one, sir?

23 MR. HASSLER: The modification of the license.

24 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Yes, that's right.

25 The modification that you're referring to, I believe,

1 are modifications which permit certain activities at TMI-2
2 to go forward. The restoration and clean-up activities at
3 TMI-2 have a very definite relationship to our proceeding.

4 We are required to view in several directions:

5 One is are there those activities -- would they
6 interfere with the safe operation of TMI-1, just the fact
7 that they are going on.

8 Two, would it strain the management capability
9 of Metropolitan Edison to have to maintain simultaneously
10 the operation of one unit, while it is carrying forth a burden
11 of cleaning up the other. And that also would enter the
12 hearing in relation to the financial qualifications.

13 So I think that the answer to your question is
14 the condition that you referred to has a very definite,
15 indirect effect upon our hearing, but not a direct one.

16 Does that -- am I reaching your question?

17 MR. HASSLER: Yes.

18 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Third, you asked -- fourth, you
19 asked about the scheduled hearings, and whether it will be
20 five days or three days, or what.

21 The overriding concern is a full, accurate and
22 reliable evidentiary record. Normally it is very difficult,
23 if not impossible, for lawyers and witnesses to function on a
24 five-day schedule, but it has been done; but normally they
25 need time for preparation.

1 The Commission has indicated that they would
2 indeed like to have some evidentiary sessions in the evenings
3 and on Saturday, and of course our view is that we would like
4 to have the sessions in such a way that the public can observe
5 them to the full extent possible.

6 However, our major requirement is to be sure that
7 the evidentiary record is complete and reliable. Therefore,
8 we have to not only accommodate the public in their opportunity
9 to observe what is happening, but we have to have a feasible
10 schedule by which witnesses can come in and out and the whole
11 business can proceed.

12 But we certainly hope that we will be able,
13 consistent with those concerns, be able to schedule evening
14 and Saturday sessions for the public to observe.

15 I think I've answered all your questions, haven't I?

16 MR. HASSLER: Could I just rephrase one more statement
17 you made for a comment?

18 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Yes, sir.

19 Well, I have another comment to make, too, that
20 you have raised many points in your remarks which some are
21 frankly outside the scope of our hearing, but many aren't.
22 And you have made suggestions which the Board feels should
23 be pursued, pursued farther, and this is quite helpful, and
24 this is one of the essential purposes of having people appear
25 here, is to make these recommendations.

1 Now, would you go ahead.

2 MR. HASSLER: Okay. The interim reports you were
3 talking about, once the -- I guess the hearings are over, you
4 are saying interim reports may be listed -- may be sent to
5 the Commission regarding adequacy?

6 CHAIRMAN SMITH: The Commission's order allows a
7 certain amount of flexibility. There are several situations
8 which might prevail. We are going back to your hypothesis
9 that our final decision is that Three Mile Island may operate.
10 All right. That could be done on two bases:

11 One, that all of the short term actions have in
12 fact been completed satisfactorily, and that the long-term
13 actions, there is reasonable progress being made.

14 In that event, there may not be any interim reports.

15 On the other hand, a decision along that line
16 could say certain short term actions are necessary, and the
17 plan by which they are to be accomplished is adequate. But
18 they are not yet accomplished.

19 In that event, the Commission would not permit
20 the operation until they were satisfied by certification from
21 the Staff that those facts had indeed -- those actions had
22 indeed been accomplished as provided for in the order.

23 MR. HASSLER: So in the final analysis, it's a vote
24 of the five Commissioners? Would it be correct to say that?

25 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Yes, sir. The final decision on

1 whether TMI-1 will operate will be by a vote of the Commissioners,
2 the five Commissioners.

3 MR. HASSLER: Based on the evidence you have
4 uncovered?

5 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Based upon the evidence we have
6 uncovered. It may -- it is possible that they could perhaps
7 remand it for further hearings if they are not satisfied.
8 There is a great deal of latitude that they have, but the
9 final decision is by the Commissioners.

10 I mentioned to you, didn't I, that even a decision
11 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commissioners is subject to considera-
12 tion by the courts as to legal adequacy?

13 MR. HASSLER: Uh-huh.

14 Now what about -- will you make a 2-to-1 decision
15 here among your Board members, or will it have to be 3-0 to
16 reopen, or how will that be?

17 CHAIRMAN SMITH: It could be a unanimous decision.
18 It could be 2-to-1 in parts. It takes two Board members to
19 decide an issue, and issue a decision. Sometimes the
20 decisions are unanimous, sometimes there is a complete dissent.
21 Sometimes there may be a different opinion on a narrow issue.

22 MR. HASSLER: Okay, then, so when the five
23 Commissioners vote on it, and they agree to reopen it, then
24 our only recourse is to go to the civil courts, then, I
25 suppose, to block it from reopening?

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Yes, I'm afraid to describe what
2 could be a complicated process in too simple terms, but I
3 think that you have made an essentially correct statement.

4 Now you should also be aware -- and I don't want
5 to get into a civics lesson or governmental lesson -- you
6 should also be aware that citizens have the right to seek
7 redress in the United States Congress, which could employ
8 totally new rules in the whole procedure.

9 And, of course, as you know, the United States
10 Congress is carefully watching the development of the nuclear
11 industry.

12 But I'm afraid you may be exceeding my competence.
13 I don't know if we can tell you all of the avenues of
14 government, all of the things that may impact upon it, but
15 those essentially would be the areas.

16 Okay.

17 MR. HASSLER: Do you have anything to say about
18 intervenor funding also, by any chance?

19 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Intervenor funding has been
20 requested by Intervenors. We have been requested to certify
21 the question of Intervenor funding to the Commissioners, and
22 in the first motion that was addressed to us, we declined
23 to certify it to the Commissioners because the Commissioners
24 have already considered the issue of intervenor funding in
25 this case, and have decided that the only area in which they

1 would consider intervenor funding in this case is in the
2 possible area of psychological stress issues.

3 MR. HASSLER: So you have tabled it, then, or --

4 CHAIRMAN SMITH: No, we have determined that it
5 is futile for us to certify the matter to the Commissioners,
6 because they have already decided the very matter we are
7 asked to certify, and we have received no new arguments.

8 at least expressed a personal opinion that
9 certain limited forms of intervenor funding would be, if nothing
10 else, a cost saving. But that is a personal opinion which has
11 no weight.

12 The point that I am making here, intervenors and the
13 public can convince us of anything they wish, but we are bound
14 by the procedures and the rules and the law as it is in this
15 proceeding, and the Commissioners have already considered
16 this issue, and they will consider it again when the matter
17 of psychological stress goes before them.

18 MR. HASSLER: Thank you very much.

19 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, sir.

20 [Applause.]

21 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Susan Shetrom, please.

22 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF SUSAN SHETROM.

23 MS. SHETROM: Good morning.

24 TMI Unit 1 cannot be permitted to operate in
25 nuclear capacity ever again. Not just because I'm standing here

1 shaking, or I clench my hands constantly, or my eye twitches,
2 but because of the conclusions I and a lot of other people have
3 come to from reading everything we can get our hands on, from
4 attending meetings like this, and attending educational seminars.

5 These are some of my conclusions:

6 First of all, I don't think Unit 1 should be
7 allowed to operate again, because Metropolitan Edison is
8 incompetent.

9 The NRC has cited Metropolitan Edison for over-
10 exposure of workers, lack of security of the heavily
11 contaminated auxiliary building, lack of radiation monitoring
12 equipment, inaccurate environmental samplers. These are just
13 a few of the things they have been cited for.

14 Mr. Deickamp blames the NRC. Bob Arnold blames
15 his employees. The NRC blames the equipment and the operators.

16 I blame Herman Deickamp, Bob Arnold, and the NRC.
17 Aren't they the ones that are supposed to be in charge?

18 My second conclusion is that nuclear power is
19 extremely expensive. The cost of accidents which the Kemeny
20 Commissions assures us will occur again cannot be separated
21 from the cost of nuclear power.

22 At a seminar for teachers sponsored by Metropolitan
23 Edison and Penn State, Herman Deickamp said that the cost
24 of electric power, because Unit 1 is not operating at the
25 present time, is approximately \$40 more per year for homeowners.

1 I would gladly pay even \$400 more per year if it
2 would mean saving my child's life.

3 My third conclusion is that nuclear power is not
4 safe or clean. I feel much safer and cleaner if I rolled in
5 manure than I do living three miles from TMI.

6 Metropolitan Edison now wants to vent radioactive
7 krypton-85 gas, but not count radiation received in March in
8 its calculations. If nuclear power is so safe, why have the
9 standards been lowered from 500 millirems to 25 millirems,
10 and why can't we count the radiation we received in March?

11 My fourth conclusion has been that the first
12 priority of the nuclear industry is making money, not safe
13 energy. Why else would they choose to use inferior materials?

14 Why don't I want TMI Unit 1 in operation again?
15 A nuclear power plant capable of immense destruction of life
16 and property should not be operated by incompetents. Lives
17 are more valuable to me than money, and I don't want to move
18 out of beautiful York County. But I will if Met Ed is
19 permitted to reopen Unit 1 or vent radioactive gas.

20 Thank you.

21 [Applause.]

22 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

end 2

23

24

25

1379 259

lrw3-1

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

2 Mary Hartnett, please.

3 We have a limited amount of time. I would ask
4 people to be prepared to follow the speaker. Following Ms.
5 Hartnett will be Timothy Lyng, Fran Stein and William Buskirk.
6 If those speakers will take places in the vicinity of the
7 microphone while Ms. Hartnett is speaking, it would allow more
8 time.

9 Ms. Hartnett.

10 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF MARY HARTNETT

11 MS. HARTNETT: Dear Chairman and commissioners,
12 attached you will find copies of self-explanatory petitions
13 signed by over 1900 persons, the vast majority of whom are of
14 voting age.

15 These signatures were obtained by several volunteers
16 during the last few weeks of the summer. From the addresses,
17 you will see that most of the signatories live in the Mechanics-
18 burg area. For your information, Mechanicsburg is a borough
19 located approximately 16 miles west-northwest of the nuclear
20 plant located at Three Mile Island.

21 Realizing that Mechanicsburg is located this consid-
22 erable distance, as well as upwind from Three Mile Island, given
23 the normally easterly winds, is a factor we feel is quite sig-
24 nificant. Given its location, to get this number of people in a
25 relatively short period of time to sign such a strongly worded

1379 260

lrw3-2

1 petition should convey to you the tremendous fear the accident
2 at Three Mile Island instilled and continues to instill in the
3 people of this area, and long weeks and months after the acci-
4 dent.

5 We implore and demand that you give these petitions
6 every consideration in your deliberations concerning the re-
7 opening of Three Mile Island Units 1 and 2. We, the steering
8 committee, feel our petitions represent the pervasive feelings
9 of the citizens of this entire area of Pennsylvania.

10 Furthermore, we will not feel safe, nor will we
11 give up our efforts, until Three Mile Island Units 1 and 2 are
12 closed forever as a nuclear generating facility, or converted
13 to an alternate form of electrical energy.

14 Our petitions, in addition to this copy being pre-
15 sented to you, are being sent or hand-delivered to various
16 elected representatives at the local, state and federal levels.

17 Most sincerely, the steering committee of the Mech-
18 anicsburg Area branch of Three Mile Island Alert.

19 I would like to present this to someone.

20 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Could I bother a member of the
21 staff to take the petitions from Ms. Hartnett?

22 MS. HARTNETT: Thank you.

23 (Applause)

24 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

25 Next is Mr. Lyng.

1379 261

1 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF TIMOTHY LYNG

2 MR. LYNG: Good morning. I am a resident of Mech-
3 anicsburg, Pennsylvania. I am a father of two children and a
4 husband and I am a graduate engineer.

5 Since the March 28 accident, I and my family and
6 many of my friends, and those whom I have come in contact with
7 since then, would like to express to you exactly how the
8 psychological impact of reopening TMI could affect us.

9 The fact that the Met Ed Company acted in a very ir-
10 responsible and incompetent manner during the March 28 acci-
11 dent leads us to only believe that they are putting new profits
12 above and beyond the considerations of safety of we, the
13 people. Many of us feel that, through conservation efforts
14 we are willing to undertake, that the plant at Three Mile
15 Island is not necessary and we don't want to be subjected to
16 the possible catastrophic effects of another accident.

17 I would like to ask the NRC staff to suggest to the
18 Commission that they consider the psychological stress, the
19 impacts of this accident and future possible accidents on the
20 residents of the entire Harrisburg Metropolitan Area as a sig-
21 nificant factor in deciding on whether the plant at Three Mile
22 Island should ever be opened again.

23 Thank you.

24 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Lyng.

25 Fran Stein.

lrw3-4

1 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF FRAN STEIN

2 MS. STEIN: I am a citizen of Harrisburg and I had a
3 few questions. Okay?

4 I wanted to know what, exactly -- what are the
5 dangers of Krypton? Maybe Dr. Little could answer that.

6 CHAIRMAN SMITH: The question is one that residents
7 in this area certainly have a right to ask and have an inter-
8 est in. However, it is so completely outside the responsibil-
9 ities and the authority of this Board that it is inappropriate
10 for us to answer.

11 In the first place, we have made no particular re-
12 search on it because our Board is not considering that aspect
13 of the case. Our answer would not be reliable.

14 What I am saying is we simply cannot answer your
15 question. However, I think that we could use our influence to
16 ask the staff to provide an answer to you outside this process.
17 If you would give your name and address to the staff people, I
18 am sure they would address this.

19 MS. STEIN: Okay.

20 Well, what I'm trying to get at is that you are
21 avoiding the issue.

22 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Yes, that's correct.

23 MS. STEIN: Okay, but it's not right to let the
24 Krypton into the air.

25 You know, if it could happen at Unit 2 -- I realize

1379 263

lrw3-5
1 that this is for the reopening of Unit 1, but if these acci-
2 dents can happen in one plant, Unit 2, why couldn't it happen
3 at Unit 1?

4 CHAIRMAN SMITH: In the event that the Krypton issue
5 is brought into our proceeding as it relates to TMI 1, we
6 certainly will consider it, you are exactly right, but we are,
7 as you stated, avoiding the issue now as it relates to what is
8 going on at TMI 2 right now simply because we are not competent
9 and we are not authorized.

10 MS. STEIN: Would it be possible for me to ask Met
11 Ed a question?

12 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Yes, it is possible. They may or
13 may not answer it now but I'm sure they will give you an answer
14 later on if they can't now.

15 MS. STEIN: Okay, I have this newspaper article --
16 this was already quoted earlier but I would like to ask a ques-
17 tion about it. It says: "The accident also displayed great
18 ignorance on the part of the public about nuclear power. There
19 was too much uncertainty. If we are going to enjoy the bene-
20 fits of nuclear, we are going to have to have better informed
21 public on the problems and hazards."

x
22 Now I would like to know, the uncertainty in this
23 article -- it is saying that the uncertainty was the public's
24 fault. I mean, Met Ed and whoever were screwing up the facts,
25 not telling us the truth; how can you say this about the

lrw3-6

1 public?

2 MR. TROWBRIDGE: Ms. Stein, I am counsel for the
3 company; not a spokesman for it in this area. I would like to
4 have your name and address and a reference to the article you
5 are talking about, and you will get a letter. This is the best
6 I can do. Ms. Ridgway in a minute will come down and get your
7 name and address and the article reference.

8 MS. STEIN: Okay, but I would just like to make a
9 comment on that. I mean, it says that the public should be
10 better informed about the problems and hazards. I think that
11 Met Ed should be more aware of the problems and hazards.

12 Letting this Krypton gas out -- also, I read in an
13 article that one of the Met Ed people said that they were
14 thinking about sending employees into the containment building
15 before it was cleaned up. I would just like to say that I pity
16 those people if they do. You know, I don't think that's right.
17 I guess it's a personal choice but, still, you should not put
18 people up to that kind of stuff.

19 Okay, now I have another question. I was in St.
20 Louis about May 1979 and I heard there were a lot of dead cows
21 found in the area. I think it was like 23. I don't know if
22 this is true, I don't know what happened, but -- I don't know,
23 I didn't hear anything else about it. I was wondering if any-
24 body knew anything about it.

25 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Is it in this area you are talking

1379 265

lrw3-7

1 about?

2 MS. STEIN: Yes, in the Three Mile Island area.

3 CHAIRMAN SMITH: If anybody knows anything about the
4 reference and would like to comment...I don't know anything
5 about it.

6 MS. STEIN: Okay, there also was a woman -- I think
7 she had a prize bird collection. She had about 100 birds. She
8 went out one day and came home and found all the birds were
9 dead. I read that she had asked somebody -- I don't know, it
10 was probably the NRC, you know, to investigate and she never
11 got any response. I would like to know why, or if she did get
12 any response.

13 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Dr. Little, who is our environmental
14 scientist, has the greatest expertise and interest in this
15 field. She is making a note that she would like to inquire
16 into that. If you can give us as much information as you can
17 on that, it would be helpful. As of now, we don't have any
18 information. We are not aware of that.

19 MS. STEIN: Okay.

20 Also, Mr. Ertel said that -- in his speech, he said
21 about the Metropolitan Edison employees being retrained and
22 trained further. I was at a Select House Committee meeting on
23 Three Mile Island -- I think it was in September or October --
24 and Harold Denton was there from the NRC.

25 He stated that the workers were not trained enough and

1379 266

lrw3-8

1 I was just wondering, if they haven't been trained further yet,
2 when are they going to be trained?

3 CHAIRMAN SMITH: One of the very definite issues --
4 there is no question about it; we are not evading this issue,
5 Ma'am -- we have full right to inquire into adequacy of the
6 training of Met Ed people and we intend to. We have the
7 authority to refuse to authorize the operation of that unit
8 until we are satisfied with the competence of the operators.

9 MS. STEIN: I hope so.

10 CHAIRMAN SMITH: This, incidently, is true of several
11 points made by Congressman Ertel in his remarks. There are
12 several points and there is no question about it; we have
13 authority and we are going to very determinedly inquire into
14 it.

15 MS. STEIN: Okay.

16 Also, I don't have these exact dates, I'm sorry, but
17 it was a couple months ago there was a 4,000 gallon release of
18 water from Unit 1 that -- they didn't test it before they re-
19 leased it and then they went back and tested it, and then they
20 discovered that Unit 1 was contaminated from Unit 2.

21 CHAIRMAN SMITH: We want to know about that, abso-
22 lutely; we are going to inquire into that.

23 MS. STEIN: They continued to dump it after they
24 tested the water. I would like to know why that is allowed.
25 There are thousands of people drinking this water.

1379 267

lrw3-9

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: If what you say is true, we want to
2 know why, too.

3 MR. TROWBRIDGE: We would be happy to -- I do under-
4 stand that reference. We would be happy to include a response
5 to that question in our letter to Ms. Stein.

6 CHAIRMAN SMITH: One of the issues we are charged
7 with is to inquire into the relationship between the storage
8 capacity of Unit 1 and Unit 2. That is, the company has to
9 explain to us that it does not depend -- or if it does, why --
10 upon the storage capability of Unit 1 for its waste from Unit 2.
11 Is that getting to what your concern is?

12 MS. STEIN: Yes, basically.

13 CHAIRMAN SMITH: This will be explored quite thor-
14 oughly in our hearing.

15 MS. STEIN: Okay.

16 The EPICORE system, it doesn't take tritium out of
17 the water, and Met Ed was talking about dumping the processed
18 water into the river. Now there are standards -- there are
19 federal standards for the water but these standards are after
20 dilution.

21 Now they could take a handful out of the containment
22 building, they could take some water just from there and dilute
23 it enough and let it out. I think the law should be changed.
24 The level should be measured before it is diluted.

25 I read in the paper that they are diluting it 3,800

1379 268

lrw3-10

1 parts of water to one part of this processed water, and I
2 think that it should be measured before it is processed -- I
3 mean, before it is diluted, because the same amount of tritium
4 is going into the drinking water, whether it has a lot of
5 water in it or not. You know, Lancaster and places like that
6 are still drinking it.

7 CHAIRMAN SMITH: The EPICORE II system, which, as I
8 understand it, is now being used, is the subject of a separate
9 proceeding. As I also understand, it is the subject of law
10 suits. It is not related to our proceeding. We will not be
11 getting into that except indirectly, and that is the Commission
12 in authorizing the EPICORE II system, directed Met Ed to hold
13 available storage facilities of Unit 1, and then, when we get
14 into our hearing, we will want to know what happened to the
15 storage facilities of Unit 1 in that process.

16 MS. STEIN: Okay.

17 I would just like to say that I think the power plant
18 should remain closed and I think Met Ed should lose its license
19 because it is incompetent. That's all I have to say.

20 DR. LITTLE: Getting back to the question about the
21 cows and the birds, we are very interested in any evidence
22 relating to effects on livestock as well as on human beings.
23 We would very much appreciate information you could give us
24 either directly or through intervenors who are concerned with
25 these aspects.

lrw3-11

1 MS. STEIN: Aren't there any studies going on now as
2 to livestock?

3 DR. LITTLE: We are trying to find out, ourselves.

4 MS. STEIN: I have the articles at home.

5 DR. LITTLE: You could send copies of those articles
6 directly to Mr. Smith. He will give them to us.

7 MS. STEIN: Okay, thank you.

8 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Do you know how to write to me?

9 MS. STEIN: Not really.

10 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Do you have my name? Ivan Smith,
11 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission -- USNRC will be
12 enough -- Washington, D.C. 20555.

13 MS. STEIN: Thank you.

14 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, Ms. Stein.

15 (Applause)

16 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mr. Buskirk, please.

17 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF WILLIAM BUSKIRK, JR.

18 MR. BUSKIRK: Good morning. My name is William
19 Buskirk, Jr. I am not a local resident. I am from Bath,
20 Pennsylvania, which is generally referred to as the Lehigh
21 Valley Area. Bath is in that area. Bath is located approxi-
22 mately 85 to 90 miles away from TMI.

23 The interest that I have in TMI is basically two
24 parts. One is the friends that I have, the acquaintances that
25 I have living in the area. I tend to think there is also a

lrw3-12

1 secondary psychological impact. That is, people outside the
2 area, whether they be relatives, friends, acquaintances or
3 whatever, also tend to suffer psychological distress as a re-
4 sult of their concern for people who they know in the immed-
5 iately affected area.

6 My other concern is, obviously -- which I think you
7 may be quite aware of -- is the Brookhaven report of the middle
8 sixties concerning the extent of impact coming from an accident
9 of a large degree. I guess the parameters of the Class 9 acci-
10 dent include the kind of accident which occurred.

11 I think I can't possibly translate or transmit to
12 you my reaction on the day of March 28, when a friend of mine
13 called me at work and said: "It's actually happening!"

14 My response was something to the effect of: "What
15 do you mean, it's actually happening?"

16 She said: "There's an accident at Three Mile Island."

17 I said: "Well, accidents happen every day at power
18 plants. It's like routine reporting."

19 She said: "No, this is a real accident."

20 It was sort of like -- this was around noontime, I
21 guess, one o'clock or something around that. She just heard it
22 on the radio. I was probably dysfunctional for the rest of the
23 day as far as my employment was concerned.

24 I subsequently didn't go to work the next day as a
25 result of just overwhelming concern, trying to keep up on what

lrw3-13

1 was going on, whether it was the kind of accident I was aware
2 of, that even 90 miles away I should be considering leaving
3 the area.

4 Needless to say, my concern, my fear, was not allev-
5 ated in the next coming days. In fact, I found more and more
6 reason to be leaving except for the kind of attachments I
7 guess we kept, attachments which kept other people here in
8 Pennsylvania, the Harrisburg area and whatever.

9 There are many conflicting kinds of psychological
10 things that you have to endure. People who are attached to a
11 lifetime of experiences in the land that they grew up in, the
12 farms on which I am a resident of, and I think sometimes what
13 people, in an objective manner, would evaluate as rational
14 behavior tends to be seen by people directly affected as
15 irrational.

16 In other words, when someone is telling you to leave
17 something you became strongly attached to, you tend to want to
18 stay. Therefore, what is irrational to others becomes rational
19 to you. I think that is the kind of thing you will have to
20 deal with if you approve licensing for TMI 1.

21 You are going to have people who are not going to be
22 making rational, reasonable interpretations according to some-
23 one's particular standards, and that, I guess, is the real
24 psychological problem that TMI 1 poses.

25 I think the people here, probably the people who

1379 272

lrw3-14

1 testified on previous days, have said pretty much of the con-
2 cerns and details that I have attempted. I know for certain
3 this morning Mr. Hostler and Representative Ertel have spoken
4 specifically of concerns that I have raised, that I have been
5 concerned about.

6 I just can't fathom how you could even conceive of
7 approving the operation of TMI 1. It is only a hypothesis
8 about when TMI 2 will be resolved. It has gone over the months
9 from next year to two years, three years, four years. Really,
10 it's all hypothetical.

11 It amazes me, to say the least, that it could even
12 be taken seriously that you want to license TMI 1 in that
13 situation. Well, I think -- I guess, probably, if it's
14 licensed, it will be representative of the kind of government
15 that can't handle a human situation, that can only operate in
16 "objective, rational, numerical abstractions" and, therefore,
17 can justify the operation of certain things at the expense of
18 other certain things because you haven't reached a threshold
19 of tolerance or intolerance.

20 I guess that's the problem I have, wondering if it
21 really matters whether we talk to you or not. Obviously, we
22 will be talking in terms that you have no authority to deal
23 with. You will be talking and making decisions on bases that
24 have no rational basis as far as we are concerned.

25 I think, probably, in a general sense, what I

lrw3-15

1 consider from my point of view in a very particular sense,
2 that concludes what I came to say. Again, in the efforts of
3 saving time, particular detail's which were raised by the
4 previous speakers I certainly endorse.

