



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

OCT 15 1979

Docket Nos. 50-369  
and 50-370

Mr. William O. Parker, Jr.  
Vice President, Steam Production  
P. O. Box 2173  
422 South Church Street  
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Dear Mr. Parker:

SUBJECT: STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL MEASUREMENT ERRORS  
(McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2)

On June 22, 1979 Westinghouse Electric Corporation reported to us a potential safety hazard under 10 CFR 21. This report addressed errors generated in the steam generator level indication sensors following high energy pipe break accidents inside containment. Since this matter could significantly effect the McGuire design, we request that you provide us with some additional information described in the Enclosure.

We request that your response be provided no later than November 19, 1979. This item is being carried as Number 33 on the McGuire Milestone Chart.

Please let us know if you have any questions regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

Robert L. Baer, Chief  
Light Water Reactors Branch No. 2  
Division of Project Management

Enclosure:  
Request for Additional  
Information

ccs w/enclosure:  
See next pages

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Mr. William O. Parker, Jr.  
Vice President, Steam Production  
Duke Power Company  
P. O. Box 2178  
422 South Church Street  
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

cc: Mr. W. L. Porter  
Duke Power Company  
P. O. Box 2178  
422 South Church Street  
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Mr. R. S. Howard  
Power Systems Division  
Westinghouse Electric Corporation  
P. O. Box 355  
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230

Mr. E. J. Keith  
EDS Nuclear Incorporated  
220 Montgomery Street  
San Francisco, California 94104

Mr. J. E. Houghtaling  
NUS Corporation  
2536 Countryside Boulevard  
Clearwater, Florida 33515

Mr. Jessie L. Riley, President  
The Carolina Environmental Study Group  
854 Henley Place  
Charlotte, North Carolina 28207

J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.  
Debevoise & Liberman  
1200 Seventeenth Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20036

Robert M. Lazo, Esq., Chairman  
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke  
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr., Director  
Bodega Marine Lab of California  
P. O. Box 247  
Bodega Bay, California 94923

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POOR ORIGINAL

OCT 15 1975

Mr. William O. Parker, Jr.

cc: Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq.  
Natural Resources Defense Council  
917 - 15th Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Richard P. Wilson, Esq.  
Assistant Attorney General  
State of South Carolina  
2600 Bull Street  
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

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OCT 15 1979

LEVEL MEASUREMENT ERRORS DUE TO ENVIRONMENTAL TEMPERATURE EFFECTS ON  
LEVEL INSTRUMENT REFERENCE LEGS

On June 22, 1979, Westinghouse Electric Corporation reported to NRC, a potential safety hazard under 10 CFR 21. This report addresses errors generated in the steam generator level indication sensors following high energy pipe break accidents inside containment. Further, the report implies that previous analyses of peak containment temperatures and pressure may have been nonconservative. Breaks of this type can result in heatup of the steam generator level measurement reference leg resulting in a decrease of the water column density with a consequent increase in the indicated steam generator water level (i.e., indicated level exceeding actual level). IE Bulletin 79-21 includes further information on this problem and addresses appropriate actions which are to be taken by licensees of operating plants.

Applicants for an operating license are requested to submit a response to the following questions and to revise their safety analysis report consistent with this response.

1. Describe the liquid level measuring systems within containment that are used to initiate safety actions or are used to provide post-accident monitoring information. Provide a description of the type of reference leg used i.e., open column or sealed reference leg.
2. Provide an evaluation of the effect of post-accident ambient temperature on the indicated water level to determine the change in indicated level relative to actual water level. This evaluation must include other sources of error including the effects of varying fluid pressure and flashing of reference leg to steam on the water level measurements.
3. Provide an analysis of the impact that the level measurement errors in control and protection systems (2 above) have on the assumptions used in the plant transient and accident analysis. This should include a review of all safety and control setpoints derived from level signals to verify that the setpoints will initiate the action required by the plant safety analyses throughout the range of ambient temperatures encountered by the instrumentation, including accident temperatures. If this analysis demonstrates that level measurement errors are greater than assumed in the safety analysis, address the corrective action to be taken. The corrective actions considered should include design changes that could be made to ensure that containment temperature effects are automatically accounted for. These measures may include setpoint changes as an acceptable corrective action for the short term. However, some form of temperature compensation or modification to eliminate or reduce temperature errors should be investigated as a long term solution.
4. Review and indicate the required revisions, as necessary, of emergency procedures to include specific information obtained from the review and evaluation of Items 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that the operators are instructed on the potential for and magnitude of erroneous level signals. Provide a copy of tables, curves, or correction factors that would be applied to post-accident monitoring systems that will be used by plant operators.