

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

PEGION II 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-413/79-14 and 50-414/79-14

Licensee: Duke Power Company

422 South Church Street

Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Facility Name: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414

License Nos. CPPR-116 and CPPR-117

Inspection at Duke Power Center Charlotte, North Carolina, July 24, and at Catawba site near Rock Hill, South Carolina, July 25-27, 1979

Inspector:

C. R. McFarland

8-16-79

Date Signed

Approved by:

J. C. Bryant, Section Chief, RCES Branch

Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on July 24-27, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 27 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of containment dome structural concrete (Unit 1), surveillance of onsite contractors, QA manual changes, control of nonconforming items on Unit 1, 10 CFR 50.55(e) items for Units 1 and 2, IE Bulletins for Units 1 and 2, hydrostatic testing of a control rod drive housing (Unit 1), control panel weld deficiencies (Unit 1), and a discussion of the announced two year delay in the operation of Units 1 and 2.

Results

Of the eight areas inspected, no apparent items of noncomplian or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

D. G. Beam, Project Manager

D. L. Freeze, Project Engineer

J. R. Wells, Corporate QA Manager

J. M. Curtis, QA Manager, Vendors Division (VD)

J. P. Akers, QA Supervisor, Electrical, VD

W. H. Bradley, QA Manager, Engineering and Services Division (ESD)

V. S. Owen, Services, ESD

W. O. Henry, QA Manager, Construction Division (CD)

*R. A. Morgan, Senior QA Engineer (QAE) CD *J. C. Shropshire, QAE Mechanical, Welding

*H. D. Mason, QAE Civil, Electrical

K. J. Crago, QAE Mechanical H. D. Johnson, QAE Mechanical

K. W. Miller, QA Technician, Mechanical

R. G. Rouse, QAE Welding H. R. Bove, QAE Electrical

H. R. Hemphill, QAE Civil

L. R. Davison, Senior QC Engineer

J. Crane, QC Inspector, Concrete W. A. Wilbanks, Electrical Lead Man

D. Yeomans, Electrical Fab Shop Foreman

J. C. Mumford, Assistant Design Engineer

J. K. Berry, Staff Mechanical Engineer C. Vargas, Document Control Supervisor

J. Mayberry, Document Control Clerk

Other licensee employees contacted included various construction craftsmen, technicians, and office personnel.

Other Organizations

Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and Insurance Company

J. W. Kosko, Authorized Nuclear Inspector (ANI)

*C. F. Toegel, ANI

Westinghouse Electric Corporation

W. Reed, Field Engineer

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on July 27, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. No new items of noncompliance or unresolved items were identified in the areas inspected.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Findings

- a. (Open) Deficiency 413-414/79-12-02, Failure to follow quality assurance program (QAP) procedure P-1, "Receiving Inspection." The inspector discussed the subject with the QA manager, ESD, who will prepare a timely reply to Region II. The P-1 procedure may need to be revised to provide for items put into a "hold area", then released from the "hold area". The licensee also may request a clarification to the wording of the "Notice of Violation" to change the term "project QA staff" to relate to the QA inspectors of the VD.
- b. (Closed) Unresolved item 413/79-08-01, Control of specification changes, Unit 1. The inspector discussed the subject with the QA manager ESD and responsible documentation control personnel at the site. QAP G-1 has been revised to incorporate requirements relative to "Addendum" to specifications or manufacturers' manuals as separate from drawings. The implementation of the revised requirements has precluded the use of superceded information by site personnel.
- (Open) Inspector Followup Item 413-414/79-05-01, Nonconforming item (NCI) system. The inspector discussed the subject with the onsite senior QA engineer and the responsible documentation personnel. The modifications to the NCI reporting system provide for automated data printouts of outstanding NCI, and trend analysis data is compiled by various piping systems and other work locations. Corrective action responsibilities for various construction department superintendents and vendors are reviewed by the senior QA engineer. The ESD personnel do the trend analysis of the NCI's. This item remains open pending the review of the effectiveness of the modified reporting system over a longer period of time.
- d. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 413/79-10-01, Repairs to concrete dome inside surface, Unit 1 reactor building. The inspector reviewed NCI 6216 and NCI 6217 which have been written and now define two case II honeycomb areas of deficient concrete on the inside surface of the Unit 1 reactor building concrete dome. The inspector discussed the subject with appropriate QA and QC personnel and observed the deficiencies identified in NCI 6216 and NCI 6217.
- e. (Closed) Inspector Followup Item 413/78-11-01, Surveillance of onsite work by vendors, Unit 1. The inspector discussed the subject with the QA manager responsible for vendor surveillance and, subsequently, the onsite senior QA engineer. The inspector also reviewed surveillance reports (dated November 3, 6, 7, 10, 13, 17, 21, and 29, 1979) of the onsite repair work relative to rolling the steam generator tubes and

discussed the work and the reports with the responsible QA engineers. The QA manager, VD, instructs the construction QA group of the work to be performed, approves the CQA surveillance checklist, and reviews the CQA surveillance reports. CQA reviewed the Westinghouse Field Deficiency Reports. The system works on a case by case basis. Surveillance of field fabricated tanks by Richmond Engineering will start again in about two months and will be conducted in a similar manner.