5 There is one comment I wanted to add. That is, a
6 person named Jane Lee, which I assume you should be familiar
7 with, has been making testimony or presenting things to the
8 Board, to the NRC, concerning the animal abnormalities that
9 have been occurring in the area of TMI. It is sort of a kind
10 of concern from somebody in the audience that you don't seem to
11 be aware of these things. How can that be when someone is
12 telling you about it? It sort of makes me wonder --

13 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Just a moment. Let's address that
14 point.

15 DR. LITTLE: Not just Mrs. Lee but several people
16 have brought up the issue with animals. That's why we asked
17 we get evidence relating to that any any evidence that anybody
18 has, we would like to see it come out somewhere in these
19 proceedings.

20 MR. BUSKIRK: Okay, I don't want to get into a
21 question-response kind of debate or anything, but I was wonder-
22 ing -- I know the story of about 19 cows this past spring.
23 How do you get evidence once the cows have been buried? No
24 one presumes it has anything to do with this abnormal occurrence.

25 CHAIRMAN SMITH: I don't know, sir. If you have

lrw3-16

1 information, you give it to us and we will follow. We cannot,
2 on the basis of you standing at that microphone saying 19 cows
3 died this spring, go from there to the conclusion that TMI 1
4 should not be operated. There has to be a bridging process
5 somewhere. If you have information, give it to us. Write us
6 a letter. Tell us about it.

7 MR. BUSKIRK: The question I am asking is: What is
8 the validity of information after the fact? In other words,
9 what I am reciting is a thing where, in the six weeks period
10 of time, I am aware of 19 cows, and apparently there have
11 been others that I haven't heard of that died, and the State
12 Department -- the animal veterinarian from the state was making
13 some kind of judgments, apparently, and they didn't do any
14 particular study on the results.

15 Therefore, somebody finally decided to call some-
16 body's attention that there wasn't enough evidence to justify
17 any kind of conclusion so it is forgotten. What is the nature
18 of the evidence that would be required?

19 CHAIRMAN SMITH: We won't know until we know what the
20 evidence is. How can we predict in advance when we don't know
21 what the evidence is, the nature of the evidence which will be
22 required? You are asking us, number one, to make an assumption
23 that animals and birds and livestock are dying because of the
24 accident at TMI 2 and then tell you what kind of evidence you
25 require to prove it to us. Until we know what the boundaries

lrw3-17

1 are, the allegations and the information which is already
2 available, we can't tell you. You have already indicated the
3 information you had is not available.

4 MR. BUSKIRK: So we are at some kind of absurd game
5 that we are playing.

6 CHAIRMAN SMITH: You are making the assumption that
7 the only evidence available is from you standing on that floor.
8 I hope, when we get into the hearing, that the state agencies
9 and everybody who does have information on this subject will
10 bring it forward.

11 MR. BUSKIRK: I hope so, too.

12 CHAIRMAN SMITH: To the extent we will be able to
13 identify that as relating to TMI 1 and we are aware of it,
14 reliable evidence on that subject, we will insist it be brought
15 forward.

16 MR. BUSKIRK: Thank you.

17 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mr. Buskirk, before you leave us,
18 how did you learn about this proceeding this morning? I am
19 interested in the adequacy of the notice to the public. I
20 notice you came here from some distance. How did you learn
21 about it?

22 MR. BUSKIRK: I am a member of an organization which
23 has been keeping track of these things in our area. I have
24 also become a recipient of -- what is it called -- the NRC
25 Press Release, a weekly mailing kind of thing.

1379 276

lrw3-18

EM 1

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

MR. SMITH: Okay, thank you, sir.

(Applause)

1379 277

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mr. Buskirk, did that light
2 intendere with your presentation?

3 MR. BUSKIRK: Not with my presentation, just
4 with my dialogue with you.

5 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

6 Mr. Siewert, please.

7 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF
8 MICHELLE SIEWERT, ETTER, PENNSYLVANIA.

9 MS. SIEWERT: That's Michelle Siewert, and I
10 live two miles from TMI in Etter, Pennsylvania. After months
11 of sitting back and letting others voice their opinion for
12 my welfare, I have decided that my turn has come.

13 Like countless others who share my views, I too
14 have tried to forget the occurrences of March 28th and
15 thereafter. After attending township meetings, I became
16 more frightened. It seemed, the less you knew, the better
17 off you were.

18 I acquired a so-called "TMI blindness," where
19 newspaper articles on the subject no longer attracted my
20 attention. It wasn't lack of concern, please understand,
21 but rather evasion and denial. A simple built-in defense
22 mechanism to help cope with the situation that even now is
23 most stressful.

24 I cannot even begin to express how this event
25 changed our lives. Home was always a place of refuge and

1 and comfort to me. Now I live in fear and uncertainty.
2 There is a feeling of helplessness that other people with
3 capitalistic motives control the environment to which I am
4 rightfully entitled to.

5 I don't like living here anymore, but there is
6 nowhere else to go. As a result of TMI, I have lost friends
7 who let the utility company run them out of their homes. I
8 may as well have been a criminal, for I became a prisoner
9 in my own home.

10 I clung to false reassurances that the thin
11 aluminum siding and walls of my home would also protect me
12 from the invisible contamination that the air outside held.
13 I always thought it would be so easy to plan a family, but
14 now I am too afraid to get pregnant.

15 With Met Ed's hopes of venting radioactive gases
16 a woman, especially in her first trimester of pregnancy,
17 would be taking a great risk. There are many nights when I
18 rock my son to sleep, and instead of feeling the peaceful --
19 instead of feeling peaceful and relaxed by the small body in
20 my arms, I was consumed with a feeling of worry and desertion,
21 worry of what the future would bring to this child I so
22 desperately wanted to protect and couldn't.

23 Now with the issue of possible relicensing, the
24 horror of the past months surface again. Everyone states
25 that we are safe now. I am standing here looking at you in

1 a perfectly healthy body, but in a few years I could be a
2 statistic, or my son could be, and I resent being one of your
3 test animals. Yet, I have no choice; the damage was done
4 months ago.

5 How low is "low level radiation"? And how safe
6 is "long-term exposure"?

7 We are usually given the answers, "I don't know."
8 Well, frankly, "I don't know" isn't good enough anymore. I
9 went my life to go along as it was before, but it will never
10 be the same. As long as we're here, those towers will
11 haunt me. A system the bigshots say was foolproof turned
12 out to be the proof of fools.

13 It is my opinion that Met Ed should have its
14 license revoked based upon the shameful history it created
15 this past year. It was incompetence and plain greed that
16 led to this disaster. They demonstrated intentional
17 disregard for the lot and welfare of human life. They have
18 proved they can't be trusted.

19 How can a place like this be permitted to invade
20 our privacy and make a mockery out of the basic values of
21 democracy that our country was founded upon? Is the people's
22 voice only a whisper now? I hope the blunders of 1979 will
23 not repeat themselves again. If the proposed procedures
24 that are planned for early 1980 are as safe w as they say,
25 then let Mr. Robert Arnold and John Collins straddle over

1 their reactors in a hot air balloon while all this
2 takes place.

3 How far are you going to let it go? Most people
4 feel that it only happens to the other guy, but maybe some
5 day the adverse effects of this might touch home with one
6 of you. When you'll know what we've been through.

7 Take a good look at these people and myself,
8 because we are the "other people," and it's something we
9 never want to live through again. Justice will rightfully
10 be served only if TMI never operates as a nuclear power
11 facility again. That is the least we could be given.

12 To allow the restart-up of TMI would be to
13 condone secrecy, corruption, and coverup. It would ruin the
14 pride and faith in local government and business that is
15 already at an all-time low. It would allow the almighty
16 dollar to control decisions, rather than honest values and
17 morality. It would create more hate and resentment to a
18 company that controls a monopoly and thinks they can do
19 whatever they please.

20 It would invade the privacy of our homes, our
21 property, our bodies, by not listening to the people's
22 choice. But most important, it would give Met Ed a glorified
23 license to legally jeopardize our health and, in a sense,
24 murder and debilitate people.

25 If our purpose on earth is indeed to improve the

1 quality of human life, then your answer should be simple.
2 When it comes right down to it, the people of Newberrytown
3 are really fighting for their personal survival, and it's
4 going to be a big fight, because we're not going to let
5 this open again.

6 TMI has been a living hell for all of us, and
7 that place, that eyesore, that concrete monster doesn't
8 belong on what once was the good earth of central
9 Pennsylvania.

10 (Applause.)

11 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Jeffrey Palmer, please.

12 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF JEFFREY PALMER,
13 SCHNECKSVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA.

14 MR. PALMER: I'm a college student, and I
15 consider myself a staunch environmentalist, and for these
16 reasons I must speak out in favor of opening TMI Unit 1.

17 I too am concerned about psychological distress.
18 I feel however that this psychological distress is caused not
19 by the nature of nuclear energy, but by all the information
20 in the media and by credence given to inciting statements
21 made by various sources.

22 I think that Met Ed's restraint when making
23 statements about the accident proves to be accurate when
24 they suggested that a large-scale evacuation would not be
25 necessary, or that there would not be a meltdown.

I think that hindsight shows that some of the

1 sources that did suggest that these possibilities were more
2 than just possibilities were somewhat off the wall.

3 I am also concerned about Mat '8d's customers.
4 I'm afraid that the people likely to show up at a hearing
5 like this are not those interested merely in general well-
6 being, but that it's those that have a special interest
7 and are politically motivated or for some other reasons have
8 a particular interest.

9 I've heard from sources such as the American
10 Medical Association that the effects of nuclear energy are
11 as much as 400 to 1000 times more serious than the effects
12 of other energy generating sources.

13 For these reasons -- that the psychological
14 distress is caused by exciting informational sources, and
15 that the cost to the silent majority, the customers, is
16 greater from the alternatives to nuclear energy -- I must
17 again stress what I believe, that TMI Unit 1 should be
18 reopened.

19 Thank you.

20 (Boos and hisses.)

21 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Palmer.

22 Barbara Heivly?

23 Ms. Heivly will be followed by Andrea Chesman
24 and then by Ray Hearne.

25

1379 283

1 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF BARBARA
2 HEIVLY, MIDDLETOWN, PENNSYLVANIA.

3 MS. HEIVLY: Mr. Smith, Committee Members, my
4 name is Barbara Heivly. I live three miles from TMI. As a
5 citizen who has been personally affected and disrupted by
6 the March 28th accident, I come today, as some might put it,
7 to bare my soul to you.

8 I ask that you not only listen, but hear what I
9 say, because it is an emotional and personal message. I
10 am employed as an elementary counselor in a school district,
11 and I am trained to tune in to human feelings, reactions,
12 and upon occasion to see children and their families in
13 difficult, stressful situations.

14 I was taught to be objective, calm, and skilled
15 in certain techniques that help deal with various everyday
16 living problems. However, my training has been severely
17 tested since the accident in two respects:

18 One, personally I now find it difficult to remain
19 calm and unemotional living near a nuclear plant, and as of
20 yet have not mustered up enough "techniques" to relieve my
21 own tension.

22 And two, I have found it difficult and frustrating
23 in relating to my family and friends, because I am unable
24 to help relieve them of their fears and concerns.

25 My basic message is this: As aware as I am of

1 stress-producing events in our lives, I have been psycholo-
2 gically affected by the accident, and so have many other
3 residents in the community surrounding Three Mile Island.

4 I feel that the NRC acknowledges the fact that
5 citizens have suffered psychologically, but they have the
6 calousness and insensitivity to not seriously consider this
7 phenomena as part of the reopening hearing process.

8 Do you know why we're upset? Do you know why we
9 get angry when our fears aren't recognized? I want to share
10 with you what I went through in March so that you may become
11 more aware of my feelings.

12 On March 28th, the local newspapers reported that
13 Met Ed had vented some radiated steam, and that the problem
14 was under control. Not being an alarmist, and assuming the
15 reporting was factual, I did not become concerned. Even on
16 Thursday, the 29th, I continued my daily activities as
17 though there was no eminent danger.

18 Thursday evening a relative who worked at Peach
19 Bottom Plant called to say that he was worried. He did not
20 like what the newspapers were saying, and felt that at
21 best maybe we should go away for the weekend, just as a
22 precaution.

23 As it turned out, I decided to take off work on
24 Friday the 30th to pack for a weekend trip. Friday morning
25 around 10:00 o'clock was when I first reacted to the

1 accident.

2 A TV program was interrupted to ask that
3 residents please close their windows, turn off air condi-
4 tioners, et cetera, and remain indoors because of a radio-
5 active release.

6 My heart still beats fast when I think of that
7 moment. I knew that there was serious danger when the
8 broadcasts kept continuing on the TV and the radio. I
9 thought of my husband who had gone to work moments before,
10 and I wondered how many radioactive particles he may have
11 inhaled.

12 I wondered how to reach him, since the phone
13 lines were busy. I was afraid he hadn't heard the warning
14 and he might go outside again. I wondered if closing all
15 the windows would keep the harmful release from coming into
16 the house.

17 I was afraid to go outside. I was afraid we
18 would be trapped in the house for a long time. It might
19 sound at this point that I may not have been behaving in a
20 rational manner, perhaps becoming a little hysterical.

21 Well, I did not scream. I did not cry. I did
22 not go running out to pack up the car. But I was deeply,
23 deeply frightened and at a loss as to what to do.

24 To condense the story a bit, my husband and I
25 decided to leave that afternoon around 3:00 p.m. At that

1 point we had packed our clothes, made arrangements where to
2 stay, made sure my husband's sister and kids had transporta-
3 tion, locked up our valuables, and left Middletown.

4 I don't want to make this process sound simple,
5 for none of this activity went on without considerable worry
6 and strain. Some say we wouldn't have had to do all
7 that, but it was psychologically healthier for us to leave
8 a potentially harmful area than to stay and remain upset
9 and in turmoil. And in their own way, each and every other
10 citizen who left the area needed that escape from the
11 unknown danger that radiation they couldn't see.

12 That is how they coped. That is how they dealt
13 with that release: To leave one's home under duress, as
14 undesirable as it was for many and a hardship as well,
15 it was better than staying.

16 Of course on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, the
17 hydrogen bubble reports prevailed and my husband and I
18 could do nothing but think of the potential loss of our
19 home, and wondered when if at all -- of course when the
20 reports were so ominous -- that we would be able to return.

21 If we were not hearing or reading about the
22 bubble, we were thinking of it silently. It never ever left
23 our minds, and we even had difficulty sleeping at night.

24 TMI has left an impact on us. It is so difficult
25 for me to express in a few minutes, in the limit that you

1 have placed upon our testimony, the flood of feelings that
2 I have experienced since March 29th.

3 Almost 8 months ago, hundreds of residents who
4 left their homes have returned, but they have not regained
5 a sense of normalcy. Their jumpy when sirens go off.
6 They are apprehensive when they see those towers. They are
7 distressful of the cleanup process. And I have seen people
8 still choke up, as you probably have seen in the hearings,
9 still after all these months when they talk about the
10 accident.

11 Whatever you do, don't deny us our feelings.
12 Don't think that we have forgotten our frightful experiences.
13 And don't underestimate the upsurge of panic that will
14 result if TMI goes back on line. We need to feel safe
15 again. We want to live in a community that will not harm
16 us. Our psychological health and mental well-being is
17 contingent upon the reopening of that plant.

18 I don't think it's worth it.

19 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, Ms. Heivly.

20 (Applause.)

21 MS. HEIVLY: May I ask one question?

22 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Yes, please.

23 MS. HEIVLY: Unfortunately I have a little
24 trouble relating to the members of your Board, and also the
25 five Commissioners upon whose ultimate decision of reopening

1 TMI 1 rests. I guess where I'm frustrated is, I wonder how
2 objective the members will be? I am highly distrustful,
3 I suppose of course of the way things were handled by Met Ed,
4 and I suppose I'm distrustful of the nuclear industry, and
5 I feel that you are tied into that industry.

6 How objective are your members going to be? And
7 how can you assure us of that?

8 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Of course objectivity is
9 something that I can't give you in numbers; I can't say
10 we're going to be "25 objective," or anything like that, but
11 I would like to point out a few things.

12 One is, Dr. Jordan has worked through a very long
13 and illustrious career in the field devoted to nuclear safety.
14 He has labored many, many years in that area. He has made
15 a greater contribution to nuclear safety than anybody who
16 has ever come close to this hearing. He has come from a
17 comfortable and well-earned retirement because he wishes to
18 bring his talents and objectivity and make them available.
19 He was requested to do it and the person who could be the
20 most informed and objective on the issue of nuclear safety.

21 Dr. Little has, again, devoted much of her
22 life to a healthy environment in this country. She has
23 responsibilities back at the university and in her own
24 business. It is not fun sitting here and looking at
25 people look at us with hostility and distrust. We don't

1 enjoy it.

2 None of my two colleagues have to be here. As
3 for myself, my job will not be affected one way or the
4 other. I don't care if that plant operates or not as far as
5 my job is concerned. The only thing I can tell you is,
6 subjectively, each of us are committed to do the best job
7 that we can do and be objective.

8 MS. HEIVLY: I certainly hope so.

9 (Applause.)

10 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF ANDREA CHESMAN,
11 HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA.

12 MS. CHESMAN: My name is Andrea Chesman and I'm
13 here to urge the NRC to consider the psychological stress as
14 a relevant issue in the reopening of TMI.

15 It's true that it's difficult to measure
16 psychological stress, and it's also true that psychological
17 stress has been shown to have very serious health conse-
18 quences. So we cannot ignore the problem of psychological
19 stress because it won't go away that way.

20 What kind of stress am I talking about? I think
21 I'm talking about the stress that brings all of us out here
22 today, because none of us, or few of us at least, have
23 ever done this before in our lives.

24 I'm talking about the fact that 144,000 people
25 felt it necessary to evacuate their homes during the TMI 2

1 accident. Because maybe no one on the Licensing Board has
2 ever been an evacuee yourselves, perhaps no one on the Board
3 has ever left their home or their jobs or their friends
4 and thought maybe they'd never go back to them again, perhaps
5 people on the Licensing Board have imaginations too limited
6 to know what it means, but you've been listening to us, so
7 I'll just add that it means continuing anxiety and continuing
8 nightmares.

9 As the evidence of the accident comes out -- and
10 it is only just now coming out -- which is again another
11 reason to delay reopening of TMI 1 -- we have more reasons
12 to worry.

13 We have become convinced by the Presidential
14 Commission that Met Ed is incompetent; that evacuation
15 plans are inadequate; and that the NRC cannot adequately
16 police an industry that is convinced it wants cheap but not
17 safe power.

18 Under these conditions, we must also worry about
19 the cleanup of Unit 2. We must worry about the release of
20 radioactive krypton 85. We do not feel that we can add to
21 our yearly radiation limit by a potential accident from
22 Unit 1 because we've already got Unit 2 in our backyards.

23 And most certainly we cannot live with the
24 additional anxiety that putting Unit 1 on line would produce.
25 Because the Kemeny report has admitted that nuclear power

1 cannot be made safe, and that it is up to the citizens to
2 declare what the acceptable limits are, this citizen here
3 is saying that the limits are: We only want nuclear power
4 if it can be made 100 percent safe. And since we know that
5 it cannot be made 100 percent safe, we don't want it.

6 Thank you.

7 (Applause.)

8 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mr. Hearne?

9 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF RAY C. HEARNE,
10 YORK, PENNSYLVANIA.

11 MS. HEARNE: "Ms."

12 CHAIRMAN SMITH: I'm sorry, Ms. Hearne.

13 MS. HEARNE: Chairman, Committee Members, my
14 name is Ray Hearne. I own an old stone house 25 miles
15 south of TMI Island, and about 8 miles northwest of Peach-
16 Bottom Nuclear Power Plant.

17 I am Assistant Director of Historic York,
18 Incorporated, a nonprofit organization dedicated to
19 historic preservation in York County.

20 Last March 28th and 29th when the Three Mile
21 Island accident occurred, or began, I blocked from my
22 consciousness what the consequences of such an event might
23 be. Since Friday, March 30th, my life has changed.

24 My relationship to a 1798 stone house which lies
25 in the enchantingly lovely village of Muddy Creek Forks,

1 the house that I have devoted my money, hard work, and
2 artistic endeavors to over the last nine years has changed.

3 My relationship to York County where I have
4 worked for the preservation of a built environment, that
5 mixture of man's architectural and agricultural endeavors
6 with the natural landscape has changed.

7 My relationship to Pennsylvania, the State of my
8 birth, the Keystone State, this land called "Penns Woods"
9 has changed.

10 My house is for sale, and as I drive down the
11 long steep hill into Muddy Creek Forks, through the woods
12 and past the old creamery, the mill buildings and the
13 general store that are living parts of the 2-1/2 centuries
14 of white settlement, I no longer feel that I am coming home.

15 My office is in another house, another old
16 house, the Willis House built by the Quaker William Willis
17 in 1762 on a piece of ground the Willis Family and the
18 Quaker Rice family received from William Penn.

19 Behind this handsome Georgian brick building
20 with its seven fireplaces lies what we once laughingly
21 referred to as Met Ed's playground, the pole training
22 area off Pennsylvania Avenue, just beyond the York City
23 Limits.

24 And below us, where we are today, the Three Mile
25 Island is a nuclear plant where Met Ed and perhaps too the

1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission cut their teeth on, perhaps
2 a better expression is "trifled with" a situation is still
3 ongoing with releases to the environment of radioactive
4 gases.

5 Here they trifled with -- trifled with -- and
6 asked permission to continue to trifle with the public's
7 health and well being. Here they played with the public's
8 dependence upon them for accurate reporting. Here they
9 debated, along with the Governor of this state, whether
10 to evacuate the immediate area, while the instruments that
11 measure radiation at the vents of the plant became so
12 saturated with radioactivity that they went off the scales.

13 And today you are considering Met Ed's request
14 to reopen Three Mile Island 1.

15 On Friday, March 30th, I was to look at a church
16 building near Goldsboro. The church's building committee
17 was seeking advice of Historic York, Incorporated, on the
18 restoration of their building.

19 As I got ready to leave, the announcement was
20 made that another heavy release of radioactive gases had
21 occurred, and that all people within 5 miles were to
22 remain indoors.

23 I got into my car. I drove to the bank where I
24 withdrew some of my savings, and hurriedly -- almost
25 dangerously -- I drove to my house in Muddy Creek Forks,

1 packed a few clothes, picked up a friend who lived nearby,
2 and drove to my parents' farm in North Carolina.

3 I cannot relate to you the sickness I felt as I
4 left York County. In North Carolina, I paced the mountain-
5 side as I heard reports of the hydrogen bubble. I wept
6 that I had not brought my cats, my childhood treasures, my
7 plants. I dared not think of those who stayed in York.

8 I debated with my parents as to whether I
9 dare return to pick up some belongings, and to plead with
10 my friends to leave. My friend, whose Scotch-Irish ancestors
11 had received the patent for the land from the Penn's, was
12 mute and withdrawn.

13 We returned, as did the thousands who had
14 evacuated, but the estrangement remains. The psychological
15 scars seem permanent.

16 On the Island called Three Mile Island where Met
17 Ed built its reactors once lived Indians who fished in the
18 Susquehanna and grew crops on the fertile alluvial earth.
19 Stone tools and fragments remain as testimony to their
20 existence.

21 In the middle 1700s, the first white settlers
22 entered York County by way of Hossie's Ferry near Goldsboro.
23 They were peace-loving Quakers who established their farm-
24 steds. Later, Germans migrated across the river and
25 settled. Scotch-Irish established communities near

1 Middletown. Each ethnic group, the English, Quakers, the
2 Germans, and the Scotch-Irish poured all they had into their
3 farms or houses, farms and outbuildings, which reflect
4 architecturally their origins.

5 This landscape, this mixture of the natural
6 formation of the land with the buildings of six or more
7 generations of people who have lived here is what gives this
8 part of Pennsylvania the sense of place that is irreplaceable.

9 Friends, I would like to read to you an explanation
10 of the meaning of "Dwelling," by Heidegger (phonetic), for
11 this is what I, as a historic preservationist, feel most
12 intensely:

13 "But in what does the nature of dwelling consist?
14 Let us listen once more to what language says to us, the
15 Old Saxon 'wunon,' the Gothic 'wunian,' like the Old World
16 bauen, mean to remain, to stay in a place. But the Gothic
17 'wunian' says more distinctly how this remaining is
18 experienced. 'Wunian' means to be a peace, to be brought
19 to peace, to remain in peace. The word for peace, 'Friede'
20 means 'the free,' 'das Frye,' and 'Frye' means 'preserve
21 from harm and danger.' 'Preserve from something,' to
22 safeguard. To free really means to spare. The sparing
23 itself consists not only in the fact that we do not harm
24 the one we spare, real sparing is something positive and
25 takes place when we leave something behind in its own

1 nature and we return it specifically to its being and we
2 free it in the real sense of the world into a preserve of
3 peace. To dwell, to be set at peace means to remain at
4 peace within the free but preserved, the free sphere that
5 safeguards each thing in its nature. The fundamental
6 character of 'dwelling' is a sparing and preserving."

7 I would say to you, that Mr. Ed has taken from
8 those of us who live within the psychological realm of
9 Three Mile Island the inutterably precious right to celebrate,
10 to find peace, and pleasure, and freedom in our landscape
11 and the right to pass on to another generation a life-giving,
12 a life-enhancing preserve.

13 Months ago a Met Ed official told the public
14 that those who don't like living here can leave. I would
15 tell you that the continued threat from Three Mile Island
16 to my health and to all that I have worked for in my house
17 and in my county has resulted in my putting my house up for
18 sale.

19 Metropolitan Edison has shaken the fabric of
20 society, has jeopardized the very roots of hundreds of
21 thousands of people.

22 Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, I ask that you
23 consider the psychological impact of restarting Unit 1.
24 The water, the air, the land, and the unique-built land-
25 scape all contribute to the safety and wellbeing of

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

the inhabitants of this area.

This safety and well being should no longer be threatened by the nuclear power industry.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, Ms. Hearne.

end JWB#4

AR #5 fols

1379 298

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mr. Gormley, please.

