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DYNAMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE PRESSURIZER  
DURING REACTOR TRIPS AT DAVIS BESSE 1

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Q.A. Statement

The information contained in this report,  
and the calculations supporting this  
request have been checked for accuracy  
and completeness.

RW Harrington  
Signature

9/1/78  
Date

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Approved:

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INTRODUCTION

A concern exists with NRC (Region 3) that the pressurizer will empty completely during a reactor trip from full power with simultaneous loss of station power. This premise is founded upon actual pressurizer performance recorded during several reactor trip transients at Davis-Besse 1. The reactor trip transients have occurred at partial power levels with either all RC pumps running or all four RC pumps tripped.

The extent of reactor coolant volume contraction following a reactor trip is primarily governed by the wetted surface area of the tube bundle and by the steam pressure maintained within both Once Through Steam Generators. It is also affected by the flowrate of reactor coolant through both steam generators, that is, all pumps running versus all pumps tripped.

An effort to properly adjust the blowdown on all the main steam safety relief valves has been performed by Toledo Edison Company at the Davis-Besse 1 plant early in 1978. The values of minimum steam pressure after a recent reactor trip transient indicate that the performance of the steam pressure relief system is greatly improved over that observed during earlier reactor trip transients.

The purpose of this report will be to develop a calculational technique for predicting minimum pressurizer levels following a reactor trip transient and account for either tripped or running RC pumps. Actual reactor trip transient test data from Davis-Besse 1 will be used to support the calculational technique. A second purpose will be to predict the minimum pressurizer level that will occur for two specific reactor trip transients and to disclose values of minimum steam pressure that will cause the pressurizer to become empty for these two transients.

SUMMARY

A calculational technique has been developed for predicting changes in pressurizer level during reactor trips which agrees very well with observed reactor trip transients at Davis-Besse 1.

The method has been used to predict the final minimum pressurizer level for two possible transients (both from 100% power): a reactor trip with simultaneous trip of all RC pumps, and a manual trip of the reactor with all RC pumps operating.

For the first transient above, the pressurizer level will decrease only 100 inches, provided that steam pressure will not decrease below 950 psig. If steam pressure decreases to 700 psig the pressurizer would become empty and could cause a steam bubble to enter into the hot leg piping.

For the manual trip of the reactor transient, the pressurizer level will decrease below the lower level tap when steam pressure drops to 950 psig. Since a minimum steam pressure of 980 psig is anticipated on future reactor trip transients, the predicted minimum pressurizer level will be a few inches above the zero indication and nearly 80 inches above the bottom of the pressurizer. If steam pressure decreases to 840 psig on this transient, then the water level would drop completely to the bottom of the pressurizer.

The maximum filling rate for the Once Through Steam Generators should be only 850 gpm rather than the 1200 gpm rate determined from the November 29, 1977 test data. In order to maintain steam generator pressure above 800 psig and prevent possible emptying of the pressurizer during the loss of RC pump-reactor trip transient, the rate

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of fill must be controlled by the Operator using manual control on the emergency feedwater pump speed as required.

Two graphs have been developed (Figures 2 and 3) which relate minimum  $T_{ave}$  to minimum pressurizer level for the two different reactor trip transients. These graphs can be used to predict pressurizer performance during any large transients at Davis-Besse 1.

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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The information included in this report is to replace that plant transient information used previously to develop the concept that the pressurizer will empty on a reactor trip from full power simultaneous with loss of all RC pumps.<sup>1</sup>.

With proper operation of the adjusted steam pressure relief system and minimum steam pressures above 980 psig, pressurizer level will not drop below the lower level tap for a normal reactor trip transient at any power level up to 100%.

The minimum pressurizer level that occurred on the Nov. 29, 1977 reactor trip transient with loss of all four RC pumps is calculated to have been 32 inches below the low level tap. A fluid reserve equivalent to 43 inches of level existed in the pressurizer before makeup flow increased the volume of reactor coolant. Minimum steam pressures were 610 and 730 psig for the two steam generators. The decrease in steam pressure over a 200 second interval was a result of using an excessive emergency feedwater flowrate to increase the water level in each steam generator as required to induce a natural circulation flowrate.

The maximum flowrate of emergency feedwater to each steam generator should be limited to only 850 gpm. The limit on the jet impingement velocity on the OTSG tube bundle (5 ft/second) is equivalent to 850 gpm. Tech Spec 3/4.7.1.2 (Bases) requires 850 gpm for decay heat removal. From the test data of the upcoming Natural Circulation test at Davis-Besse 1, the steam generators should be filled to the new required water level at a rate not to exceed 20 inches per

minute, which is compatible with maintaining steam pressures above 800 psig in order to keep pressurizer level above zero.

If, after initiation of either kind of reactor trip, the SFRCS were to be actuated and steam pressure decreases below 850 psig, then the predicted final pressurizer levels (i.e. from Figures 2 and 3) could be 20 inches or a completely empty pressurizer depending on the operation of the RC pumps. This analysis does not include the effect of SFRCS operation on primary system contraction due to any overcooling.

DISCUSSION OF DAVIS-BESSE 1 TRANSIENTS

Four recent reactor trip transients were selected to determine a realistic primary system cooldown profile for analyzing and predicting pressurizer performance. None of these transients were initiated from full power and each transient had a unique sequence of operations either before or following the trip of the reactor. The table below briefly describes each of the four reactor trip transients:

Table 1

<u>Date</u>	<u>Initial Power Level</u>	<u>RC Pumps Running</u>	<u>Comments</u>
2/24/78	74	yes	trip initiated by the failure of a flowmeter $\Delta P$ transmitter.
4/2/78	75	yes	turbine trip test with unsuccessful runback of reactor power.
8/2/78	40	yes	reactor trip due to divergent oscillations while in tracking mode.
11/29/77	40	no	reactor trip and station blackout causing loss of RC pumps.

The response of the ICS and plant was adequately similar for these four transients to be able to characterize the  $T_{ave}$ -RC pressure relationship following the trip of the reactor. Figure 1 displays this relationship. This curve was utilized in predicting minimum conditions in the reactor coolant system for calculating minimum values of level in the pressurizer.

The following paragraphs present a critique of each of the selected reactor trip transients.

Due to flowmeter instrumentation failure the reactor was tripped from 74% power level and that action automatically tripped the turbine. Feedwater flow decreased to nearly zero 60 seconds after the transient was initiated.

Minimum steam generator pressure was 952 psig and minimum  $T_{ave}$  was 547.7F. The minimum values for RC pressure and pressurizer level were 1734 psig and 12 inches respectively. The change in pressurizer level for this reactor trip transient was 191 inches where the initial level was not 180 inches, but 203 inches.

If the initial pressurizer level had been at 180 inches, the final minimum level would have been 11 inches below the lower level tap. A fluid reserve equivalent to 64 inches of pressurizer level would have existed below that minimum level and no adverse affect on the primary system would have resulted.

## Reactor Trip Transient on April 2, 1978 (Site Problem Report 435)

A turbine trip transient occurred on April 2, 1978 from 75% power level. A runback in reactor power proceeded for about 50 seconds before the reactor was tripped.

Immediately after tripping the turbine, a very large reduction in feedwater flow to both steam generators occurred (due to high steam pressure) followed by too much feedwater flowrate in each loop. (This was prior to adding feedwater pump speed kicker circuits to the ICS at Davis-Besse 1). The excess feedwater flow reduced pressurizer level from a peak value of 238 inches to 170 inches and a peak RC pressure value of 2250 psig to about 1960 psig before the reactor was tripped.

After the reactor was tripped, minimum values of steam pressure and  $T_{ave}$  were 943 psig and 546F respectively. Minimum values of RC pressure and pressurizer level were 1650 psig and 6 inches. The change in pressurizer level following the reactor trip was 162 inches, and the level remained above the lower level tap during the entire transient.

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## Reactor Trip Transient on August 2, 1978

The initial reactor power level was 40% and the operator had placed the Diamond station in manual. The ICS therefore was in a tracking mode. Oscillations in generated power were being reinforced every two minutes and after 8 or 9 minutes, the reactor tripped. From the Post Trip Review log, hot and cold leg temperatures were 6 to 8F higher than normal. Also, pressurizer level was 230 inches rather than 180 inches.

After the reactor trip steam pressure decreased to only 980 psig and about 5 minutes after the trip  $T_{ave}$  reached a minimum value of 552F. (The values on this transient are excellent minimum values). About 90 seconds after reactor trip, a minimum pressurizer level of 34 inches was reached. This is a 196 inch level change and is greater than the normal operating point of 180 inches. Thus, the pressurizer level would have dropped to 16 inches below the lower level tap on this transient.

The unusually large contraction of the RC system fluid was caused by the higher than normal  $T_{ave}$  and pressurizer level prior to reactor trip. The change in  $T_{ave}$  was from 589.3F to 555F, or 34.3F. If the same  $\Delta T$  occurred from 582F, then the minimum  $T_{ave}$  would have been 547.7F and the minimum pressurizer level would have been 18 inches below the lower tap in accordance with Figure 3.

Note: The information on temperatures and pressures during this reactor trip transient were derived from the Post Trip Review

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Log only. Since some channels only update every 15 seconds, while others only update every 30 seconds, this data cannot adequately describe this kind of a transient.

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Reactor Trip on November 29, 1977 (Site Problem Report 396)

At 40% power level, the reactor was tripped by high flux indications. (This was caused by spurious signals through improper patch panel connections). Automatically after the reactor trip, the turbine was tripped. The operators decided to open the main circuit breakers. The backup diesel power was started, but one of the two units tripped and shutdown.

The station experienced a 7 second blackout and the RC pumps were de-energized so that natural circulation flowrate of reactor coolant lasted for 15 minutes.

About 5 minutes after the reactor trip, RC pressure reached a minimum value of 1625 psig with a  $\pm$  50 psig oscillation. One minute earlier, pressurizer level had decreased below the low level tap and remained off scale for 6½ minutes.

One minute after the trip of the reactor, water level in each steam generator was 29 to 34 inches (startup level). After a rapid rate of fill of emergency feedwater, the levels increased to 80 inches in Steam Generator #1 and 120 inches in Steam Generator #2. During the three minute filling operation, steam generator pressures decreased from 920 psig to 610 in Steam Generator #2. The excessive contraction in the primary system is due to the cold leg temperatures produced by the rapid fill rate (and level) of each steam generator by the emergency feedwater system.

From References 1 through 4, detailed profiles of RC pressure,  $T_{ave}$ , and other related plant parameters were prepared from the test data to create a characteristic relationship of  $T_{ave}$  and RC pressure for reactor trip transients at Davis-Besse 1. This is displayed as Figure 1 which is part of Reference 5.

In general, there is a difference in the cooldown of  $T_{ave}$  and the decrease in RC pressure following a reactor trip depending on whether or not the RC pumps are running. The cooldown of the primary system is considerably faster with all four pumps running than when natural circulation exists: about 1 minute compared to 5 minutes to reach minimum  $T_{ave}$ .

Figure 1 also shows that for minimum values of  $T_{ave}$  below 540F, the final RC pressure will be approximately the same regardless of whether the pumps are running or not.

For this study of pressurizer level change following reactor trip transients, the most conservative (lowest) relationship of  $T_{ave}$  and RC pressure was used. That relationship utilizes data from the August 2, 1978 and April 2, 1978 transients.

ANALYSIS

The objective of Reference 5 was to compare the predicted change in pressurizer level with measured changes in level and verify that the mathematical model was sufficiently accurate to predict pressurizer level changes that dropped below the lower level tap or would occur during hypothetical transients.

The mathematical model used to represent the contraction of the RC system during these transients utilizes the following equation:

Total mass of fluid in the RC system =  $M_0 =$

$$\frac{\text{Equivalent Volume of Hot Fluid}}{\text{Specific Volume of Hot Fluid}}$$

$$+ \frac{\text{Equivalent Volume of Cold Fluid}}{\text{Specific Volume of Cold Fluid}}$$

$$+ \frac{\text{Liquid Volume of the Pressurizer}}{\text{Specific Volume of Pressurizer Fluid}}$$

Initially, no attempt was made to account for variable makeup flowrates and pressurizer vent valve flowrates during the cooldown interval. After evaluating the agreement between calculated and measured changes in pressurizer level, it was decided to not account for slight additions or deletions of reactor coolant mass during the cooldown transient.

The calculational technique requires the determination of the initial and final pressures and temperatures of the reactor coolant system, an evaluation of the specific volumes for those conditions plus saturated conditions within the pressurizer, and the difference

in pressurizer volume due to the calculated contraction of the constant mass in the RC system.

Table 2 below, presents a comparison of calculated pressurizer level changes with measured level changes at selected time intervals in the four reactor trip transients.

Table 2

Comparison of Measured and Calculated Changes  
In Pressurizer Levels During Reactor Trip  
Transients at Davis-Besse 1

<u>Date of Rx Trip</u>	<u>Measured Δ Level - inches</u>	<u>Calculated Δ Level - inches</u>	<u>Time Elapsed - seconds</u>
2/24/78	191	184	60
4/2/78	162	167	45
8/2/78	196	206	90
11/29/77	139	132	170
11/29/77	184	181	240

The equivalent volume of hot fluid consists of upper half of each steam generator, one half of the reactor vessel and all the hot leg piping.

Similarly the equivalent volume of cold fluid consists of the other half of both steam generators, the lower half of the reactor vessel, and all the cold leg piping. The sum of the hot and cold fluid volumes is equivalent to the total reactor coolant system volume excluding the pressurizer.

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A reference volume of 800 ft<sup>3</sup> for a normal pressurizer level of 180 inches was often adjusted to account for different initial levels as measured in the selected reactor trip transients.

The test data from the November 29, 1977 reactor trip was examined to find the minimum RC pressure and temperatures that probably occurred while the pressurizer level was off scale and the values were determined to be the following:

At clock time 22:48:50, minimum RC pressure was 1625 psig ( $\pm$  50 psig due to oscillations). The corresponding value of hot leg temperature was 562.5F whereas the cold leg temperature was off-scale (below 520F) and was calculated to be 508.5F.

$T_{ave}$  for Loop 2 was determined to be 535.5F and the Loop 1 and 2 steam pressures indicated 610 and 760 psig respectively.

These values were used to specify the final specific volumes required in the equation and revealed that the change in pressurizer level was 224 inches. Since the initial pressurizer level at instant of reactor trip was only 192 inches, then the final pressurizer level was 32 inches below the lower level tap. There was another 43 inches of water remaining in the pressurizer at this time.

Figure 2 was developed for the situation of a reactor trip from full power plus loss of all RC pumps. The minimum  $T_{ave}$  will be controlled by the steam pressure in each steam generator. By selecting decreasing values of  $T_{ave}$  and corresponding values of steam pressure, minimum pressurizer levels were predicted.

The intent is for the user to be able to predict the total change in pressurizer level that will occur as  $T_{ave}$  changes from a normal 582F to a known or anticipated minimum temperature.

Figure 2 shows that  $T_{ave}$  has to decrease to 534F to empty the pressurizer for this reactor trip transient (no RC pumps running) and that this requires a minimum steam pressure in each steam generator to be equal to 665 psig.

By controlling steam pressure above 800 psig during this transient, (via limiting the fill rate and water level in each steam generator) the pressurizer level can remain above the lower level tap.

