

NORTHEAST UTILITIES

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
THE HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

P.O. BOX 270
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(203) 666-6911

September 25, 1979
MP-1-1311

Mr. Boyce H. Grier
Director, Region I
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference: Provisional License DPR-21
Docket No. 50-245
Reportable Occurrence RO-79-28/3L

Dear Mr. Grier:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence RO-79-28/3L required to be submitted within 30 days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.a. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

J. F. Opeka
Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

JFO/RHY:11m

Attachment: (LER RO-79-28/3L)

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C.
(30)
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control,
Washington, D.C. (3)

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ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-28/3L
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT 1
PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21
DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Failure of a primary containment isolation valve to go closed.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to the occurrence, the plant was operating at a steady-state power level of 100 percent. Venting of the pressure suppression chamber, using the vent bypass, was in progress.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On August 28, 1979, at 1045 hours, after venting the pressure suppression chamber, the vent bypass valve (1-AC-12) failed to close. The required surveillance for an inoperable containment isolation valve was performed.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The failure of 1-AC-12 to close was initially attributed to particle contamination. Disassembly and inspection, of the valve, revealed particle contamination (i.e., rust scale) on the valve pivot mechanism. This was apparently sufficient to prevent the valve from closing completely.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The two-inch pressure suppression chamber vent bypass valve, 1-AC-12, is one of the primary containment isolation valves and has a requirement to go fully closed in 15 seconds upon receipt of an isolation signal. Closure of this valve, in an emergency, is designed to minimize the potential leakage paths from the pressure suppression chamber.

Failure of this valve to go closed did not create a condition which had not been previously analyzed. Closure of the other isolation valve in this line would be sufficient to maintain the required integrity.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The valve was disassembled, inspected, cleaned, reassembled, and satisfactorily tested.

This valve is exercised frequently and will be continually monitored for satisfactory performance.

The subject valve and operator are manufactured by the DEZURIK COMPANY, MODEL NUMBER 256.

This occurrence is similar in nature to LER 79-22/3L and 79-23/3L.

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