2 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF JIM GORMLEY,
3 MIDDLETOWN, PENNSYLVANIA.

4 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mr. Gormley will be followed by
5 Terry Roth, and then Toni and Nick Brink.

6 MR. GORMLEY: Thank you for the opportunity to
7 speak about the proposed reopening of TMI-1.

8 My name is Jim Gormley, and I live two miles from
9 TMI, on a small farm in Londonderry Township. I work for an
10 electrical equipment vendor and plan to earn a living as a
11 mechanical engineer.

12 I want to express my opposition to the reopening
13 of TMI in this context. It's not clear to me why this license
14 was ever issued in the first place.

15 Prior to the renewed interest in reactor safety
16 consequent to the Class 9 loss-of-coolant accident that we
17 were assured would never happen, there was great concern
18 over the legacy of spent fuel. Today this situation is un-
19 changed.

20 However, we now know that there is no disposal,
21 only waste management and guardianship requirements and
22 expenses that will be borne by our children for the next
23 millenium.

24 Prior to the accident contemplated by WASH-1400,
25 there was increasing concern that exposure standards to plant

1 workers and the neighboring population were too liberal by a
2 factor somewhere between 2 and 10.

3 Today the situation remains unchanged. However,
4 the store of curies is daily growing, and growing numbers of
5 people are educating themselves on the hazard operating plants
6 routinely pose.

7 It would appear the historical trend that watched
8 dial painters, radiologists, weapons tests participants and
9 others established with the sacrifice of their lives will
10 continue.

11 All of this leads me to conclude that there is no
12 safe nuclear power plant, either light water reactor, heavy
13 water, gas, carbon, or any other variation this industry can
14 concoct to extract money from the ratepayers in general.

15 I have this opinion because it seems to be wrong
16 to place people's lives in jeopardy in the absence of their
17 freely given, informed consent.

18 The performance of the nuclear industry and Met
19 Ed in particular evidences the deception, -- the deceptive
20 and coercive foundation of the perverted social contract that
21 permits anyone to operate a nuclear power plant or any
22 purpose.

23 Met Ed lies. They say no one was injured due to
24 the continuing TMI-2 accident. They show a film attesting to
25 this in a building at TMI they choose to call an information

1 center. They use their wealth to publish in the local paper
2 such tripe as "nuclear power is cheap, clean and economical,"
3 and then proceed to substantiate economical by only citing
4 the fuel costs of nuclear coal and oil.

5 Met Ed and the nuclear industry coerced people by
6 structuring the choices available to people to their benefit,
7 and by manipulating the regulatory structure and the licensing
8 process to their benefit.

9 I understand the ASLB has never denied an operating
10 license; not to Vepco's North Anna Plant, Detroit Edison's
11 Fermi 1, Browns Ferry, Diablo Canyon, or Humboldt.

12 What type of demonstration of hazard does an ASLB
13 require to deny a license to such a loathsome, vile, ugly
14 and unnecessary facility?

15 Thank you.

16 [Applause.]

17 If you have any questions, I'd be happy to answer
18 them.

19 [Applause.]

20 CHAIRMAN SMITH: I have no questions.

21 Thank you, sir.

22 MR. GORMLEY: Thank you.

23 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF TERRY ROTH,
24 CAMP HILL, PENNSYLVANIA.

25 MS. ROTH: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

1 My name is Terry Roth. I live three miles from Three Mile
2 Island, and I practice law ten miles from Three Mile Island.

3 As an attorney, I would like to stand before you
4 today and have all the technological facts at my disposal,
5 because I think that this is perhaps the most important case
6 I will ever argue.

7 But I don't have those facts at my disposal. In
8 fact, there are a lot of things that I don't know, and those
9 are the things that I want to talk to you about today.

10 I don't know how much my clients, the clients that
11 I serve, suffered as a result of the week that I spent away
12 from Harrisburg, or as a result of my agitation, fear and
13 distraction when I returned to Harrisburg.

14 I don't know if the diarrhea that I experienced
15 for almost a month after the accident was caused by my stress
16 or was in fact caused by the low level radiation in the area.

17 Similarly, I don't know if the peculiarities in
18 my menstrual cycle, or those of three of the women that I
19 work with, were caused by psychological stress or by the
20 effects of the radiation.

21 I do not know if the burning feeling that I
22 experienced on my face on the evening of March the 28th
23 was some weird peculiarity -- of course, at the time I had
24 no idea what I had to be afraid of, or if it was in fact
25 an effect of the massive dosage of radiation that we received

1 that night.

2 When after the accident, when I started hearing
3 about iodine and so forth, I thought about the fact that I have
4 a thryoid condition. I'm hypothyroid, and I take medication
5 to correct that condition.

6 I was concerned about whether there was some
7 steps that I should take, some change in my medication, or what-
8 ever, to correct what additional effects the iodine may have had
9 on me, and having no understanding of that sort of thing, I
10 called a doctor in the area who said that he was sure that I
11 had no cause for concern, and the public was unduly alarmed
12 about the whole thing.

13 So I called a relative of mine who is in Pittsburgh,
14 he practices medicine, and I asked him his opinion. And his
15 opinion, ladies and gentlemen, was that I should, and I quote,
16 "get the hell out of here as fast as I could."

17 I don't know what he based that opinion on, I
18 don't know if he was right or wrong.

19 I also do not know if my fear of having children
20 is warranted. I do not know if there is any validity to
21 claims of chromosome damage, of the potential of genetic
22 defects in a child that I might have.

23 I do not know that. But I know that I am afraid.

24 Let me conclude with two things that I do know:

25 I know that Three Mile Island must not, it cannot

1 be opened. There are too many things that I do not know, that
2 you do not know, and I am convinced that if we did know these
3 things, Three Mile Island would never reopen.

4 And finally, I know, although I will probably never
5 be able to prove it in a court of law, that if in 15 years
6 I get cancer or if I bear a child that has some genetic defect,
7 or if any of the other beautiful people in this room do, I
8 will know that it is because of Three Mile Island.

9 I do not envy you, ladies and gentlemen, having
10 to bear that sort of responsibility.

11 Thank you.

12 [Applause.]

13 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, counselor.

14 Toni Brink.

15 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF TONI BRINK,
16 COBURN, PENNSYLVANIA.

17 MS. BRINK: I am a registered dietician, and I am
18 a school bus driver, and I am here to oppose the reopening of
19 TMI-1.

20 I'm mainly here, though, as stepmother and mother
21 of five children, and also a homeowner. We live 60 miles away
22 from TMI-1, and still we don't feel safe.

23 During the accident last spring at TMI-2, the
24 wind was in fact blowing our way, but we had no way to know
25 that because the radio stations weren't broadcasting wind

1 directions for three days, but afterwards we found out that it
2 was coming our way.

3 The reopening of TMI-1 would affect me adversely
4 in many ways, including psychologically, emotionally,
5 economically, and healthwise.

6 For years I thought nuclear power could produce
7 dangerous radiation pollution, and could have a potential
8 for grave accidents. But aside from receiving some newsletters
9 from the Union of Concerned Scientists, I was never very
10 involved in the controversy until the accident at Three Mile
11 Island last spring.

12 When I read in the newspapers then of a possible
13 meltdown, I knew enough to be frightened. We have five children
14 who are the most important focus of my life, and I was worried
15 about the effects on them. I was worried for myself, and I was
16 worried for everyone.

17 All our children's other parents were also very
18 concerned, and we were busy phoning each other, and we came
19 to an immediate agreement that we would like to get the children
20 out of the area. It bothered me somewhat that it seemed like
21 we were possibly able to do that, when many of our friends
22 wouldn't have that choice.

23 The only relatives we could count on as caretakers
24 for the children for an unlimited, indefinite amount of time
25 lived in California. We arranged for a plane flight to the

1 West Coast for our five children. It took about two days to
2 actually get them on the plane, because the planes are, of
3 course, very busy, and there wasn't room. It took me a full
4 day to drive them to Pittsburgh, to buy their tickets, and they
5 left late in the middle of the night.

6 It was the first time that any had flown without
7 an adult, and it was the first time that some of them had flown
8 at all. They had a real fine trip, but saying goodbye to them
9 was very frightening for me.

10 We parents chose not to leave for various reasons.
11 One was a public health nurse, one was a school bus driver,
12 my husband works at a state hospital. We had dairy goats, and
13 it didn't seem like the right time to impose on a friend to
14 take care of our small herd while we left and they stayed
15 for an emergency, so the goats, if we would have all left,
16 would have just died.

17 My husband was needed at the hospital, and I
18 thought he needed my support, but it was difficult to choose
19 whether to stay with him or to go with the children, and it
20 was hard, too, to choose between perhaps life and death.

21 The plane tickets for the children cost \$1200,
22 which we had to borrow. We didn't have any savings. Luckily,
23 we were able to get credit right away, or quite quickly. It
24 took us many months for us to repay this money, and that
25 didn't include the huge phone bills it took to call

1 California and try to arrange with all the different relatives
2 where the kids were going to be at different times. It didn't
3 include any of the expenses that all our relatives covered
4 while they were out there to take care of them.

5 So, if only for economic reasons, I figured I'd
6 better learn a lot more about nuclear power and invest time
7 and money into trying to prevent a similar situation.

8 The decision-making during the time of the accident
9 was very stressful, weighing the money and the loan against
10 the possible nuclear accident results. Taking the children
11 out of school for an indefinite amount of time, and trying
12 to account to the school officials. Hoping the plane wouldn't
13 crash. Realizing that the plane ride is also a source of
14 elevated radiation and exposure.

15 Worrying about the children's reactions and feelings.
16 Being concerned about grandparents and relatives that aren't
17 used to caring for five active children. Being powerless
18 to supervise the plane switch at 2:00 o'clock in the morning
19 in Chicago for a six, seven, eight, 10 and 12 year old.
20 Wondering if I should go, too. Being torn between being
21 with my children or at my husband's side. Realizing that
22 my husband might be far away at work at the time of a meltdown.

23 Imagining what could happen and knowing if the
24 worst did happen, that evacuation would be impossible in a
25 short amount of time.

1 Wondering what radiation sickness is like.
2 Wondering if everyone would be too sick to care for each other.
3 Wondering if I would see my children again, and how it would
4 affect them to lose all of their parents.

5 Since then, I wonder, too, we have a very small
6 goatherd -- I wonder why two of our goats who one of the
7 finest veterinarians in the whole world, actually, he lives
8 near State College -- he confirmed to us that our goats were
9 pregnant when he was out at our house, and neither one of them
10 ever kidded. Some had udder enlargement, but nothing ever
11 happened with those two goats, and one of our -- our only
12 purebred goat that was born had an undescended testicle.
13 Now I have no idea what this was from. But I'll always
14 wonder if it wasn't Three Mile Island.

15 And our children, who are normally very healthy,
16 between May and August of last year, after the accident, two
17 of our children, came down with asthma attacks, and what has
18 come of that is, of course, I mop their room every day
19 and, of course, bought a new vacuum cleaner and all this sort
20 of thing, and have to take all sorts of precautions, being
21 able to give adrenalin, and so forth. And whether this had
22 anything to do with Three Mile Island, I don't know, and I'll
23 always wonder why quite a few things seemed to happen all at
24 once.

25 The opening of TMI-1 would threaten us constantly

1 with a possibility of having to go through these same
2 circumstances again with the same sort of situation, or
3 perhaps a different accident.

4 It would be worse now, though, because since then
5 I have put a lot of energy into studying about nuclear power
6 as well as I can, and I am finding out that ionizing
7 radiation can do to the body much more than I really thought
8 before, and that people that are at risk stand a much worse
9 chance of being damaged. Older people and younger people, and
10 people that already have health problems.

11 Worst of all, to me, is the possibility of
12 genetic damage. It might affect our children, and it might
13 just pollute the gene pool, so that when our children grow up
14 and get married, we have no idea what their husbands have
15 been exposed to, or what the grandchildren or the children
16 thereafter might have in disabilities, and there will be no way
17 to trace. But I think it could mean a decrease in the quality
18 of our lives and economic burden and much suffering.

19 I realize that life is full of risks, and that
20 throughout the history of man, man has lived with risks. However,
21 I resent the risks that are manmade, and the risks which
22 jeopardize the human race and our ecosystem, while fattening
23 the pockets of industry and those who own certain stocks.

24 I resent that I have no choice in making some of
25 these decisions, and at home we have lowered our electricity

1 consumption. We have increased the amount of work that we do
2 with our own muscles. We changed our diet. We grow much of
3 our own food. We burn wood. We use wood cookstoves. We
4 have done many things, but we can change even more, and we
5 want to. But we would rather not have nuclear power. Our
6 life --

7 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Ms. Brink, could you give me some
8 idea of how long your statement is going to continue?

9 MS. BRINK: Not much longer.

10 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

11 MS. BRINK: Okay.

12 I feel our life has improved since we made these
13 changes. The quality of our life has improved. We do fine
14 without a TV, we do fine without using the clothes dryer.
15 But we can't get away from the pollution others are producing
16 for a quick profit, and no concern for the larger population
17 and future generations.

18 I feel deceived because much of the information
19 about the dangers of nuclear power have been concealed, and
20 scientific studies which reveal adverse effects have been
21 discouraged. Yet we know x-rays and even background radiation
22 is not harmless.

23 I doubt that children even as bright as ours are
24 will be able to deal with the radioactive waste that we're
25 dumping in their lap.

1 So the reopening of TMI-1 will show me once more
2 that our society, which should know better, will sacrifice
3 its very life and the hope of the health for the future
4 generations for shortsighted reasons.

5 This will demoralize me, but it will increase the
6 amount of time and money that I will invest in stopping
7 the nuclear proliferation.

8 The opening of TMI-1 will be evidence of the lack
9 of respect for the environment which sustains us, and lack of
10 respect for our own bodies. In these ways the reopening of
11 TMI-1 will hurt me economically and psychologically, and may
12 well affect the health of myself and of my offspring, and I
13 greatly oppose the reopening.

14 Thank you.

15 [Applause.]

16 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, Ms. Brink.

17 Now, for the first time during these sessions, I
18 have become concerned that we may not be able to hear everybody
19 today who has indicated a request to speak.

20 We have not had to limit anybody yet in their
21 presentations. Everybody has been able to take all the time
22 they required, with one exception.

23 But now I am concerned. So may I recommend that
24 you give consideration to two approaches:

25 One is that if you have a written statement,

1 summarize it within no more than a five-minute period, and
2 submit the written statement. And I assure you that the
3 written statement will receive the same attention from this
4 board as your oral statement. Moreover, it will even have a
5 broader dissemination in the various reading rooms.

6 Secondly, some of the points are being made
7 repeatedly. For example, the concern about genetic damage.
8 I think that we can more profitably and efficiently use this
9 time if the speakers will try to build on ideas previously
10 submitted and give us some new information, and particularly
11 the recommendations that have practical use in the hearing
12 are especially valuable.

13 So may I ask that an effort be made to go along
14 that line, and to keep your presentations within a five-minute
15 period, and that way I think there is a fair shot that we can
16 get to everybody who wants to speak today.

17 Mr. Brink.

18 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF NICHOLAS

19 BRINK, COBURN, PENNSYLVANIA.

20 MR. BRINK: Thank you.

21 I had timed this before I came, and it took four
22 and a half minutes, so. . .

23 I'm Nicholas Brink. I'm a licensed psychologist
24 in Pennsylvania. I got my Ph.D. in 1970 from the University
25 of California, Los Angeles.

1 For what I have to say to make sense, I feel I
2 need to first give you three of my beliefs:

3 I feel I have the evidence and facts to back up
4 these beliefs, but that is not the point of this testimony.

5 First, radiation, even in very small doses, is
6 dangerous to health and life.

7 Radiation is cumulative and synergistic.

8 It causes cancer, birth defects, and predispositions
9 to many other diseases.

10 Second, nuclear power plants are extremely dangerous,
11 and the absolute safety of a plant is impossible. In the
12 case of TMI-2, more radiation and much higher levels than
13 acknowledged by the various agencies involved has and continues
14 to be given off, endangering the life and health of the
15 people in much larger area around TMI than has been reported
16 by these agencies.

17 This damage to health will be seen in years to
18 come; especially dangerous is the transportation and storage
19 of radioactive wastes.

20 Third, renewable alternatives do exist and are
21 practical.

22 Now, I live in Penns Valley, about 60 miles to the
23 northwest of TMI. I began to buy our family seven acres in
24 this beautiful rural valley about six years ago. To do this,
25 I took a job at Danville State Hospital. I commute to this

1 hospital approximately 50 miles one way each day. I have
2 done this because I feel a family needs roots, a family needs
3 a safe and secure place to live and grow, a place towards
4 which children can look to as a home, even after they grow up.

5 After graduating from UCLA in California in 1970,
6 I took a position at Penn State. While in Pennsylvania I met
7 another uprooted Californian who is now my wife. We felt
8 it was very important for our family to establish a rooted
9 homestead, a security that is necessary and allows a family
10 to become a family.

11 I feel that with our transient society as it is,
12 we all see much unhappiness, divorce and crime as a result
13 of uprooting.

14 Much of this uprooting is voluntary, but even so,
15 it has been traumatic to our society. TMI has caused an
16 involuntary uprooting, as I will describe in a minute.

17 Working in a mental hospital and having experience
18 with nursing homes, I have frequently seen individuals die
19 simply because they were forced to move, at Danville, from
20 one ward to another, frequently for administrative reasons.

21 In nursing homes, new residents, after having lived
22 in a community and possibly one house all their lives, with
23 their life, roots, family, security tied to that community,
24 these new residents, when moved to a nursing home, frequently
25 give up living and die.

1 How is TMI-2 and the possibility of TMI-1
2 caused this traumatic and involuntary uprooting?

3 First, out of our fear, my wife and I sent our
4 five children to California for two weeks during the TMI
5 accident. She has just told you about that trip.

6 I told you about our seven acres in Penns Valley.
7 We see it as a homestead. We live a simple life there. We
8 love the land and earth around us. We are looking towards
9 the day when I will have the mortgage paid off, and I believe
10 this will be this next year. Now we believe that this could
11 become a wasteland. If the mortgage were paid off, I could
12 quit at Danville State Hospital and not have to travel over
13 100 miles per day, when we could have lived simply off this
14 land.

15 Having come from the city of Los Angeles, we've
16 had much to learn about rural living over the last six years.
17 We have become more and more skilled in gardening, and we
18 have grown most of our food, including milk and cheese from
19 our goats, eggs from our chickens, and honey from our bees.

20 I had hoped to become more of a full-time beekeeper
21 when I quit my job. Now these beginnings of roots seem much
22 less grounded.

23 With TMI-2, my wife has, with my support, spent
24 the majority of her time writing letters and organizing
25 campaigns to stop nuclear power. My wife has spent much

1 less time in the garden, less time canning, less time with
2 the activities with the family, because of the life
3 of our family and for the safety of our family, we must
4 stop nuclear power.

5 Life can never be secure, life can never be simple,
6 life can never be doing things together as a family, our roots
7 cannot grow, and our garden will continue to be weedier until
8 nuclear power is stopped.

9 Roots are very important to our family. Roots
10 won't grow when we fear we may have to pick up and move, when
11 we are never certain that we will see our garden again.
12 We lose interest in the garden and we fear the fact that
13 the chance of our getting cancer has greatly increased,
14 when the health of our family, goats, bees and gardens
15 have decreased.

16 TMI has created a great uprooting change in our
17 family. Life can never be as rooted or safe as long as there
18 is nuclear power.

19 I do believe that nuclear scientists and other
20 various nuclear agencies involved are honest people. I believe
21 they believe in what they are saying, but I feel that their
22 roots are planted in the nuclear industry. Their life has
23 been committed to nuclear science.

24 I feel they feel the same fears I feel in being
25 uprooted or giving up their security and profession.

1 I also believe that people such as those from
2 the Union of Concerned Scientists generally do not have their
3 roots so deeply planted in the nuclear industry, and are thus
4 more objective of the problems of nuclear power.

5 I feel that because of the roots of the nuclear
6 scientists that the picture they present of nuclear power is
7 distorted.

8 I feel that those of us that fear nuclear power
9 distrust the nuclear scientists because of this distortion.
10 I feel that the various nuclear agencies and local and
11 national leaders are honest in their feelings of panic if
12 evacuation should be called.

13 That panic would result if the honest facts
14 about TMI were presented. This has added to our distrust
15 of the nuclear industry and our national leaders.

16 This distrust in our national leaders has caused
17 an uprooting in the faith of our democracy.

18 Yes, people with their roots in the nuclear industry
19 are frightened, too, of being uprooted, but their roots are
20 in cancer, destruction, and death. These roots are a threat to
21 our security and safety. They must be uprooted. We must
22 stop the nuclear industry.

23 Thank you.

24 [Applause.]

1379 317

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Robert Donnelly, please. Robert
2 Donnelly will be followed by Ron Dawes -- that could be Davis.

3 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF ROBERT DONNELLY

4 MR. DONNELLY: Thank you. I have just a little
5 letter I would like to hand in after this.

6 There is uncertainty as to dealing with the cleanup
7 of Unit 2, so why are you considering starting up Unit 1?
8 Haven't we in the TMI area been through enough anxious days
9 since March 28? Now you want to add to this anxiety by start-
10 ing up Unit 1.

11 Tell me what happens if, after Unit 1 is back on line,
12 an accident again happens while cleanup of Unit 2 is taking
13 place.

14 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Who are you addressing your remarks
15 to?

16 MR. DONNELLY: I'll hand this in.

17 CHAIRMAN SMITH: In the first place, we need help.
18 Repetition of misconceptions doesn't help us. We are not
19 eager to start up TMI 1. We are here to receive evidence as to
20 whether or not it should be started up.

21 MR. DONNELLY: I'm trying to address that. This is
22 my concern. You're talking about stress. I'm stressing.

23 CHAIRMAN SMITH: All right.

24 MR. DONNELLY: You know better than us that the
25 cleanup of Unit 2 is laden with unforeseen dangers. What

lrw6-2

1 happens when the core is uncovered or the radiation in the
2 containment building? It is common sense just to wait and see
3 what goes on in Unit 2 before even thinking of starting up
4 Unit 1.

5 To add to what I state here, in this morning's paper
6 in Lancaster, Governor Thornburgh asked that question to Bob
7 Arnold yesterday and he said the worst possible accident would
8 have to be to abandon the island. That's exactly what is said
9 here.

10 Thank you.

11 (Applause)

12 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Do you want to give us that letter?
13 Thank you.

14 Mr. Daws -- or is it Davis?

15 MR. DAVIS: It's Davis.

16 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

17 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF RON DAVIS

18 MR. DAVIS: My name is Ron Davis. I live near
19 Lancaster. I am a mathematician and computer scientist and
20 a professor at Millersville State College.

21 I would just like to take a moment to relate to you
22 my personal experience with the TMI accident. On the first
23 several days of the accident, we were aware there were radia-
24 tion releases. We stayed indoors.

25 On Friday morning, I went to work. The first thing I

1379 319

lrw6-3

1 heard upon arriving there was that there were uncontrolled re-
2 leases of radiation coming from the plant. I immediately went
3 home. My wife, my two year old son and I put our few valuable
4 possessions together and got in the automobile and left as
5 quickly as we could. There was no way that I was going to take
6 any chance with my young son's life.

7 As we left Lancaster and drove out through the Amish
8 country, out beyond the windmills and the simple people, I knew
9 what it felt like to be a refugee. I had this feeling in my
10 mind that people have probably felt down through time as they
11 were forced to flee from their homes.

12 The emotions I felt were very overwhelming. One of
13 the things that I resolved was that this was never going to
14 happen to me again. I was never going to be chased from my
15 home by a nuclear plant accident again. I spent all the time I
16 could find aside from my professional life since the accident
17 doing what I can, working with citizens in the Lancaster area,
18 to see that Three Mile Island never reopens again.

19 Now I would like to address specifically and give
20 you some information about why I think Three Mile Island should
21 not reopen. The Kemeny Commission and tens of thousands of
22 citizens in this area agree that Met Ed is incompetent to
23 operate a nuclear plant. They are also deceitful.

24 They were aware of the seriousness of the accident
25 very early on and did not report this. While children were out

lrw6-4

1 waiting for the school busses and radiation was being released
2 from the plant, they were telling us there was nothing to worry
3 about.

4 Secondly, I agree with Congressman Ertel: This is
5 extremely premature, to say the least, that we would consider
6 reopening Unit 1 while the cleanup of this accident at Unit 2
7 still has such unresolved consequences and so much work to be
8 done with the water in the containment building, water in the
9 auxilliary building, the Krypton in the containment building,
10 the core that has to be removed. To think of that other
11 nuclear reactor operating while we are still living with this
12 ongoing accident is absurd to me.

13 I would like to address the question of evacuation
14 plans. I think this is true about any nuclear plant operating
15 in this country at this time but I will restrict it to Three
16 Mile Island. If that plant is to go back on line, and if there
17 is an accident, I feel that evacuation plans are a cruel joke.

18 It would be impossible to evacuate everyone from the
19 danger area should a serious accident occur. I want you to just
20 ask yourself: Suppose there is a nuclear accident at TMI Unit
21 1 some night in January at 2:00 A.M. when the temperature is
22 down around zero and there is a snowstorm going on? What do
23 you think the chances are of getting people out of this area?
24 For that matter, if the weather conditions are ideal, I am
25 confident there is no way an evacuation could take place.

1379 321

lrw6-5

1 Also, we have a lot of dairy farmers in this region.
2 I have talked to them. Even if they and their families can get
3 out, their animals are going to die and they will be wiped out
4 financially. Of course, the Price-Anderson Act will make sure
5 that they will not be compensated for that.

6 I would like to talk about civil unrest, also. If
7 that particular plant comes back on line, the fear is going to
8 start all over again in this area. There is the risk that some
9 individual or individuals will experience such a degree of fear
10 that they are willing to use violence against either the physical
11 structure of the plant or the employees or officers and employ-
12 ees of Met Ed. You may or may not be aware that there have
13 already been threats made against the plant.