If the initial power level had been 100% on the November 29, 1977 transient, then the calculated minimum pressurizer level would have been 58 inches below the lower level tap. Since the initial power level was only 40%, the amount of contraction in the RC system was only -32 inches and less than predicted (by application of Figure 2). The dependence of the contraction of reactor coolant on initial power level is exhibited in Table 3 below:

Table 3

RC Contractions for Reactor Trips  
(With Station Blackout) From 40% and 100% Power Levels

Power Level - %	40	100
Initial RC Pressure - psia	2138	2138
Initial $T_{hot}$ - F	592	605.5
Initial $T_{cold}$ - F	567	558.5
Initial Level - Inches	192	192
Initial RC Volume - $\text{Ft}^3$	11,264	11,264
Initial RC Mass - Lbs.	496,969	493,437
Final RC Pressure - psia	1640	1640
Final $T_{hot}$ - F	562.5	562.5
Final $T_{cold}$ - F	508.5	508.5
Final RC Mass - Lbs	496,969	493,437
Final Pzr. Volume - $\text{Ft}^3$	122	37
Final Pzr. Level - Inches	-32	-58

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Figure 3 was similarly developed for a regular reactor trip from full power (all pumps running). This transient is more severe than the previous situation in that the forced convection of reactor coolant quickly removes all stored heat in the primary system. Below a  $T_{ave}$  value of 550F,  $T_{ave}$ , cold leg temperature, and saturation temperature in the steam generators are almost all equal. Thus, much greater care must be exercised on maintaining steam pressure to avoid emptying the pressurizer. Without the steam generator fill rate occurring in the previous type of reactor trip, good pressure control will occur as has been demonstrated on the August 2, 1978 reactor trip. An expected pressure of 980 psig will not cause the pressurizer level to go below the lower level tap.

The investigation of the cause for the final contraction of RC volume on the November 29, 1977 transient revealed that the rate of fill in both steam generators by the emergency feedwater system was too large for proper control of the steam pressure and the primary system cold leg temperature.

Figure 4 displays the rate of change in full range level and steam pressure in the interval of time between the reactor trip (0 seconds) and the time of minimum pressurizer level (315 seconds).

By calculating true levels of water in each steam generator from the indicated levels, and converting the volumetric rate of change in the steam generator to inlet conditions at the auxiliary nozzles, it was determined that an emergency feedwater flowrate of 1200 gpm was delivered to each steam generator during this transient.

The emergency feedwater flowrate of 1200 gpm should be reduced under all operating conditions to only 850 gpm. With this adjustment, the following advantages can be realized:

1. The limit of 5 feet per second impingement velocity on the tube bundle from the auxiliary feedwater nozzles is satisfied with a flowrate no greater than 850 gpm. At 1200 gpm, there is a high probability that tubes are vibrating excessively opposite the nozzles whenever the emergency system is utilized. This is an undesirable condition that can contribute to tube failure or leakage.
2. By filling each steam generator at two-thirds the previous rate (and to a lower liquid level setpoint) the ability of the operators to maintain steam pressure above the desired minimum value of 800 psig for a reactor trip-station blackout transient will be enhanced.

The basis for Technical Specification 3/4.7.1.2 states that the emergency feedwater system should have the capability to flow 850 gpm into each steam generator at an existing steam pressure of 1035 psig. The concern is to provide adequate flow for cooling the plant down to 280F. Comparison of Davis-Besse 1 fill rates with those measured and recorded at the Crystal River-3 plant reveal that the emergency feedwater flowrate for each steam generator was approximately two-thirds that shown in Figure 4 for Davis-Besse 1.

REFERENCES:

1. Site Problem Report #431, Report including test data on the reactor trip transient of February 24, 1978.
2. Site Problem Report #435, Report including test data on the turbine trip test (and reactor trip) of April 2, 1978.
3. Site Problem Report #396, Report including test data on the reactor trip and station blackout transient of November 29, 1977.
4. Copies of test data for the reactor trip on August 2, 1978.
5. B&W Calculational File: 32-9538-00, "Davis-Besse 1 Pressurizer Levels During Reactor Trips", by R.W. Winks, dated August 31, 1978.

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10 X 10 TO 1 INCH X 7½ X 10 INCH  
K-E KELFEL & ECKER CO. MADE IN U.S.A.

R.C. SYSTEM PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE DURING  
SPECIFIC REACTOR TRIPS AT DAVIS-BESSE 1

85-2226 00

2400

2300

2200

2100

2000

R.C. PRESSURE - PSIG

Nov 29, 1977  
(W/O R.C. PUMPS)

FEB 24, 1978

AUG 2, 1978

APR 2, 1978

1600

540

550

560

570

580

590


UNIT AVERAGE TEMPERATURE - F

FIG 1

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PREDICTED PRESSURIZER LEVELS FOR A REACTOR TRIP  
AND LOSS OF RC PUMPS AT DAVIS-BESSE I


85-2225 00



52-9558 00

PREDICTED PRESSURIZER LEVELS FOR A REACTOR TRIP  
FROM FULL POWER AT DAVIS-BESSE I

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STEAM GENERATOR PERFORMANCE DURING REACTOR TRIP ON Nov. 29, 1977

46 1470

KOT TO 10 TO 1% INCHES /<sup>1/2</sup> X 10 INCHES

STOKE & SCHAFF CO. made in U.S.A.




FIG 4

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BWMP-29032A-3 (10-76)

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BNNP-20210-1 (1-78)

CALCULATION DATA/TRANSMITTAL SHEETDOCUMENT IDENTIFIERCALC. 32 - 9538 - 00TRANS. 86 - -TYPE: RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT NUC. SERV. INPUT DESIGN RQMT.  DESIGN VERIF.  
 OTHERTITLE DB-1 Pressurizer Levels During Reactor TripsPREPARED BY P. W. Wilks REVIEWED BY R M Tarran

TITLE Principal Engineer DATE 8/18/78 TITLE Sr Engr DATE 8/31/78

## PURPOSE:

To review actual plant operating data and show that pressurizer level will not go below a zero indication when the reactor is tripped from full power and station blackout occurs simultaneously and all RC pumps trip.

## SUMMARY OF RESULTS (INCLUDE DOC. ID'S OF PREVIOUS TRANSMITTALS &amp; SOURCE CALCULATIONAL PACKAGES FOR THIS TRANSMITTAL)

Minimum Pressurizer levels will provide sufficient margin above bottom of vessel for both kinds of reactor trips from full power: trip of all RC pumps or all RC pumps operating. The requirements are that proper control of OTSG steam pressure and water inventory be established after each reactor trip.

Site Problem Reports # 396, 431 and 435 from Davis-Besse 1 were used as source of actual plant performance.

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DISTRIBUTION

C. W. Tally  
P. M. Gribble  
J. R. Burris  
Linda Page

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1 MU Pump Operation:

$$k_1 = 0.010 \text{ and } 0.0050$$

$$= (\text{psid/gpm}^2)$$

Prc psig	$Q_{MU}$ gpm	$Q_{RE+SI}$ gpm	$Q_{Pump}$ gpm	Pd psig	$\Delta P_{sys}$ psi	$k_1$	$Q_{MU}'$ gpm
2200	142	70	212	2400	200	0.010	141
2000	169	70	239	2290	290	0.010	170
1800	192	70	262	2169	369	0.010	192
1700	203	70	273	2108	408	0.010	202
<hr/>							
2200	160	70	230	2325	125	0.0050	158
2000	190	70	260	2180	180	0.0050	190
1800	215	70	285	2036	236	0.0050	217
1700	227	70	297	1960	260	0.0050	228

2 MU Pump Operation with same system resistance  
 $k_2 = k_1 = 0.010 \text{ and } 0.0050 \text{ psi/gpm}^2$

Prc	$Q_{MU}$	$Q_{Pump}$	$Q_{TOT}$	Pd	$\Delta P_{sys}$	$k_1$	$Q_{TOT}'$
2200	95	165	190	2562	362	0.010	190
2000	112.5	182.5	225	2508	508	0.010	225
1800	127.5	197.5	255	2456	656	0.010	256
1700	135	205	270	2430	730	0.010	270
<hr/>							
2200	119	189	238	2485	285	0.0050	239
2000	142	212	284	2402	402	0.0050	284
1800	161	231	322	2322	522	0.0050	323
1700	170	240	340	2280	580	0.0050	340

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CALCULATED MAKEUP FLOWRATES FOR EITHER 1 OR 2  
MAKEUP PUMPS VERSUS RC PRESSURE AT DAVIS-BESSE 1

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
K+E 10 X 10 TO 14 INCHES X 10 INCHES  
REUPFEL & FISHER CO. MADE IN U.S.A.

FIG 6

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CALCULATED H.U. SYSTEM FLOWRATE VERSUS RC PRESSURE  
FOR VALVE WIDE OPEN CONDITIONS

46 1320


KoΣ 10 X 10 TO  $\frac{1}{2}$  INCH 2 X 10 INCHES  
KELFEL & SISTER CO. MADE IN U.S.A.

FIG 7

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	$\odot$	$\odot$	$\odot$	$\odot$	$\odot$	
Flow, GPM	112.00	$\odot + \odot$	No Line	MV Pump	FC Press @ HSI Nozzle	
Flow, GPM	Flow (GPM), GPM		DF (PSI)	TSH (PSI)	$\odot - \odot$ (PSI)	
<u>One Pump</u>						
22	140	172	102	2400	1523	
22	150	182	117	2355	2235	
22	160	192	132	2315	2192	
22	170	212	165	2210	2062	
22	200	252	203	2130	1922	
22	220	272	251	2115	1774	
22	240	272	299	1915	1316	
22	260	282	351	1790	1439	
<u>Two Pump</u>						
	<u><math>\odot + \odot</math></u>					
22	160	96	133	2630	2497	
22	200	116	205	2590	2372	
22	240	136	299	2520	2221	
22	260	156	407	2460	2053	
22	300	176	531	2390	1949	
22	320	196	673	2300	627	
22	340	216	830	2215	1385	
22	360	236	749	2255	1506	
22	370	251	710	2290	1570	
22	380	266	467	2420	1443	
22	400	286	600	2340	1743	
22	420	286	551	2490	2139	

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TECO  
Appendix to 32-9745-0014  
J. R. Merchant for  
R. W. Wilkins

10/3/78

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

TOLEDO, OHIO 43652

TELCOPY REQUEST

DATE September 25, 1972 [Monday]

MESSAGE TO: Ray Licker - B&W

TELCOPY NUMBER: 1-804-324-6721 <sup>7290</sup>

VERIFICATION NUMBER: \_\_\_\_\_

NO. OF PAGES 2 PLUS COVER PAGE

MESSAGE FROM: Suebel Jean

TELCOPY NUMBER 419-259-5398

VERIFICATION NUMBER 419-259-5000 Ext., 5495

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Post Trip Review Data for 11/29/77 Event  
for see range of interest (~ 6 min after Reactor  
Trip)

- L761 MU TK LVL (in H<sub>2</sub>O)  
F717 LETDOWN FLOW (gpm)  
F740 MU FLOW (HI RANGE) (gpm)  
F782 RCP SEAL IN FLOW (range 0 to 100.0 gpm)

POOR ORIGINAL

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13:40

30/77

## T TRIP REVIEW

REACTOR TRIP AT 22:43:23

TIME	76 MW TRIP	70 MW	70 MW	SP
22:42:00	-85	59.47 ✓	44.71 ✓	50.78
22:42:15	-70	59.47	44.71	50.75 ✓
22:42:30	-55	59.33 ✓	27.29 ✓	50.75
22:42:45	-40	59.33	27.29	50.84 ✓
22:43:00	-25	59.31 ✓	26.95	50.84
22:43:15	← Trip	59.31	26.95	50.79 ✓
22:43:30	+5	58.62 ✓	125.6 ✓	50.79
22:43:45	+20	58.62	125.6	50.66 ✓
22:44:00	+35	56.78 ✓	119.1 ✓	50.66
22:44:15	+50	56.78	119.1	0000 ✓
22:44:30	+65	56.86 ✓	16.09 ✓	0000
22:44:45	+80	56.86	16.09	0000
22:45:00	+95	56.93 ✓	16.04	0000
22:45:15	110	56.93	16.04	0000
22:45:30	125	56.99 ✓	16.00 ✓	↑
22:45:45	140	56.99	16.00	↑
22:46:00	155	57.04 ✓	15.92 ✓	↓
22:46:15	170	57.04	15.92	↓
22:46:30	185	57.05 ✓	15.82 ✓	↓
22:46:45	200	57.05	15.82	↓
22:47:00	215	57.05 ✓	15.67	↓
22:47:15	230	57.05	15.67	↓
22:47:30	245	56.87 ✓	17.96	↓
22:47:45	260	56.87	17.96	↓

LETTDOWN FLOW  
ZERO IN THIS PERIOD

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\$414

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	L 761	F 740	F 717	F 782
22: 48: 00 275	56.38	18.04	0	26.55
22 48: 15 290	56.38	18.04	0	26.55
22 49: 15 350	55.23	17.99	0	27.21
22: 52: 15		112.		
22: 53: 15		(-4)		

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TRANS. 86 - 2226 - 00

TYPE: RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT NUC. SERV. INPUT DESIGN RQMT. DESIGN VERIF.TITLE Dynamic Performance of the Pressurizer During Reactor Trips at Davis-Besse I OTHERPREPARED BY Robert Wile REVIEWED BY RM/Harrington

TITLE Principal Engineer DATE 8/31/78 TITLE Sr. Engineer DATE 9/1/78

## PURPOSE:

To report on the success of a mathematical technique of calculating minimum pressurizer level when initial and final RC hot leg and cold leg temperatures and RC pressures are known relative to large upset transients such as reactor trips from full power.

## SUMMARY OF RESULTS (INCLUDE DOC. ID'S OF PREVIOUS TRANSMITTALS &amp; SOURCE CALCULATIONAL PACKAGES FOR THIS TRANSMITTAL)

The minimum level of water in the pressurizer will remain above the bottom provided the lowest value of Tave and steam pressure are above certain specified values for either a reactor trip with all RC pumps running or without the pumps running.

Field data from Davis-Besse I plant contained in SPP # 396, 431, 435 and 476, was used to verify the accuracy of calculated minimum pressurizer levels during transients.

The Calculational File used to prepare this report is 32-9538-00.

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DYNAMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE PRESSURIZER  
DURING REACTOR TRIPS AT DAVIS BESSE 1

By: Robert W. Winks  
Principal Engineer  
Babcock & Wilcox Co.  
Lynchburg, Virginia

August 31, 1978

Q.A. Statement

The information contained in this report,  
and the calculations supporting this  
request have been checked for accuracy  
and completeness.

RW Harrington 9/1/78  
Signature Date

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Approved:

SB Davis  
Control Analysis Manager

86-2226 00

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750136

INTRODUCTION

A concern exists with NRC (Region 3) that the pressurizer will empty completely during a reactor trip from full power with simultaneous loss of station power. This premise is founded upon actual pressurizer performance recorded during several reactor trip transients at Davis-Besse 1. The reactor trip transients have occurred at partial power levels with either all RC pumps running or all four RC pumps tripped.

The extent of reactor coolant volume contraction following a reactor trip is primarily governed by the wetted surface area of the tube bundle and by the steam pressure maintained within both Once Through Steam Generators. It is also affected by the flowrate of reactor coolant through both steam generators, that is, all pumps running versus all pumps tripped.

