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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

Docket No. 50-580
Docket No. 50-581

The Ohio Edison Company
ATTN: Mr. R. J. McWhorter
Vice President Engineering
76 South Main Street
Akron, OH 44308

Gentlemen:

This IE Information Notice No. 79-25 is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time. If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular, Bulletin, or NRR Generic Letter will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions. If you have any questions regarding the matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Sincerely,

James G. Keppeler
James G. Keppeler
Director

Enclosure: IE Information
Notice No. 79-25

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

October 1, 1979

IE Information Notice 79-25

REACTOR TRIPS AT TURKEY POINT UNITS 3 AND 4

Background

On August 3, Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 tripped while operating at full power. A voltage spike on a second protection channel caused Unit 4 to trip during surveillance testing on the reactor protection system. This resulted in a loss of offsite power and subsequent shedding of non-essential loads. Unit 3 tripped as the result of high coolant pressure caused by a turbine runback.

Discussion

While performing a periodic test on channel "C" of the T-Average and Delta T Protection Channels, a spurious signal on channel "A" completed a 2 out of 3 trip logic: tripping Unit 4. This resulted in a loss of offsite power condition for Unit 4. At this time, the Unit 4 startup transformer was out of service due to performance of periodic maintenance. This condition caused the initiation of the emergency diesel generator load sequencer which resulted in the shedding of non-vital loads. Among the non-vital loads shed, were those on Motor Control Center (MCC) "D" which is common to both units. Since the Rod Position Indication System for both units is powered by the non-vital portion of MCC-D, a turbine runback on Unit 3 was initiated upon loss of rod position indication. This resulted in a reactor trip on high pressurizer pressure. At the time, neither of the two pressurizer spray valves was available. One was considered inoperable prior to the transient and the other, temporarily powered by the non-vital portion of MCCD, had become unavailable earlier as a consequence of the Unit 4 trip.

A subsequent review disclosed inadequacies in the administrative controls over the correction of operational problems exhibited by spray valve PCV-3-455B. The original Hagan controller for spray valve PCV-3-455B had been disconnected and was replaced by another manual controller which was plugged into the valve control circuit and which had been taped to the top of a console in the main control room. The actual installation of the manual controller was not performed under established guidelines. Additionally, no temporary procedure had been issued to ensure consistent understanding between shifts of the operational control of this unusual cc

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