14 Now, I, of course, as any rational person, abhor the
15 thought of violence, but I think it is a possibility. Those
16 of us in the anti-nuclear movement are committed to non-violence.
17 I am certain, if that plant is to reopen, a call will go out
18 from this area for every anti-nuclear activist in the United
19 States to come to Three Mile Island and help the people close
20 that plant, themselves.

21 The cost of this will be armed National Guardsmen in
22 our area. It is going to require thousands of troops and
23 police here. I am sure there will be tens of thousands of
24 people who will come to Three Mile Island. You have seen what
25 happened to Seabrook and nothing is even operating at Seabrook.

1379 322

lrw6-6

1 There has not been an accident at Seabrook.

2 Three Mile Island is the focus of just what is wrong
3 with nuclear power in this country. The civil unrest that will
4 be precipitated by the reopening of this plant in Pennsylvania
5 just frightens me to think about it. This is one of the hidden
6 costs of nuclear power. You will rip the social fabric here so
7 that that plant can go back on line and bail out Metropolitan
8 Edison.

9 Now I would like to also address the question of
10 psychological stress. I felt the stress. My family felt the
11 stress. All of my friends felt the stress at the time of the
12 accident. I think I was more frightened at that time than I
13 have ever been at any time in my life.

14 I know about the dangers of a serious nuclear acci-
15 dent. I know what the consequences are. I knew about them at
16 that time. I was aware that one was in progress right up the
17 river. I and everyone I know experienced that psychological
18 stress and we still do.

19 I happen to have a fire siren a few doors up the
20 street on top of the service station. In the weeks after that
21 accident, and even now, when that fire siren goes off in the
22 middle of the night and I wake up, the first thing that
23 flashes into my mind often is: I wonder if it's the nuclear
24 plant. Then I say: No, it has to be a fire. And I count. I
25 know, after eight blows on the siren, if it's shut off, everything

lrw6-7
1 is okay in the sense that you know it is not a disaster; it's
2 just a fire.

3 This personal experience of mine is shared by tens of
4 thousands of people across South Central Pennsylvania. The
5 people that live in Middletown and Goldsboro and Harrisburg,
6 I'm sure their fear is compounded by their proximity to the
7 plant.

8 Now I have another thing that is a fear of ours that
9 is not felt by the people close to the plant. It is felt by
10 the people down the river. Our family is among the over 100,000
11 people who get their drinking water from the Susquehanna River.
12 We have been subjected to psychological fear that our drinking
13 water is being poisoned. I did not know, prior to the accident
14 that nuclear plants discharged low level radiation into the
15 river as a matter of course even when they are not in an acci-
16 dent mode. This was going on for years.

17 During the days of the accident, it is my understand-
18 ing there were dumps to the river of untasted water in the tur-
19 moil of the accident. I have no idea how much of that I drank.
20 I am a plaintiff in a lawsuit to prevent the discharge --

21 CHAIRMAN SMITH: How long will your presentation be?

22 MR. DAVIS: I am almost finished.

23 I am a plaintiff in a lawsuit to prevent the dumping
24 of water into the river. Our citizens group spent over
25 \$30,000, which we have raised from churches and citizens, to

lrw6-8

1 protect our drinking water. I swear to you that it is a very
2 stressful situation for me when I'm aware that my family has to
3 drink tapwater which in all probability is containing radio-
4 active contamination from the Three Mile Island plant.

5 Then there is the Krypton release. We have heard
6 for months -- and it is in the newspapers now, it is in the
7 headlines in the Lancaster newspaper -- Met Ed wants to vent
8 the Krypton. We don't want that vented. It causes fear,
9 psychological fear for us. We don't know how much radiation
10 we have been exposed to and we don't want any more.

11 Finally -- and I'm not alone in this, believe me --
12 if that plant opens, in all probability, I'm going to sell my
13 home and leave this area. I'm sure this will not happen
14 immediately because, as I say, I have told you what the con-
15 sequences of opening the plant are. There will be a tremendous
16 rend in the social fabric in opening that plant.

17 I don't believe that any rational person is going to,
18 in the end, when all the judgments are made, I cannot believe
19 that you are going to recommend the reopening of that plant,
20 but if it ever does come about, it is going to come only after
21 an incredible cost in dollars and human toll and -- I don't
22 know, I don't usually lose my train of thought --

23 CHAIRMAN SMITH: I think it is time to summarize.
24 There are others who have concerns who are waiting to be heard.

25 MR. DAVIS: Okay.

1379 325

lwr6-9

1 What I would like to summarize, then, is that the
2 Three Mile Island accident has destroyed the quality of life
3 in South Central Pennsylvania for tens of thousands of people
4 and I think you have got to look at the psychological conse-
5 quences of this accident and the psychological consequences of
6 letting Met Ed reopen that plant.

7 Thank you very much.

8 (Applause)

9 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

10 The next speaker is Jill Buzan. She will be
11 followed by Bernard August, who will be followed by William
12 Stevens.

13 Again, I have very much concern about others who I
14 see that are very close to the plant who we certainly must hear
15 from and our time -- I am concerned about running out.

16 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF JILL BUZAN

17 MS. BUZAN: Good morning. I am 20 years old and I
18 live eight miles south of Three Mile Island.

19 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Would you stand a bit closer to the
20 microphone and start again, please?

21 MS. BUZAN: I live eight miles south of Three Mile
22 Island and I am attempting to live a life of self-sufficiency.

23 CHAIRMAN SMITH: How old are you?

24 MS. BUZAN: 20 years old.

25 CHAIRMAN SMITH: You did say that, didn't you?

1379 326

lrw6-10

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

MS. BUZAN: Right.

It is kind of ironic trying to grow organic food and have healthy animals living in an area which may be highly contaminated. It is very difficult to pursue goals and avoid feeling a sense of futility when living under constant threat of nuclear chemical annihilation.

Beyond shock, anger and disbelief at the lack of morality and sense in Met Ed and the NRC, who are people and who are basically no different than me, I feel deep sadness and grief that my future is so questionable and that I have to be afraid that I might not be able to have healthy children.

I would like to read to you a speech written by my young friend, Jeremy Crooke, who is five years old and is here now with some other children. He represents a growing generation who unfortunately doesn't seem to get much consideration in all of these selfish, greedy tunnel vision pursuits of money and power that you call maintaining high standards of living. Jeremy represents the real future which must have the careful maintenance of life on the earth.

"Don't ever open nuclear power plants again. Don't ever kill any animal or people again. Don't ever make them again because they hurt people and animals and they kill animals and people. Use sun, water, wind. We want God to fight against nukes and we want the President to fight against nukes and more and more judges to fight."

1379 527

lrw6-10 11
x

1 I think that, when making your decision on whether
2 to open Three Mile Island, you should take your power and
3 authority and start asking questions to yourself. If you are
4 not already a species too mechanized to be humane, the truth
5 may still be in your somewhere. If it is not, ultimately,
6 nature will let the truth be known because nature is much more
7 powerful than we are.

8 Thank you.

9 (Applause)

10 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, Ma'am.

11 Bernard August.

12 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF BERNARD AUGUST

13 MR. AUGUST: Good evening. My name is Bernard August.

14 I live in Wilmington, Delaware and I am here to represent the
15 people of Wilmington, Delaware that do not like nuclear power.

16 We live, ourselves, in the shadow of a couple of
17 white elephants, Salem 1 and 2, who are constantly plaguing
18 us with the same problems people up here are, but have not yet
19 thrown us from our homes.

20 I have some particular questions to ask the Commis-
21 sion today about the status of this plant up here. It directly
22 affects us in Wilmington since often, after the accident, we
23 were downwind from this plant and we have received large
24 amounts of the iodine and noble gasses that came down for two
25 weeks after since we were downwind.

lrw6-11 12
1 People in Wilmington were suffering great, great
2 colds and just a lot of physical difficulties. A lot of them
3 unanswered and we don't know, it just seems to be coincidental.
4 What I would like to ask first, though: What effect will this
5 limited appearance testimony have in the decision-making
6 process?

x
7 CHAIRMAN SMITH: The limited appearance statements
8 are not evidence. We cannot make a decision based directly
9 upon what you tell us, or anyone else.

10 The limited appearance statement serves several other
11 purposes, however, one of which is you can recommend areas of
12 evidence that you think should be developed during the hearing.
13 You can ask questions of the NRC staff and the licensee that
14 you may have about the facility, and normally their practice
15 is to either provide private or public answers.

16 You can ask questions of us about the nature of the
17 proceeding. We cannot, of course, you understand, discuss the
18 merits of the issues because we have to judge those issues upon
19 the evidentiary record. Does that help you?

20 MR. AUGUST: Yes, but, actually, what all is happen-
21 ing here today is that this -- say the psychological distress
22 issue and the great doubt about the competency of Met Ed
23 because of -- it might be the emotional issue will not have any
24 bearing whatsoever on the decision?

25 CHAIRMAN SMITH: What time did you arrive?

lrw6-12

1 MR. AUGUST: I would say I was here around ten or so.

2 CHAIRMAN SMITH: You missed, of course, an explana-
3 tion. The issues -- what was your first one, the management
4 capability?

5 MR. AUGUST: Yes.

6 CHAIRMAN SMITH: We will address that thoroughly.
7 We explained that earlier. We will address that quite thor-
8 oughly.

9 Psychological distress issues will or will not be
10 addressed, depending upon our gathering now of evidence, pre-
11 liminary evidence and arguments and submitting those to the
12 Commissioners, who will then make the determination.

13 MR. AUGUST: Okay.

14 Now will we citizens be able to find out how the
15 Commission will vote on these issues, and what person voted
16 for or against it?

17 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Yes.

18 MR. AUGUST: By what means will we be able to find
19 out?

20 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Their decision will be printed
21 and the Commissioners who participate in the decision, the
22 decision will indicate who participated in the decision. If
23 there is any dissent from the decision, those will also be
24 printed with the decision and disseminated. It will be a very
25 public document, you may be assured.

1379 330

14
lrw6-13

1 MR. AUGUST: So I can take it that even the pre-
2 hearing transcripts will be available for the intervenors to
3 use?

4 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Do you understand we are not
5 Commissioners?

6 MR. AUGUST: I must be -- I understand. I'm just....

7 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Yes, and the same is true of our
8 decision. Our decision will be public, and if any of us
9 dissent from the decision, that fact will be known and we will
10 individually sign the decisions.

11 The transcripts of this session, for example, and
12 the session of the pre-hearing conferences, in which the inter-
13 venors and the state agencies have debated issues, are also
14 available for examination.

15 MR. AUGUST: Okay.

16 I have some questions I wish to ask. It is in rela-
17 tion to TMI Unit 1.

18 CHAIRMAN SMITH: You are reading from a document I
19 think I recognize. Would you read the title of it?

20 MR. AUGUST: Yes. The document is NUREG 0600. It is
21 "The investigation into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island
22 Accident by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement." Report
23 No. 50-320-7910, Office Of Inspection USNRC.

24 CHAIRMAN SMITH: That's fine. We each have that
25 document and are familiar with it, and so are the other

lrw6-1p5

1 participants in the proceeding.

2 MR. AUGUST: Thank you.

3 I had scantily gone over this. I will try and ask
4 my questions directly. I have a question -- you have the
5 schematic here from the President's Commission in front of us.
6 I notice it says "vent stack" on it. Now do both units run
7 off of this one vent stack or does each unit have one of these
8 vent stacks hooked to the rad waste lines?

9 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Can you answer, staff? It was my
10 impression that the schematic here is duplicative of both
11 units. I am not looking at --

12 MR. AUGUST: Yes, I can see that, but I wanted to know
13 whether both units operate off of one rad waste system or are
14 they separate independent systems?

15 MR. PATON: We may be able to. I will need a
16 minute. There is someone sitting in the audience who may be
17 able to respond to that.

18 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Okay.

19 The slowness in answering these questions, many
20 people may have the answer but we want to be careful the
21 answer is correct.

22 MR. AUGUST: I'm a patient person.

23 CHAIRMAN SMITH: We will go to the next one and come
24 back to that.

25 MR. AUGUST: It was stated that the stack monitors

lrw6-16 1 were off scale. I would really like to know what stack
2 monitors were. It is not quite clear in this to me, and in
3 the Kemeny Commission report, in the testimony and the trans-
4 cripts of the -- Commissioners Ahearn and Gilinsky, they
5 questioned a Mr. Gibson. They talked about the stack and the
6 duct but didn't really specify what stack or duct it was. So
7 could you --

8 CHAIRMAN SMITH: I want to also explain a problem
9 you may be presenting in your questions. Some of the statements
10 contained in that document are the view of the person who wrote
11 the document but may not be agreed to by everyone involved.

12 We may very well have to decide whether some of those
13 statements are, in fact, correct or not correct and some of your
14 questions may not be answered because of that very reason;
15 that they are in dispute and decision hasn't been made on them
16 yet.

17 However, some of the answers can be presented as to
18 what the staff believes the case to be.

19 MR. PATON: May I respond, Mr. Chairman? We would
20 rather answer these questions, if we can, either in writing
21 directly to this gentleman or later in our opening statement.
22 I think he apparently is coming up with a series of fairly
23 technical questions which we would rather not respond to off-
24 hand. We will write to him if he would like or answer these
25 in our opening statement.

lrw6-17 1 MR. AUGUST: Well, I would like the answer to at
2 least a couple of these questions. A lot of people out here
3 are technically involved in nuclear power --

4 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Do you understand that this is
5 exactly why we are here? To determine the accuracy of any of
6 those statements. You are asking for some people to answer
7 questions before the accuracy has been determined in this
8 proceeding. That is one of your basic problems.

9 MR. AUGUST: I see.

10 VOICE: You don't even know how the rad waste is
11 hooked up?

12 CHAIRMAN SMITH: It seems that could be answered.

13 MR. AUGUST: I would like an answer. It is a -- do
14 both units hook up to one stack or not?

15 CHAIRMAN SMITH: You will get that answer as soon as
16 we have it. You are not going to get it from us, but from the
17 staff.

18 MR. PATON: Could we have a delay here a minute or
19 two and I'll talk to the gentleman?

20 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Can't we proceed with the
21 questions while --

22 MR. AUGUST: This has something to do --

23 VOICE: Tell him you don't know; that's good enough.

24 CHAIRMAN SMITH: You will have your opportunity,
25 sir, to comment. You are not being helpful. We need help

lrw6-18

1 here, sir.

2 VOICE: Can I answer? Can I say one thing? I'm
3 sorry if I made an outburst, but what you did, in my judgment,
4 was you told a person who asked a very fair and straightforward
5 and honest question that it was his problem. I got angry.
6 Maybe I was wrong, maybe I was out of place, but I think you
7 were out of place in putting him on the spot like that.

8 CHAIRMAN SMITH: You misunderstood me entirely. This
9 is an anonymous voice back there; I can't see him. You mis-
10 understood entirely. No fair reading of my statement could be
11 interpreted to say that he has a problem, that it's his problem
12 in relation to these questions.

13 The point is the problem with his questions is that
14 the answer may not yet be known. I'm sorry if I misled you.

15 Would you proceed if you have any more?

16 MR. AUGUST: Yes. I also would like to ask about the
17 introduction of the Class 9. There was a contention that was
18 submitted by Mrs. Berryhill in the prehearing.

19 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Yes. We had several Class 9 con-
20 tentions submitted and we are still considering those. We have
21 not yet had an opportunity to confer at the special prehearing
22 conference on the admissibility of those contentions.

23 MR. AUGUST: I would like to say that -- can I ask
24 what is the particular problem on the acceptance of the Class 9?
25 Do you have --

1379 335

46-19 1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: We have debated that. We have
2 heard debates on the acceptability on limited Class 9s,
3 narrow Class 9s, by the hour, and it is not as simple as you
4 would have it be.

5 MR. AUGUST: Yes.

6 CHAIRMAN SMITH: There are many, many types of Class
7 9s. This is one of the things we are debating.

8 MR. AUGUST: But the Class 9 rating of the unit next
9 to TMI 1 does not have any bearing on that, then, apparently;
10 the licensing of that reactor.

11 CHAIRMAN SMITH: You can't make that assumption. You
12 are trying to simplify a difficult problem.

13 To the contrary, the events at TMI 2 have a direct
14 bearing on TMI 1, which everybody concedes.

15 MR. AUGUST: That is sort of contrary to what I was
16 told by one of your staff members.

17 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Then I would expect you would get
18 your information about this proceeding from a more reliable
19 source. You are trying to simplify difficult problems.

20 MR. AUGUST: I don't mean to go -- I thought the NRC
21 staff was a reliable source.

22 (Applause)

23 CHAIRMAN SMITH: I am not commenting about the
24 reliability of the NRC staff.

25 MR. AUGUST: I am.

1379 336

lrw6-20

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: I think we may have a problem here.
2 I thought we were making excellent progress. If you are going
3 to become argumentative --

4 MR. AUGUST: I --

5 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Would you let me complete this?
6 -- then we will simply waste our time. We have a
7 serious responsibility here. We need information. We don't
8 need jokes. This is a serious matter.

9 MR. AUGUST: Yes, sir, I'm well aware of it.

10 There was a previous limited appearance person here
11 who stated about the public's right to information. The
12 Kemeny Commission reported stated various things about the
13 information release and the competency of the information
14 release.

15 What I would like to ask is what bearing will this
16 have on the licensing of TMI unit 1, whether in any type of
17 non-accident situation our access to information -- will it
18 be the same as it always has been or will it be as cluttered
19 and evasive as it was during the accident?

20 CHAIRMAN SMITH: I'm sorry, you will have to artic-
21 late your question.

22 MR. AUGUST: Is the quality of information going to
23 remain as incompetent as it has been? I know from my own
24 personal experiences in getting records and files on the plant
25 in the library, the local library courses, it has not been up

lw6-21

to date.

DS6

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

1379 338

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: The reliability of information
2 and the flow of information, and the information dissemina-
3 tion to the public is a part of our emergency preparedness
4 issue which we are required to hear.

5 MR. AUGUST: Do you have the answer to my other
6 question?

7 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Do you have that answer yet?

8 MR. PATON: The gentleman I asked will be back in
9 a few minutes, and we'll give him his answer.

10 MR. AUGUST: Well, what I was getting at is that
11 there are various monitors in the TMI Unit 1 in NUREG-0600
12 that are not operable, and I wanted to ask specifics about
13 the monitors. Whether you can put back on line, or if
14 anything has been done about them. They were mentioned in
15 this report, and if I could just --

16 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Well --

17 MR. AUGUST: Here it is. Okay, I have it. I'm
18 sorry --

19 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Now your questions are going to--
20 have various corrections been made? Is that it?

21 MR. AUGUST: Yes.

22 CHAIRMAN SMITH: The answer is going to be: For
23 the purposes of this proceeding, we don't know. We're going
24 to find out. That's why we're here. So it is not going to
25 help you to go through these. It's premature. We don't

1 know. We will find out. We are required by law to find
2 out whether these various corrections have been made.
3 And we will do it when the evidence is available.

4 I am very much concerned that we have people here
5 who haven't had a chance to talk from very, very close,
6 within a few miles of the facility. Why don't you organize
7 yourself, present your questions in writing, and just get
8 organized and accurate answers to your questions. You're
9 entitled to these answers, but you're entitled to accurate,
10 not hastily produced questions, and the people giving the
11 answers are entitled to reflect upon them before they give
12 them.

13 In the meantime, we have to proceed with hearing
14 from the people who live in this region and have concerns
15 about this, and we want to know what they are.

16 MR. AUGUST: Thank you very much.

17 DR. LITTLE: I will tell you that one of the
18 specific charges to us is to ensure that the licensee does
19 upgrade -- and I'll read directly from the Memorandum and
20 Order -- "upgrade of monitoring capability."

21 MR. AUGUST: But will this monitoring capability
22 work? Because apparently there is a gross inequity in this
23 capability of this utility to do a sort of --

24 CHAIRMAN SMITH: This is what we have to decide,
25 sir. Don't you understand? We are here to determine these

1 things. And the hearing is months and months away.

2 MR. AUGUST: Well, I have nothing further to say.

3 (Applause.)

4 CHAIRMAN SMITH: William Stevens, please.

5 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF WILLIAM STEVENS,
6 YORK, PENNSYLVANIA.

7 MR. STEVENS: An impact expressed and displayed
8 at the school I was attending at the time of the accident
9 was as follows: A showcase display being a 3.4 population
10 of Harrisburg, and one and two are small, wiry metal
11 sculptures, three was a dead rubber frogg, four and .4 was
12 a rotten apple with one melted plastic eye.

13 Don't laugh. Some day this could be reality.

14 I also would like to read something I found
15 yesterday that I believe is very relative to all of us.
16 Someone suggested to me that I do something to explore my
17 powers. Power can be a tool or a weapon or a lot of other

18 It can be leaping tall buildings in a single bound,
19 or saying 'no' to someone you love. Everyone's got lots of
20 it, but most keep it shoved down inside them so deep that
21 their face looks all tight, and their eyes seem twisted.

22 If we would forget fear for just long enough to
23 let power flow through and rise, then we would have it to
24 help us live free.

25 I'm sure it's some heart and some painful, but

1 there is no limit. Start humble and small and watch yourself
2 grow.

3 Personally, I dig seeing everybody stand up and
4 be. If you've done it already, then help someone who hasn't.

5 Thank you.

6 (Applause.)

7 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you very much, sir.

8 Daniel Greenberg from Philadelphia.

9 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF DANIEL GREENBERG

10 (AGE 9), PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA.

11 MASTER GREENBERG: Hello, I'm Danny Greenberg
12 and as you know I'm from Philadelphia. I know someone who's
13 just got mugged, and I know it's real dangerous there, but
14 I'd rather live in danger than in poison.

15 I live 8 miles from Three Mile Island, and I
16 feel it's not safe where I am, even though I like where I
17 am. I'd rather live in the place where I've been all my
18 life and where I've --

19 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Is that your brother (indicating
20 child putting hand over Danny Greenberg's mouth)?

21 MASTER GREENBERG: No, it's not.

22 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Is it that you used to live here
23 and now you live in Philadelphia?

24 MASTER GREENBERG: No, I used to live in
25 Philadelphia and now I live here.

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Oh, all right, where do you live?

2 MASTER GREENBERG: York, Hallum. Hallum, PA,
3 York, PA.

4 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Okay.

5 MASTER GREENBERG: And I feel it's much safer
6 in Philadelphia, even though someone just about got his
7 thumb cut off and his arm is in a cast.

8 And I'd rather live in a place like that than
9 a place like poisoned. And I live so close to it and I
10 complained to my father, and I'm just not happy the way I
11 live, even though I like it.

12 Thank you.

13 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, Danny.

14 (Applause.)

15 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Pat and Jenny Street have
16 signed together here, and they'll be followed by Philip
17 Nester and then Ms. Georgianna Nyce.

18 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENTS OF PAT AND JENNY
19 STREET, LONDONDERRY, TOWNSHIP, PENNSYLVANIA.

20 MRS. STREET: This is my daughter. She's 7 years
21 old. She has just a little bit to say.

22 MISS STREET: My name is Jennifer Street. I
23 live less than a mile from TMI. I want TMI to be closed.
24 I want it to be closed so I can live till I'm 90.

25 (Applause.)

1 MRS. STREET: My name is Pat Street. Somehow it
2 would seem appropriate to stand up here and either bawl for
3 five minutes or scream.

4 I've had to listen to comments made by my children
5 since March the 28th. I'd like to share them with you.

6 On the 28th of March my children were Baptized.
7 Approximately three months after the accident, my daughter
8 said, "I'll always remember the 28th of March; not because
9 I got Baptized and that was a happy time, but because that
10 was the day we almost lost everything."

11 We took our family to Maryland to my mother-in-
12 law's. We were discussing on Saturday evening whether to go
13 back and pick up some clothes, and how long we would stay
14 away.

15 My son said, "Wait until they say it's okay,
16 then wait a little bit longer. Because they don't know
17 what they're doing."

18 We listened to my son before we brought the
19 children back. It saved them some iodine. We have a garden.
20 My children's comments about the garden: "Are those from
21 the garden? I don't want to eat them; they're radioactive."

22 My son Michael said, "The only good thing about
23 our tomatoes is you can pick them in the dark; they glow
24 red."

25

1379 544

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Is that literally true, ma'am?

2 MRS. STREET: No. We have a sense of humor. We
3 have to have a sense of humor, or else we would cry.

4 Michael is very interested in animals. Michael
5 said, "There aren't as many animals around here. I think
6 they're a lot smarter than we are. They left." He said,
7 "The animals are important, because if the animals are
8 gone, we're next."

9 We saw a little clip on the news, Chad Green
10 died. He had leukemia. We saw another clip on the news of
11 children in Cambodia starving. My children realized then
12 that children could die. "Am I going to die?" How do you
13 answer that? I don't know the answer. I wouldn't want to
14 lie to them, yet on the other hand I don't want to upset
15 them.

16 I'm not going to talk much longer, because I'm
17 getting ready to cry, but --

18 CHAIRMAN SMITH: If you would like to take an
19 opportunity to compose your thoughts and come back later, we
20 will assure you of time and an opportunity for that. We
21 would very much like to hear about your experiences and
22 your reflections. Would you like to do that?

23 MRS. STREET: I think I can conclude shortly
24 and send you a written testimony, but I think the main
25 thing I want to tell you is why I'm here.

1 I moved to my home four years ago. My daughter
2 was three. She went to bed at night. For several nights
3 she woke up screaming, "The steams! The steams are going to
4 get me, mommy!"

5 I don't know if the steams have harmed her --
6 that's her term for the towers. I don't want to wait and
7 have them reopen so they can have another chance, if they
8 haven't, because I told her at that time that they only
9 gave her electricity. They only give you lights. And I
10 lied to her.

