## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

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	CONTROL BLOCK: PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION
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	17 ACTION FUTURE COMPONENT TAKEN ACTION ON PLANT SHUTDOWN METHOD HOURS 22 ATTACHMENT FORM SUB. SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER SUBMITTED FORM SUB. PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER MANUFACTURER SUPPLIER SUPPLIE
	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (27)
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15	STATUS SPOWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32
	ELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 N/A LOCATION OF RELEASE 36
1 7 8	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 N/A  PERSONNEL INJURIES  13  80
1 × 7 8	NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) N/A
1 9	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43  TYPE DESCRIPTION N/A  1151 263
	PUBLICITY SSUED DESCRIPTION (45) N/A 7910150445 NRC USE ONLY  080 080 080 080 080 080 080 080 080 0
7 8	9 10 W. Verne Childs 315-342-3840 0

## POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-333

ATTACHMENT TO LEK /9-05//011-	ENT TO LER 79-057/01T-	79-	LER	TO	TACHMENT	AT
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During normal operation, as the result of the Pipe Stress Reanalysis being conducted by the Architect Engineer, the plant staff was notified that five pipe supports were considered inoperable; two were associated with Service Water return to the lake (H46-280 and H46-281) one was associated with Core Spray (H14-46) and two were associated with the RHR System (H10-503 and PFSK-503). As set forth in the August 14, 1979 letter lifting the Show Cause Order of March 13, 1979, analysis was performed to determine the effect of these overstressed supports upon system operability. From this analysis it was determined that two supports, H14-46 on the "B" Core Spray System and H46-281 on the Service Water System caused piping overstress.

The modifications to H14-46 were completed within the seven (7) day time frame required by the Technical Specifications and the August 14, 1979 letter. Surveillance testing of safety systems required by the Technical Specifications was satisfactorily accomplished during the period in which "B" Core Spray System was considered inoperable. The support is now fully acceptable.

The Service Water System is not addressed in the Technical Specifications. Modifications to H46-281 were accomplished within the seven () day time frame required by the August 14, 1979 letter. The support is now fully acceptable.

As set forth in Paragraph IV.4 of the August 14, 1979 letter, analysis was performed which proved the RHR System remained operable with H10-503 and PFSK-956 removed. Modifications to H10-503 have been completed. This support is now considered fully acceptable. Modification to PFSK-956 are in progress. The affected portion of the RHR system, the supply piping to the Fuel Pool Cooling System is isolated from the remainder of the system during power operations.

Analysis by the Architect Engineer showed that with H46-280 removed from the Service Water System no piping overstress would occur which would result in system inoperability. Modifications to this support are currently being designed. These will be pursued in an expeditious manner.

As noted above, all modification and analysis were performed within the time frames set forth in the Augu 14, 1979 letter and the Technical Specifications. All supports causing system inoperability have been upgraded such that the systems are fully operable. Modifications to those supports which, although inoperable, do not result in system inoperability, are being pursued in an expeditious manner. Therefore, the event did result in a significant safety hazard to the public health and safety.