An effort to properly adjust the blowdown on all the main steam safety relief valves has been performed by Toledo Edison Company at the Davis-Besse 1 plant early in 1978. The values of minimum steam pressure after a recent reactor trip transient indicate that the performance of the steam pressure relief system is greatly improved over that observed during earlier reactor trip transients.

The purpose of this report will be to develop a calculational technique for predicting minimum pressurizer levels following a reactor trip transient and account for either tripped or running RC pumps. Actual reactor trip transient test data from Davis-Besse 1 will be used to support the calculational technique. A second purpose will be to predict the minimum pressurizer level that will occur for two specific reactor trip transients and to disclose values of minimum steam pressure that will cause the pressurizer to become empty for these two transients.

SUMMARY

A calculational technique has been developed for predicting changes in pressurizer level during reactor trips which agrees very well with observed reactor trip transients at Davis-Besse 1.

The method has been used to predict the final minimum pressurizer level for two possible transients (both from 100% power): a reactor trip with simultaneous trip of all RC pumps, and a manual trip of the reactor with all RC pumps operating.

For the first transient above, the pressurizer level will decrease only 100 inches, provided that steam pressure will not decrease below 950 psig. If steam pressure decreases to 700 psig the pressurizer would become empty and could cause a steam bubble to enter into the hot leg piping.

For the manual trip of the reactor transient, the pressurizer level will decrease below the lower level tap when steam pressure drops to 950 psig. Since a minimum steam pressure of 980 psig is anticipated on future reactor trip transients, the predicted minimum pressurizer level will be a few inches above the zero indication and nearly 80 inches above the bottom of the pressurizer. If steam pressure decreases to 840 psig on this transient, then the water level would drop completely to the bottom of the pressurizer.

The maximum filling rate for the Once Through Steam Generators should be only 850 gpm rather than the 1200 gpm rate determined from the November 29, 1977 test data. In order to maintain steam generator pressure above 800 psig and prevent possible emptying of the pressurizer during the loss of RC pump-reactor trip transient, the rate

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of fill must be controlled by the Operator using manual control on the emergency feedwater pump speed as required.

Two graphs have been developed (Figures 2 and 3) which relate minimum  $T_{ave}$  to minimum pressurizer level for the two different reactor trip transients. These graphs can be used to predict pressurizer performance during any large transients at Davis-Besse 1.

750139

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The information included in this report is to replace that plant transient information used previously to develop the concept that the pressurizer will empty on a reactor trip from full power simultaneous with loss of all RC pumps.<sup>1</sup>

With proper operation of the adjusted steam pressure relief system and minimum steam pressures above 980 psig, pressurizer level will not drop below the lower level tap for a normal reactor trip transient at any power level up to 100%.

The minimum pressurizer level that occurred on the Nov. 29, 1977 reactor trip transient with loss of all four RC pumps is calculated to have been 32 inches below the low level tap. A fluid reserve equivalent to 43 inches of level existed in the pressurizer before makeup flow increased the volume of reactor coolant. Minimum steam pressures were 610 and 730 psig for the two steam generators. The decrease in steam pressure over a 200 second interval was a result of using an excessive emergency feedwater flowrate to increase the water level in each steam generator as required to induce a natural circulation flowrate.

The maximum flowrate of emergency feedwater to each steam generator should be limited to only 850 gpm. The limit on the jet impingement velocity on the OTSG tube bundle (5 ft/second) is equivalent to 850 gpm. Tech Spec 3/4.7.1.2 (Bases) requires 850 gpm for decay heat removal. From the test data of the upcoming Natural Circulation test at Davis-Besse 1, the steam generators should be filled to the new required water level at a rate not to exceed 20 inches per

750140

minute, which is compatible with maintaining steam pressures above 800 psig in order to keep pressurizer level above zero.

If, after initiation of either kind of reactor trip, the SFRCS were to be actuated and steam pressure decreases below 850 psig, then the predicted final pressurizer levels (i.e. from Figures 2 and 3) could be 20 inches or a completely empty pressurizer depending on the operation of the RC pumps. This analysis does not include the effect of SFRCS operation on primary system contraction due to any overcooling.

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DISCUSSION OF DAVIS-BESSE 1 TRANSIENTS

Four recent reactor trip transients were selected to determine a realistic primary system cooldown profile for analyzing and predicting pressurizer performance. None of these transients were initiated from full power and each transient had a unique sequence of operations either before or following the trip of the reactor. The table below briefly describes each of the four reactor trip transients:

Table 1

<u>Date</u>	<u>Initial Power Level</u>	<u>RC Pumps Running</u>	<u>Comments</u>
2/24/78	74	yes	trip initiated by the failure of a flowmeter $\Delta P$ transmitter.
4/2/78	75	yes	turbine trip test with unsuccessful runback of reactor power.
8/2/78	40	yes	reactor trip due to divergent oscillations while in tracking mode.
11/29/77	40	no	reactor trip and station blackout causing loss of RC pumps.

The response of the ICS and plant was adequately similar for these four transients to be able to characterize the  $T_{ave}$ -RC pressure relationship following the trip of the reactor. Figure 1 displays this relationship. This curve was utilized in predicting minimum conditions in the reactor coolant system for calculating minimum values of level in the pressurizer.

The following paragraphs present a critique of each of the selected reactor trip transients.

Reactor Trip on February 24, 1978 (Site Problem Report 431)

Due to flowmeter instrumentation failure the reactor was tripped from 74% power level and that action automatically tripped the turbine. Feedwater flow decreased to nearly zero 60 seconds after the transient was initiated.

Minimum steam generator pressure was 952 psig and minimum  $T_{ave}$  was 547.7F. The minimum values for RC pressure and pressurizer level were 1734 psig and 12 inches respectively. The change in pressurizer level for this reactor trip transient was 191 inches where the initial level was not 180 inches, but 203 inches.

If the initial pressurizer level had been at 180 inches, the final minimum level would have been 11 inches below the lower level tap. A fluid reserve equivalent to 64 inches of pressurizer level would have existed below that minimum level and no adverse affect on the primary system would have resulted.

750143

Reactor Trip Transient on April 2, 1978 (Site Problem Report 435)

A turbine trip transient occurred on April 2, 1978 from 75% power level. A runback in reactor power proceeded for about 50 seconds before the reactor was tripped.

Immediately after tripping the turbine, a very large reduction in feedwater flow to both steam generators occurred (due to high steam pressure) followed by too much feedwater flowrate in each loop. (This was prior to adding feedwater pump speed kicker circuits to the ICS at Davis-Besse 1). The excess feedwater flow reduced pressurizer level from a peak value of 238 inches to 170 inches and a peak RC pressure value of 2250 psig to about 1960 psig before the reactor was tripped.

After the reactor was tripped, minimum values of steam pressure and  $T_{ave}$  were 943 psig and 546F respectively. Minimum values of RC pressure and pressurizer level were 1650 psig and 6 inches. The change in pressurizer level following the reactor trip was 162 inches, and the level remained above the lower level tap during the entire transient.

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## Reactor Trip Transient on August 2, 1978

The initial reactor power level was 40% and the operator had placed the Diamond station in manual. The ICS therefore was in a tracking mode. Oscillations in generated power were being reinforced every two minutes and after 8 or 9 minutes, the reactor tripped. From the Post Trip Review log, hot and cold leg temperatures were 6 to 8F higher than normal. Also, pressurizer level was 230 inches rather than 180 inches.

After the reactor trip steam pressure decreased to only 980 psig and about 5 minutes after the trip  $T_{ave}$  reached a minimum value of 552F. (The values on this transient are excellent minimum values). About 90 seconds after reactor trip, a minimum pressurizer level of 34 inches was reached. This is a 196 inch level change and is greater than the normal operating point of 180 inches. Thus, the pressurizer level would have dropped to 16 inches below the lower level tap on this transient.

The unusually large contraction of the RC system fluid was caused by the higher than normal  $T_{ave}$  and pressurizer level prior to reactor trip. The change in  $T_{ave}$  was from 589.3F to 555F, or 34.3F. If the same  $\Delta T$  occurred from 582F, then the minimum  $T_{ave}$  would have been 547.7F and the minimum pressurizer level would have been 18 inches below the lower tap in accordance with Figure 3.

Note: The information on temperatures and pressures during this reactor trip transient were derived from the Post Trip Review

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Log only. Since some channels only update every 15 seconds, while others only update every 30 seconds, this data cannot adequately describe this kind of a transient.

750146

Reactor Trip on November 29, 1977 (Site Problem Report 396)

At 40% power level, the reactor was tripped by high flux indications. (This was caused by spurious signals through improper patch panel connections). Automatically after the reactor trip, the turbine was tripped. The operators decided to open the main circuit breakers. The backup diesel power was started, but one of the two units tripped and shutdown.

The station experienced a 7 second blackout and the RC pumps were de-energized so that natural circulation flowrate of reactor coolant lasted for 15 minutes.

About 5 minutes after the reactor trip, RC pressure reached a minimum value of 1625 psig with a  $\pm$  50 psig oscillation. One minute earlier, pressurizer level had decreased below the low level tap and remained off scale for 6½ minutes.

One minute after the trip of the reactor, water level in each steam generator was 29 to 34 inches (startup level). After a rapid rate of fill of emergency feedwater, the levels increased to 80 inches in Steam Generator #1 and 120 inches in Steam Generator #2. During the three minute filling operation, steam generator pressures decreased from 920 psig to 610 in Steam Generator #2. The excessive contraction in the primary system is due to the cold leg temperatures produced by the rapid fill rate (and level) of each steam generator by the emergency feedwater system.

From References 1 through 4, detailed profiles of RC pressure,  $T_{ave}$ , and other related plant parameters were prepared from the test data to create a characteristic relationship of  $T_{ave}$  and RC pressure for reactor trip transients at Davis-Besse 1. This is displayed as Figure 1 which is part of Reference 5.

In general, there is a difference in the cooldown of  $T_{ave}$  and the decrease in RC pressure following a reactor trip depending on whether or not the RC pumps are running. The cooldown of the primary system is considerably faster with all four pumps running than when natural circulation exists: about 1 minute compared to 5 minutes to reach minimum  $T_{ave}$ .

Figure 1 also shows that for minimum values of  $T_{ave}$  below 540F, the final RC pressure will be approximately the same regardless of whether the pumps are running or not.

For this study of pressurizer level change following reactor trip transients, the most conservative (lowest) relationship of  $T_{ave}$  and RC pressure was used. That relationship utilizes data from the August 2, 1978 and April 2, 1978 transients.

750148

ANALYSIS

The objective of Reference 5 was to compare the predicted change in pressurizer level with measured changes in level and verify that the mathematical model was sufficiently accurate to predict pressurizer level changes that dropped below the lower level tap or would occur during hypothetical transients.

The mathematical model used to represent the contraction of the RC system during these transients utilizes the following equation:

Total mass of fluid in the RC system =  $M_0 =$

$$\frac{\text{Equivalent Volume of Hot Fluid}}{\text{Specific Volume of Hot Fluid}}$$

$$+ \frac{\text{Equivalent Volume of Cold Fluid}}{\text{Specific Volume of Cold Fluid}}$$

$$+ \frac{\text{Liquid Volume of the Pressurizer}}{\text{Specific Volume of Pressurizer Fluid}}$$

Initially, no attempt was made to account for variable makeup flowrates and pressurizer vent valve flowrates during the cooldown interval. After evaluating the agreement between calculated and measured changes in pressurizer level, it was decided to not account for slight additions or deletions of reactor coolant mass during the cooldown transient.

The calculational technique requires the determination of the initial and final pressures and temperatures of the reactor coolant system, an evaluation of the specific volumes for those conditions plus saturated conditions within the pressurizer, and the difference

in pressurizer volume due to the calculated contraction of the constant mass in the RC system.

Table 2 below, presents a comparison of calculated pressurizer level changes with measured level changes at selected time intervals in the four reactor trip transients.

Table 2

Comparison of Measured and Calculated Changes  
In Pressurizer Levels During Reactor Trip  
Transients at Davis-Besse 1

<u>Date of Rx Trip</u>	<u>Measured Δ Level - inches</u>	<u>Calculated Δ Level - inches</u>	<u>Time Elapsed - seconds</u>
2/24/78	191	184	60
4/2/78	162	167	45
8/2/78	196	206	90
11/29/77	139	132	170
11/29/77	184	181	240

The equivalent volume of hot fluid consists of upper half of each steam generator, one half of the reactor vessel and all the hot leg piping.

Similarly the equivalent volume of cold fluid consists of the other half of both steam generators, the lower half of the reactor vessel, and all the cold leg piping. The sum of the hot and cold fluid volumes is equivalent to the total reactor coolant system volume excluding the pressurizer.

A reference volume of 800 ft<sup>3</sup> for a normal pressurizer level of 180 inches was often adjusted to account for different initial levels as measured in the selected reactor trip transients.

The test data from the November 29, 1977 reactor trip was examined to find the minimum RC pressure and temperatures that probably occurred while the pressurizer level was off scale and the values were determined to be the following:

At clock time 22:48:50, minimum RC pressure was 1625 psig ( $\pm$  50 psig due to oscillations). The corresponding value of hot leg temperature was 562.5F whereas the cold leg temperature was off-scale (below 520F) and was calculated to be 508.5F.

$T_{ave}$  for Loop 2 was determined to be 535.5F and the Loop 1 and 2 steam pressures indicated 610 and 760 psig respectively.

These values were used to specify the final specific volumes required in the equation and revealed that the change in pressurizer level was 224 inches. Since the initial pressurizer level at instant of reactor trip was only 192 inches, then the final pressurizer level was 32 inches below the lower level tap. There was another 43 inches of water remaining in the pressurizer at this time.

Figure 2 was developed for the situation of a reactor trip from full power plus loss of all RC pumps. The minimum  $T_{ave}$  will be controlled by the steam pressure in each steam generator. By selecting decreasing values of  $T_{ave}$  and corresponding values of steam pressure, minimum pressurizer levels were predicted.

750151

The intent is for the user to be able to predict the total change in pressurizer level that will occur as  $T_{ave}$  changes from a normal 582F to a known or anticipated minimum temperature.

Figure 2 shows that  $T_{ave}$  has to decrease to 534F to empty the pressurizer for this reactor trip transient (no RC pumps running) and that this requires a minimum steam pressure in each steam generator to be equal to 665 psig.

By controlling steam pressure above 800 psig during this transient, (via limiting the fill rate and water level in each steam generator) the pressurizer level can remain above the lower level tap.

If the initial power level had been 100% on the November 29, 1977 transient, then the calculated minimum pressurizer level would have been 58 inches below the lower level tap. Since the initial power level was only 40%, the amount of contraction in the RC system was only -32 inches and less than predicted (by application of Figure 2). The dependence of the contraction of reactor coolant on initial power level is exhibited in Table 3 below:

Table 3

RC Contractions for Reactor Trips  
(With Station Blackout) From 40% and 100% Power Levels

Power Level - %	40	100
Initial RC Pressure psia	2138	2138
Initial $T_{hot}$ - F	592	605.5
Initial $T_{cold}$ - F	567	558.5
Initial Level - Inches	192	192
Initial RC Volume - $\text{Ft}^3$	11,264	11,264
Initial RC Mass - Lbs.	496,969	493,437
Final RC Pressure - psia	1640	1640
Final $T_{hot}$ - F	562.5	562.5
Final $T_{cold}$ - F	508.5	508.5
Final RC Mass - Lbs	496,969	493,437
Final Pzr. Volume - $\text{Ft}^3$	122	37
Final Pzr. Level - Inches	-32	-58

750152

Figure 3 was similarly developed for a regular reactor trip from full power (all pumps running). This transient is more severe than the previous situation in that the forced convection of reactor coolant quickly removes all stored heat in the primary system. Below a  $T_{ave}$  value of 550F,  $T_{ave}$ , cold leg temperature, and saturation temperature in the steam generators are almost all equal. Thus, much greater care must be exercised on maintaining steam pressure to avoid emptying the pressurizer. Without the steam generator fill rate occurring in the previous type of reactor trip, good pressure control will occur as has been demonstrated on the August 2, 1978 reactor trip. An expected pressure of 980 psig will not cause the pressurizer level to go below the lower level tap.