11 I tried to think of a good way to conclude this
12 statement, and I was at a teacher's conference yesterday to
13 find out how my children were doing in school. I sat and
14 looked at a poster across the hall that seemed very
15 appropriate.

16 It said that their future depends on your love.
17 Thank you very much.

18 (Applause.)

19 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Philip Nester, please.

20 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF PHILIP NESTER,
21 ZIGLERSVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA.

22 MR. NESTER: Thank you for the opportunity to
23 be here. I have a bit of a cold, and I'm sorry if I
24 can't speak too clearly, but I have here a letter from
25 Phillis Zitzer, which she wanted to be here today but she

1 couldn't make it, because she couldn't get off of her work.

2 I have here another letter from Mrs. Eleanor
3 Inouye, I-n-o-u-y-e. She also couldn't make it today. The
4 reason she couldn't make it was because she was not notified
5 of the hearings today. She requested written information,
6 and the same goes with Phillis Zitzer.

7 In the first paragraph of her letter she says:

8 "My name is Phillis Zitzer and I strongly oppose
9 plans to reopen Unit 1 at Three Mile Island. I am outraged
10 that many of us who had requested to make limited appearance
11 statements and asked to be notified when the hearings would
12 take place in order to make a public statement were ignored
13 by the NRC. It's as though our lives were not considered
14 to be important or affected by anything happening at Three
15 Mile Island.

16 "I therefore request to make an additional
17 statement during the TMI 1 proceedings when the restart
18 evidentiary hearings resume this spring. I am angered by
19 the fact that the NRC allowed the startup of TMI Unit 2
20 despite serious unresolved safety and environmental
21 issues raised in the licensing proceedings. Radon emission
22 from the uranium fuel cycle and a heavier-than-design-base
23 plane crash into the reactor. It is appalling that the
24 NRC would even consider allowing Met Ed to ever again

25

1379 347

1 operate any nuclear reactor, after witnessing its blatant
2 disregard for the lives and safety of members of the public.

3 "The absence of a workable evacuation plan for
4 the TMI area almost five years after TMI Unit 1 was first
5 licensed to operate confirms the intent of the NRC to
6 blindly approve any and all reactor applications, regardless
7 of the consequences. This 'public be damned' attitude
8 ignores the basic question of whether evacuation is even
9 possible under realistic accident conditions."

10 I'll skip over the main body of the letter and
11 go directly to the last paragraph, and try to save some
12 time. I will leave all of this with you.

13 The last paragraph says:

14 "Arguments relating to supposed economic benefits
15 from the reopening of TMI Unit 1 should be disregarded in
16 favor of protecting the already immeasurably damaged public
17 from further unnecessary exposures. Life-threatening
18 experimentation on citizens without their consent and
19 willful causing of disease, death, and deformity within a
20 large number of people are crimes against humanity being
21 conducted by the nuclear power industry and the U.S.
22 Government. The principles of individual responsibility
23 established by the Nuremberg principle must apply to
24 those allowing random, premeditated murder to take place
25 in the planning and execution of the nuclear power program.

1 No more blatant disregard for human life has been displayed
2 than those promoting reopening of TMI Unit 1." And it's
3 signed Phillis Zitzer.

4 Now a small statement of my own. When I came
5 through the doorway into this building, I noticed that we
6 are all in a fall-out shelter. When I was a child in
7 school, I remember the teacher used to flick the lights
8 and we would all dive under the desk. That was an air raid
9 drill for a nuclear war, a cold war. I never expected to
10 have to do such a thing because of Metropolitan Edison.

11 Thank you.

12 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, sir.

13 (Applause.)

14 (Handing letters to the Chairman.)

15 CHAIRMAN SMITH: You made a reference -- I'm
16 sorry, we made a reference to Ms. Inouye and Ms. Zitzer
17 requesting to be advised. Ms. Inouye stated that she
18 understands the times have been set for the hearing. She
19 wanted to know when "she" could be heard, and there simply
20 was no way that we could tell when she could be heard, because
21 we didn't know when she was available to be heard, and we
22 could only come up with a first-come/first-signup method as
23 one that we thought was workable and fair.

24 Both the records from the Secretary's office
25 indicate that there was a communication to them, to each of

1 them from the Secretary, but I don't know what the nature
2 of that communication was.

3 Yes, ma'am?

4 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF GEORGIANNA
5 NYCE, HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA.

6 MS. NYCE: I'm Georgianna Nyce. My husband and
7 I and two children reside about 10 miles from TMI in
8 Paxtang Burrough.

9 Unit 1 at TMI should be closed permanently as a
10 nuclear facility for the generation of electricity. With
11 the accident at Three Mile Island, we saw that the proba-
12 bility figures given for core-melt accidents were incorrect,
13 and need to be revised substantially.

14 There is no longer just a "remote possibility"
15 of a core-melt accident. Should a total meltdown occur
16 with possible containment failure, many people could be
17 killed and others seriously injured due to the release of
18 high levels of radiation, as you know.

19 The task of promptly evacuating our area out
20 far enough to prohibit all death and injury would be
21 monumental. There are schools, hospitals, rest homes,
22 prisons, and other institutions which would need special
23 evacuation procedures.

24 I believe the scope of such an evacuation
25 within a restricted time frame would be well beyond the

1 capabilities of our emergency preparedness people.

2 Also, should a severe accident occur during the
3 winter months, as has been pointed out by someone else, it
4 would be next to impossible to get out of here.

5 I believe it is unjust for citizens of the
6 United States to have to live under these warlike conditions
7 having to be ready for possible evacuation at any time when
8 the siren sounds.

9 Having gone through the accident at TMI, I
10 emphatically refuse to accept the situation as a normal risk
11 of everyday living, as some proponents of nuclear power have
12 suggested.

13 I fear for my children's lives, and resent the
14 fact that the Federal Government has seen fit to promote such
15 a situation which endangers the lives of its citizens to
16 this extent.

17 The NRC representatives who have worked and spoken
18 in this area appear, for the most part, to believe that they
19 have the right to set the risks of life and death for the
20 rest of us living here.

21 On occasion, they have been nearly ruthless in
22 their attempt to keep an industry going at all costs, and
23 have failed to consider the severe emotional trauma which
24 many people of this area experienced as a result of the
25 accident on March 28th. The mental health of the

1 people living here needs to be considered with respect to
2 the restart of Unit 1.

3 Many people are still under stress from the
4 uncertainty of events regarding the prolonged cleanup at
5 Unit 2 and the added stress from any startup of 1, with all
6 its ramifications of possible inadvertent radioactive
7 releases and accidents would be damaging to the mental
8 health of the people.

9 In turn, continuous stress would eventually, or
10 could eventually result in physical problems. Metropolitan
11 Edison does not appear to be placing safety first, even
12 after a serious accident.

13 At a recent technical meeting approximately a
14 month ago, I don't have the exact date of this, on the
15 restart of Unit 1, which I attended, the NRC requested the
16 use of safety-grade equipment in some instances. The company
17 replied that it had purchased equipment they felt would do
18 the job, but it did not have the proper pedigree.

19 There were no manufacturers, papers, or specifica-
20 tions accompanying this equipment. They said the waiting
21 period was too long for safety-grade equipment.

22 As I recall, some of this equipment involved
23 flow sensing devices that would indicate emergency feedwater
24 flow. In addition, in response to a statement from the NRC
25 requiring the company to review a chronology of the TMI-2

1 accident so that an understanding of the events would
2 ensure against another occurrence at Unit 1, the company's
3 answer was, "Not applicable."

4 On the matter of radiation exposure, Metropolitan
5 Edison does not seem to realize that the limits set for
6 radiation exposure to the public are, as I understand it,
7 not a green light for companies to constantly release
8 radiation, so long as it is just below the upper levels.

9 It is well known that radiation is potentially
10 harmful, and no unnecessary exposure should be permitted.
11 The company in their statements constantly demonstrate a
12 lack of understanding of this principle.

13 In connection with radiation, this area of
14 Pennsylvania houses a large dairy industry and rich agri-
15 cultural land which could suffer substantial and perhaps
16 permanent economic harm as a result of further releases of
17 radioactivity from Units 1 or 2.

18 Radioactive iodine accumulates in milk products
19 following an accident, and as more people become aware of
20 exactly what is happening, the economic damage will occur.

21 Also, we know that fresh fruits and vegetables
22 grown in the area can be paths of ingestion.

23 In conclusion, knowing what we do now regarding
24 the greatly increased possibility of a core melt, the
25 restarting of Unit 1 would represent a grave threat to the

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

citizens of this area.

In a democracy such as ours, and as long as other sources exist with which to generate electricity, as they do at present, there can be no justification for further endangering of lives and property through the use of nuclear technology at the Three Mile Island site.

Thank you.

(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, ma'am.

We are going to take a very short recess, and we will be back in 5 or 10 minutes.

(Recess.)

end JWB#7

R #8 fol 13

1319 354

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Ladies and gentlemen, we are
2 ready to resume our limited appearance statements.

3 Is Bernard August, is Mr. August here?

4 All right, Mr. August, a member of the NRC Staff
5 now has an answer to your question concerning the stack.

6 MR. PATON: Mr. August, there are separate vent
7 stacks for Unit 1 and 2.

8 MR. AUGUST: Thank you very much.

9 MR. PATON: Yes, sir. I'm sorry it took a few
10 minutes.

11 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Ladies and gentlemen, we have
12 sufficient time. This session will be adjourned at 3:00
13 o'clock, or before, depending upon the request for appearances,
14 but no later than 3:00.

15 This gives us sufficient time to hear everyone
16 who has signed up providing there is a rough approximation of
17 a five-minute limit.

18 We will try to hear people who signed up later
19 who are not here yet, but if they can't make it, they will
20 be given a later opportunity.

21 So we will have time for everyone who is present
22 and has signed up to make a statement, if we average somewhere
23 near five minutes.

24 Our next speaker is Robert Pittman, who will be
25 followed by David Creasey, and Frank Thompson.

1 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF ROBERT
2 PITTMAN.

3 MR. PITTMAN: Good afternoon, committee members.

4 I might be able to offer some information from
5 my own experience. I live approximately three miles from
6 the island, and I was employed for about six years by United
7 Engineers, the contractor involved with the construction for
8 both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

9 And my main concerns are with the attitude of
10 Metropolitan Edison, and inasfar as the safety of its
11 employees during the construction of that plant.

12 As I said, I worked down there for approximately
13 six years, and never, to my knowledge, during that six
14 years, was there ever conducted an actual drill, of radiation
15 drill or evacuation drill.

16 There were plans, vague plans, that my fellow
17 employees had about what to do in case of a problem, but
18 they were never actually practiced.

19 As a matter of fact, there were weekly drills of
20 the alert systems and sirens, but there were also at the same
21 time many -- and I would go so far as to say at least biweekly,
22 there were unannounced alarms that were never preceded or
23 followed by any statements saying whether or not they were
24 an actual alert or not.

25 We got to the point -- by "we," I mean my fellow

1 workers, tradesmen, where we would ignore them and shrug our
2 shoulders, and not really pay any attention, because nobody
3 else seemed to worry about them. And looking over some of
4 the past records, after the March 28th incident, the accident
5 on the 28th brought out a lot of the past records, and I
6 assumed that we were exposed to radiation levels, to minor
7 accidents compared to the 28th accident, and we were never
8 informed of it.

9 Now this is the same company who dealt with the
10 28th incident through misinformation, through playing down
11 the accident, and in general, simply trying to cover up the
12 entire incident, and make it seem as if it were nothing.
13 Exactly as they did to us who worked there.

14 Now the consideration of reopening a plant to give
15 this people -- these people, with this prevalent attitude of
16 just making a buck and having no other concerns whatsoever,
17 and I truly believe that in my heart, that they are not
18 concerned with our safety. I was never given a choice as to
19 whether the radiation levels were too high or not. We were
20 simply not informed.

21 On the same token, we were given a very slight
22 amount of information after Unit 2 was fueled up -- or Unit No.
23 1 was fueled up. We received about two hours of classroom
24 information which was very, very lax.

25 As a matter of fact, we had a little test afterwards.

1 and the instructor left and the test was so lax that the men
2 passed around notes and copied answers, and it really didn't
3 make any difference.

4 The only thing Met Ed was interested in, from my
5 particular point of view, was that the man had received instruc-
6 tions and had passed some insignificant test, and that the
7 burden of responsibility was no longer Met Ed's. It was lying
8 with the workmen themselves.

9 I think that what we are discussing here is not so
10 much the safety of nuclear power as it is the integrity of
11 the people operating the plant.

12 Certainly an automobile by itself is not a dangerous
13 instrument, but given the hands of an incompetent or a drunk,
14 it becomes a lethal device which can snuff out a life in a
15 second's notice.

16 Now we are not talking about an automobile and
17 one or two people, we are talking about possibly tens of
18 thousands of lives here and future generations that we are
19 dealing with, and to allow a company that has demonstrated
20 gross negligence to continue, even though they make some
21 token safety adjustments, it still doesn't alter the deep-
22 rooted feelings they have of what is top priority as far
23 as the generating station goes.

24 And I think that mostly you will find this kind
25 of information is harder to come by because a lot of the

1 people who work there, you have to understand, their livelihood
2 comes from that very plant and, of course, they try to ignore,
3 as I have tried to ignore, the dangers that are involved.
4 You try to shrug it off and live with it as it is, but it's
5 too high a price for me to have my children pay for my own
6 mistakes, and I hope that we can learn from this accident
7 and realize that in the case of a possible meltdown, that
8 so many people would be affected, it would be a nightmare to
9 even try and imagine it.

10 And in touching on the economics -- and I realize
11 the amount of money spent to build the place, I worked there,
12 I understand how much it cost, but I think all of the money
13 saved in generating by nuclear power would be wasted in a
14 moment, in a half hour, through a meltdown, if five, ten or
15 perhaps 20 miles around the plant were to become uninhabitable.
16 Our economic savings would be shot in one accident. So that
17 argument holds no weight as far as I'm concerned.

18 Well, rather than be repetitious, I think I will
19 just conclude by saying that I am thankful that we have had
20 time here to voice our own opinions, and I hope that these
21 words don't fall on deaf ears.

22 Thank you, gentlemen.

23 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Pittman.

24 [Applause.]

25 CHAIRMAN SMITH: During our five-minute recess, I

1 was out in the foyer, and I had a very brief conversation
2 with two gentlemen from State College, who were making some
3 points that I was very interested in, and I think are an
4 appropriate subject matter to be covered at this session.

5 I'm sorry I had to turn you off, because of two
6 reasons: I didn't have time, and secondly, it is not
7 appropriate for me to engage in conversations of that nature
8 alone with persons advocating a particular point of view.



9 So may I suggest that one of you, or both of you,
10 sign up or at least be available after we have heard from those
11 who have signed up? We would like to hear what you have to
12 say. You've been here, and I think you can make a contribution.
13 Are you still here? I can't see out there. Are you still here,
14 gentlemen?

15 I'm sorry, I can't see you. If you are here, I
16 would like to have you develop your remarks, in turn. Can
17 you wait until those who have signed up have done it?





18 VOICE: I'm sorry, I was talking to someone else,
19 I didn't hear what you were saying.



20 CHAIRMAN SMITH: During the intermission, we were
21 having a conversation in the foyer. I cut you off, for two
22 reasons:

23 One, I don't have time, and the other is it's
24 not appropriate for me to discuss in detail these ideas, but
25 I think the point you were making, are the type of things that









**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**











**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**









**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**





**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



1 we should be hearing about, about the reactions and about
2 the compartmentalization of responsibility, and those points,
3 and I am inviting you to develop your points more fully when
4 we have exhausted this present list of speakers, if you'd
5 like to.

6 It should be something that I think is in the public
7 record.

8 Mr. Creasey.

9 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF DAVID CREASEY.

10 MR. CREASEY: Good afternoon. My name is David
11 Creasey. I live in Berwick, Pennsylvania, where Pennsylvania
12 Power & Light Company is currently constructing the Susquehanna
13 Nuclear Power Generating Plant, approximately 70 miles upstream
14 from TMI.

15 I come here today to voice my opposition to the
16 restart of TMI Unit 1. To say damage was negligible during
17 and after the March 28th accident could not be further from
18 the truth.

19 The irreparable mental damage incurred by the people
20 coupled with the restart of Unit 1 will be, I fear, catastrophic.
21 The mere knowledge that the reactor is operating, plus all
22 the unknowns associated with operation, will create an air
23 of tension and hostility towards Met Ed, the NRC, and the
24 government.

25 But most poignant is the fact that Unit 2 lives on

1 as a threat to the health and well being of the people in the
2 area and downstream. There are still many unsolved problems
3 in leaks which will continue to build the arsenal of contaminants
4 which accumulates on the island.

5 In the event of an accident in Unit 1, the loss
6 of adequate back-up such as storage for contaminated liquids
7 and also low level wastes, will hamper efforts to keep our
8 environment safe from radiation and its unequal damages.

9 I believe the risk of any accident happening with
10 Unit 1 jeopardized by the fact that Unit 2 lies crippled,
11 overshadows any need for operation of this unit.

12 And what of the Susquehanna and Chesapeake Bay?
13 Will we continue to pollute them with discharges considered
14 to be "emergencies," and within federal standards? Many
15 people derive their livelihood from the products of these
16 waters. Many more people ingest these products, completing
17 a vicious pathway from human error to human decay.

18 I do not believe Met Ed can be entrusted with the
19 operation of TMI. They were blatant liars throughout the
20 accident, and I feel they would not hesitate to cover their
21 tracks once more.

22 Public safety is not the primary concern of the
23 corporate utility. The protection of the stockholder is the
24 primary concern.

25 In this light, the restart of Unit 1 is nothing more

1 than Met Ed trying to pull out financially.

2 PP&L, the utility from my area, in cooperation
3 with the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland power group,
4 has been selling electricity to Met Ed at cost plus 10
5 percent. This seems to me to be a much more safe means of
6 supplying electricity to this area with no drawbacks whatsoever.

7 It seems worth it to me for all the peace
8 of mind of the people of the area would have if this avenue
9 were to be continued.

10 To summarize, I feel the mental anguish is not
11 worth the restart of Unit 1, and I do recommend that the
12 psychological distress be taken as primary concern in these
13 proceedings. The threat of Unit 2 looming over any accident
14 which might occur, is not worth restarting it. The extra
15 pollutants which will be introduced either into the river or
16 the lands for disposal is not worth the restart.

17 The inability of Met Ed to manage and operate Unit
18 1 is another factor in my opposition to the restart. But the
19 most important overview is the denial of our rights to life,
20 liberty, and pursuit of happiness which the operation of TMI-1
21 will surely eliminate.

22 Thank you.

23 [Applause.]

24 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mr. Thompson, please.

25 [No response.]

1380 003

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Pat Sgrignali, please.

2 Who will be followed by Louise Flack.

3 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF PAT SGRIGNALI.

4 MS. SGRIGNALI: My name is Pat Sgrignali, and I
5 am a resident of York County, and I'm a mother, and a customer
6 of Met Ed and these all, I think, are really significant
7 things here.

8 Now I was in Middletown on March 28th with my baby
9 and husband, and I live fairly close to the plant, and every-
10 body else brought up a lot of good points. They're repetitious
11 to you, but they're good points to me about what we went
12 through in evacuation, with time and money, and you know,
13 nobody reimbursed me. I was within five miles and my baby
14 was four months old, and we spent seven days in motel rooms.
15 These all are very dramatic things, but I think the important
16 thing here is that I'm a customer of Met Ed, and so it's
17 my utility, my business, I consider it to be such, and like
18 we're usually real nice people that live around here, and
19 good natured and everything, and we thank you for coming here
20 and everything, but we have trouble standing in front of you
21 people talking, because you are the people that we relied
22 on and just listened to and relied on for the safety and
23 operation of these power plants.

24 And the fact is that we don't trust you any more,
25 and in my opinion, neither Met Ed nor you -- meaning the NRC --

1 deserved my trust.

2 And on that basis alone, I think that it should be
3 shut down, and permanently shut down, and never reopened again.

4 Everything else aside, with these little facts
5 like I and a lot of my friends, like another woman had, for
6 some reason stopped or had irregular menses, you know,
7 nobody's ever going to ask me -- I lived out of the five-mile
8 area, but I think the important thing is I pay Met Ed, and it's
9 my company, and I don't want it, and I'll do anything --
10 anything, cost or otherwise, to see it shut down. You just
11 tell me what to do, and I'll do it.

12 [Applause.]

13 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Ms. Flack.

14 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF LOUISE FLECK.

15 MS. FLECK: My name is Fleck, Louise Fleck, and
16 I am a former administrative assistant with the Department
17 of Justice --

18 CHAIRMAN SMITH: F-l-e-c --

19 MS. FLECK: Right.

20 CHAIRMAN SMITH: -- k?

21 MS. FLECK: And with the governor's office. I
22 resigned my job. Luckily I was there long enough to be
23 able to retire, which made me luckier than most of the
24 people in this area who were forced to stay when they were
25 afraid enough to go, as we were.

1 Our family has been gone now since March, coming
2 back temporarily. I have a brother who is sick now, and I
3 didn't really know these hearings were scheduled, but when I
4 found out, I just had to come here.

5 My speech, therefore, will be rather disjointed,
6 but I do want to speak because it's on my heart that this
7 needs to be done.

8 I know our home has been broken up. Both of us
9 worked out whole lives and we had two daughters that we put
10 our whole life into seeing them educated. One is now a lawyer
11 and one a doctor, and we are very proud of them. They
12 graduated this spring, and when we should have been able to
13 have some kind of a homecoming for them and to show our friends
14 how proud we were, the thing in March stopped that, because
15 the graduation was in May.

16 So that was one price, but that's little compared
17 to the other things that have happened.

18 When we knew we were leaving, we listened to Dr.
19 George Wald, who is a Nobel prize winner, and Dr. Caldicott,
20 Dr. Gethman, and Barry Commoner. We didn't really know much
21 about nuclear energy before, and we trusted Met Ed and the
22 government, and we found out, too, that they are liars.
23 I hate to say it, but they are.

24 And I had a personal experience of calling Met
25 Ed and asking them the week that they dumped the 4000

1 gallons of water and, you know, pretended they weren't going
2 to do it, and then did it -- I called them on Wednesday and
3 was assured that it would not happen, and on Friday, the
4 man called back from there and still assured me that it would
5 not happen, and on Monday I read in the paper it happened on
6 Thursday. So I know they are liars from my personal experience.

7 But aside from all that, this, to try to show
8 you the psychological stress that a family could go through
9 here, when we knew we were leaving, we love our family very
10 dearly, we gathered up our children and we went to North
11 Carolina, because we understood that if this meltdown occurred,
12 it could mean the whole Eastern Seaboard.

13 When the imminent meltdown was announced, we took
14 off from here, but before going, we went around to each of
15 our families and called friends, and asked them to come with
16 us. Even if we didn't have the funds, we'd try to live
17 together in what we called a long house, the way the Indians
18 used to live, just to be together and be safe.

19 But as I said in the beginning, they weren't all as
20 lucky as we were to be able to go, since we were retired.

21 I wasn't ready to leave my job. I had promised
22 my children I'd help them with their college expenses, but
23 as I said, I was able to retire, so I had to do that. But
24 we went to each of the family and we asked my brother -- he
25 just signed up for a new home the week before, had that

1 obligation he couldn't run away from. Besides which, he is a
2 steelworker, and has four or five more years to go before
3 his pension will be available, and he's got young boys that
4 he wants to send to college, so he can't see starting over
5 in some other place at his age.

6 But also when we went there that day, my sister-in-law's
7 mother was lying on a couch, hooked up to a kidney machine,
8 and we were saying, "Please come with us," but they couldn't
9 come, and we understood why, and with aching hearts we left
10 this area.

11 But going is really no solution to the problem,
12 either, we found, because not only have they lied to us here,
13 they have lied to people all over this country, and wherever
14 we went, in California, the Montana, the missiles --
15 California, the weapons, and the waste storage piles, there
16 is no place to hide people, and it has to be solved here.

17 I want to come home with my family and friends
18 and, believe me, as the man from Lancaster said, if this
19 opens up, there will be a call go out that will be bigger
20 than the one at Washington or Wall Street, and you better
21 believe I'm going to be here. I don't believe in violence,
22 but violence brings violence. So if you ask for it, and you
23 get it, it will be that you asked for it.

24 Last night I was thinking about Hodding Carter
25 on TV, telling about the hostages, the American hostages being

1 held in Iran, and that's terrible, very, very bad. But at
2 least they are hostages of a foreign country under fear of
3 death.

4 We here in this area are hostages of our own
5 government, and a governmental agency, and a private company
6 that thinks profits are more important than people.

7 When Mr. Palmer spoke earlier, he said that those
8 of us who speak up for the closing of TMI are speaking
9 because we have some special interest, he was dead right.
10 I have a special interest in my family, in my extended family,
11 in my friends, and in my home, and I want to come back.

12 [Applause.]

13
14 1380 009
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

149-1

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mr. Russell Myers, please.

2 Mr. Russell Myers will be followed by Mr. Brooks,
3 Mr. Prelesnik and then by Mr. Arnold. I would appreciate it if
4 the speakers would come forward so that you would be ready to
5 speak as soon as the preceding speaker concludes.

6 Yes, sir.

7 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF RUSSEL MYERS

8 MR. MYERS: I wish to thank you for this opportunity
9 to speak to you.

10 I work here for the City of Harrisburg as the Public
11 Works Director. I am a retired Navy commander, having com-
12 pleted 26 years last July.

13 This is my second occasion to meet with this
14 committee. I met with you about 17 years ago, as the program
15 manager for placing the FM3A reactor in Antarctica.

16 I would like to say that our program successfully
17 operated nuclear power plants at Fort Greeley, Alaska, Fort
18 Belvoir, Virginia, Sundance, Wyoming, Camp Century on the
19 Greenland Ice Cap, as well as at McMertle Sound, Antarctica, and
20 I would like to say that our safety record was a good one.

