



72

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
631 PARK AVENUE
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

Docket Nos. 50-317
50-318

JUL 30 1979

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. A. E. Lundvall, Jr.
Vice President, Supply
P. O. Box 1475
Baltimore, Maryland 21203

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 79-16 which requires action by you with regard to your reactor facility(ies).

Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

R. W. McDaughy
for Boyce H. Grier
Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Bulletin No. 79-16
2. List of IE Bulletins Issued
in Last 12 Months

cc w/encls:

R. M. Douglass, Manager, Quality Assurance
L. B. Russell, Chief Engineer
W. Gibson, General Supervisor, Operational QA
R. C. L. Olson, Senior Engineer
K. H. Sebra, Principal Engineer

7908090283

ENCLOSURE 1

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

IE Bulletin No. 79-16
Date: July 30, 1979
Page: 1 of 4

VITAL AREA ACCESS CONTROLS

Description of Circumstances:

An attempt to damage new fuel assemblies occurred recently at an operating nuclear reactor facility. During a routine fuel inspection, the licensee discovered that a chemical liquid had been poured over 62 of 64 new fuel assemblies. Analysis indicates that the chemical liquid was sodium hydroxide, a chemical stored and used onsite.

The licensee stores new fuel assemblies in dry storage wells on the same elevation as the spent fuel pool within the Fuel Building, a vital area. Access to the building is controlled by use of a coded keycard which electronically unlocks the alarmed personnel portals. The licensee issues coded keycards to both licensee and contractor personnel after the successful completion of a background screening program. In addition, licensee site management certifies monthly that each individual has the need for a coded keycard in order to perform required duties. Further access within this building is not limited by other barriers or controls.

As a result of this incident, an initial licensee audit determined that several hundred licensee and contractor personnel had access to this area during the period when the attempt to damage the fuel was made. The audit also revealed that one coded keycard reader at a vital area portal was inaccurately recording access data at the alarm station. Also discovered during this audit were indications of frequent "tailgating" on access through the portals. Tailgating occurs when more than one person passes through a portal on one person's authorized access. Their passage is therefore not recorded, and unauthorized persons could gain entry in this manner. Tailgating does not include authorized access controlled by an escort.

Discussion of Applicable Requirements:

10 CFR 73.55(a) requires the licensees to protect against industrial sabotage committed by an insider in any position. 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) states that access to Vital Areas shall be positively controlled and limited to individuals who are authorized access to vital equipment and who require such access to perform their duties. Specific commi
described in each licensee's approved

DUPLICATE DOCUMENT

Entire document previously
entered into system under:

ANO 7908020176

No. of pages: 8