The investigation of the cause for the final contraction of RC volume on the November 29, 1977 transient revealed that the rate of fill in both steam generators by the emergency feedwater system was too large for proper control of the steam pressure and the primary system cold leg temperature.

Figure 4 displays the rate of change in full range level and steam pressure in the interval of time between the reactor trip (0 seconds) and the time of minimum pressurizer level (315 seconds).

By calculating true levels of water in each steam generator from the indicated levels, and converting the volumetric rate of change in the steam generator to inlet conditions at the auxiliary nozzles, it was determined that an emergency feedwater flowrate of 1200 gpm was delivered to each steam generator during this transient.

The emergency feedwater flowrate of 1200 gpm should be reduced under all operating conditions to only 850 gpm. With this adjustment, the following advantages can be realized:

1. The limit of 5 feet per second impingement velocity on the tube bundle from the auxiliary feedwater nozzles is satisfied with a flowrate no greater than 850 gpm. At 1200 gpm, there is a high probability that tubes are vibrating excessively opposite the nozzles whenever the emergency system is utilized. This is an undesirable condition that can contribute to tube failure or leakage.
2. By filling each steam generator at two-thirds the previous rate (and to a lower liquid level setpoint) the ability of the operators to maintain steam pressure above the desired minimum value of 800 psig for a reactor trip-station blackout transient will be enhanced.

The basis for Technical Specification 3/4.7.1.2 states that the emergency feedwater system should have the capability to flow 850 gpm into each steam generator at an existing steam pressure of 1035 psig. The concern is to provide adequate flow for cooling the plant down to 280F. Comparison of Davis-Besse 1 fill rates with those measured and recorded at the Crystal River-3 plant reveal that the emergency feedwater flowrate for each steam generator was approximately two-thirds that shown in Figure 4 for Davis-Besse 1.

750154

REFERENCES:

1. Site Problem Report #431, Report including test data on the reactor trip transient of February 24, 1978.
2. Site Problem Report #435, Report including test data on the turbine trip test (and reactor trip) of April 2, 1978.
3. Site Problem Report #396, Report including test data on the reactor trip and station blackout transient of November 29, 1977.
4. Copies of test data for the reactor trip on August 2, 1978.
5. B&W Calculational File: 32-9538-00, "Davis-Besse 1 Pressurizer Levels During Reactor Trips", by R.W. Winks, dated August 31, 1978.

150155

52-9538 00  
R.C. SYSTEM PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE DURING  
SPECIFIC REACTOR TRIPS AT DAVIS-BESSE 1

85-2226 00

2400

2300

2200

2100

2000

R.C. PRESSURE PSIG

1900

1800

1700

1600

540

550

560

570

580

590

UNIT AVERAGE TEMPERATURE - F

FEB 24, 1978

AUG 2, 1978

NOV 29, 1977  
(W/O RC PUMPS)

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FIG 1

32-9538 00

PREDICTED PRESSURIZER LEVELS FOR A REACTOR TRIP  
AND LOSS OF R.C. PUMPS AT DAVIS-BESSEY

86-2225 00




FIG. 2

22-9338 00

PREDICTED PRESSURIZER LEVELS FOR A REACTOR TRIP  
FROM FULL POWER AT DAVIS-BESSE I

86-2226 00




FIG 3

STEAM GENERATOR PERFORMANCE DURING REACTOR TRIP ON Nov. 29, 1977

46 1470

100

100

100

900  
800

800  
700

700  
600

600  
500

FULL RANGE LEVEL - INCHES OF WATER

Loop 1 S.G.  
PRESSURE

Loop 2 S.G.  
PRESSURE

**POOR ORIGINAL**




FIG 4

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C.W. Tally	1 /			
Linda Frazee	1			St. Paul 9/1/77 NAME DATE

CALCULATION DATA/TRANSMITTAL SHEETDOCUMENT IDENTIFIERCALC. 32 - \_\_\_\_\_ - \_\_\_\_\_TRANS. 86 - 2226 - 00TYPE: RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT NUC. SERV. INPUT DESIGN RQMT. DESIGN VERIF.TITLE Dynamic Performance of the Pressurizer During  
Reactor Trips at Davis-Besse 1 OTHERPREPARED BY Robert Winkles REVIEWED BY R.M.Harrington

TITLE Principal Engineer DATE 8/31/78 TITLE Sr. Engineer DATE 9/1/78

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The minimum level of water in the pressurizer will remain above the bottom provided the lowest value of Tave and steam pressure are above certain specified values for either a reactor trip with all RC pumps running or without the pumps running.

Field data from Davis-Besse 1 plant contained in SPP # 396, 431, 435, and 476, was used to verify the accuracy of calculated minimum pressurizer levels during transients.

The Calculational File used to prepare this report is 32-9538-0D.

750161

POOR ORIGINALDISTRIBUTION

R. B. Davis

J. R. Burris

R. M. Harrington

Linda Page

R. M. Gribble

R. C. Lutkin

C. W. Tally

R. W. Winkles - Please Return Originals to me

# Babcock & Wilcox

Power Generation Group

P.O. Box 1260, Lynchburg, Va. 24505

Telephone: (804) 384-5111

BWT-1734

File: T1.2/12B

December 22, 1978


Mr. C. R. Domeck  
Nuclear Project Engineer  
Toledo Edison Company  
300 Madison Avenue  
Toledo, OH 43652

Subject: Toledo Edison Company  
Davis-Besse Unit 1  
NSS-14  
MINIMUM PRESSURIZER LEVEL REPORT

Dear Mr. Domeck:

Attached is a copy of a report, "Minimum Pressurizer Level for Various Reactor Trip Transients" prepared per your request.

Very truly yours,



RCL/hj

Attachment

R. C. Luken  
Project Manager

For A. H. Lazar  
Senior Project Manager

cc: JD Lenardson w/a  
JC Lewis  
DJ DeLaCroix  
EC Novak/1 w/a  
M Malcom/4 w/a

bcc: (all without attachment)

RW Winks  
AHL/RED/FRF  
Records Center T1.2  
RC Luken  
LB

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POOR ORIGINAL

86-2725 00

Minimum Pressurizer Level  
for Various Reactor Trip  
Transients

by

Robert Winks

Babcock & Wilcox Co.  
Lynchburg, Virginia 24501

December 22, 1978

Reviewed by:

Date:

*Linton L. Boyer*

Approved by:

Title:

Date:

*J. D. D.*

*Manager - Design*

POOR ORIGINAL

86-2725 00

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POOR ORIGINAL

1.0 Introduction:

Throughout the startup program for the Davis-Besse 1 plant a large number of reactor trip transients have occurred. These transients have revealed necessary adjustments in several of the auxiliary systems, such as higher reseating pressure of the steam relief valves and lower liquid levels in the steam generator. In the near future Toledo Edison Company plans to conduct three very significant "operational" transients in order to demonstrate proper operation of all related systems. They are: loss of electrical load from full power, loss of all offsite power with reactor at 15% power, and shutdown from outside the control room with the reactor at 15% power.

Previous reactor trip transients have revealed considerable overcooling of the reactor coolant system and a concern exists that excessive cooling of the primary system might occur during some of the planned reactor trip transients. A request for analysis and calculations of minimum pressurizer level during several types of reactor trip transients was made by Toledo Edison Company in order to understand the limits required to avoid emptying the pressurizer. The scope of this report will be to describe several typical reactor trip transients, and to predict the minimum pressurizer level, and to state any limitations on plant operation to prevent emptying the pressurizer.

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2.0 Objectives of the Analysis:

Tabulate the specific reactor trip transient test data which was used to complete the study of minimum pressurizer level during selected reactor trip transients.

Show that RC pressure will remain higher than 1650 psig during these selected reactor trip transients by incorporating actual Davis-Besse 1 test data.

Show that the minimum pressurizer level for a normal reactor trip transient at any initial power level will be above a zero indicated level.

Show under what conditions minimum pressurizer level will remain above a zero indication on a reactor trip following a loss of main feedwater.

Show that minimum pressurizer level for a reactor trip coincident with loss of station power will remain above a zero indication provided the operator maintains a proper water level in the steam generator via the auxiliary feed-water system.

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### 3.0 Conclusions

1. For a normal reactor trip from full power (Case 1) with main feedwater pumps operating and the main feedwater system holding a 2 foot level in each steam generator, the pressurizer level will remain on scale provided steam generator pressure is no lower than 980 psig.
2. For a normal reactor trip from 15% power (Case 2) with main feedwater pumps operating the pressurizer level will remain on scale if steam pressure does not drop below 980 psig. At the same time the cold leg temperatures must not decrease below 545F in the first 60 to 90 seconds after the reactor trip.
3. For a reactor trip from low power levels with loss of main feedwater pumps (Case 4) the pressurizer level will just barely remain "on scale" if the auxiliary feedwater maintains only a 30" level in each steam generator and the control room operator uses the makeup pumps to simultaneously regain approximately 12" of pressurizer level.
4. For a reactor trip and loss of all RC pumps and main feedwater pumps (Case 5) the pressurizer level will not drop "off scale." If the auxiliary feedwater system was used to generate a 100" startup level in each steam generator, (and steam pressure decreased to 770 psig) then pressurizer level would decrease to a zero indication.
5. The 3 foot setpoint for startup level during auxiliary feedwater system operation appears to be satisfactory in keeping pressurizer level above a zero indication except for Case 3, the reactor trip transient from full power due to a loss of main feedwater flow.
6. The performance of the auxiliary feedwater system on the loss of offsite power transient of November 29, 1977, has been applied to both natural circulation and forced convection situations for this analysis. By comparing the test data of SPR #430, a reactor trip on March 1, 1978, with the data of November 29, 1977, it is clear that applying the November 29th auxiliary feedwater system performance to reactor trip transients with RC pumps operating is more conservative (lower pressurizer levels) than applying an appropriate auxiliary feedwater system performance corresponding to all RC pumps operating.

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#### 4.0 Summary of Analytical Method

The work performed in this report was targeted toward preparing calculated RC pressurizer levels at Davis-Besse 1 for the following kinds of reactor trips. (Refer to available site problem reports which describe actual plant performance during reactor trip transients.)

Case No.	Reactor trip transient
1	Normal reactor trip (100%) with RC pumps and main feedwater system operating. Normal control of steam pressure and water level in both steam generators.
2	Normal reactor trip from 15%; other conditions same as 1 above.
3	Loss of feedwater with reactor power at 100%. RC pumps are operating and the operator manually controls final steam generator levels using the auxiliary feedwater system.
4	Loss of feedwater with reactor power at 15%. Other conditions same as 3 above.
5	Loss of offsite power with reactor power at 15%. RC pumps and main feedwater pumps shutdown. Operator manually controls the auxiliary feedwater system.

The procedure used to analyze these five cases was as follows:

1. Several recent site problem reports were studied to determine the relationship between RC pressure and  $T_{ave}$  following reactor trip at DB-1 (section 6.1). This relationship was used to determine proper specific volumes for the primary coolant following a reactor trip. An incidental use of this data was to verify that the reactor trips listed as Cases 1-5 previously will not actuate the Safety Features Actuation System.
2. Using the RC pressure -  $T_{ave}$  relationships just discussed, the contraction of the RC coolant after a reactor trip was determined, hence the level change in the pressurizer was calculated. The particular technique used is described in section 6.3.

#### 4.1 Tabulated Description of Actual Reactor Trip Transients at DB-1

Table 1 presents recent reactor trip transients used to determine a  $T_{ave}$  - RC pressure relationships assumed in this report. Each event was reported by a site problem report (SPR) numbered as shown in Table 1.

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Table 1

SRP No.	Rx Trip Date	Brief Description of Transient
476	8/2/78	Following a control rod insertion test a large neutron power error drove feedwater to overfeed the steam generators and overcool the RC system. After the trip SG levels were held at 40 inches by <u>main</u> feedwater.
484	9/28/78	At 95% power a failed BY $\Delta P$ transmitter initiated a runback. Due to erroneous loop 1 and 2 RC flow indications, feedwater flow to each steam generator was re-ratioed. Operator over fed the steam generators and overcool RCS causing a low pressure trip. After the trip SG levels were held at 100 inches by <u>main</u> feedwater.
485	10/3/78	A turbine trip occurred at 70% power level. Runback proceeded for 30 seconds before low RC pressure tripped reactor. SG levels were held at approximately 4 feet by <u>main</u> feedwater following the trip.
431	2/24/78	Rx tripped by high reactor outlet temperature. Turbine tripped and main feedwater flows reduced to zero in about 1 minute. Steam generator startup levels maintained above 50 and 75 inches in loops #1 and #2.
435	4/2/78	A planned turbine trip test from 75% power level. Reactor power runback proceeded for approximately 50 seconds. Reactor tripped on low RC pressure due to main feedwater overcooling primary side.
396	11/29/77	At 40% power level all station power was lost and the reactor and RC pumps were shutdown. Loss of main feedwater pumps set up the auxiliary feedwater system and 10 foot and 8foot levels were maintained, respectively, in the two steam generators.

4.2 Relationship Between RC Pressure and  $T_{ave}$  Following Rx Trips at DB-1

The relationship of minimum RC pressure for a minimum  $T_{ave}$  following a reactor trip at Davis-Besse 1 is shown in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 displays the most recent reactor trip transients and indicates a slightly higher RC pressure due to the improved operation of the steam relief valves. Figure 2 shows that there have been instances of RC pressure decreasing to 1650 psig on some reactor trip transients. This information has been included to verify the minimum  $T_{ave}$  values used in the following analysis. Figure 2 shows a loss

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of RC pumps cooldown as well as a normal RC pump operating cooldown of the RC system.

#### 4.3 Method of Analysis - An Example Calculation

The initial mass of reactor coolant immediately prior to a reactor trip transient is determined by knowing three RC system volumes and evaluating the proper specific volumes of the fluid at reactor outlet and inlet temperatures and at saturation temperature within the pressurizer.

For example: At 100% power level we know the following information:

Tave	582F
RC pressure	2170 psia
T hot leg	605.5F
T cold leg	559F
Hot leg volume	5471 ft <sup>3</sup>
Cold leg volume	4955 ft <sup>3</sup>
Pressurizer level	200 inches
Pressurizer volume	864 ft <sup>3</sup>

The specific volume of the hot leg reactor coolant at 605.5F is 0.023491 ft<sup>3</sup>/lb whereas the specific volume of the cold leg coolant at 559F is 0.021641 ft<sup>3</sup>/lb. The fluid contained in the pressurizer is at saturation temperature at 2170 psia pressure so its specific volume is 0.026525 ft<sup>3</sup>/lb. The initial (and final) mass of the reactor coolant is:

$$M_o = \frac{V_{hot}}{v_{hot}} + \frac{V_{cold}}{v_{cold}} + \frac{V_{pqr}}{v_{pqr}}$$
$$= \frac{5471}{0.023491} + \frac{4955}{0.021641} + \frac{864}{0.026525}$$

$$M_o = 494,435 \text{ lbs.}$$

It is conservative to predict a minimum pressurizer level based on a contraction of the fluid in the primary system by ~ 50 ft, no net addition of mass to the RC system (via makeup flow) during the initial 60 seconds or so of the reactor trip transient.