- f. (Open) Licensee Identified Item (LII) 413-414/79-12-01 Control panel weld deficiencies, Units 1 and 2. The inspector reviewed the deficiency and the corrective action as stated in the DPC letter to Region II dated July 20, 1979, discussed the subject with responsible design, vendor inspection, and onsite personnel, and observed the repair work on the main control boards and the eight miscellaneous control panels. This item remains open pending a final report from DPC stating the corrective action to prevent this type of deficiency from occurring on other safety related components and to report on the seismic low level verification testing which is to be performed prior to operation.
- g. (Open) LII 413-414/77-13-01 Valve operator natural frequency analysis deficiency, Units 1 and 2. The inspector discussed the subject with the staff mechanical engineer. A final report is needed after DPC accepts the modified valves.
- h. (Open) LII 413/78-11-02 and 414/78-10-01, Containment isolation valve deficiencies, Units 1 and 2. The inspector discussed the subject with the staff mechanical engineer and reviewed current plans for changes and modifications to the subject valves.
- i. (Open) LII 413-414/78-01-0., Stem mounted limit switches. No new switches have been installed to date.

4. Unresolved Items

There were no unresolved items identified during his inspection.

5. IE Bulletins (IEB)

- a. (Open) IEB 413-414/78-12, 12A and 12B, Atypical weld material in reactor pressure vessel (RPV) welds. The inspector reviewed the DPC responses to Region II dated May 16 and July 2, 1979, and documents related to the Unit 1 RPV supplied by Combustion Engineering, Inc. (CE). This item remains open for Unit 1 pending NRC evaluation of the CE topical report and pending the receipt and review of similar information for the Unit 2 RPV manufactured by Rotterdam Dockyard Company.
- b. (Open) IEB 413-414/79-02, Pipe support base plate designs using concrete expansion anchor bolts. The DPC response to Region II dated July 5, 1979, is currently being evaluated by Region II. DPC will report to Region II the results of the cyclic testing referred to in actions 3 and 4 about August 15, 1979.

- c. (Open) IEB 413-414/79-03, Longitudinal weld defects in ASME SA-312 type stainless steel pipe spools manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Company (YWEC). The inspector reviewed the DPC response to Region II dated April 20, 1979, discussed the subject with the QA managers for vendors and construction activities. The inspector also reviewed the QA vendor surveillance reports of inspections of YWEC on February 16, 1979, June 22, 23, 1979, and June 27, 28, 1979, and documentation of the physical testing of the various lengths of large diameter piping that has been ultrasonically tested per the requirements of the ASME Code, Section III, paragraph NC 2551. This item remains open pending further evaluation of the DPC response by Region II.
- d. (Open) IEB 413-414/79-07, Seismic stress analysis of safety related piping. The DPC response to Region II dated May 29, 1979, is currently being evaluated by the NRC.
- e. (Closed) IEB 413-414/79-09, Failures of GE type AK-2 circuit breakers in safety related systems. The inspector reviewed the DPC response to Region II dated July 16, 1979, and discussed the subject with the QA manager, ESD. No GE type AK-2 circuit breakers are used or planned for use in safety related systems at Catawba.

Licensee Identified Item (10 CFR 50.55(e))

a. (Open) LII 413-414/79-14-01, Steam generator level errors. On July 24, 1979, DPC informed Region II that Westinghouse has informed DPC that analysis of a high energy line break indicates that auxiliary feedwater would be delayed in initiation due to steam generator level indication errors introduced by an increasing reference leg temperature. Westinghouse is also reporting this item to the NRC as it appears to be generic to all Westinghouse plants.

7. Management Information

The inspector discussed the DPC press release of July 18, 1979, relative to the two year delay in the scheduled operation of Units 1 and 2 with the project manager. The two units are now scheduled for operation in 1983 and 1985, rather than 1981 and 1983 as previously expected. Construction work will not be delayed; it is expected to take longer than originally planned. A detailed schedule of the work to be completed is being developed.

8. Independent Inspection

The inspector toured the Unit 1 and 2 facilities, observed work inside the reactor buildings, the auxiliary building and the control room, talked to various craft personnel and observed an attempt to hydrostatically test a control rod drive housing canopy on the Unit 1 reactor vessel head.