21 I have visited and studied the atomic museum at
22 Nagasaki. I have been a strong supporter of the peaceful use
23 of the atom as started by President Eisenhower from Gettysburg
24 and I will continue to support this program.

25 I supported it and worked in the program for five

1380 010

lrw9-2

1 years, both at Fort Belvoir, Virginia and at the AEC head-
2 quarters in Germantown. I served Gen. Ludekin and Dr. Pitkin.

3 I have visited the TMI plant, including the control
4 rooms of Units 1 and 2, the steam generating rooms, the turbine
5 rooms, and I have been inside the cooling towers. I have a
6 couple of comments I would like to make at this time.

7 Number one, the Kemeny report stated that the acci-
8 dent was inevitable, and I would like to say that it is an
9 indictment truly of our technology in the United States. I am
10 talking now about the light water technology.

11 We have had many hazards analyses prepared on each
12 plant which the NRC and your committee studied before these
13 plants are approved to operate, and yet the Kemeny report states
14 the accident was inevitable. I cannot agree with that report
15 and that conclusion. There are too many professional people
16 working in the Atomic Forum and the industry to have to take
17 that indictment.

18 I would like to give you just one little piece of
19 why I feel this is a strong statement. In the Atomic Energy
20 Commission, I worked for a gentleman, a former Army officer,
21 named Dr. Joseph LeFleur. Perhaps some of you know him. Dr.
22 LeFleur did his experiment and thesis on work of a nuclear
23 power plant when a pressurizer valve would stick open.

24 The reactor experiment was performed under my direc-
25 tion at Fort Belvoir and it has been available now since, I

1380 011

lrw9-3

1 believe, 1959. Dr. LeFleur has also testified that there was
2 a Westinghouse reactor in Switzerland which had a similar
3 happening about two years prior to TMI.

4 If this type information had been transmitted
5 throughout the field, TMI should not have occurred. I am not
6 going to judge whether or not this is true. This is your busi-
7 ness and I am not going to second-judge your evaluations. But
8 I would say a primary problem with starting up TMI 1 and the
9 recovery of TMI 2 is communications with the public.

10 I have heard many of the testimony today and I know,
11 deep in their hearts, they feel very strongly about not start-
12 ing up this plant. I would like to tell you how TMI 1, I
13 think, should be started, but before that, I would like to go
14 over briefly how I was affected by TMI 2.

15 I work for the Navy here at Mechanicsburg, Pennsyl-
16 vania, just outside the ten mile circle. My view, based upon
17 what I was able to gather in the newspapers, on television and
18 any way I could, was that there was no hazard to the general
19 public. Approximately 50% of my employees in the Public Works
20 Division did not agree with me. They left the area because
21 they lived in Goldsboro, Middletown and immediately surrounding
22 areas. They did not trust the news that was being released.

23 I, quite frankly, trusted the news as long as I
24 could gather all the news and put the pieces together myself.
25 I became concerned singly when I learned that Dr. Denton was

1380 012

lrw9-4

1 going to be the sole spokesman. This is where the communica-
2 tions breakdown occurs. I, as an individual, felt I was
3 enough educated that I could sort out the bits and pieces and
4 I could keep the puzzle put together. When Dr. Denton became
5 the sole speaker, I said to myself: What does he know that he
6 doesn't tell?

7 Now you may say: Isn't that adequate? I have strong
8 feelings about government censure of news. I feel it
9 should be censured during wartime, during national emergencies
10 and other things, but I did not feel this was a particular
11 moment when it had to be censured.

12 Also, unknown to Dr. Denton, the news was getting out
13 and there were many ways of finding out. There was a back
14 channel available, as we call it in military communications.
15 Let me describe to you gentlemen how it happens, how it occurs.

16 As I understand it, the TMI plant operates a teletype
17 system which goes out to other plants. They make hourly
18 reports on what is occurring at TMI. It happened that one of
19 my neighbors had a brother who worked in Chicago at a nuclear
20 power plant and he called her and he told her -- he said: "Now
21 quite frankly, there are two things you should know. Number
22 one, the news media is reporting approximately 12 hours to 18
23 hours behind the events that are occurring. Number two, the
24 situation may be much more severe than what is being released
25 over the news media."

1380 013

lrw9-5

1 This person was advised to pack bags and prepare to
2 leave the area for three or four days, and this gentleman would
3 call her at least 12 hours in advance before it was appropriate
4 to leave.

5 Now you may wonder why is this important, and I
6 think it is important because, based upon the number of people
7 living in this area -- not in the evacuation area announced by
8 the Governor but in the area who would want to evacuate -- I
9 think you would find that probably it would take 24 to 36 hours
10 for that number of vehicles to transit the routes designated
11 by the disaster committee.

12 I am talking about unloading on the highways of
13 approximately 900 vehicles per lane per hour, which is about
14 the maximum loading you could get under this event.

15 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Do your responsibilities include
16 the maintenance of the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania road system?

17 MR. MYERS: It involves those road systems within
18 the limits of Harrisburg but not the super-highways, which
19 were going to be used for evacuation routes.

20 As I understand it, going west they were going to
21 open up the turnpike, all four lanes going west. They were
22 going to open up Route 81, all lanes going west. And all other
23 roads would be closed to the general public.

24 Now my information may not be correct but this is
25 what I understand the evacuation route was to be going west,

lrv9-6
1 which, in fact, was the sector I was living in. Anyway, to
2 continue, my wife and I did not pack our bags at this time
3 because, again, having a background in nuclear power, I did
4 not feel, with the containment, we had anything to be concerned
5 about.

6 We attended a function on Saturday night at Hershey,
7 Pennsylvania. It was a credit union dinner. About 9:30, we
8 heard many people being called to the telephone. We did not
9 get called to the phone, ourselves, and we were not concerned.

10 However, when we got home shortly after midnight, we
11 ran into our daughter. My daughter was a senior in high
12 school. We found that our groceries had all been packed in
13 the kitchen in brown bags ready to go. Our clothes had all
14 been packed in suitcases. And she had done this because at
15 approximately 9:30 there had been a television trailer put on
16 announcing the evacuation.

17 Again, the announcement was erroneous. The next
18 day, this daughter could not hardly speak to us. It took us
19 about six hours to get her to the point where she would speak
20 to us.

21 So what I would like to continue to say is, number
22 one, we have several things that I think should be looked at
23 very carefully. Number one, we know the plants are contained
24 and I personally feel that the containment is airtight and it
25 will seal the materials in there.

lrw9-7

1 However, there are questions being raised about the
2 Krypton gas and about the tritium in the water. I think these
3 can be solved and I think they should be solved. I think the
4 communications with the public still need to be improved, as
5 evidenced by this hearing today.

6 A third item that I feel strongly about: In reading
7 my insurance policies, I find my insurance does not cover
8 nuclear accidents. There is discussion going on whether this
9 is a No. 9 incident, No. 8, No. 2. My view is that if you
10 plan -- and I think you should plan to start this plant up
11 again -- I think you should insure the people have insurance
12 coverage.

13 CHAIRMAN SMITH: You have been about 15 minutes and
14 that is just simply outside of any conceivable idea of our
15 scope of authority.

16 MR. MYERS: I will just wrap it up very shortly.

17 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Please.

18 MR. MYERS: Okay. I have about four items and I
19 will quickly go over them.

20 CHAIRMAN SMITH: We simply aren't going to be able
21 to hear everybody if you continue at this pace. I found your
22 remarks to be quite instructive. However, we have other
23 people who also have contributions to make.

24 MR. MYERS: Yes, I will finish in less than thirty
25 seconds.

lrw9-8

1 Medical coverage in case of an incident is inadequate.
2 I am basing this on the fact that about 80% of the medical
3 people in the surrounding area were the first ones to
4 evacuate. You can determine those statistics for yourself.

5 The last point I would like to say is the electrical
6 rates reflect the increased cost due to this plant not operat-
7 ing, which reflects back upon the people that buy the electricity.
8 I feel the decision should be made to either operate the plant
9 or the federal government should accept the cost of not operat-
10 ing it.

11 VOICE: Thirty seconds!

12 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Have you concluded?

13 MR. MYERS: I think it is best that I conclude, yes,
14 sir.

15 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you very much. If you were
16 not able to complete your remarks, you understand you can aug-
17 ment them with a written statement. Did you understand that?
18 All right.

19 The next speaker is Stephen Brooks. Are you Mr.
20 Brooks?

21 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF STEPHEN BROOKS

22 MR. BROOKS: Yes.

23 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Wait a minute. How are we going to
24 transcribe the music you are about to play into a written
25 record? Will you sing a song?

1380 017

lrw9-9 1 MR. BROOKS: The words are written down. They will
2 be delivered to the Board.

3 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Okay, thank you.

4 MR. BROOKS: (Mr. Brooks, with guitar in hand, sang
5 as follows:)

6 In the spring of this year

7 Grace came somehow violent

8 To each man here,

9 Downwind of Three Mile Island.

10 Some years back

11 We put up four white towers

12 As scrubbed and shiny as teeth,

13 And they gave us power,

14 And the man in the street,

15 Not close to the heat,

16 Thinks it's tidy and neat,

17 Sees no need to retreat.

18 And there's lead in his feet

19 And his head and his heart,

20 And his old commonsense

21 Will soon fall apart.

22 They say this reactor

23 Is a stable factor,

24 And a fact is a fact

25 And we are too far ahead to go back,

lrw9-10

1 For our nation's security
2 Depends on having energy
3 To spin wheels in factories
4 And lift the poor from poverty.
5 You can't see it,
6 But they say that it's clean,
7 And the potential problems have all been foreseen.
8 The particles breed like rats in a tomb,
9 Like a bush that burns but is not consumed.
10 And you're
11 Three miles from Heaven and it's falling fast,
12 And you wonder if the coming hour will be your last.
13 You made some bad mistakes in the past,
14 And there's no alibi-in,
15 So get your ass far away from that tight little
16 island.
17 In the dark before dawn
18 When not too many folks were awake,
19 Two hundred bells sounded
20 And fifty knees began to shake.
21 In the depths of the concrete
22 Somehow a valve was stuck open,
23 Though no one knows how,
24 The circle abruptly was broken.
25 And the men at the panels

1380 019

lrw9-11

1 Are taken aback,
2 Cause the dials they are reading
3 Are far from exact
4 And the back-ups to back-ups are suddenly slack
5 As the core starts steaming
6 And the seals crack.
7 They say it's contained, then they
8 Say that it's leaked,
9 While the company spokesman
10 Plays hide-and-go-seek,
11 While the truth is refracted
12 And periodically retracted,
13 And scatters like the steam,
14 So heavily radio-acted.
15 You can't see it,
16 But you know that it's there,
17 Like the strange taste of metal in the morning air
18 And the sorriest thing is to sit and wait
19 For you know when it blows you will be too late.
20 Since that time
21 The experts aren't so optimistic.
22 They speak to us now
23 Of acceptable risks and highway statistics
24 They will upgrade
25 The safety with the lessons learned,

1380 020

lrw9-12

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

And children will play with matches
Until they get burned.
Who's got the power? We've got it.
We've got the power, but most of it's counterfeit.
We don't have the power for genesis,
But we do have the power to cease to exist.
We use the power
But it isn't really in our hands.
The things we cannot see
We don't really understand
An atom is as dull as stone
And twice as hard to crack,
But once you let the fire out
You cannot put it back.
Though atoms, germs and angels
Are things too wee to see,
There's nothing that we're blinder to
Than what has yet to be,
You can't see it,
And you never will see
But our hearts have been heated to a thousand
degrees
And if you don't take the chance to make history
A new kind of power will be set free.
And you're

1380 021

lrw9-13

1 Three miles from heaven and it's falling fast,
2 And you wonder if the coming hour will be your last,
3 You made some bad mistakes in the past,
4 And there's no alibi-in
5 So get your ass far away from that tight little
6 island.

7 (Applause)

8 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Warren Prelesnik.

9 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF WARREN L. PRELESNIK

10 MR. PRELESNIK: Good afternoon. Thank you for the
11 opportunity to speak to you.

12 My name is Warren Prelesnik. I live in Hershey, just
13 five and a half air miles from Three Mile Island. I have a
14 Bachelor's degree from the University of Michigan in Industrial
15 Engineering, with the first two and a half years concentrated
16 in Engineering Physics. I have a Master's degree also from
17 the University of Michigan and have worked in the hospital
18 administration field since 1966.

19 I am the Executive Vice President at Harrisburg
20 Hospital and have written several hospital disaster plans and
21 served on hospital, county and USAF disaster planning
22 committees in the past. What I have to say today, however,
23 represents my thoughts. I am not speaking on behalf of the
24 hospital.

25 The issues of health and safety, in my mind, are
ones that the old AEC, the NRC, the nuclear industry in general.

1380 022

lrw9-14

1 and Metropolitan Edison and CUP, in particular, have attempted,
2 with some success, to conceal the truth from the public. It
3 is my contention that these two issues of health and safety,
4 both interrelated, must be the only factors in deciding what
5 is to be done with Unit 1 or Unit 2, both units being closely
6 interrelated in numerous ways.

7 In the health related area:

8 1. I contend that there is in existence extensive,
9 scientific evidence that low radiation levels -- low level
10 radiation is harmful at any level, no matter how low. The
11 accident with TMI Unit 2 subjected the population to a high
12 level of gamma and other radiation.

13 The first day, according to the NRC, emissions were
14 over 1,000 millirems per hour or more. This is a topend
15 measurement that probably will never be verified because the
16 monitors went off scale. The "normal" levels of radiation
17 released from a "normal" operating plant also subject the
18 population to continuous exposure to low level radiation.

19 These "normal" releases continue to not only expose
20 us to cumulative doses of radiation on a continuing basis, but
21 also slowly increases the "normal" background radiation levels
22 that the industry is so fond of quoting.

23 These levels or standards are continuously cited to
24 justify the utilities' compliance with NRC standards of "safe
25 levels of radiation," "unharmful," and "no hazard to the public."

lrw9-15

1 For this reason, I believe that Central Pennsylvanians ve
2 suffered enough and have been subjected to more than their
3 "committed dose" of radiation for the life of both plants.

4 In its initial operating license, Met Ed assured
5 the public that only 0.01 curies of iodine 131 would be
6 released during a year of normal operation. In sworn testi-
7 mony before the U. S. House Subcommittee on Energy and the
8 Environment on June 2, 1979, Thomas Gerusky, Director of the
9 Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection, stated that about
10 15 curies were released. That is 1,500 times that for one
11 year of normal operation and 50 times more than the plant was
12 expected to release over its 30 year life cycle.

13 Even in normal operations, TMI 1 would add to these
14 releases that are far above those committed to and promised
15 by the industry. Similar considerations should also apply to
16 other radioactive isotopes. Units 1 and 2 must never restart
17 in order to protect our health and safety and adhere to the
18 "committed dose" limitation of their license.

19 2. According to NUREG 0578, page A-37, "less than
20 20% of operating plants have monitors that would have stayed
21 on scale under conditions of the TMI accident....None of the
22 effluent monitors now in service at any operating plant would
23 remain on scale." I believe that Metropolitan Edison, the
24 Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, and the
25 NRC were and still are negligent in conducting adequate and

lrw9-16

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

accurate monitoring. Health obviously was not the concern;
clearly, profits were.

END#9

1380 025

1 The public's fear of this plant being operated by
2 a utility with profit-oriented motives and charged by the
3 Kemeny Commission with mismanagement and incompetency
4 and regulated and supervised by the NRC, also charged by
5 the Kemeny Commission with numerous and severe inadequacies,
6 has left the people of Central Pennsylvania with an intensely
7 high level of stress. Met Ed, NRC, and TMI Units 1 and 2
8 cannot continue to be allowed to keep adding to this
9 already high stress level.

10 Three, in a news release on November 14th, 1979,
11 Robert Arnold, Vice President, Metropolitan Edison, stated
12 that the company wants to "release the krypton gas from the
13 accident of Unit 2 into the atmosphere over the next
14 three-month period beginning in January."

15 This is a further example of the company's
16 inability to deal with, or the disregard for the public's
17 health and safety. There are three other options in dealing
18 with that gas, but they are more expensive and time-
19 consuming. We again see Metropolitan Edison putting profits
20 ahead of health issues. For this reason, Units 1 and 2 at
21 TMI must not be restarted.

22 Four, during the process of cleanup of Unit 2
23 there will continue to be releases of radiation into the
24 environment -- releases that are intentional, accidental,
25 and perhaps "normal." The public does not need that threat

1 of added releases from Unit 1 on top of what will happen
2 during the cleanup of Unit 2.

3 Five, the probability exists, due to the exten-
4 sive damage to the core, and possible inability to remove
5 it, that this high-level waste from the cleanup of Unit 2
6 may never be removed from the TMI facility. Because other
7 states refuse to accept radioactive waste of that high
8 intensity, we in effect may have high-level radiation dump
9 10 miles from Harrisburg. This is a health danger and a
10 stress that does not need to be added to by restarting Unit 1.

11 Six, overall, the health effects measured in terms
12 of the cancers or deaths will not be visible for another 5
13 to 30 years. Childhood leukemias may begin to show up within
14 5 years, but adults probably not for many more years to
15 come.

16 The health effects radiation in relation to
17 lowered resistance, susceptibility, and myriad of other
18 minor symptoms are already here.

19 The psychological effects stemming from the
20 above, as well as numerous related traumatic happenings
21 since the accident, the frustrations in dealing with Met
22 Ed, the NRC, and our government, are many indeed.

23 People are extremely concerned and irate about
24 what happened at TMI and what is happening here now and
25 in the future. The people do not trust Metropolitan Edison,

1 the NRC or local, state, and Federal Government to protect
2 the public health and safety.

3 Many are talking of leaving the area if TMI Units
4 1 and 2 reopen. This fear, anxiety, -- fear and anxiety
5 cannot be dismissed during these hearings. The psychological
6 issues are real, they exist, and they will be heard.

7 In the area of safety, I would like to make the
8 following comments:

9 One, the winterization of the piping which is not
10 protected and subject to freezing at the Unit 2 still has
11 not been accomplished, according to Bob Arnold of the
12 Metropolitan Edison Company. This is a potential hazard and
13 danger if we have a very severe winter this year.

14 Water continues to saturate the honeycombed
15 cement containment building, perhaps up to 10 to 12 inches
16 so far, a real clear danger of freezing and cracking the
17 cement that might be present this winter.

18 Metropolitan Edison continues to approach these
19 issues in an unplanned manner with ever-present cost/benefit
20 analysis. A cost/benefit analysis that pits the cost to the
21 company of doing the right thing versus the benefit or lack
22 of benefit to the public.

23 Clearly the public is the loser.

24 Two, if there is a problem with the emergency
25 core cooling system of Unit 2 during the cleanup, and since

1 Unit 2 is still not in cold shutdown due to the extensive
2 damage to the core preventing necessary circulation to the
3 center of the core, Unit 1 must remain in a backup status
4 to receive possible waste storage or to help with water
5 circulation if necessary.

6 CHAIRMAN SMITH: How long do you have to go?

7 MR. PRELESNIK: I have about two more minutes.

8 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Okay, I suspect that your rate
9 of delivery is going to be awfully fast for the reporter
10 to pick up. Would you make available what you're reading
11 from?

12 MR. PRELESNIK: Everything I say will be given
13 to you in typed form at a later date.

14 CHAIRMAN SMITH: All right. Thank you.

15 MR. PRELESNIK: Three, where man is involved, the
16 "perfectly safe" reactor will never be built. Infallibility
17 is impossible. The dangers are too great, the risks too
18 many. All risk analysis has had to be reassessed and
19 updated in light of the TMI Unit 2 accident.

20 You have already noted that the NRC itself has
21 called the Unit 2 accident a Class 9 accident. The Rasmussen
22 assumptions must be reassessed, as well as all other risk
23 factor assessment studies. Unit 1 has the same basic design
24 with all of the same inherent problems as Unit 2. Unit 1 is
25 an accident waiting to happen.

1 Four, I believe that extreme danger exists in
2 regard to the dams across the Susquehanna River just below
3 Three Mile Island.

4 These dams are named the Yorkhaven Hydrodam, and
5 the East Cannel Dam. The Yorkhaven Dam is a very old one.
6 It is cracked in several places, and the cement is crumbling
7 away at several other spots. This dam will probably not
8 withstand another major flood.

9 If that dam continues to weaken and eventually
10 breaks, the cooling inlet pipes for TMI 1 and 2 will
11 possibly be above the water level and unable to draw cooling
12 water from the river. Therefore, a LOCA will probably occur.
13 This risk is present even now for Unit 2. We do not need
14 to add to it with Unit 1.

15 What is currently being done to prevent this
16 LOCA from happening?

17 I don't expect an answer at this point, but I
18 would like a written reply later on to the questions that
19 are raised here.

20 Five, I believe that a true danger exists in
21 regard to the highly radioactive water in the containment
22 building. That is: When the concrete becomes wet, when it
23 is irradiated, there could be what is called a "radiation
24 dissociation" of the water to hydrogen and oxygen, which
25 would actually create an explosive mixture, turning the

1 reactor into a bomb.

2 What is being done to ensure that this will not
3 happen at TMI Unit 2?

4 Six, lastly, the public must be told the truth
5 about the need for and probability of an evacuation around
6 a nuclear power plant in the event of a meltdown. In effect,
7 we the people surrounding these plants would be written off.
8 We would become a "nonentity."

9 A nuclear meltdown is not a natural disaster.
10 Each nuclear disaster is unique and unpredictable. No
11 matter how good the plans are, or how many disaster exercises
12 are held, evacuation in a metropolitan area is impossible.

13 Our officials have grossly underestimated the
14 chaos, panic, and general disruption that would be caused
15 by a meltdown situation.

16 May I quote Dr. William Weidner, Chief of
17 Radiology, of the Hershey Medical Center in an article that
18 appeared in the Journal of the American Hospital Association
19 May 1st, 1979:

20 "... radioactivity poses a psychological threat
21 not present in other disasters. Nurses are
22 dedicated and trained to helping the sick, but many
23 of our nurses were caught between conflicting
24 drives -- wanting to help their patients by
25 staying at the hospital and wanting to help

1 their families by evacuating. When we had the
2 floods at Wilkes-Barre and Johnstown a few years
3 ago, the American Red Cross put out a call for
4 volunteers and was swamped -- 400 in one day. I'm
5 told that when it put out a call for volunteers to
6 fight radioactivity, it came up with only
7 four."

8 I would also like to quote Dr. William DeMuth, Jr., also of
9 Hershey Medical Center:

10 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Could you give me again another
11 estimate of how long it's going to take, since you've
12 already exceeded your earlier estimate?

13 MR. PRELESNIK: About one minute and I'll be
14 done.

15 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Okay, thank you.

16 MR. PRELESNIK: I'd also like to quote
17 Dr. William DeMuth, Hershey Medical Center:

18 "The danger may be so immense that battlefield
19 decision making will be required. And if we have
20 massive amounts of radiation, the effects of
21 which are often irreversible, we may have to
22 decide whom we try to save and whom we let die."

23 As stated in WASH-740 regarding the worst
24 possible accident and the problem of evacuation -- being the
25 necessity to rapidly evacuate a 92-square-mile area stretching

1 to a point as far as 100 miles downwind, and a slower
2 evacuation required up to 320 miles downwind. According
3 to this statement, your present evacuation plans are grossly
4 unacceptable and inadequate on dealing with a 5- to 20-mile
5 radius.

6 I was directly involved in the planning for the
7 possible evacuation of the hospitals in the Harrisburg
8 area. There were 18 ambulances available to evacuate over
9 300 patients in the hospitals in this community. It would
10 have required help of some sort.

11 Those patients needed medical support systems of
12 various types in order to prevent jeopardizing their health
13 and lives. Our hospital alone would have required a minimum
14 of 48 hours under "ideal" conditions to safely evacuate
15 those 200 type of patients that we had in our hospital at
16 that time.

17 In summary, I would like to leave you with this
18 thought:

19 I was taught as an engineer and a businessman
20 to be very pragmatic, logical, and objective in approaching
21 problems. I have approached the TMI problem in the same way.

22 In my judgment, when looking at TMI in that light,
23 I still come to the conclusion that nuclear energy is wrong,
24 considering the areas of ethics, economics, health, and
25 safety.

1 My family evacuated for 10 days to Pittsburgh,
2 but I remained to run the hospital. I was torn between
3 family and duty. I expected never to see my family again.
4 The continuing fight with an insensitive, uncaring, and
5 incompetent and uninformed industry and government has been
6 extremely time-consuming, stressful, fatiguing on myself
7 and my family, with a total and complete disruption of our
8 lifestyles and the quality of our lives has decreased
9 substantially.

10 This nuclear madness must stop, and let us begin
11 by permanently closing TMI 1 and 2 as a nuclear power plant
12 now.

13 Thank you.

14 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

15 (Applause.)

16 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mr. Prelesnik, if we could have
17 your statement, if we could have your written statement now --
18 the reason we would like to have it now, if possible, is
19 it would greatly assist the reporter in getting that into
20 the written transcript. Because your delivery was quite
21 rapid and lengthy, and they could use that as a checking
22 against their records, if it's available.

23 Would that be helpful?

24 THE REPORTER: Yes, sir.

25 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Yes, it would be quite helpful.

1 MR. PRELESNIK: I have no problem in doing that.
2 I did not have a chance to Xerox this from my own files
3 beforehand. Is there a copying machine available?

4 VOICE: There's a Xerox in the library.

5 CHAIRMAN SMITH: They'll return it to you.

6 MR. PRELESNIK: Do you have a copier available
7 here?

8 (Discussion off the record.)

9 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mr. Arnold?

10 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF LARRY ARNOLD,
11 HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA.

12 MR. ARNOLD: Our name is Larry Arnold. We're
13 from Harrisburg. We would first like to apologize to the
14 transcriber. Our delivery will probably be rapid, but we
15 were up until all last night preparing our testimony only
16 to find out that the Xerox machine was broken this morning --
17 one of those technological problems beyond our control.