Now, by reversing the application of the above equation, it is possible to find the amount of reactor coolant remaining in the pressurizer at the "minimum" values of RC pressure and temperatures.

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For example, what is the minimum pressurizer level corresponding to a reactor outlet temperature of 551F, a reactor inlet temperature of 550F and a minimum RC pressure of 1735 psia?

The proper specific volume values are:

$$v_{hot} = 0.021538 \text{ ft}^3/\text{lb}$$

$$v_{cold} = 0.021506 \text{ ft}^3/\text{lb}$$

$$v_{pqr} = 0.02443 \text{ ft}^3/\text{lb}$$

Solving for the final pressurizer volume;

$$\begin{aligned} V_{pqr} &= \left[ M_0 - \frac{V_{hot}}{v_{hot}} - \frac{V_{cold}}{v_{cold}} \right] \times v_{pqr} \\ &= \left[ 494,435 - \frac{5471}{0.021538} - \frac{4955}{0.021506} \right] \times 0.02443 \\ V_{pqr} &= 245 \text{ ft}^3 \end{aligned}$$

The final pressurizer level is:

$$\Delta V_{pqr} = 864 - 245 = 619 \text{ ft}^3$$

$$\begin{aligned} V_{pqr} \text{ level} &= 619/3.2 \text{ ft}^3/\text{inch} \\ &= 193 \text{ inches} \end{aligned}$$

Final pressurizer level = 200" - 193" or 7 in. (above the zero indication).

Whenever a reactor trip transient starts at 100% power and the primary fluid temperature drops below 550F (and 1720 psig), then the minimum pressurizer level will nearly equal a zero indication of level which is 75 inches above the bottom of the pressurizer. No operator action involving makeup flowrate was assumed. Also, the corresponding pressure in each steam generator to generate a 550F RC system temperature would be approximately 950 psig assuming a 6F difference between  $T_{cold}$  and saturation temperature.

On the following pages are displayed tables of calculated pressurizer levels for the different cases described on page 6.

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86-2725 00

THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY  
TELEPHONE CALL DOCUMENTATION  
ED 6650

FILE TT 3.3

ORIGINATOR Terry Murray	COMPANY/ORGANIZATION Toledo Edison Company	ROUTE TO: 1.
CALL MADE TO: Bill Spangler	COMPANY/ORGANIZATION B&W Lynchburg	2.
CONFERENCE CALL PARTIES Fred Faist, Chuck Domeck, Ed Kane, Dick DeMars, Bob Winks, Ray Luken, Al Lazar		3. 4.
STATION/UNIT D-B #1	DATE July 25, 1978	TIME 1430 a.m. p.m. 5.
SUBJECT:		

Terry Murray reviewed the question that was discussed, i.e., on the November 29th Event 1977 when the pressurizer level dropped below indicated range, how can we, Toledo Edison, rationalize continued operation given the fact that during this event pressurizer level did go off scale. We must also consider that the second auxiliary feedpump did not start until later. The transient analysis indicates that we should not lose levels but in actual experience we did. What is the difference between the two? What have we done to correct the situation? Bob Winks of B&W reminded us that the main steam safety valves had a very large effect on the transient that was observed in the November 29th Event. During that event, steam pressure was allowed to drop to somewhere between 940-950 pounds. Based on the data observed during the 75% turbine trip in April of this year, we know that the adjustments that we made in the interim now prevented steam pressure from going below 975. Since the April 2nd turbine trip test, we have in fact made further adjustments to better refine the steam pressure control transient. Now we expect that steam pressure will be maintained even higher than the 975 because there were several valves that had to have their setpoint adjusted upward. The improvements that were made as a result of these upward setpoint adjustments can be demonstrated by the fact that during the turbine trip test, we did in fact maintain pressurizer level on scale.

Another significant item that was brought out in the discussion with those people was that if in fact both auxiliary feedpumps did come on simultaneously as designed, and if there was a significant difference as a result of the second feedpump coming on, that the expansion of

COPIES TO: F. Faist, C. Domeck, Section Heads, L. E. Roe, J. S. Grant, Don Lee , TOM - new

7/27/78

PREPARED BY

*Terry Murray*

750172

DATE  
7/24/78

TELEPHONE CALL DOCUMENTATION

Terry Murray/Bill Spangler Conference Call  
July 25, 1978, 1430

Page 2

the pressurizer steam bubble into the No. 2 Loop, i.e., the Loop that is connected to the pressurizer, that this would only give you a vapor lock or affect the natural circulation in the No. 2 Loop. The No. 1 Loop would still be available for natural circulation and one loop is sufficient to remove the decay heat.

Third item directly related to this is that the review of the strip charts and plots for the November 29th Event indicate that there was only approximately a minute difference in the time that the two pumps were actuated and that during this period of time the pressurizer level was still falling and that pressurizer decrease effect was a result of both auxiliary feedpumps feeding steam generators.

It was agreed that our position is one that we have made adjustments to the main steam safety valves which would greatly reduce the shrinkage that we see in the pressurizer in an event like this. Second point is that if both aux feedpumps do come on and you get steam blockage, it would only affect one loop. The other loop would be available for decay heat removal. The third point is that the actual difference in time between the two auxiliary feedpumps in the November 29th Event was so slight that in fact the effect that we saw was a result of both auxiliary feedpumps.

TDM/daw

750173

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

FEB 17 1978

TELETYPE COMM.

SPR 396

BDS 663.5

To                    R.P. WILLIAMSON - NUCLEAR SERVICE  
From                C.W. TALLY - CONTROL ANALYSIS (EXT. 2633)  
Cust.              TECO  
Subj.             SPR 396

File No.  
or Ref.

Date

FEBRUARY 10, 1978

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only.

Reference: 1. Letter BWT-1609, J.A. Lauer to C.R. Domeck, T1.2/12B, dated December 5, 1977.

Engineering has evaluated the transient described in SPR 396 resulting in the following comments:

1. The classification of the transient in Reference 1 was correct and no further comment on this aspect is required.
2. The decrease in pressurizer level (off-scale low) is indicative of rapid steam generator level increases following the initiation of AFW. This undesirable effect is symptomatic of high level setpoints. Conversations with Fred Miller of TECO Engineering have confirmed TECO's awareness of this problem and their desire to have it rectified. In view of the fact that Davis-Besse I has elevated loops, there should be little difficulty in decreasing the level setpoint with appropriate analysis. The funding for this work will be pursued through Project Management.
3. Engineering has been unable to satisfactorily resolve the dissimilar behavior of the two OTSG's during the transient. During the 5 to 15 minute period of the transient, the two steam pressures moved in opposite directions and were considerably apart. The plant computer printout says a main steam line warm up isolation valve was open during this time ("22:55:56 Z688 MN STM Line 2 WU ISO VLV CLOS"), but TECO Engineering says the valve indicator is wired backwards, indicating that it actually was closed until 22:55:56, when an operator opened it. If indeed it was closed until this time, there appears to be no logical explanation for the steam pressure differences. This should be passed on to TECO Engineering, since Plant Design has no further information with which to investigate this anomaly.

CW.Tally  
C.W. Tally

750174

cc: J.R. Burris  
R.B. Davis  
J.A. Lauer  
R.W. Winks

POOR ORIGINAL

10:50:47 SR's energized HI's HI-1,1  
12:51:51 MU #1 Pump on  
12:56:24 APPT 2 trouble  
12:58:50 APPT 1 trouble  
22:57:16 APPT's normal

NOTES: HI-1 failed low at some later time - preamplifier problem - preamp bias now been replaced.

Electrical problems in 34560, 61 should not have been opened minimally - the 30 sec. time sequence should have been allowed to time out for anti-motorizing. 2) The transfer of A Bus to GI was successful but later tripped - cause unknown at yet. 3) Or 7 dropped rod problem not identified as yet.

- 4) Reactimeter data shows RCS pressure dropped to ~1600 psig.
- 5) Evaluation of computer printouts has uncovered several computer pointer and alarms in error - MWL's have been written to correct these.
- 6) Turb. trip procedure modification made to correct the operation of 34560, 61.
- 7) Cause of DG #1 tripping after its start sequence is unknown.
- 8) Discovered leade lifted for 108 11A,B then prevented switchover from Turbine bypass Valves during a Main Water lineup change. Problem corrected by tying down these leads.
- 9) Main Water Valve problem - Maint. preparing to repair.

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To

C. M. Fausch, PhD  
Radioactive  
Scot 115

BUCKEY & WILSON

1/31/78

From

LYNNFIELD, VA.

Fred R. Faist, Site  
Operations Manager

#800-64

Attached is the reactimeter data obtained during the 11/29/77 transient at Davis-Besse 1.  
BWT-16C9 is the conclusion reached from this data.

SPL 396

Yours truly,

Fred R. Faist

VMF:nlf

cc: J. A. Lauer

*DK*

*IDG*  
~~File 800-64~~

*To Yachell Hollings*

POOR ORIGINAL

750176

12/5/77

TELECOPY

Power Generation Group

P.O. Box 1260, Lynchburg, Va. 24505  
Telephone: (804) 334-5111

December 5, 1977

BWT-1609  
File: T1.2/12B

Mr. C. R. Semeck  
Nuclear Project Engineer  
Toledo Edison Company  
300 Madison Avenue  
Toledo, Ohio 43652

Subject: Toledo Edison Company  
EVALUATION OF NOVEMBER 26 TRANSIENT  
Davis-Besse Unit 1  
HSS-14

Dear Mr. Semeck:

BWT has evaluated the November 26 reactor trip at Davis-Besse and found no harmful effects were incurred in the reactor coolant boundary. The reactor coolant pressure dropped about 410 psi in 7-1/2 minutes. The temperature in the #1 cold leg dropped approximately 56°F in 3-1/4 minutes.

The design specification for Davis-Besse components required evaluation of 40 cycles of loss of station power. This transient includes a pressure drop of 420 psi and a temperature drop of 20°F in 20 seconds. The effect of the actual pressure drop is about the same as the design transient, since pressure stress is not time dependent. The actual temperature drop was greater than the design transient but the rate of temperature drop was much less severe, and they tend to offset each other. The net result is that the fatigue usage of this reactor-trip transient is about the same as that predicted for one cycle of loss of station power.

BWT has no objection to continued operation of Davis-Besse.

Very truly yours,

A. H. Lazar  
Senior Project Manager

*J. A. Lazar*

By: J. A. Lazar  
Project Manager

JAL/hj

cc: J. D. Lenardson  
J. C. Lewis  
D. A. Bellinger  
P. P. Amis/4c  
E. C. Novak/1c

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POOR ORIGINAL

\*\*\*\*\* NOT CERTIFIED \*\*\*\*\* NOT CERTIFIED \*\*\*\*\* NOT CERTIFIED \*\*\*\*\*

REPRINT MONITORING VARIABLES

DATE NUMBER	UNITS	TIME	MONITORING
613	SFC	0112	0120 1020 1040 1050 1055
623	DEGF	0112	RC INL 1020 1040 1050 1055
632	DRGF	0112	RC INL 1020 1040 1050 1055
662		0112	RC INL 1020 1040 1050 1055
663		0112	RC INL 1020 1040 1050 1055
664		0112	RC INL 1020 1040 1050 1055
665		0112	RC INL 1020 1040 1050 1055
666		0112	RC INL 1020 1040 1050 1055
667		0112	RC INL 1020 1040 1050 1055
668		0112	RC INL 1020 1040 1050 1055
669		0112	RC INL 1020 1040 1050 1055
670		0112	RC INL 1020 1040 1050 1055
671	PCT	0112	0120 1020 1040 1050 1055
672	PCT	0112	0120 1020 1040 1050 1055
673	PSIG	0112	0120 1020 1040 1050 1055
674	PSIG	0112	0120 1020 1040 1050 1055





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REPORT MONITORED VARIABLES

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REPORT MONITORO VARIABLES

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$T_c$  increases when the coupling scale  $\alpha$  at  $T \approx 300$  increases.

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PRINT MONITOR VARIANCES

POOR DR

Loop 1	Loop 2	Passive	Loop 3
CHANNEL 119			CHANNEL 20
0111, 0112			0111, 0112
0113, 0114			0113, 0114
1015, 0116			1012, 0117
1017, 0118			1012, 0117
0119, 0120			0119, 0120
0121, 0122			0121, 0122

RRIZINI MONITOREO VARIANLES

CHAN	CHANNEL 9	CHANNEL 10	CHANNEL 11	CHANNEL 12	CHANNEL 13	CHANNEL 14	CHANNEL 15	CHANNEL 16
9	7.483	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
10	7.483	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
11	7.601	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
12	7.585	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
13	7.724	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
14	6.611	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
15	7.593	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
16	21.8	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
17	100	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
18	39.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
19	76.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
20	76.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
21	65.1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
22	56.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
23	26.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
24	56.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
25	62.2	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
26	34.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
27	34.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
28	34.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
29	34.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
30	64.1	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
31	63.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5

NOT CERTIFIED      \*\*\*\*

PRINT MONITOR VARIANCES

WELDING  
SCHOOL

NOT CERTIFIED

CHANNEL	1.5
17	4.57
17	0.20
19	0.212
19	4.20
19	6.27
19	4.55
19	6.74
19	8.19
19	8.49
19	8.68
19	6.05
19	5.11
19	1.3
19	0.26
19	2.59
19	2.24
19	1.05
19	0.62

בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְבְנֵי  
יִהוָה אֱלֹהֵינוּ מֶלֶךְ  
בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְבְנֵי

— OTSG Pressure —

RPRINT MONITORED VARIABLES

LOOP 2      LOOP 1

CHANNEL 19	CHANNEL 20
843.445	867.450
953.571	933.410
1043.529	1032.192
1054.505	1052.957
928.613	1028.817
930.266	1007.932
917.190	991.827
979.562	979.381
958.326	968.687
973.562	959.496
958.541	965.794
972.715	956.788
979.834	953.571
976.830	947.226
971.553	939.608
962.608	944.369
956.272	968.762
951.615	969.127
974.801	932.797
933.570	964.775
927.472	1034.665
922.522	1012.812
990.614	1018.568
936.230	1024.721
932.238	1029.665
973.573	1032.100
975.600	964.182
959.670	957.654
957.633	949.716
957.504	942.977
951.517	950.475
956.514	961.143
953.574	968.050
950.577	976.923
925.530	910.846
925.532	935.827
928.532	946.292
916.532	956.207
912.523	966.467
908.523	987.608
910.533	974.474
910.533	951.750
919.533	955.676
912.541	952.630
919.541	956.762
913.541	958.411
870.576	925.203
874.578	946.567
870.572	939.755
869.575	934.227
851.533	930.452

