



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

JUL 26 1979

In Reply Refer To:

R11:JPO

50-325, 50-324

50-261


Carolina Power and Light Company
ATTN: J. A. Jones
Executive Vice President
and Chief Operating Officer
411 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 79-16 which requires action by you with regard to your reactor facility(ies).

Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.

Sincerely,


for James P. O'Reilly
Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Bulletin No. 79-16
2. List of IE Bulletins
Issued in Last 12
Months

7908080706

JUL 26 1979

Carolina Power and
Light Company

-2-

cc w/encl:

A. C. Tollison, Jr.

Plant Manager

Box 458

Southport, North Carolina 28461

R. B. Starkey, Jr., Plant Manager

Post Office Box 790

Hartsville, South Carolina 29550

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
July 26, 1979

IE Bulletin No. 79-16

VITAL AREA ACCESS CONTROLS

Description of Circumstances:

An attempt to damage new fuel assemblies occurred recently at an operating nuclear reactor facility. During a routine fuel inspection, the licensee discovered that a chemical liquid had been poured over 62 of 64 new fuel assemblies. Analysis indicates that the chemical liquid was sodium hydroxide, a chemical stored and used onsite.

The licensee stores new fuel assemblies in dry storage wells on the same elevation as the spent fuel pool within the Fuel Building, a vital area. Access to the building is controlled by use of a coded keycard which electronically unlocks the alarmed personnel portals. The licensee issues coded keycards to both licensee and contractor personnel after the successful completion of a background screening program. In addition, licensee site management certifies monthly that each individual has the need for a coded keycard in order to perform required duties. Further access within this building is not limited by other barriers or controls.

As a result of this incident, an initial licensee audit determined that several hundred licensee and contractor personnel had access to this area during the period when the attempt to damage the fuel was made. The audit also revealed that one coded keycard reader at a vital area portal was inaccurately recording access data at the alarm station. Also discovered during this audit were indications of frequent "tailgating" on access through the portals. Tailgating occurs when more than one person passes through a portal on one person's authorized access. Their passage is therefore not recorded, and unauthorized persons could gain entry in this manner. Tailgating does not include authorized access controlled by an escort.

Discussion of Applicable Requirements:

10 CFR 73.55(a) requires the licensees to protect against industrial sabotage committed by an insider in any position. 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) states that access to Vital Areas shall be positively controlled and limited to individuals who are authorized access to vital equipment and who require such access to perform their duties. Specific commitments imposed in each licensee's approved Security Plan

DUPLICATE DOCUMENT

Entire document previously
entered into system under:

ANO

7908020176

No. of pages: 8