



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-369/79-28 and 50-370/79-16

Licensee: Duke Power Company
 422 South Church Street
 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370

License Nos. CPPR-83 and CPPR-84

Inspector: *R. D. Bradley* 8/22/79
 for M. D. Hunt Date Signed

Approved by: *J. C. Bryant* 8/22/79
 for J. C. Bryant, Section Chief, RC&ES Branch Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on August 8-10, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 21 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of licensee identified items, unresolved items, standby shutdown system, and equipment control.

Results

Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *G. W. Grier, Project Engineer
- *E. B. Miller, Senior QA Engineer
- *W. O. Henry, QA Manager Construction
- *M. S. Starnes, Senior QC Engineer
- *K. S. Kesida, QA Engineer
- *T. P. Harrall, Assistant Design Engineer
- *G. A. Copp, Nuclear Engineer-Licensing
- *J. W. Gleen, Associate QA Engineer
- T. Wyke, Principal Design Engineer
- W. G. Goodman, Mechanical QC
- T. C. McMeekin, Principal Engineer
- W. J. Foley, Jr., Principal Engineer
- P. M. McBride, Technical Specialist

*Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 10, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Unresolved Item 369/79-05-01, Installed pipe support inspection. The inspector reviewed Procedure Instruction M-15E, Support Inspection Instruction which was developed by the licensee as guidance and the acceptance criteria for hanger inspection. RII has no further questions.

(Closed) Deficiency 369/79-14-03, Cable 1*NC 752 lead reversal at transmitter 1NCFT 5050. The inspector reviewed the certification of the environmental qualification of the materials used for splicing connections to replace terminal strips within containment. The acceptance criteria had been reviewed during a previous inspection. RII has no further questions.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Independent Inspection Effort

The inspector reviewed an initial approved release of a system description for a Standby Shutdown System (SSS). The SSS will provide an alternate and independent means to achieve and maintain a hot shutdown condition for one or both units following postulated fire or sabotage events. The system will

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be in accordance with accepted fire protection and security requirements but is not designed to withstand design basis seismic loading nor is it nuclear safety related.

However, in view of the fact that the system will interface with certain safety related functions, assurance is required that the failure of the system cannot in any way jeopardize the operation of the safety related components. The licensee informed the inspector that the design package would be presented to NRR in approximately 18 months. In discussions with NRR the inspector was assured that the interface between the systems would be reviewed in detail.

Construction Procedure Serial No. 533, Equipment and Material Transfer and Exchange Procedure was reviewed to ensure control of equipment exchanged between Units 1 and 2.

Within the areas examined, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Licensee Identified Items (LII) 10 CFR 50.55(e)

(Open) LII 369/79-28-01 and 370/79-16-01, Steam generator level errors. DPC reported to RII July 24, 1979 that Westinghouse had informed DPC that analysis of a high energy line break indicates that auxiliary feedwater would be delayed in initiation due to steam generator level indication errors introduced by an increasing reference leg temperature. Westinghouse is reporting under 10 CFR 21, as the problem appears to be generic to all Westinghouse plants.

(Open) LII 369/79-28-02 and 370/79-16-02, Personnel air lock seal. DPC reported to RII August 3, 1979 that the bolt holes for the seal mounting bolts exceeded the design depth for the Unit 1 upper personnel air lock. Further investigation disclosed that the second personnel air lock also contained this fabrication error. The licensee reported to the inspector August 9, 1979 that the personnel air lock for Unit 2 had been found to have the same deficiency.

(Open) LII 369/79-28-03, Barton transmitter environmental qualification testing. DPC advised RII on July 24, 1979 that Westinghouse informed them that seven Barton level transmitters furnished for the steam generators were in a lot that failed accuracy tests following environmental qualification testing.

(Open) LII 369/79-28-04 and 370/79-16-03, Emergency feedwater system design deficiency. On August 10, 1979, during this inspection, DPC reported that a review of the McGuire emergency feedwater system had identified some accident modes which were not originally considered in the design but which have unacceptable operational consequences. An evaluation of the deficiency and corrective action is being made.

(Open) LII 369/79-28-05 and 370/79-16-04, Safety related instrumentation design deficiency. On August 10, 1979, during this inspection, DPC identified a design deficiency in safety related instrumentation and controls. The application of non-safety grade controllers, positioners, solenoids, and instrumentation to control valves could result in failure of these valves to go to the safe position upon loss of air or to control properly if air is available. An evaluation of this deficiency and corrective action is being made.

(Open) LII 369/79-22-03 and 370/79-11-01, Improper insulation on electrical leads. The inspector was advised that approximately 20 coils remain to be replaced. RII will continue to follow.

7. Inspector Followup Items (IFI)

(Closed) IFI 369/78-14-03, Improper handling of hydraulic shock suppressors-corrective action on NCR 6273. The inspector reviewed the resolution of NCR 6273. The corrective action further resulted in the development of the control of storage and inspection. These inspection results are reviewed and accepted by the appropriate engineering discipline. RII has no further questions.

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