POOR ORIGINAL

W0156

## RPRINT MONITORED VARIABLES

	CHANNEL 19	CHANNEL 20
27	858.533	924.522
00	852.445	917.495
00	846.605	900.561
00	834.169	891.227
00	810.253	887.032
00	826.477	886.584
00	832.631	879.253
00	828.576	872.061
00	825.540	865.779
00	820.405	859.257
00	817.460	852.523
00	817.497	846.476
00	819.213	843.432
00	818.432	834.243
00	815.652	820.251
00	739.027	823.952
00	736.521	819.028
00	793.491	813.820
00	730.371	800.376
00	737.408	804.641
00	736.115	794.637
00	730.574	794.563
00	777.403	790.561
00	775.572	785.977
00	777.473	781.616
00	770.336	776.634
00	767.031	772.072
00	765.208	770.608
00	751.945	766.595
00	750.006	761.472
00	758.945	757.553
00	757.379	756.601
00	753.697	750.025
00	752.156	747.240
00	750.122	746.113
00	743.251	741.073
00	745.110	737.704
00	741.737	734.701
00	735.110	731.515
00	731.171	728.292
00	728.103	725.162
00	726.144	722.652
00	722.418	716.549
00	719.621	716.426
00	715.113	713.783
00	701.721	710.532
00	704.177	707.525
00	706.701	706.962
00	738.242	702.050
00	735.103	636.330

## RPRINT MONITORED VARIABLES

	CHANNEL 19	CHANNEL 20
27	773.143	634.170
00	741.010	631.166
00	750.203	628.930
00	767.157	625.536
00	750.151	623.075

POOR ORIGINAL

250187

## RPRINT MONITORED VARIABLES

CHANNEL 19	CHANNEL 29
733.151	634.170
741.559	631.165
744.259	628.630
747.189	625.636
750.333	623.073
753.564	620.546
755.613	617.643
758.353	614.646
760.776	612.415
763.196	611.706
767.281	614.649
767.359	627.065
769.565	632.595
771.231	636.477
772.243	641.071
772.299	647.541
775.535	652.324
776.525	657.715
777.527	659.879
778.593	652.557
778.511	653.743
778.256	666.471
777.354	669.103
777.550	671.572
777.220	674.071
777.016	678.227
778.045	681.194
778.424	684.952
774.405	686.115
776.524	692.764
773.511	695.593
774.175	700.411
772.499	707.934
771.597	706.973
771.514	710.675
770.935	713.752
779.566	717.635
753.246	720.238
752.101	723.228
767.562	726.261
766.573	738.914
766.270	741.079
759.611	744.541
765.171	737.518
766.170	739.516
763.203	742.026
762.277	744.592
760.713	746.860
751.216	748.574
761.116	751.550

POOR ORIGINAL

7501588

REPAINT MONITORED VARIANCES

REPRINT MONITORED VARIABLES

	CHANNEL	20
Chatter	19	
7.51	7.51	8.45
7.51	7.52	8.46
7.51	7.53	8.47
7.51	7.54	8.48
7.51	7.55	8.49
7.51	7.56	8.50
7.51	7.57	8.51
7.51	7.58	8.52
7.51	7.59	8.53
7.51	7.60	8.54
7.51	7.61	8.55

## RPRINT MONITORED VARIABLES

	CHANNEL 29	CHANNEL 20
C1	721.551	845.019
F1	727.155	841.018
F2	721.715	835.194
F3	729.655	840.222
E1	731.130	850.720
E2	724.694	847.524
F4	720.271	841.558
L1	717.219	839.187
L2	719.205	840.569
L3	717.163	839.533
S1	720.678	850.101
S2	722.478	855.558
S3	722.243	848.453
S4	722.532	849.149
F5	722.539	844.574
F6	717.158	856.013
F7	723.123	857.528
F8	722.624	852.461
F9	722.078	846.527
F10	722.175	847.146
F11	722.582	860.629
F12	722.055	851.032
F13	722.252	861.564
F14	722.435	862.849
F15	722.053	862.932
F16	722.603	863.025
F17	722.154	863.655
F18	722.262	863.859
F19	721.255	865.025
F20	721.743	865.525
F21	721.613	865.525
F22	715.656	865.525
F23	711.854	855.041
F24	711.551	855.374
F25	713.653	870.453
F26	711.100	856.522
F27	711.104	856.522
F28	711.112	853.773
F29	721.201	870.047
F30	721.119	870.264
F31	721.153	870.573
F32	721.143	871.452
F33	721.077	871.937
F34	721.169	872.075
F35	721.067	872.017
F36	717.651	866.215
F37	731.931	859.619
F38	721.118	865.575
F39	710.786	865.903

POOR ORIGINAL

230490

16102A

POOR ORIGINAL

SPECIAL MONITORING VALES

APPENDIX MONITORING VARIABLES

CHANNEL	20
940	245
950	250
955	250
960	250
965	250
970	250
975	250
980	250
985	250
990	250
995	250

RPRINT MONITORED VARIABLES

CHNLNO	27	CHANNEL 19	CHANNEL 20
007.000		670.706	876.215
011.000		675.764	862.298
011.000		672.738	865.267
012.000		680.771	858.304
012.000		679.732	857.279
013.000		690.732	861.637
013.000		691.755	860.841
017.000		686.724	877.729
017.000		637.717	837.574
018.000		690.750	856.504
018.000		694.759	876.354
019.000		696.753	875.992
020.000		702.745	875.623
021.000		734.743	846.471
021.000		714.712	887.426
021.000		711.795	828.738
021.000		716.792	850.396
021.000		719.775	892.437
907.000		723.677	853.756

P-INT COMPLETED

POOR ORIGINAL

256192

\*\*\*\* CEHT PROGRAM \* CALCULATES DECAY HEAT \* VERSION 2.1 MAR., 1977 \*\*\*\*  
\*\*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*\*  
\*\*\*\* 12/09/77 14:45:18 \*\*\*\*  
TECO DECAY HEAT BLKS

STEP	TIME (SEC)	P (BTU/HR)	E (BTU)
1	0.0000E+00	• 55511E+09	• 14242E+05
2	1.0000E+01	• 55521E+09	• 17911E+05
3	2.0000E+01	• 55531E+09	• 22518E+05
4	3.0000E+01	• 55541E+09	• 23331E+05
5	4.0000E+01	• 55554E+09	• 36654E+05
6	5.0000E+01	• 55563E+09	• 44663E+05
7	6.0000E+01	• 55572E+09	• 55321E+05
8	7.0000E+01	• 55581E+09	• 70244E+05
9	8.0000E+01	• 55590E+09	• 88001E+05
10	9.0000E+01	• 55599E+09	• 11012E+05
11	1.0000E+02	• 55608E+09	• 15774E+05
12	1.1000E+02	• 55617E+09	• 17172E+05
13	1.2000E+02	• 55626E+09	• 21460E+05
14	1.3000E+02	• 55635E+09	• 33005E+05
15	1.4000E+02	• 55644E+09	• 48968E+05
16	1.5000E+02	• 55653E+09	• 50592E+05
17	1.6000E+02	• 55662E+09	• 62631E+05
18	1.7000E+02	• 55671E+09	• 77304E+05
19	1.8000E+02	• 55680E+09	• 95331E+05
20	1.9000E+02	• 55689E+09	• 11777E+05
21	2.0000E+02	• 55698E+09	• 16562E+05
22	2.1000E+02	• 55707E+09	• 17771E+05
23	2.2000E+02	• 55716E+09	• 21333E+05
24	2.3000E+02	• 55725E+09	• 29721E+05
25	2.4000E+02	• 55734E+09	• 32629E+05
26	2.5000E+02	• 55743E+09	• 39728E+05
27	2.6000E+02	• 55752E+09	• 48234E+05
28	2.7000E+02	• 55761E+09	• 58441E+05
29	2.8000E+02	• 55770E+09	• 72352E+05
30	2.9000E+02	• 55779E+09	• 86772E+05
31	3.0000E+02	• 55788E+09	• 12460E+05
32	3.1000E+02	• 55797E+09	• 14941E+05
33	3.2000E+02	• 55806E+09	• 17977E+05
34	3.3000E+02	• 55815E+09	• 21253E+05
35	3.4000E+02	• 55824E+09	• 25804E+05
36	3.5000E+02	• 55833E+09	• 33731E+05
37	3.6000E+02	• 55842E+09	• 33970E+05
38	3.7000E+02	• 55851E+09	• 44507E+05
39	3.8000E+02	• 55860E+09	• 51649E+05
40	3.9000E+02	• 55869E+09	• 61311E+05
41	4.0000E+02	• 55878E+09	• 72313E+05
42	4.1000E+02	• 55887E+09	• 86404E+05
43	4.2000E+02	• 55896E+09	• 10257E+05
44	4.3000E+02	• 55905E+09	• 12141E+05

POOR ORIGINAL

750193

CERN PROGRAM \* CALCULATE'S DECAY RATE  
CEPPEL CERTIFICATION \*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION

12/09/77 14:45:13 PAGE #\*\*\* 4  
FULL CERTIFICATION

12/09/77 14:45:13 PAGE \*\*\*\* 4  
FULL CERTIFICATION

\* CERTIFICATION VERSION 2.1 MAR-1977 FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*\*

LUMINESCENCE DECAY HIGHLIGHTS

卷之三

\*\* \* \* \* \* 420077  
HDX3=160K HDL=535 HDU=530

\*\*\*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*\*\*

MARCH 2027

12/09/77 10:15 32 PAC  
\*\*\*\*\*  
FULL CERTIFICATION

12/09/77 10:15:32 PAC \*\*\*  
FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*\*

HAROLD J. DILLON  
FULTON CERT

Full Certification

\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*\*\*

TIME(S) P (0.100)

ESTU

9610524

POOR ORIGINAL  
75013

PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

JULY-CERTIFICATION

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\*\*\* DEVE PROGRAM \* CALCULATES DECAY HEAT \* VERSION 2.1 MAR. 1977 \*\*\*  
\*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*  
\*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*

12/39/77 10:15:33 PAGE 4  
\*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*

TECO DECAY HEAT SLK3

POOR ORIGINAL  
750197

STEP	TIME(SEC)	P(BTU/HR)	E(BTU)
1	100000E+00	44747E+09	12485E+05
2	100010E+00	44565E+09	11621E+05
3	100020E+00	44384E+09	10731E+05
4	100030E+00	44203E+09	98502E+05
5	100040E+00	44123E+09	91153E+05
6	100050E+00	43943E+09	83115E+05
7	100060E+00	43763E+09	74306E+05
8	100070E+00	43584E+09	65621E+05
9	100080E+00	43405E+09	56956E+05
10	100090E+00	43226E+09	48302E+05
11	100100E+00	43047E+09	39658E+05
12	100110E+00	42868E+09	31015E+05
13	100120E+00	42689E+09	22372E+05
14	100130E+00	42510E+09	13730E+05
15	100140E+00	42331E+09	50971E+05
16	100150E+00	42152E+09	44142E+05
17	100160E+00	41973E+09	56463E+05
18	100170E+00	41804E+09	67164E+05
19	100180E+00	41625E+09	82285E+05
20	100190E+00	41446E+09	10177E+07
21	100200E+00	41267E+09	12602E+07
22	100210E+00	41088E+09	14531E+07
23	100220E+00	40909E+09	16310E+07
24	100230E+00	40730E+09	27597E+07
25	100240E+00	40551E+09	20004E+07
26	100250E+00	40372E+09	34034E+07
27	100260E+00	40193E+09	41162E+07
28	100270E+00	40014E+09	49351E+07
29	100280E+00	39835E+09	59652E+07
30	100290E+00	39656E+09	71051E+07
31	100300E+00	39477E+09	83662E+07
32	100310E+00	39298E+09	10002E+07
33	100320E+00	39119E+09	11651E+07
34	100330E+00	38940E+09	14501E+08
35	100340E+00	38761E+09	17773E+08
36	100350E+00	38582E+09	21175E+08
37	100360E+00	38403E+09	25001E+08
38	100370E+00	38224E+09	23532E+08
39	100380E+00	38045E+09	34710E+08
40	100390E+00	37866E+09	43077E+08
41	100400E+00	37687E+09	46015E+08
42	100410E+00	37508E+09	50752E+08
43	100420E+00	37329E+09	56293E+08
44	100430E+00	37150E+09	77675E+08
45	100440E+00	36971E+09	90682E+08

\*\*\* DEVE PROGRAM \* CALCULATES DECAY HEAT \* VERSION 2.1 MAR. 1977 \*\*\*  
\*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*  
\*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*

STEP	TIME(SEC)	P(BTU/HR)	E(BTU)
1	10011E+04	60811E+03	10535E+03
2	10012E+04	59725E+03	12115E+03
3	10013E+04	61639E+03	13571E+03
4	10014E+04	60653E+03	15055E+03
5	10015E+04	59667E+03	16116E+03
6	10016E+04	58682E+03	21570E+03
7	10017E+04	57696E+03	23227E+03
8	10018E+04	56710E+03	20035E+03
9	10019E+04	55724E+03	20415E+03
10	10020E+04	54738E+03	32917E+03
11	10021E+04	53752E+03	36574E+03
12	10022E+04	52766E+03	41454E+03

+110

250158

NUCLEAR CERTIFICATION

NUCLEAR CERTIFICATION

03/07/77 CERTIFICATION

03/07/77 CERTIFICATION

L + f 10

6.0934E+02  
-5.5127E+03  
-4.6285E+03  
-3.5507E+03  
-2.7492E+03  
-2.1417E+03  
-1.7403E+03  
-1.2751E+03  
-7.3473E+02  
-6.5954E+02  
-5.5954E+02  
-4.7205E+02  
-3.9157E+02  
-2.5323E+02  
-1.8167E+02  
-1.1767E+02  
-7.1314E+01  
-3.5271E+01  
-1.0717E+01  
-2.0444E+00  
-1.2354E+00  
-9.5206E+00  
-6.9123E+00  
-4.8373E+00  
-3.2533E+00

POOR ORIGINAL

\*\*\*\*\*  
DECAY HEAT CALCULATIONS \* DECAY HEAT \*  
\*\*\*\*\*  
FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*\*\*