18 CHAIRMAN SMITH: May I ask, do you have an
19 estimate of how long your presentation is going to be?

20 MR. ARNOLD: We would hope that it will consume
21 about 6-1/2 minutes. We're going to appreciate our prepared
22 testimony, because we do intend to deliver it to you for
23 your records, with footnotes.

24 CHAIRMAN SMITH: I thank you.

25 MR. ARNOLD: You're welcome.

1 We would first like to succinctly and strongly
2 our support for all contentions raised before you by the
3 legal intervenors in this case. There was sufficient
4 evidence we feel for reasonable decisionmaking process to
5 uphold each contention, thereby fulfilling your charge from
6 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and to the people of
7 this area, mandating that TMI 1 not be permitted to generate
8 as a nuclear-fueled facility.

9 There are several aspects, however, which warrant
10 your further attention and investigation so that your
11 consideration of this matter may be more complete and
12 thorough as regards public safety and health.

13 The first category is: Deficiencies in design,
14 construction, and operation of Unit 1.

15 Met Ed has, according to information delivered
16 to us, installed rusty pump systems during the installation
17 of piping systems at Unit 1. There is an item called
18 "desynthesis holes" in which construction was so haphazard
19 and ill-planned that large craters had to be dug up on
20 site to determine the location of underground piping so
21 that when new piping was installed it wasn't cut apart.

22 We received numerous indications from independent
23 sources that the containment building of Unit 1 suffered
24 honeycombing during the pouring of concrete. We've been
25 unable to substantiate this ourself. We're still trying.

1 If we succeed, we will certainly let you gentlemen know.

2 I would ask that you keep an eye open for indica-
3 tions that honeycombing was in effect, because as you
4 probably know, Public Service Indiana's Marble Hill Plant
5 has been shut down by the NRC because of honeycombing
6 problems and coverups.

7 Earthquake vulnerability to Unit 1: Metropolitan
8 Edison has admitted that it has used less than design-
9 specification strap hangers in piping installed at Unit 1,
10 and as Pennsylvania Geological and Topographical Survey
11 personnel have recently identified, a new fault system west
12 of Three Mile Island, and that in the last couple of years
13 there have been two earthquakes in northern Lancaster
14 County and the geologists cannot identify as to source.

15 We feel it is incumbent upon the Board to
16 reassess Unit 1's ability to meet seismic resistance
17 standards.

18 Control room design: It's been our impression
19 that Unit 2 is quite similar in design control room wise to
20 Unit 3. The Safety Commission found major faults with the
21 design of Unit 3, even though Jack Lambert told us awhile
22 back in 1977 that the control room was adequately designed
23 and that his personnel were able to respond to any and all
24 indications from the control panels.

25 If the same shortcomings are still inherent in

1 Unit 1 and Met Ed has not given us any indication that they
2 have made any major changes in the control system at Unit 1,
3 then we feel that this warrants continued suspension of the
4 operating license for Unit 1.

5 Security: We have a council of guards who get
6 drunk on the job, who play games with security cameras, who
7 violate and succeed in breaching "impregnable top security
8 zones," who allow trespassers to gain access to the site
9 for 1 to 1-1/2 hours, and then escape without apprehension,
10 who turn off parameter defense alarms without checking to
11 see if the alarms are being triggered by intruders,
12 terrorists, or rabbits; and that security doors and hatches
13 have been left unlocked.

14 In these ways and likely others, Met Ed has
15 fulfilled its licensing requirement to protect the people
16 of south central Pennsylvania.

17 The threat of terrorism, as has been indicated
18 here against Unit 1, if it is restarted, is bound to increase
19 over what it has been in the past. Therefore, such lax
20 security procedures cannot be tolerated by this Board which
21 must decide if Met Ed shows an inclination to literally
22 "batten down its hatches."

23 Contention of Fuel storage pool: Bob Arnold in
24 a conversation with us yesterday was unable to indicate to
25 us whether or not there was sufficient waste storage volume

1 on site to handle the waste products that will come out of
2 the cleanup of Unit 2, and possibly handle spent fuel
3 assemblies that would be produced as a result of bringing
4 Unit 1 back on line say in the spring of 1980.

5 CHAIRMAN SMITH: That is one of our issues.

6 MR. ARNOLD: Good. Excellent. Thank you.

7 Operational finances: GPU President Herman
8 Dieckamp before Governor Thornburgh yesterday, that in order
9 for Met Ed to remain solvent it requires (a) rate hikes;
10 and (b) that TMI 1 be back on line.

11 Therefore, Met Ed is financially able to operate
12 Unit 1 if Unit 1 is restarted, and not able to operate if
13 Unit 1's license is suspended. It doesn't seem to us that
14 the utility is giving the people and the Board really much
15 of a choice in this particular matter of financial solvency.

16 Response to Crises: Met Ed has twice assured
17 the AEC and the NRC, and hence the public, that notification
18 of emergencies would be conducted through proper channels
19 within minutes. During the March 28th LOCA incident at
20 Unit 2, the sequence was neither through proper channels
21 nor prompt.

22 Earlier that afternoon, John Harbein was telling
23 the public that TMI 2 was under control, and that it would
24 be back operating normally within a few days or weeks.

25 We had talked earlier that day with a plant safety

1 personnel who had come off-site. He had been telling us
2 the parameters, the scenario of the accident's development,
3 and he was concerned and we had great reason to be concerned
4 ourselves.

5 We looked at him when Jack Herbein was making
6 these statements before the press and we'll quote his
7 reply: "Herbein doesn't know what the fuck he's talking
8 about."

9 We want to be assured, and we would like the
10 Board to also consider whether it can be assured that such
11 miscomprehensions and/or misrepresentations of events by
12 Met Ed spokesman will not occur again if Unit 1 restarts
13 and subsequently develops its own crises.

14 We suggest that the issue of how Metropolitan
15 Edison as a corporate company responds to stress, and
16 whether the company's psychological profile indicates a
17 tendency to jeopardize others simply to protect itself,
18 and we would like to suggest -- even though it is beyond
19 the scope of your charge -- that your colleagues in the NSM
20 also develop psychological profiles for all nuclear utility
21 companies in the United States. We feel it has great
22 advantages.

23 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Is there such a science?

24 MR. ARNOLD: We are honestly not qualified
25 to give that question a "yes" or "no."

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Okay.

2 MR. ARNOLD: We feel it warrants investigation.

3 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

4 MR. ARNOLD: We are not going to address evacuation
5 per se, because the intervenors are already doing that
6 formally. However, we would like to submit, just for your
7 edification, that in 1977 before fellow colleagues on the
8 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, the Dauphine County
9 Civil Defense Director in testifying to the efficacy of
10 his evacuation plans for an accident at TMI said that the
11 11,000 residents within the 4.0 mile radius maximum hypo-
12 thetical area could be evacuated within "20 minutes."

13 On testimony such as that, the Atomic Safety and
14 Licensing Board decided to grant an operating license for
15 Unit 2. Also at the same time, Mr. Malloy indicated to the
16 ASLB that his evacuation plan was not finalized, it would be
17 later that year.

18 That, in the case that Unit 1 did not -- and in
19 our view still does not have -- an adequate emergency evacua-
20 tion plan, it seems that this is in direct contradic on to
21 the parameters under which that utility is allowed to obtain
22 an operator license.

23 CHAIRMAN SMITH: This is also one of the mandatory
24 issues in our proceeding.

25 MR. ARNOLD: We submit that comment, then, for

1 your consideration as the kind of testimony that was let
2 into the record and adopted in the past regarding TMI.

3 Psychological stress obviously has resulted from
4 the accident at TMI. That really can't be denied based on
5 what you gentlemen and Dr. Little have observed here in the
6 last three days. But the issue is whether it's relevant
7 to the hearing on Unit 1's restart.

8 The NRC staff, which in our view has not been
9 the most perceptive lot, has stated, as you know, that
10 psychological distress is not legally an item to be considered.
11 However, -- Well, we will pass over that and you may read
12 our comments in the transcript.

13 One reason the NRC staff has concluded this is
14 because they said that stress was not allowed to be
15 considered in the licensing of Unit 1. Our comment to that
16 is simply that it wasn't allowed, just as in the licensing
17 of Unit 2 and Unit 1 again considerations of a Class 9
18 incident were not allowed to be discussed.

19 As long as we develop a licensing process with
20 these kinds of parameters, we can selectively choose what is
21 conducive and favorable to the company, to the nuclear
22 industry, and what isn't.

23 Dr. Little, as a biologist, do you not
24 acknowledge a sacred essence, yet unidentified by science,
25 that distinguishes yourself from a corpse?

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Well, I don't really think --
2 That's a rhetorical question. We'll just go on. I think
3 your point will be appreciated by Dr. Little.

4 MR. ARNOLD: The point is, from that question,
5 that in our view Unit 1 is not simply nuts and bolts. It's
6 people, people who operate it, people who assess it, and
7 people who live within its range of destruction.

8 CHAIRMAN SMITH: I can assure you of Dr. Little's
9 sensitivity.

10 MR. ARNOLD: Excellent. That's very encouraging.

11 Then we would sincerely believe that the issue
12 of psychological stress which has been so evident in the
13 last three days before Dr. Jordan, Mr. Smith, and Dr. Little,
14 will be entered and adopted into the formal guidelines
15 considerations of Unit 1's restart petition.

16 DR. LITTLE: I will just tell you one thing
17 that might interest you. My daughter is a psychologist.

18 MR. ARNOLD: There are other stress factors,
19 however, that get beyond simple psychological distress.
20 There's a thing called a "life stress incident," life event
21 stress. We've talked to psychologists, people in the
22 community around Three Mile Island who deal professionally
23 with people who come under stress situations for a variety
24 of reasons. Those individuals, as we said in our transcript,
25 have told us that people may cope with X number of stressful

1 events, but if they find one more incident -- and we
2 were told specifically of Three Mile Island being that
3 incident -- that becomes in essence the straw that breaks
4 the camel's back. People can no longer cope physically,
5 psychologically. They are likely to become involved in
6 accidents, industrial accidents, automobile accidents, and
7 endangering not only their own lives, but lives of other
8 people in the general community.

9 We would also like the Board to consider the
10 aspect of psychophysiological stress. Dr. Hans Saw (phona-
11 tic), who is Director of the Institute on Experimental
12 Medicine and Surgery at the University of Montreal and the
13 world's foremost expert on the effects of stress on the
14 human physiology, has concluded that the influence of
15 conditioning factors which determine sensitivity, or
16 disease-proneness, a normally well tolerated degree of
17 stress can become pathogenic and cause diseases of adapta-
18 tion, selectively affecting disposed bodily areas.

19 Some of these effects which he and his colleagues
20 have identified as resulting from stress factors in the
21 human physiology are neurophysiological activity disruptions,
22 endocrine and immunological imbalances, blood supply and
23 pressure dysfunctions, changes in the respiratory rate
24 and pattern and digestive processes that are disrupted.

25 Also, women's menstrual cycles are adversely

1 affected by stressful situations -- not only psychophysiolo-
2 gically, but we've done a number of interviews with people
3 in the area who in our view have manifested physiological
4 dysfunction directly as a result of low-level radiation
5 emitted primarily during the first three days of the accident
6 at Unit 2.

7 If Unit 1 is allowed to come back on line, and
8 we will submit to you what we feel is evidence to support
9 that statement. If Unit 1 comes back on line, we have seen
10 no indication, heard no indication of any authority that
11 what happened at Unit 2 can be precluded from happening at
12 Unit 1.

13 CHAIRMAN SMITH: What is your time schedule
14 now? You have substantially exceeded your estimate -- which
15 I understand. This is a natural thing that happens, but
16 what is your estimate now, sir?

17 MR. ARNOLD: We have a few pages which we will
18 synopsise. We'd try two minutes? Would you grant us that,
19 sir?

20 CHAIRMAN SMITH: And then, if you have not had
21 time to make your entire points, if we can come back to you
22 at the end, we will. But there are still others that I'm
23 still concerned about reaching them.

24 MR. ARNOLD: We apologize for infringing on those,
25 and we appreciate your leniency.

1 Dr. Sell finds four stress factors that are
2 the worst stresses: That is, hatred, anger, fear, and
3 frustration.

4 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Now have you considered working
5 with some of the intervenors who have raised psychological
6 stress issues? You seem to have done a lot of work on it.

7 Go ahead, I'm sorry to interrupt, but I just
8 wondered if you have considered that avenue of input with
9 your ideas?

10 MR. ARNOLD: Yes, sir.

11 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Go ahead.

12 MR. ARNOLD: Thank you.

13 Those four emotions we have observed to have
14 predominated the aftermath of Unit 2 and have contributed
15 psychophysiologically to deleterious health impacts on the
16 population of this area, and the same impacts are going to
17 result if Unit 1 is allowed to restart.

18 Psychological damage compounded already by
19 Unit 1 that would result from a restart -- I'm sorry, of
20 Unit 2 that would result from a restart of Unit 1 in our
21 view would have really serious problems, cause really
22 serious problems to the health of the people in this area,
23 or become an integral part of their life every day that
24 Unit 1 would fission again.

25 In our view, the bottom line in this issue is

1 found within the NRC's charge to this Board: That the
2 Commission presently lacks the requisite reasonable assurance
3 that the licensee's Three Mile Island Unit 1 facility can be
4 operated without endangering the health and safety of the
5 public.

6 We do not feel that that kind of reassurance can
7 ever be alleviated. That the Unit 1 cannot be operated as
8 a nuclear facility without endangering the safety, health,
9 well being of the residents here.

10 If you recommend that Three Mile Island Unit No. 1
11 remain closed as a nuclear plant, then we will all know that
12 we have been remembered for the three days that you spent in
13 south central Pennsylvania and that you hold our psychophysio-
14 logical wellbeing dear to your hearts.

15 If you recommend a restart, however, then we will
16 know that once again we have been abandoned. We have always
17 been told that machinery is expendable, but human beings are
18 not. At this moment, we have great reason, great hope that
19 the three Atomic Safety and Licensing Board members that we're
20 addressing will concur with our view, and that with a
21 humanitarian outlook would throw away the machinery that
22 Three Mile Island Unit 1 and its catastrophic threats.

23 But please, please don't throw us away again.

24 (Applause.)

25 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

1 Nancy Prelesnik, please, who will be followed by
2 Paul Nolan.

3 MS. PRELESNIK: Could I (inaudible).

4 CHAIRMAN SMITH: All right, thank you.

5 Ms. Prelesnik said she requested she be put at
6 the end of the speakers for the day because she is having
7 difficulty composing herself.

8 Did I understand you correctly, ma'am?

9 MS. PRELESNIK: Yes.

10 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mr. Nolan, please?

11 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF PAUL NOLAN.

12 MR. NOLAN: Every day I make it a point to read
13 the local paper so I can keep myself fairly well informed
14 on the situation. Several days ago I read that there would
15 be hearings held on the extraordinary nuclear occurrence,
16 and oddly enough I found this article on the page with the
17 obituaries. I just happened to notice it as I was passing
18 through.

19 Well, what my question is: Will the hearings on
20 the extraordinary nuclear occurrence be widely publicized
21 so that people can attend? Or will they be better publicized
22 than this event was?

23 CHAIRMAN SMITH: We don't understand thoroughly
24 the nature of those hearings, either. Those are not
25 adjudicative hearings such as this where a decision and

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

judicial officers are presiding. This is a hearing which relates to the Price-Anderson Act, and the reach of the liability and the insurance problems.

I have no idea how those hearings are going to be conducted. They don't directly relate to the issue of the startup of Unit 1, only as they might indirectly relate to financial qualifications, but we don't know about that, even.

END JWB10

1380 049

1 MR. NOLAN: Okay, thank you.

2 And then another problem was several years ago,
3 whenever TMI Unit 1 and Unit 2 were coming on line, one
4 problem that was never addressed or never fully comprehended
5 was the aircraft crash damage to reach the containment.

6 Will that issue be considered in the licensing
7 or relicensing of TMI-1?

8 CHAIRMAN SMITH: The issue of the airplane crash-
9 ing into Unit 2 is in fact going to be heard in this area.
10 After the beginning of the year, that was an issue that
11 remained unresolved, in Unit 2, so that issue is going to be
12 heard. The issue has a definite relationship to Unit 1.
13 The aircraft problem will be heard by a separate board, and
14 we will await -- we don't know yet the relationship between
15 that hearing to this hearing. It is a problem that we are
16 still working on.

17 MR. NOLAN: Okay. And you said earlier that
18 the transcript of these hearings and all the hearings will be
19 published. My question is are we going to have to pay for
20 that document and any other documents?

21 CHAIRMAN SMITH: The transcripts will be available
22 for examination at several places, including this very building.

23 MR. NOLAN: So then we can't write in to get it
24 for free?

25 CHAIRMAN SMITH: No, you can't. These transcripts

1 are -- for example, here is yesterday's, and this costs a
2 lot of money.

3 VOICE: We are paying for it.

4 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Well, you are paying for it, and
5 I agree, but you are addressing your concerns to the wrong
6 person. I simply have no authority with which I can provide
7 those transcripts.

8 VOICE: You shouldn't have any authority.

9 VOICE: The NRC does.

10 VOICE: Sounds like a cop-out.

11 MR. NOLAN: Another question that's been addressed
12 many times today, will the mental stress issue be considered
13 in the hearings, or will you recommend that it be considered
14 or be a formal recommendation or consideration?

15 CHAIRMAN SMITH: What, the psychological stress,
16 is that what you meant?

17 MR. NOLAN: Yes.

18 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Psychological distress issue is --
19 we are in the process now of receiving arguments and briefs
20 from the various intervenors and the parties, and discussion
21 of the nature of the evidence and, of course, we are listening
22 to people here telling us how important that is.

23 Then we are going to have to refer the entire
24 matter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for their
25 judgment to decide whether we will hear it.

1 MR. NOLAN: Okay. Thank you.

2 And you mentioned that there will be further rounds
3 of hearings in this licensing procedure. Will there be time
4 for public input on every step of the way, or after it goes
5 so far, will it be limited only to the formal intervenors, or --

6 CHAIRMAN SMITH: The opportunity for practical
7 purposes, the evidence is prepared, the testimony, and the
8 documents which are going to be received in evidence, are
9 prepared in advance of the evidentiary hearing, and disseminated
10 among the parties and the Board.

11 At any time, no matter what the stage of the hearing
12 is, that this Board should learn of a matter of significant
13 safety concerns that belongs in the hearing, we want to know
14 about it, and we will make the necessary adjustments. But
15 the normal rate -- the normal pace of the hearing is that
16 the evidence is prepared before the hearing begins.

17 Then there is cross-examination and arguments
18 during -- I commend to you, or I recommend to you that you
19 attend those hearings.

20 MR. NOLAN: Okay, thank you.

21 I'd like to know -- some of you people here might
22 know -- what does the Three Mile Island license say regarding
23 the storage of waste on the island? And the point of the
24 question is what will happen to the highly contaminated
25 resins left over from the operation of the EPICOR II system?

1 Is this allowed under their license, or has the license
2 been adapted? Are they operating in violation of their
3 license?

4 CHAIRMAN SMITH: The question, the Nuclear
5 Regulatory Commission has authorized -- and this is outside
6 what we are doing here, but I happen to know the answer, so
7 I will tell you -- the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
8 authorized Metropolitan Edison Company to begin using the
9 EPICOR system.

10 It has also created a special board, separate from
11 us, to consider the issue if a hearing on it is required.

12 As I understand it, the Commission by order
13 has authorized EPICOR, and then you are referring to a license
14 modification as an implementing means by which they may do it.

15 MR. NOLAN: I'd just like to clear up a few
16 remarks.

17 Currently at school we are studying the Roman
18 Empire. The Romans managed to move water miles without
19 problems.

20 Twice in the past year Met Ed has shown their
21 incompetence and thoroughly destroyed 2000 years of plumbing
22 knowledge by developing bubbles in their pipes.

23 They have proven many times over their incompetence
24 to run a nuclear facility. A speaker several minutes ago
25 said that he supported the peaceful use of the atom as

1 started by President Eisenhower.

2 I think a few people here need to be reminded
3 that Eisenhower's policy concerning nuclear power was,
4 "Keep 'em confused."

5 The same man also mentioned the breakdown of
6 communications between the public and the officials. When
7 it came to information, we could have been considered virtually
8 blind. This combined with Dr. Denton's infamous remark of a
9 blind man stumbling in the dark, shows a perfect example of
10 the blind leading the blind.

11 The only reasonable, rational thing to do is to let
12 Three Mile Island go the way of the Enrico Fermi Reactor
13 near Detroit.

14 Thank you.

15 [Applause.]

16 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Now may I call upon the gentleman
17 from State College, if you're prepared, sir?

18 I want to apologize. You weren't prepared to
19 speak, and I hope I didn't take you by surprise.

20 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF ED WALSH.

21 MR. WALSH: No, I'm not going to say much. I
22 just wanted to kind of reiterate the same points that I
23 brought up and that Bob Coleman brought up with you in the
24 corridor.

25 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Okay, would you mind giving --

1 MR. WALSH: I'm sorry, my name is Ed Walsh. I'm
2 Assistant Professor of Sociology at Penn State University
3 in University Park.

4 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Assistant professor of what?

5 MR. WALSH: Sociology.

6 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Sociology.

7 MR. WALSH: My point is briefly that I think --
8 and others have made it, it's not a new point -- I want to
9 just develop it a little bit. It's a mistake to just consider
10 this issue as a technological one, and perhaps I'm wrong,
11 but I am under the impression that there's a strong thrust
12 in that direction, even though I know you've clarified it a
13 number of times. But that is the fear of a lot of people,
14 that it's going to be considered merely as a technological
15 issue, and I know that you have said time and again that
16 that point hasn't been decided. I just want to reiterate that
17 I think it would be a very serious mistake if you do just
18 consider, oh, the safety of the pipes and this, that and the
19 other thing that I'm certainly not qualified to speak to.

20 Right now, by almost all assessments, the nuclear
21 question is very much a social and political question, in
22 addition to being a technological one, and I think that the
23 wrong decision about what to consider could have very serious
24 unintended consequences, and that's the point.

25 Not considering the psychological, if this happens

ar11-7

1 that the NRC decides to follow its staff's recommendations
2 not to consider the psychological, it seems to me and to many
3 others that it would be almost equivalent to saying to the
4 people, "Tough. Just tough."

5 All right. Then people can react in a number of
6 different ways. They can either move or feel bad or become
7 nervous persons, or they might lash out at this apparently
8 illegitimate decision, and I think that you people have to
9 consider that, and I know that you're going to try to, or at
10 least I hope you are.

11 Psychological stress may lead to serious political
12 alienation and a challenge to the legitimacy of the system,
13 and I think that has to be considered.

14 [Applause.]

15 And I'm not really interested in rabble-rousing
16 at all. I personally am studying the groups in the area,
17 trying to understand it, because I teach social movements,
18 and I know that the groups have already formed. They are
19 very far along the way in their organization, and in planning
20 goals, and they are looking beyond the NRC's decision.

21 Many in these groups, perhaps erroneously, are
22 assuming that the NRC is going to decide against them, and
23 that they are going to have to then go either to civil court
24 or perhaps to some other more drastic tactic.

25 A couple of speakers have already addressed that.

ar11-8

1 point. And so I guess I'm just saying that I think that's
2 a very serious consideration that should be taken into
3 account.

4 I don't want to get into this right now, but I
5 think the situation in Iran is an example of the situation
6 where that wasn't taken into account, where monied interests
7 dictated what happened -- this at least is the way many people
8 would interpret it -- that the Shah was brought back into this
9 country despite the tremendous anger that a lot of people in
10 that country, rightly or wrongly, felt towards him, primarily,
11 some say, because Rockefeller wanted him back in this country.
12 And now unintended consequences have flowed from that. That's
13 my point.

14 And I think that that same thing, you know, it
15 may seem absurd equating the reopening of TMI-1 with Iran,
16 but I think if you think about it, at least there's a
17 possibility of a link there, these unintended consequences.

18 So my final point is that I think you people need
19 real wisdom to defuse what may be a potential -- may be a
20 very explosive situation in this area, and I see your situation
21 not very much unlike that of Solomon, in the sense that you
22 had two parties, basically two parties before you, claiming
23 to love life and to love children, and you have to decide
24 which of these two is telling the truth.

25 Good luck.

1380 057

ar11-9

1 [Applause.]

2 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Ms. Preslenik, are you ready to
3 proceed now?

4 LIMITED APPEARANCE STATEMENT OF MS. PRESLENIK.

5 MS. PRESLENIK: Mr. Chairman, Drs. Jordan and
6 Little, NRC Staff, and counsel for Met Ed:

7 Thank you for the opportunity for speaking before
8 you today, and addressing these issues.

9 I will not be presenting what I had planned on
10 presenting to you. I will be forwarding it to you in length
11 and in written form early next week.

12 Please excuse my composure. I don't normally lose
13 it. When Pat Street spoke this morning, she was trying to
14 stop from crying, and I couldn't, and a few of the speakers
15 have gotten to me, and I am in a position that I don't want
16 to be in.

17 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Would you like the light off?

18 MS. PRESLENIK: No, it's okay. It doesn't matter.

19 Also the presentation will be extremely dis-
20 organized, partly due to my condition.

21 I am a registered nurse. I have served in the
22 United States Air Force Nurse Corps from 1967 through '69.
23 My first disaster training was at age 14 in 1959 with the
24 Civil Defense, with additional training in nursing school,
25 the Red Cross, and the United States Air Force.

1380 058

1 I have participated in any local and county
2 disaster exercises and in California and Minnesota, and
3 also national events, as well as tornadoes and earthquakes.

4 I responded well and coped well, and I very
5 personally know exactly what war is all about.

6 I'm usually cool, collected, when necessary, and
7 I have always been prepared for the worst --

8 CHAIRMAN SMITH: I think we can come back to you
9 later.

10 MS. PRESLENIK: Well, I think the further I get
11 into it, I think I'll maybe do better, if you know what I mean.
12 I'll try it a little bit more.

