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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

OCTOBER 18 1979

Docket No. 50-313

Mr. William Cavanaugh, III
Vice President, Generation
and Construction
Arkansas Power & Light Company
P. O. Box 551
Little Rock, Arkansas 72203

Dear Mr. Cavanaugh:

We have reviewed your submittals dated April 24, May 16, June 6 and June 8, 1979, concerning your requests for amendments and Technical Specification changes to Facility Operating License No. DPR-51 for Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit No. 1, as a result of IE 79-05A, IE 79-05B and the Order of May 17, 1979. In order to complete our review, we need additional information. You are requested to provide the enclosed additional information within 30 days of receipt of this letter.

Sincerely,

Peter B Erickson
for Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:
Request for Additional
Information

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT NO. 1

1. In your proposed Technical Specifications (TS), Sections 4.8.1, the operability of the emergency feedwater (EFW) trains, and hence the limiting conditions for operation, are determined by surveillance requirements on specific components within the trains. Our position is that the following additional revisions should be made to these in order to address the concerns of the bulletins and orders issued since Three Mile Island with regards to EFW:

   a. Add a surveillance requirement for the EFW flow instrumentation which states when the detectors will be calibrated and tested.

   b. Revise your requirements to include that the trains shall be tested on a staggered test basis.

2. We have some concern as to the capability of your turbine driven EFW pump to cool the plant down to the RHR cut in temperature of 280°F since Psat for 280°F is approximately 50 psia. Demonstrate that your turbine driven EFW pump has this capability or provide a TS that requires an additional appropriate action during a cooldown when only the turbine driven EFW pump is available.

3. Your revised TS for limiting conditions for operation (LCO) in Section 3.5.1.7 regarding the operability of the reactor trip circuitry upon loss of main feedwater or turbine trip as written allows power operation (10 to 20%) when either of these trips are inoperable. Revise items 1, 2 and 3 as follows such that the trips may be bypassed up to these power levels but not inoperable and such that hot shutdown is the required action within 12 hours rather than 24:

   1. Reactor trip upon loss of main feedwater shall be operable (as determined by Specification 4.1.a, items 2 and 36 of Table 4.1-2) at $\geq$5% reactor power. (May be bypassed up to 10% reactor power).

   2. Reactor trip upon turbine trip shall be operable (as determined by Specification 4.1.a, items 2 and 42) at $\geq$5% reactor power. (May be bypassed up to 20% reactor power.)

   3. If the requirements of Specifications 3.5.1.7.1 or 3.5.1.7.2 cannot be met, restore the inoperable trip within 12 hours or bring the plant to a hot shutdown condition.

3a. Provide the basis for the bypass setpoints of 10 and 20% power for the loss of main feedwater and turbine trips anticipatory reactor trips.

4. Your proposed TS do not include the revised temperature/pressure limits of Appendix G which are to be applied during emergency conditions (do not shutdown HPI flow until system pressure is twice that allowed by the previous brittle fracture limits). Revise your specifications to include new emergency tempera-

ture/pressure limits. The revised specifications should clearly indicate when the emergency limit is to be applied, and when the previous Appendix G limit applies.

5. Verify that the number of acceptable scrams as limited by the TS include the additional scram functions (that is, reactor trip on main turbine trip and reactor trip on main feedwater pump trip). If not, provide a list for these additional scram functions.

6. The proposed TS do not address station operation with the electromatic relief isolation valve closed or electromatic relief valve inoperable. In this regard, include reporting requirements for a special report on the status of a power operated relief valve which has been inoperable or isolated for more than 24 hours when reactor coolant system pressure is above the low reactor coolant system pressure trip setpoint associated with the reactor protection system. This report is to be prepared and submitted to the staff within 10 days following inoperability or isolation of the power operated relief valve for more than 24 hours.

7. For all the proposed TS changes, provide a revised bases Section in your TS that support the proposed changes.