MAR-1977  
\*\*\*\*\*  
FULL CERTIFICATION

\*\*\*\*\*  
DECAY HEAT 314

12/08/77 16:52:12 PAGE  
\*\*\*\*\*  
FULL CERTIFICATION

\*\*\*\*\*  
DECAY HEAT 314

750359

POOR ORIGINAL

DECAY HEAT \* CALCULATIONS \* DECAY HEAT \*  
\*\*\*\*\*

FULL CERTIFICATION

\*\*\*\*\*

TIME SEC	PSTU/H2	E (BTU)
0.00000000	503676.09	*14050E+05
502940.03	*502940.03	*17610E+05
504570.03	*504570.03	*22794E+05
496540.03	*496540.03	*37211E+05
497170.03	*497170.03	*49232E+05
497900.03	*497900.03	*69242E+05
498370.03	*498370.03	*69747E+05
498791.03	*498791.03	*13557E+05
498937.03	*498937.03	*15440E+05
499035.03	*499035.03	*21037E+05
499135.03	*499135.03	*21228E+05
499235.03	*499235.03	*21319E+05
499335.03	*499335.03	*21410E+05
499435.03	*499435.03	*21501E+05
499535.03	*499535.03	*21592E+05
499635.03	*499635.03	*21683E+05
499735.03	*499735.03	*21774E+05
499835.03	*499835.03	*21865E+05
499935.03	*499935.03	*21956E+05
500035.03	*500035.03	*22047E+05
500135.03	*500135.03	*22138E+05
500235.03	*500235.03	*22229E+05
500335.03	*500335.03	*22320E+05
500435.03	*500435.03	*22411E+05
500535.03	*500535.03	*22502E+05
500635.03	*500635.03	*22593E+05
500735.03	*500735.03	*22684E+05
500835.03	*500835.03	*22775E+05
500935.03	*500935.03	*22866E+05
501035.03	*501035.03	*22957E+05
501135.03	*501135.03	*23048E+05
501235.03	*501235.03	*23139E+05
501335.03	*501335.03	*23230E+05
501435.03	*501435.03	*23321E+05
501535.03	*501535.03	*23412E+05
501635.03	*501635.03	*23503E+05
501735.03	*501735.03	*23594E+05
501835.03	*501835.03	*23685E+05
501935.03	*501935.03	*23776E+05
502035.03	*502035.03	*23867E+05
502135.03	*502135.03	*23958E+05
502235.03	*502235.03	*24049E+05
502335.03	*502335.03	*24140E+05
502435.03	*502435.03	*24231E+05
502535.03	*502535.03	*24322E+05
502635.03	*502635.03	*24413E+05
502735.03	*502735.03	*24504E+05
502835.03	*502835.03	*24595E+05
502935.03	*502935.03	*24686E+05
503035.03	*503035.03	*24777E+05
503135.03	*503135.03	*24868E+05
503235.03	*503235.03	*24959E+05
503335.03	*503335.03	*25050E+05
503435.03	*503435.03	*25141E+05
503535.03	*503535.03	*25232E+05
503635.03	*503635.03	*25323E+05
503735.03	*503735.03	*25414E+05
503835.03	*503835.03	*25505E+05
503935.03	*503935.03	*25596E+05
504035.03	*504035.03	*25687E+05
504135.03	*504135.03	*25778E+05
504235.03	*504235.03	*25869E+05
504335.03	*504335.03	*25960E+05
504435.03	*504435.03	*26051E+05
504535.03	*504535.03	*26142E+05
504635.03	*504635.03	*26233E+05
504735.03	*504735.03	*26324E+05
504835.03	*504835.03	*26415E+05
504935.03	*504935.03	*26506E+05
505035.03	*505035.03	*26597E+05
505135.03	*505135.03	*26688E+05
505235.03	*505235.03	*26779E+05
505335.03	*505335.03	*26870E+05
505435.03	*505435.03	*26961E+05
505535.03	*505535.03	*27052E+05
505635.03	*505635.03	*27143E+05
505735.03	*505735.03	*27234E+05
505835.03	*505835.03	*27325E+05
505935.03	*505935.03	*27416E+05
506035.03	*506035.03	*27507E+05
506135.03	*506135.03	*27598E+05
506235.03	*506235.03	*27689E+05
506335.03	*506335.03	*27780E+05
506435.03	*506435.03	*27871E+05
506535.03	*506535.03	*27962E+05
506635.03	*506635.03	*28053E+05
506735.03	*506735.03	*28144E+05
506835.03	*506835.03	*28235E+05
506935.03	*506935.03	*28326E+05
507035.03	*507035.03	*28417E+05
507135.03	*507135.03	*28508E+05
507235.03	*507235.03	*28599E+05
507335.03	*507335.03	*28690E+05
507435.03	*507435.03	*28781E+05
507535.03	*507535.03	*28872E+05
507635.03	*507635.03	*28963E+05
507735.03	*507735.03	*29054E+05
507835.03	*507835.03	*29145E+05
507935.03	*507935.03	*29236E+05
508035.03	*508035.03	*29327E+05
508135.03	*508135.03	*29418E+05
508235.03	*508235.03	*29509E+05
508335.03	*508335.03	*29590E+05
508435.03	*508435.03	*29681E+05
508535.03	*508535.03	*29772E+05
508635.03	*508635.03	*29863E+05
508735.03	*508735.03	*29954E+05
508835.03	*508835.03	*30045E+05
508935.03	*508935.03	*30136E+05
509035.03	*509035.03	*30227E+05
509135.03	*509135.03	*30318E+05
509235.03	*509235.03	*30409E+05
509335.03	*509335.03	*30490E+05
509435.03	*509435.03	*30581E+05
509535.03	*509535.03	*30672E+05
509635.03	*509635.03	*30763E+05
509735.03	*509735.03	*30854E+05
509835.03	*509835.03	*30945E+05
509935.03	*509935.03	*31036E+05
510035.03	*510035.03	*31127E+05
510135.03	*510135.03	*31218E+05
510235.03	*510235.03	*31309E+05
510335.03	*510335.03	*31390E+05
510435.03	*510435.03	*31481E+05
510535.03	*510535.03	*31572E+05
510635.03	*510635.03	*31663E+05
510735.03	*510735.03	*31754E+05
510835.03	*510835.03	*31845E+05
510935.03	*510935.03	*31936E+05
511035.03	*511035.03	*32027E+05
511135.03	*511135.03	*32118E+05
511235.03	*511235.03	*32209E+05
511335.03	*511335.03	*32290E+05
511435.03	*511435.03	*32381E+05
511535.03	*511535.03	*32472E+05
511635.03	*511635.03	*32563E+05
511735.03	*511735.03	*32654E+05
511835.03	*511835.03	*32745E+05
511935.03	*511935.03	*32836E+05
512035.03	*512035.03	*32927E+05
512135.03	*512135.03	*33018E+05
512235.03	*512235.03	*33109E+05
512335.03	*512335.03	*33190E+05
512435.03	*512435.03	*33281E+05
512535.03	*512535.03	*33372E+05
512635.03	*512635.03	*33463E+05
512735.03	*512735.03	*33554E+05
512835.03	*512835.03	*33645E+05
512935.03	*512935.03	*33736E+05
513035.03	*513035.03	*33827E+05
513135.03	*513135.03	*33918E+05
513235.03	*513235.03	*34009E+05
513335.03	*513335.03	*34090E+05
513435.03	*513435.03	*34181E+05
513535.03	*513535.03	*34272E+05
513635.03	*513635.03	*34363E+05
513735.03	*513735.03	*34454E+05
513835.03	*513835.03	*34545E+05
513935.03	*513935.03	*34636E+05
514035.03	*514035.03	*34727E+05
514135.03	*514135.03	*34818E+05
514235.03	*514235.03	*34909E+05
514335.03	*514335.03	*35000E+05
514435.03	*514435.03	*35091E+05
514535.03	*514535.03	*35182E+05
514635.03	*514635.03	*35273E+05
514735.03	*514735.03	*35364E+05
514835.03	*514835.03	*35455E+05
514935.03	*514935.03	*35546E+05
515035.03	*515035.03	*35637E+05
515135.03	*515135.03	*35728E+05
515235.03	*515235.03	*35819E+05
515335.03	*515335.03	*35910E+05
515435.03	*515435.03	*36001E+05
515535.03	*515535.03	*36092E+05
515635.03	*515635.03	*36183E+05
515735.03	*515735.03	*36274E+05
515835.03	*515835.03	*36365E+05
515935.03	*515935.03	*36456E+05
516035.03	*516035.03	*36547E+05
516135.03	*516135.03	*36638E+05
516235.03	*516235.03	*36729E+05
516335.03	*516335.03	*36820E+05
516435.03	*516435.03	*36911E+05
516535.03	*516535.03	*37002E+05
516635.03	*516635.03	*37093E+05
516735.03	*516735.03	*37184E+05
516835.03	*516835.03	*37275E+05
516935.03	*516935.03	*37366E+05
517035.03	*517035.03	*37457E+05
517135.03	*517135.03	*37548E+05
517235.03	*517235.03	*37639E+05
517335.03	*517335.03	*37730E+05
517435.03	*517435.03	*37821E+05
517535.03	*517535.03	*37912E+05
517635.03	*517635.03	*38003E+05
517735.03	*517735.03	*38094E+05
517835.03	*517835.03	*38185E+05
517935.03	*517935.03	*38276E+05
518035.03	*518035.03	*38367E+05
518135.03	*518135.03	*38458E+05
518235.03	*518235.03	*38549E+05
518335.03	*518335.03	*38640E+05
518435.03	*518435.03	*38731E+05
518535.03	*518535.03	*38822E+05
518635.03	*518635.03	*38913E+05
518735.03	*518735.03	*39004E+05
518835.03	*518835.03	*39095E+05
518935.03	*518935.03	*39186E+05
519035.03	*519035.03	*39277E+05
519135.03	*519135.03	*39368E+05
519235.03	*519235.03	*39459E+05
519335.03	*519335.03	*39550E+05
519435.03	*519435.03	*39641E+05
519535.03	*519535.03	*39732E+05
519635.03	*519635.03	*39823E+05
519735.03	*519735.03	*39914E+05
519835.03	*519835.03	*40005E+05
519935.03	*519935.03	*40096E+05
520035.03	*520035.03	*40187E+05
520135.03	*520135.03	*40278E+05
520235.03	*520235.03	*40369E+05
520335.03	*520335.03	*40460E+05
520435.03	*520435.03	*40551E+05
520535.03	*520535.03	*40642E+05
520635.03	*520635.03	*40733E+05
520735.03	*520735.03	*40824E+05
520835.03	*520835.03	*40915E+05
520935.03	*520935.03	*41006E+05
521035.03	*521035.03	*41097E+05
521135.03	*521135.03	*41188E+05
521235.03	*521235.03	*41279E+05
521335.03	*5	

002080

POOR ORIGINAL

\*\*\*\*\* CALCULATES DECAY RATE \*\*\*\*\*  
\*\*\*\*\* FULL CERTIFICATION \*\*\*\*\*  
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12/09 DECAY RATE

TIME(S)