13 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Take your time. We have plenty of
14 time to hear from you, and just do it your way, any way you
15 want to.

16 MS. PRESLENIK: Thank you.

17 I'm usually cool and collected, when necessary,
18 and I've always been prepared for the worst, with an
19 optimistic view that with enough knowledge and preparation
20 I could be a survivor and also contribute to the rescue work
21 needed.

22 I have always, until March 28th, 1979, had a
23 strong sense of duty and volunteered often for various
24 community needs.

25 That day and Friday, March 30th, changed my life

ar11-11

1 forever, unknowingly.

2 I moved from California only one year before the
3 accident to five and a half miles away from the plant. I
4 can assure you that if TMI-1 or 2 ever restart as a nuclear
5 station, I will leave Pennsylvania.

6 What I learned that day is that where I live, we
7 will not live if there is a meltdown. Probably our health
8 has also been affected.

9 I did trust the government, the NRC and related
10 agencies, that they would not be playing games with my life
11 and the lives of my family. But on Wednesday and Thursday,
12 I was very concerned and well aware of the exact situation,
13 we did not evacuate.

14 On Friday morning, when the news release of the
15 evacuation came out, my children were at school, my husband
16 at work, I was at home. My car was in for repairs and I was
17 left without transportation. Phone communication was
18 impossible.

19 Knowing my husband's position, I knew that he
20 would have to stay and he would be here. I guess I always
21 figured if there were to be a disaster, even though I would
22 probably be support, that at least we would be able to
23 communicate with one another and reorganize or get in touch
24 with our children and drop them off with friends or someone
25 that they could be well cared for, so that they were not going

1380 160

1 to be left alone without their parents, to deal with whatever
2 disaster would arise.

3 This was not going to be the case with this
4 situation, and if it ever happens again, it will be the same
5 situation.

6 The first hour I realized that I was telling
7 myself not to panic and to -- which I did not, and to do
8 the right things, start packing and make appropriate plans.
9 I did realize that I would probably not be able to get in
10 touch with my family because I had tried on the phone and
11 it was impossible.

12 I guess I felt that if we had to go, that we would
13 have liked to have died as a family unit together, or at
14 least have the opportunity to say goodbye and to tell them
15 that you love them, which isn't always true in a disaster.

16 Since Three Mile Island, I have felt like I am
17 dead, and I still feel that way, so I don't care if I
18 give my life to make sure that Three Mile Island is closed,
19 because I really feel like I'm dead.

20 I lost my happiness, my previous lifestyle, every-
21 thing I knew. What I had trust and faith in was robbed, it
22 was taken away from me, and there is nothing that this
23 government and responsible agencies has done since then to
24 restor that to me, and I doubt that it will happen. I
25 really seriously doubt it.

ar11-13

1 The situation at Unit 2 right now is still
2 terribly unstable, and I fear every single day, especially
3 at night, knowing some of the crew at night.

4 You just wonder when the next episode or transient
5 is going to happen at No. 2, and I just am not sure that we
6 are going to make it out of this area.

7 People that live close to the facility -- I do
8 realize and know that if there ever is a meltdown or
9 anything critically serious again at the plant, that I don't
10 expect to live or to be in touch with my family, from what
11 I learned from before. I just feel that that won't happen,
12 and it's something that shouldn't be nice to accept, but I
13 guess I've accepted that.

14 I don't like it, and I don't feel that I should
15 have to contend with things like that during a peacetime
16 America. I feel like I'm in a war zone, right in my own
17 country, during peaceful times, and it has robbed me and my
18 family of all our constitutional rights in the Bill of Rights,
19 and I will fight for Three Mile Island to be closed as
20 well as our rights to be restored.

21 I have some other fears, and I think that they
22 are well founded, and that is that these hearings --
23 previously in the past all these ASLB hearings have
24 basically been a rubber stamp, and I'm afraid that these
25 things are going to happen again, and last Thursday and

1380 162

1 Friday, I was upset as an observer in the audience that
2 they were not impartial.

3 I commend you for the hearings on Thursday and
4 Friday of this week, and on Wednesday of this week, I had
5 different feelings, but I don't know what to expect next
6 spring, and you can be assured that I will be present most
7 every day, and this is a personal interest that I have taken.
8 It has totally upset my lifestyle, seven days a week, 24 hours
9 a day, almost -- I sleep about two or three hours a night.
10 I am working to try and stop this nuclear madness from
11 continuing on, and I just will continue to see that it
12 happens.

13 I would like, I guess, a commitment from the
14 Board that maybe for the first time in history -- it wasn't
15 true of Watergate or any other -- not the Kemeny Commission,
16 either, but the truth and justice will prevail for the first
17 time. It hasn't happened, and I think it's time.

18 [Applause.]

19 In May of this year, a month and a half after
20 the accident, about a week or two after the plant went on
21 natural circulation, I became pregnant. It was not planned.
22 I had an IUD that was imbedded that I didn't know about at
23 the time, and I did not find out that I was pregnant until
24 the beginning of July.

25 There was no physician that could reassure me that

1 there would be no adverse effects -- not that they predicted
2 that there would be, but he could not reassure me that there
3 wouldn't be.

4 Also at the very same time, our cat, who had been
5 previously perfectly healthy, with no problems at all, died
6 of leukemia. The diagnosis did not come in until two weeks --
7 we had been nursing the cat religiously.

8 The veterinarian did state that if I were to be
9 pregnant -- or I asked him if there were any precautions that
10 should be taken in caring for the cat, you know, and he said,
11 "Well, if you're pregnant, just avoid any contact whatsoever
12 with the cat."

13 Well, I didn't know I was pregnant. I had missed
14 one period, and I thought that it was due to the increase in
15 the stress that I felt, and the fact that I was probably very
16 tired and overworked and dismissed it.

17 When I found out that I was pregnant, between
18 our cat dying of leukemia and the unknown releases, I did not
19 feel that I could carry through with this pregnancy; that,
20 coupled with my age, which I will be 35 on my next birthday --
21 any one of those figures -- or I should say any of those
22 facts, I would probably have taken the risk or gamble and
23 continued through with the pregnancy, but not with all three.
24 And so I had an abortion. I never thought I would have an
25 abortion. It was a difficult decision to arrive at, and

1 the abortion was painful.

2 Three weeks ago I had a laparoscopy, or my tubes
3 tied, because I know that we will not be able to leave this
4 state for the next year or two, and I don't want to have a
5 baby in this state, nor living where I am, because even though
6 I could be assured that my baby was still free of birth
7 defect, I could not be assured of what would be happening
8 with Unit 2 for the duration of my pregnancy, or for the
9 duration of that child's first year or two of life, which
10 would be a critical period, and so I knew that a sterilization
11 procedure was really the only way to approach the issue.

12 I feel very sorry for young couples that still
13 want to have a family. They are doing it in a time that was
14 not like when I had my children. It's so ridden with fears
15 that I couldn't go through it.

16 Also I don't think I could cope with a child
17 that was born normally, but developed leukemia or cancer
18 some time within its first year or two, or even at any age,
19 at say five, six, or 10, and that's a fear that I have to
20 still contend with with my own children.

21 Due to technology, some of it being medical, as
22 well as the nuclear technology, in our world, when we've
23 been given something on the market before, there's been
24 adequate research and testing, and it's true of the
25 nuclear issues from day one in its history and inception.

1 My husknd received high doses of radiation for his
2 acne when he was a teenager. Since then it's not carried out
3 because it's definitely proven to have been dangerous and
4 cancer-producing.

5 I received a mammography for a breast mass when
6 I was pregnant with my youngest child, and had surgery.
7 That child received high doses of radiation in utero and also
8 in its first year of life because of ingestion had a fluoroscopic
9 procedure done.

10 That, in conjunction with normal x-ray procedures,
11 that are low dose, give us sufficient cause to be really
12 concerned about our levels. Now we are faced with additional
13 environmental sources of radiation, low and high. I just
14 really don't see how the Board or the NRC can justify the
15 releases that are released from nuclear power plants in conjunc-
16 tion with all of the various other releases that people get
17 that they have to receive.

18 I think it's asking us to pay too much.

19 As far as the economic issue -- and I would address
20 this at length in my written statement -- but when you look --
21 I'm looking at it objectively and logically. When you
22 approach the fuel cycle from the inception or the beginning of
23 it to the end, starting with mining to milling, enrichment,
24 fabrication, transportation, the nuclear facilities, waste,
25 the entire process, transportation being used

1 intermittently throughout the fuel cycle, and if I am incorrect
2 in some of my rough statements, I would wish that any one of
3 you would correct me, because if what I say, if my
4 assumptions are basically correct, by checking the statistics,
5 it would seem only logical that the answer would be no, so
6 right now currently the nuclear power industry provides
7 approximately -- and I've read specifics from anywhere from
8 10 to 15, so if you pick 13, 14 is irrelevant to me -- 13 or
9 14 percent of our electrical power from nuclear reactors.
10 When the picture is looked at from total power or total
11 energy production, it's more like around 3 to 5.

12 And again I've seen various figures -- 3 to
13 5 percent of our total energy needs are met by nuclear
14 reactors.

15 David Comey -- and I'm sure he was much more
16 astute at gathering information than I have been. I have
17 worked extensively on it for the last eight months, but I
18 know he worked for a lot longer -- has stated that the
19 nuclear enrichment process takes up 3 percent of our total
20 industry's energy.

21 If this is true, just from one area in the fuel
22 cycle alone, that 3 percent that nuclear reactors give us, is
23 used up, just in enrichment alone.

24 I would like that fact -- oh, investigated and
25 qualified.

1 Because if that's true, when you throw in all of
2 the rest of the energy needs along with the rest of the fuel
3 cycle, we aren't getting any energy then from nuclear
4 reactors, with all of the billions and billions of dollars
5 that we've spent on it.

6 It just seems illogical to continue on an
7 economic basis.

8 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mrs. Preslenik, if the rest of
9 your remarks are going to be addressed to the economic issues,
10 I thought it may be more reasonably set down in writing so
11 we could study them a little bit more carefully, because it's
12 very difficult to follow the reasoning orally that you're
13 making.

14 MS. PRESLENIK: I will be submitting them to you
15 in writing. This is all I really had to say. But I just --
16 just even on an objective, logical basis, as far as economics
17 alone, if those are correct facts, it seems that it's insanity
18 for us to keep spending billions upon billions of dollars
19 for nothing.

20 [Applause.]

21 If that's true.

22 [Applause.]

23 Thank you very much.

24 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you, ma'am.

lrwl2-1

1 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

2 This is the end. Is there anybody who has signed up
3 to give a statement who hasn't been called upon yet?

4 MR. KECK: I tried to sign up but they wouldn't take
5 me. I also, over a month ago, wrote you --

6 CHAIRMAN SMITH: When did you try to sign up?

7 MR. KECK: When I walked in this afternoon.

8 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Come on up and give your statement.
9 That was a misunderstanding. The message given to you is to
10 sign up, but we could not guarantee that we would have time
11 this afternoon. There was a misunderstanding there.

12 Is there anyone else who got the impression they
13 could not sign the register for statements? Yes? All right.

14 Go ahead and give your statement. We have to
15 adjourn this at three o'clock but we will continue to receive
16 statements until that time. I'm sorry for the confusion.

17 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF TED KECK

18 MR. KECK: I understand that this technology cannot
19 be made perfect. I witnessed that during the accident. And
20 the very idea of you thinking about restarting either one of
21 those damn reactors apalls me.

22 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Would you give your name?

23 MR. KECK: Ted Keck.

24 Unless you can insure absolute 100% perfection from
25 either one of those reactors, you should not even think of

13 0 369

lrw12-2

1 reopening them. And the authority -- I don't understand what
2 authority the three of you have on this issue at all. This
3 is an issue of the people that live near these reactors. It
4 can only be decided by the people that live near the reactors.
5 It cannot be decided by you and then go back to Washington and
6 hide where there is no nuclear reactor within 100 miles.

7 So this is an issue for the people living around
8 the reactor, within 20 miles or so of the reactor. This is not
9 for you to decide. Especially if you cannot assure one hundred
10 percent perfection. What makes you think that, if you can't
11 build a perfect reactor, you can build a perfect backup system?

12 Now if we put it to a vote of the 25 mile radius of
13 the plant and the vote says go ahead and have it, I will
14 quietly move away and sell my property and not live here any
15 more. But your decision, if you decide to let that reactor
16 reopen, is invalid. I will not accept it. The only way is to
17 let the people have a referendum.

18 I feel that I will not live as close as I do to that
19 reactor or any reactor again in my life. You are talking
20 about the psychological aspects. I was damn scared when I left
21 here and I'm damn scared they will blow the cleanup.

22 They are talking about letting gas out again to an
23 already irradiated population. Everybody knows there is a
24 cumulative effect. There is no safe limit. Why are you trying
25 to let gas escape even more radiation on an already irradiated

lrwl2-3

1 public? This can be compressed, condensed into cryogenics and
2 hauled away. The only thing is that it's cheapest for Met Ed
3 to do it that way. Therefore, they want to do it.

4 Why are our lives being subject to what a corporate
5 entity wants to do with their own profits? They are trying to
6 make a profit off of our lives and I won't stand for that.

7 VOICE: Neither will a lot of other people!

8 VOICE: Me, too!

9 (Applause)

10 DR. LITTLE: May I respond a moment? Mr. Keck, I
11 think you probably came in later than most of the people. I
12 am from Raleigh, North Carolina and Dr. Jordan is from Oak
13 Ridge, Tennessee. I live within 20 miles of what will be the
14 largest reactor site in the United States eventually.

15 MR. KECK: I feel very sorry for you. I wouldn't
16 live there.

17 DR. LITTLE: I wanted to let you know we were not
18 all three from Washington.

19 MR. KECK: Well, I don't feel the NRC has the
20 authority, especially after what the Kemeny Commission said
21 about you, to do this. If you make the decision to close
22 TMI 1, I will accept it, but I won't accept opening it at all.

23 I have been extremely emotional through this whole
24 talk. I have been extremely emotional since the accident
25 happened. It changed my life. It changed the quality of my

lrw12-4

1 life. But I plan to stand up against it in any way possible.

2 (Applause)

3 This is my daughter, who would like to say something.

4 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF ERICA KECK

5 MS. KECK: When we moved, when that started happen-
6 ing, I was in school and they didn't tell us anything. Just
7 a big bell rang and they started closing windows and we heard
8 doors slamming. Our teacher wouldn't tell anything.

9 And then, when I got home, me and my mother had a
10 talk about what happened and then, later on in the night, we
11 went to the other -- we went to Virginia with my cousins and
12 my aunt and my uncle, and it was very scary.

13 My brother was asleep at the time -- not really
14 asleep but he was so sleepy, he didn't even notice what was
15 happening. He was only five years old.

16 I wrote a message I put in the newspaper. It is
17 called "Radiation Flowers." It says: "They didn't let us
18 decide if we wanted a nuclear plant. When they opened it,
19 they should have let the people vote on it -- not the govern-
20 ment decide -- because it is the people who will suffer; not
21 the people who keep it open.

22 "If they do have the nuclear plants, they should
23 put them where they won't hurt anybody, and if they let out
24 all the radiation, what would happen to all the farms and the
25 pretty flowers that would have been left behind?"

lrw12-5

1 That's all, thank you.

2 (Applause)

3 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Could we have your name?

4 MS. KECK: Erica Keck.

5 CHAIRMAN SMITH: How old are you?

6 MS. KECK: Nine.

7 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

8 Yes, Ma'am?

9 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF SANDRA NEVIUS

10 MS. NEVIUS: I am Sandra Nevius. I am from Harris-
11 burg. I will make this very brief.

12 Five years ago, I experienced a very stressful
13 traumatic experience. I lost my husband -- physically --
14 through an accident he had during his employment. He fell off
15 a building and died.

16 At that time, I came in contact with a physician
17 who told me that over 50% of widows and widowers experience or
18 develop serious diseases, usually terminal illnesses, within
19 three years of their traumatic experience. I thought to
20 myself: Sandy, you are not going to let that happen to you
21 because you will take control over what is happening to you.
22 And I did.

23 The episode we have all experienced here with Three
24 Mile Island is traumatic, and I can assure you it is worse
25 than I experienced when I lost my husband. I have felt that I

lrw12-26

1 have not been able to take control over what is happening to
2 me. We have all tried, but I can tell you I will not stop
3 trying. With all my heart and with all my soul, I will fight
4 to the end. I will. Because I will not allow myself to
5 develop an illness due to such an idiotic experience for us.

6 It is just -- we don't have control over it. We
7 don't. We are trying but the NRC, the government, the
8 utilities, will not allow us. But I can tell you the people
9 in this area will keep trying to the end.

10 Thank you.

11 (Applause)

12 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

13 Are there any other statements? Yes, sir.

14 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF JOHN ALDMAN

15 MR. ALDMAN: Hello. My name is John Aldman. I am
16 from Baltimore. I would like to make a very brief statement.

17 I would like you all to just look around this great
18 room, this hall we are gathered in, and look at the maps and
19 the stars and the empty seats. To me, the empty seats are
20 filled with people. The maps tell me of human struggles and
21 human victories and the stars tell me something about our
22 place in the great universe.

23 I just want the best for all of us. I want life.
24 We all want life. We must recognize that life is very deli-
25 cate and that if we are to uphold the efforts of the past and

lrw12-7

1 continue them, we must not desecrate our heritage.

2 Thank you.

3 (Applause)

4 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Is there anyone else? Yes, sir.

5 PR. PRELESNIK: Can I make one little last comment?

6 CHAIRMAN SMITH: I don't know if it will be the
7 last but you can make one now, sir.

8 FURTHER LIMITED APPEARANCE OF WARREN L. PRELESNIK

9 MR. PRELESNIK: We hear a lot these days about a
10 concept of corporate morality and ethics. I would like to
11 talk about that for a few minutes. As a businessman, I think
12 I can relate to it rather well.

13 What is meant by corporate morality or ethics? I
14 think it means that no man is an island unto himself. I
15 think you can translate that into a corporation. No corpora-
16 tion today is an island unto itself. The decisions that are
17 made by even the smallest company tucked in the back woods of
18 America or by the least significant person in that company can
19 have tremendous significant impacts on all of us throughout
20 the whole country, or even the world.

21 As an example, I can think about a small company in
22 California called Intel. Intel developed the first micro-
23 processor on a chip. That microprocessor on a chip is a very
24 small insignificant little thing barely the size of a pinhead
25 that will have tremendous impact on all of us for the next few

lrwl2-8 1 years and to our lives. A small contribution, a small thing
2 that will have a tremendous impact on all of us.

3 When a decision is made, I want it to be very clear
4 that corporations don't make decisions. People do. People
5 make decisions. Not a non-entity like a corporation. Not
6 a facility. Not a building. But people.

7 I, for one, as a businessman, do fully support the
8 profit motive. I am a capitalist. I believe in it. I think
9 that has been what made this country strong. It keeps innova-
10 tion in front of us at all times.

11 However, in today's environment, with the complexi-
12 ties of things we are faced with, I think it is imperative that
13 in any decision that any one of us make, no matter what your
14 industry, you bear in mind the morality and the ethics of mak-
15 ing that decision, the effects that decision will have on you
16 as a company and your profits, on your neighbors, on their
17 health and welfare, the environment surrounding us, or your
18 general community or, in a larger sense, this United States or
19 the Earth, itself.

20 All of us today, because of the fast changing
21 technologies, must remember what impact it has on our neigh-
22 bors. The technology, no matter big or large, and the fact
23 is the higher the technology, the bigger the impact. The more
24 capital intensive the technology, the bigger the impact.

25 I, for one, enjoy my work. Perhaps it is because I

lrw12-9

1 can go home at night, look in the mirror and feel good about
2 what I have done for my fellow man. I work in a hospital. I
3 feel I have accomplished something for my people.

4 I wish you could do the same thing.

5 Thank you, and my daughter would --

6 (Applause)

7 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Mr. Prelesnik, you and Mrs.
8 Prelesnik have occupied a great deal of time. We appreciate
9 hearing from you but we have another person who wants to make
10 a statement. Is that your son? Does he want to make a
11 statement?

12 MR. PRELESNIK: My daughter. She wanted to say
13 something. Maybe after we are done....

14 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Yes.

15 Let's get Barbara Light now.

16 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF BARBARA LIGHT

17 MS. LIGHT: I had a very long statement which I keep
18 having and I will send to you but I don't feel that it is
19 appropriate at this point.

20 I want to share only one or two thoughts with you.
21 One of them that is most significant to me is that from what I
22 have observed from the time I have been here, what you have
23 been hearing from, the people you have been hearing from are
24 the strong people. You have been hearing from the people who,
25 although they have experienced overwhelming amounts of

lrwl2-10

1 anxiety, fear, frustration, lack of trust, have handled that
2 by taking action with it, by coming here, by trying to do
3 something to change the situation to save themselves, to save
4 their children, to save yours.

5 Be concerned, if you would, for the people who
6 don't have that kind of strength. I have talked with dozens
7 and dozens of people in the last few weeks who simply express
8 they could not do these things, they couldn't take this risk,
9 they could not express themselves in this way. They sit in
10 their houses in their fear and they don't have the relief of
11 feeling that they are taking some kind of action.

12 My name is Barbara Light. I live in Middletown, two
13 and a half miles from the plant. I can't get home without
14 seeing it, which makes it rather obnoxious and terrorizing to
15 me. That's not my main issue right now. Other people have
16 spoken so beautifully to that, I don't think I need to.

17 Just a couple of other thoughts I wanted to share
18 with you. One of the things that I heard referred to several
19 times in the last few days has been the standard of our life.
20 Our standard of living and how adversely it might be affected
21 by not reopening this plant.

22 One of the things that comes to my mind is that the
23 standard of life that we have is not necessarily directly
24 related to the quality of life that we have. As our standard
25 of living has improved over the years, the quality of our

lrw12-11

1 life has drastically diminished. Statistics that are publicly
2 available related to crime, juvenile delinquency, street-
3 related disorders -- I am thinking also in terms of corporate
4 crime and blue collar crime -- have all increased drastically
5 so we are talking about an improved standard of living and we
6 are also talking about a quality of life that has been
7 diminished.

8 If we are trying to protect our standard of living,
9 maybe we should consider what we have paid for this standard
10 of living in terms of the quality of our human life. I would
11 also like to mention that as human beings experiment with
12 science, or as this particular culture has evolved, we kind
13 of developed a love affair with science, so much so that unless
14 we prove it scientifically, we tend to treat it as though
15 it doesn't exist, regardless of what goes on in people's common
16 sense or People's previous experience.

17 This has been true since science began to flower.
18 This was true when physicians learned they could deliver babies
19 and brought them into hospitals and gave their mothers fever
20 and children died. Doctors didn't believe they could have
21 caused this. They knew they were doing what had to be done.
22 They had scientific understanding of having babies. They had
23 no understanding of germs.

24 This is also true in terms of the use of medical
25 technology to treat diseases of childhood. We heard one woman

lrwl2-12

1 speak of this here, who was irradiated for a respiratory ill-
2 ness and ultimately developed a thyroid cancer. This has been
3 true in terms of chemical development. We have done it to
4 infants with thalidomide. It is almost frightening that, as
5 we learn the limits of our scientific awareness, we also learn
6 the destruction that we have wrought on other people. Too
7 often, it is children and women.

8 I have one more thought to share with you. That has
9 to do with what I have perceived of as the social contract. I
10 really thought, believed intellectually, philosophically, in my
11 gut, that if I was loyal and I fostered the well-being of my
12 government and I did my political duty, I voted, I did all the
13 things a good citizen is supposed to do, that my government was
14 then charged with defending my best interests.

15 At 36, it has been blown away. That's pretty diffi-
16 cult to tolerate. I believe that the premise is still there.
17 I think we have lost track of it. Perhaps it is time to get
18 back to it.

19 You are in such a remarkable position. You have
20 probably one of the greatest ethical and moral opportunities
21 of our time. You have the opportunity to defer a decision,
22 for one thing. You have the opportunity to recommend a public
23 referendum, a local public referendum. You have the opportu-
24 nity to encourage that the human beings who live in this area
25 and who are directly affected by this have a right to have a

lrw12-13

1 say about it. That it, in fact, does not necessarily lie
2 with a governmental agency. Perhaps it is time to think in
3 terms of turning back some power to the people who are
4 affected.

5 Thank you.

6 (Applause)

7 CHAIRMAN SMITH: We will just have time to hear from
8 your daughter, sir.

9 LIMITED APPEARANCE OF JOANNE PRELESNIK

10 MS. PRELESNIK: You are just hurting everybody's
11 feelings when you do that. I think they should shut down
12 nuclear power plants right now. Thank you.

13 CHAIRMAN SMITH: What is your name?

14 MS. PRELESNIK: Joanne Prelesnik.

15 CHAIRMAN SMITH: How old are you?

16 MS. PRELESNIK: Eight.

17 CHAIRMAN SMITH: Thank you.

18 (Applause)

19 CHAIRMAN SMITH: That's it. We have heard from
20 everyone who has --

21 VOICE: One more.

22 CHAIRMAN SMITH: I'm sorry, this will be the last
23 statement that we will receive and we have accommodated every-
24 one who has signed for limited statements.

25 Go ahead.

1380 081

lrw12-14

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

LIMITED APPEARANCE OF JOAN PETROSKY

MS. PETROSKY: My name is Joan Petrosky. I live in Steelton, seven miles from TMI.

Because of this accident at Three Mile Island, news of it went around the world. I have only this to say: When you make your decision, please remember the whole world is watching.

Thank you.

(Applause.)

CHAIRMAN SMITH: Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes this afternoon's session. We appreciate very much your courtesy, hospitality and patience.

(Whereupon, at 2:55 P.M. the hearing was concluded.)

EW 12

1380 082