



FEMA

September 6, 2019

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THROUGH: Vanessa Quinn, Chief
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FROM: Thomas Scardino, Chief/RAC
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SUBJECT: Preliminary Capabilities Assessment – Surry Power Station

Background:

On Tuesday, September 3, 2019, Hurricane Dorian's path threatened the Commonwealth of Virginia and the EPZ counties surrounding the Surry Power Station. Hurricane Dorian brought rain and strong winds and caused localized flooding. Although Hurricane Dorian did not make landfall in Virginia, the storm did require major protective actions and response efforts by federal, state, and local authorities. The risk and host counties of Surry County, Isle of Wight County, York County, James City County, City of Newport News, and City of Williamsburg implemented protective actions that included: activation of emergency response centers; mandatory evacuation for coastal zones; sheltering and mass care activities; and emergency public information and warnings. During the storm, Dominion Energy maintained both units operating at 100% and did not shut down.

FEMA Region III, in coordination with NRC Region II and Dominion Energy, held discussions with representatives from the Virginia Department of Emergency Management and Offsite Response Organizations (OROs). These discussions were held on September 6th, to assess the offsite capabilities potentially affected by Hurricane Dorian.

On Friday, September 6, 2019, based on the Preliminary Capabilities Assessment performed and our review of available information gathered in discussions with state and local government agencies, FEMA Region III has concluded that offsite radiological emergency preparedness remains adequate to provide a reasonable assurance determination. Appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the Surry Power Station. At this time, FEMA Region III is not recommending actions to conduct a Disaster Initiated Review of offsite emergency preparedness within the Surry Power Station 10-mile emergency planning zone. The Regional Administrator and the Federal Preparedness Coordinator are aware of this decision.

FEMA Region III assessed the offsite capabilities of the response organizations as it relates to the Surry Power Station. The assessment is as follows:

Assessment:

1. Emergency Response Facilities

The state emergency operations center in Midlothian, VA was activated at Level 1 (full activation), with FEMA FCO and IMAT support. The Risk Jurisdiction EOCs were activated. The emergency operation centers were not compromised and were capable of coordinating emergency response operations in support of the Surry Power Station.

2. Communications

Primary and secondary communication systems were operable. No irregularities or failures were noted in the communication networks among Dominion, the state, and risk and host counties. In fact, communications systems were bolstered during this event by ancillary communications systems brought in, to include FEMA MERS.

3. Emergency Response Organizations

State and county emergency response organizations were capable of performing the activities required of them in accordance with approved plans and procedures.

4. Public Alert and Notification

The prompt alert and notification system for the 10-mile emergency planning zone was operable. The risk counties had the resources to conduct backup route alerting if needed. The state's joint information system had the capability to make emergency public information and instructions relative to the Surry Power Station in a timely manner.

5. Access and Functional Needs and Transportation Resources

The state and risk counties maintained enough transportation assets to fulfill requirements. Movement of transportation dependent populations to include disabled, access/functional needs, and schools were unencumbered.

6. Evacuation Routes

The state and risk counties maintained satisfactory law enforcement assets to perform the duties required of them. Primary evacuation routes inside of the 10-mile emergency planning zone were not impacted.

7. Accident Assessment

The Virginia Department of Health (VDH) had the resources available to provide independent radiological dose assessment and recommendations to decision makers on protective actions for the health and safety of the public. VDH could have deployed the state's radiological field monitoring teams to monitor and assess a radiological plume. Additionally, the risk counties had the ability to monitor and decontaminate the public and emergency workers.

8. Support Services

The risk and host counties had resources to operate reception and congregate care centers in accordance with their plans and procedures. The supporting county emergency medical services were not degraded and were capable of responding, treating, and transporting a radiologically contaminated injured individual. Noteworthy, a REP mass care center was activated for this event in the City of Newport News.

9. Population Shifts

There were no population shifts due to Hurricane Dorian.

10. Supporting Documentation

All supporting documentation gathered will be retained on file at FEMA Region III.

Conclusion:

In part, and along with this capability assessment, all community lifelines remain stable. The Commonwealth of Virginia and affected counties surrounding the Surry Power Station have the ability to implement their radiological emergency plans and procedures as written. A formal Disaster Initiated Review is not recommended.