POSTURE

STATE

TIME(S)	POSTURE	STATE
0.00	0.0	0.0
0.01	40.57 * 0.9	40.57 * 0.9
0.02	47.63 * 0.8	47.63 * 0.8
0.03	52.24 * 0.7	52.24 * 0.7
0.04	55.07 * 0.6	55.07 * 0.6
0.05	56.97 * 0.5	56.97 * 0.5
0.06	58.02 * 0.4	58.02 * 0.4
0.07	58.24 * 0.3	58.24 * 0.3
0.08	58.57 * 0.2	58.57 * 0.2
0.09	58.91 * 0.1	58.91 * 0.1
0.10	59.26 * 0.0	59.26 * 0.0
0.11	59.61 * -0.1	59.61 * -0.1
0.12	59.96 * -0.2	59.96 * -0.2
0.13	60.31 * -0.3	60.31 * -0.3
0.14	60.66 * -0.4	60.66 * -0.4
0.15	61.01 * -0.5	61.01 * -0.5
0.16	61.36 * -0.6	61.36 * -0.6
0.17	61.71 * -0.7	61.71 * -0.7
0.18	62.06 * -0.8	62.06 * -0.8
0.19	62.41 * -0.9	62.41 * -0.9
0.20	62.76 * -0.9	62.76 * -0.9
0.21	63.11 * -0.9	63.11 * -0.9
0.22	63.46 * -0.9	63.46 * -0.9
0.23	63.81 * -0.9	63.81 * -0.9
0.24	64.16 * -0.9	64.16 * -0.9
0.25	64.51 * -0.9	64.51 * -0.9
0.26	64.86 * -0.9	64.86 * -0.9
0.27	65.21 * -0.9	65.21 * -0.9
0.28	65.56 * -0.9	65.56 * -0.9
0.29	65.91 * -0.9	65.91 * -0.9
0.30	66.26 * -0.9	66.26 * -0.9
0.31	66.61 * -0.9	66.61 * -0.9
0.32	66.96 * -0.9	66.96 * -0.9
0.33	67.31 * -0.9	67.31 * -0.9
0.34	67.66 * -0.9	67.66 * -0.9
0.35	68.01 * -0.9	68.01 * -0.9
0.36	68.36 * -0.9	68.36 * -0.9
0.37	68.71 * -0.9	68.71 * -0.9
0.38	69.06 * -0.9	69.06 * -0.9
0.39	69.41 * -0.9	69.41 * -0.9
0.40	69.76 * -0.9	69.76 * -0.9
0.41	70.11 * -0.9	70.11 * -0.9
0.42	70.46 * -0.9	70.46 * -0.9
0.43	70.81 * -0.9	70.81 * -0.9
0.44	71.16 * -0.9	71.16 * -0.9
0.45	71.51 * -0.9	71.51 * -0.9
0.46	71.86 * -0.9	71.86 * -0.9
0.47	72.21 * -0.9	72.21 * -0.9
0.48	72.56 * -0.9	72.56 * -0.9
0.49	72.91 * -0.9	72.91 * -0.9
0.50	73.26 * -0.9	73.26 * -0.9
0.51	73.61 * -0.9	73.61 * -0.9
0.52	73.96 * -0.9	73.96 * -0.9
0.53	74.31 * -0.9	74.31 * -0.9
0.54	74.66 * -0.9	74.66 * -0.9
0.55	75.01 * -0.9	75.01 * -0.9
0.56	75.36 * -0.9	75.36 * -0.9
0.57	75.71 * -0.9	75.71 * -0.9
0.58	76.06 * -0.9	76.06 * -0.9
0.59	76.41 * -0.9	76.41 * -0.9
0.60	76.76 * -0.9	76.76 * -0.9
0.61	77.11 * -0.9	77.11 * -0.9
0.62	77.46 * -0.9	77.46 * -0.9
0.63	77.81 * -0.9	77.81 * -0.9
0.64	78.16 * -0.9	78.16 * -0.9
0.65	78.51 * -0.9	78.51 * -0.9
0.66	78.86 * -0.9	78.86 * -0.9
0.67	79.21 * -0.9	79.21 * -0.9
0.68	79.56 * -0.9	79.56 * -0.9
0.69	79.91 * -0.9	79.91 * -0.9
0.70	80.26 * -0.9	80.26 * -0.9
0.71	80.61 * -0.9	80.61 * -0.9
0.72	80.96 * -0.9	80.96 * -0.9
0.73	81.31 * -0.9	81.31 * -0.9
0.74	81.66 * -0.9	81.66 * -0.9
0.75	82.01 * -0.9	82.01 * -0.9
0.76	82.36 * -0.9	82.36 * -0.9
0.77	82.71 * -0.9	82.71 * -0.9
0.78	83.06 * -0.9	83.06 * -0.9
0.79	83.41 * -0.9	83.41 * -0.9
0.80	83.76 * -0.9	83.76 * -0.9
0.81	84.11 * -0.9	84.11 * -0.9
0.82	84.46 * -0.9	84.46 * -0.9
0.83	84.81 * -0.9	84.81 * -0.9
0.84	85.16 * -0.9	85.16 * -0.9
0.85	85.51 * -0.9	85.51 * -0.9
0.86	85.86 * -0.9	85.86 * -0.9
0.87	86.21 * -0.9	86.21 * -0.9
0.88	86.56 * -0.9	86.56 * -0.9
0.89	86.91 * -0.9	86.91 * -0.9
0.90	87.26 * -0.9	87.26 * -0.9
0.91	87.61 * -0.9	87.61 * -0.9
0.92	87.96 * -0.9	87.96 * -0.9
0.93	88.31 * -0.9	88.31 * -0.9
0.94	88.66 * -0.9	88.66 * -0.9
0.95	89.01 * -0.9	89.01 * -0.9
0.96	89.36 * -0.9	89.36 * -0.9
0.97	89.71 * -0.9	89.71 * -0.9
0.98	90.06 * -0.9	90.06 * -0.9
0.99	90.41 * -0.9	90.41 * -0.9
1.00	90.76 * -0.9	90.76 * -0.9
1.01	91.11 * -0.9	91.11 * -0.9
1.02	91.46 * -0.9	91.46 * -0.9
1.03	91.81 * -0.9	91.81 * -0.9
1.04	92.16 * -0.9	92.16 * -0.9
1.05	92.51 * -0.9	92.51 * -0.9
1.06	92.86 * -0.9	92.86 * -0.9
1.07	93.21 * -0.9	93.21 * -0.9
1.08	93.56 * -0.9	93.56 * -0.9
1.09	93.91 * -0.9	93.91 * -0.9
1.10	94.26 * -0.9	94.26 * -0.9
1.11	94.61 * -0.9	94.61 * -0.9
1.12	94.96 * -0.9	94.96 * -0.9
1.13	95.31 * -0.9	95.31 * -0.9
1.14	95.66 * -0.9	95.66 * -0.9
1.15	96.01 * -0.9	96.01 * -0.9
1.16	96.36 * -0.9	96.36 * -0.9
1.17	96.71 * -0.9	96.71 * -0.9
1.18	97.06 * -0.9	97.06 * -0.9
1.19	97.41 * -0.9	97.41 * -0.9
1.20	97.76 * -0.9	97.76 * -0.9
1.21	98.11 * -0.9	98.11 * -0.9
1.22	98.46 * -0.9	98.46 * -0.9
1.23	98.81 * -0.9	98.81 * -0.9
1.24	99.16 * -0.9	99.16 * -0.9
1.25	99.51 * -0.9	99.51 * -0.9
1.26	99.86 * -0.9	99.86 * -0.9
1.27	100.21 * -0.9	100.21 * -0.9
1.28	100.56 * -0.9	100.56 * -0.9
1.29	100.91 * -0.9	100.91 * -0.9
1.30	101.26 * -0.9	101.26 * -0.9
1.31	101.61 * -0.9	101.61 * -0.9
1.32	101.96 * -0.9	101.96 * -0.9
1.33	102.31 * -0.9	102.31 * -0.9
1.34	102.66 * -0.9	102.66 * -0.9
1.35	103.01 * -0.9	103.01 * -0.9
1.36	103.36 * -0.9	103.36 * -0.9
1.37	103.71 * -0.9	103.71 * -0.9
1.38	104.06 * -0.9	104.06 * -0.9
1.39	104.41 * -0.9	104.41 * -0.9
1.40	104.76 * -0.9	104.76 * -0.9
1.41	105.11 * -0.9	105.11 * -0.9
1.42	105.46 * -0.9	105.46 * -0.9
1.43	105.81 * -0.9	105.81 * -0.9
1.44	106.16 * -0.9	106.16 * -0.9
1.45	106.51 * -0.9	106.51 * -0.9
1.46	106.86 * -0.9	106.86 * -0.9
1.47	107.21 * -0.9	107.21 * -0.9
1.48	107.56 * -0.9	107.56 * -0.9
1.49	107.91 * -0.9	107.91 * -0.9
1.50	108.26 * -0.9	108.26 * -0.9
1.51	108.61 * -0.9	108.61 * -0.9
1.52	108.96 * -0.9	108.96 * -0.9
1.53	109.31 * -0.9	109.31 * -0.9
1.54	109.66 * -0.9	109.66 * -0.9
1.55	110.01 * -0.9	110.01 * -0.9
1.56	110.36 * -0.9	110.36 * -0.9
1.57	110.71 * -0.9	110.71 * -0.9
1.58	111.06 * -0.9	111.06 * -0.9
1.59	111.41 * -0.9	111.41 * -0.9
1.60	111.76 * -0.9	111.76 * -0.9
1.61	112.11 * -0.9	112.11 * -0.9
1.62	112.46 * -0.9	112.46 * -0.9
1.63	112.81 * -0.9	112.81 * -0.9
1.64	113.16 * -0.9	113.16 * -0.9
1.65	113.51 * -0.9	113.51 * -0.9
1.66	113.86 * -0.9	113.86 * -0.9
1.67	114.21 * -0.9	114.21 * -0.9
1.68	114.56 * -0.9	114.56 * -0.9
1.69	114.91 * -0.9	114.91 * -0.9
1.70	115.26 * -0.9	115.26 * -0.9
1.71	115.61 * -0.9	115.61 * -0.9
1.72	115.96 * -0.9	115.96 * -0.9
1.73	116.31 * -0.9	116.31 * -0.9
1.74	116.66 * -0.9	116.66 * -0.9
1.75	117.01 * -0.9	117.01 * -0.9
1.76	117.36 * -0.9	117.36 * -0.9
1.77	117.71 * -0.9	117.71 * -0.9
1.78	118.06 * -0.9	118.06 * -0.9
1.79	118.41 * -0.9	118.41 * -0.9
1.80	118.76 * -0.9	118.76 * -0.9
1.81	119.11 * -0.9	119.11 * -0.9
1.82	119.46 * -0.9	119.46 * -0.9
1.83	119.81 * -0.9	119.81 * -0.9
1.84	120.16 * -0.9	120.16 * -0.9
1.85	120.51 * -0.9	120.51 * -0.9
1.86	120.86 * -0.9	120.86 * -0.9
1.87	121.21 * -0.9	121.21 * -0.9
1.88	121.56 * -0.9	121.56 * -0.9
1.89	121.91 * -0.9	121.91 * -0.9
1.90	122.26 * -0.9	122.26 * -0.9
1.91	122.61 * -0.9	122.61 * -0.9
1.92	122.96 * -0.9	122.96 * -0.9
1.93	123.31 * -0.9	123.31 * -0.9
1.94	123.66 * -0.9	123.66 * -0.9
1.95	124.01 * -0.9	124.01 * -0.9
1.96	124.36 * -0.9	124.36 * -0.9
1.97	124.71 * -0.9	124.71 * -0.9
1.98	125.06 * -0.9	125.06 * -0.9
1.99	125.41 * -0.9	125.41 * -0.9
2.00	125.76 * -0.9	125.76 * -0.9
2.01	126.11 * -0.9	126.11 * -0.9
2.02	126.46 * -0.9	126.46 * -0.9
2.03	126.81 * -0.9	126.81 * -0.9
2.04	127.16 * -0.9	127.16 * -0.9
2.05	127.51 * -0.9	127.51 * -0.9
2.06	127.86 * -0.9	127.86 * -0.9
2.07	128.21 * -0.9	128.21 * -0.9
2.08	128.56 * -0.9	128.56 * -0.9
2.09	128.91 * -0.9	128.91 * -0.9
2.10	129.26 * -0.9	129.26 * -0.9
2.11	129.61 * -0.9	129.61 * -0.9
2.12	130.01 * -0.9	130.01 * -0.9
2.13	130.36 * -0.9	130.36 * -0.9
2.14	130.71 * -0.9	130.71 * -0.9
2.15	131.06 * -0.9	131.06 * -0.9
2.16	131.41 * -0.9	131.41 * -0.9
2.17	131.76 * -0.9	131.76 * -0.9
2.18	132.11 * -0.9	132.11 * -0.9
2.19	132.46 * -0.9	132.46 * -0.9
2.20	132.81 * -0.9	132.81 * -0.9
2.21	133.16 * -0.9	133.16 * -0.9
2.22	133.51 * -0.9	133.51 * -0.9
2.23	133.86 * -0.9	133.86 * -0.9
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2.25	134.56 * -0.9	134.56 * -0.9
2.26	134.91 * -0.9	134.91 * -0.9
2.27	135.26 * -0.9	135.26 * -0.9
2.28	135.61 * -0.9	135.61 * -0.9
2.29	135.96 * -0.9	135.96 * -0.9
2.30	136.31 * -0.9	136.31 * -0.9
2.31	136.66 * -0.9	136.66 * -0.9
2.32	137.01 * -0.9	137.01 * -0.9
2.33	137.36 * -0.9	137.36 * -0.9
2.34	137.71 * -0.9	137.71 * -0.9
2.35	138.06 * -0.9	138.06 * -0.9
2.36	138.41 * -0.9	138.41 * -0.9
2.37	138.76 * -0.9	138.76 * -0.9
2.38	139.11 * -0.9	139.11 * -0.9
2.39	139.46 * -0.9	139.46 * -0.9
2.40	139.81 * -0.9	139.81 * -0.9
2.41	140.16 * -0.9	140.16 * -0.9
2.42	140.51 * -0.9	140.51 * -0.9
2.43	140.86 * -0.9	140.86 * -0.9
2.44	141.21 * -0.9	141.21 * -0.9
2.45	141.56 * -0.9	141.56 * -0.9
2.46		

750201

POOR ORIGINAL

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

1145.0000000000000

REFACTIMETER PLOT TSN=67

(X10<sup>-2</sup>)

33.333

32.333

31.333

30.333

29.333

28.333

27.333

26.333

25.333

24.333

23.333

22.333

21.333

20.333

19.333

18.333

17.333

16.333

15.333

14.333

13.333

12.333

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4.333

3.333

2.333

1.333

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
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3.000 3.250 3.500 3.750 4.000 4.250 4.500 4.750 5.000 5.250 5.500 5.750 6.000 6.250 6.500 6.750 7.000 7.250 7.500 7.750 8.000 8.250 8.500 8.750 9.000 9.250 9.500 9.750 10.000 10.250 10.500 10.750 11.000 11.250 11.500 11.750 12.000 12.250 12.500 12.750 13.000 13.250 13.500 13.750 14.000 14.250 14.500 14.750 15.000



NP-4000-A

750202

POOR ORIGINAL

REFLECTIMETER PLOT TSN-57

(2) 010 (X)

TIME (SECONDS)

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POOR ORIGINAL


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25.2.11

759204


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REACTIMETER PLOT TSN=67


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
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
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
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
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
259210

POOR ORIGINAL



PERACTIMETER PLOT TSN C7

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230244

0.000

20.000

15.000

10.000

5.000

0.000

-5.000

-10.000

-15.000

-20.000

HOLDER ORIGINAL

759212



TIME (SECONDS)  
(X10 - 2)

REACTIMETER PLOT TSN=57

750213

POOR ORIGINAL




REFLECTIMETER PLOT  
TSN=67

(X10 -2)

750214

POOR ORIGINAL



TIME (SECONDS)  
(X10 2)

REACTIMETER PLOT TSN=67

# Babcock & Wilcox

Power Generation Group

P.O. Box 1260, Lynchburg, Va. 24505

Telephone: (804) 384-5111

October 10, 1978

BWT-1707

File: T1.2/12B

bcc: (with attachment)  
Ivan Green  
WH Spangler  
RW Winks  
AH Lazar  
FR Faist  
RC Luken  
Records Center  
RED/FRF

Mr. C. R. Domeck  
Nuclear Project Engineer  
Toledo Edison Company  
300 Madison Avenue  
Toledo, OH 43652

Subject: Toledo Edison Company  
Davis-Besse Unit 1  
NSS-14  
PRESSURIZER PERFORMANCE DURING REACTOR TRIPS

Reference: C. R. Domeck letter to A. H. Lazar, dated  
September 18, 1978, TBW-495

Dear Mr. Domeck:

As requested in the reference letter, B&W has calculated the effect of net makeup flow after reactor trip on pressurizer level at Davis-Besse 1. The attached report by R. W. Winks dated October 6, 1978 is forwarded for your use.

Very truly yours,

R. C. Luken  
Project Manager

For A. H. Lazar  
Senior Project Manager

cc: J. D. Lenardson w/a  
J. C. Lewis  
D. J. DeLaCroix  
M. Malcom/4 w/a  
E. C. Novak/l w/a

750215

THE EFFECT OF NET MAKEUP FLOW AFTER REACTOR TRIP ON  
PRESSURIZER LEVEL AT DAVIS-BESSE 1

BY:

Robert W. Winks  
Babcock & Wilcox  
Lynchburg, Va.

October 6, 1978

750216

### Introduction

A study of the change in pressurizer level following a trip of the reactor was performed recently for Toledo Edison Company specifically for the Davis-Besse 1 plant. The mathematical technique assumed that the contraction of the fluid in the reactor coolant system would occur with no net gain or loss in mass during the nominal sixty second interval until a minimum pressurizer level was achieved. The purpose of this study is to determine the net addition of coolant to the RC system within this nominal sixty second period and to calculate the effect it has on the change in pressurizer level described in the previous report.

### Summary

Analysis of recorded data on seal injection, makeup and letdown flowrates during four specific reactor trip transients indicates that approximately 325 gallons of cold leg temperature fluid was added to the RC system to try to maintain RC pressure and pressurizer level in the interval of time between reactor trip and minimum pressurizer level. This is equivalent to 14 inches of pressurizer level even though it represents only a 0.4% addition to the total volume of the RC system (~84,000 gallons).

The source of data for seal injection, makeup and letdown flowrates during the reactor trip transients was the Post Trip Review log. Since it records actual values of the monitored parameters once every thirty seconds, the number of data points for a nominal sixty second period between reactor trip and minimum pressurizer level is very limited. Hence, accurate knowledge of these in flow and out flow values for the RC system is very approximate.

756217

In most cases, the volume of fluid added to the RC system is most strongly influenced by the makeup flowrate when two makeup pumps are operating. Since the maximum indication of makeup flowrate is 160 gpm and is approximately one half the expected or calculated flowrate, no verification of the makeup flowrate when two pumps are running is available.

The contraction of the reactor coolant due to the temperature change in a nominal sixty second interval of time is corrected by 0.4% using a calculated net addition of 325 gallons to the total volume of the system. It is reasonable to assume that six temperature measurements, each having a time constant of approximately four seconds, could lead to an uncertainty in the calculated contraction nearly equal to 0.4%.

Since the addition of net makeup flow into the RC system is only known approximately and reduces the total change in pressurizer level due to the temperature contraction of the system, it will be more conservative to continue to use the assumption of constant RC system mass in calculating minimum pressurizer level for reactor trip transients.

#### Discussion of Analysis

With the assistance of Messrs Sushil Jain and Fred Miller of the Toledo Edison Company, a complete set of Post Trip Review data logs for the following reactor trip transients at Davis-Besse 1 was made available:

<u>Reactor Trip Date</u>	<u>Reactor Trip Time</u>	<u>SPR No.</u>
2/24/78	05:51:06	431
4/2/78	08:30:12	435
8/2/78	09:50:44	476
11/29/77	22:43:24	396

The plant parameters required for this study were the following:

RC Pumps Seal Injection Flowrate	F-782
RC System Letdown Flowrate	F-717
RC System Makeup Flowrate	F-740
RC System Pressure	Reactimeter
Loop 1 or 2 Cold Leg Temperature	Reactimeter

Seal injection and letdown flowrates appeared to remain on-scale or decreased to 0 gpm during the reactor trip transients; however, makeup flowrate was frequently greater than 160 gpm which is the full scale indication. A separate but related effort was performed for determining the maximum flowrate of makeup into the RC system at various pressures for either one or two makeup pumps operating.

In the following figures, the net additional volume to the RC system is the integral of the net makeup flowrate from reactor trip time to the time that minimum pressurizer level occurs. The net makeup flowrate is defined as:

$$\dot{W}_{\text{net}} = \dot{W}_{\text{seal injection}} + \dot{W}_{\text{makeup}} - \dot{W}_{\text{letdown}}$$

All of these flowrates are measured at approximately 100F and represent the net volume addition to the RC system at 100F prior to being heated to the

730219

cold leg temperature of approximately 550F. The ratio of volume for the mass of coolant being added to the RC system is approximately 1.3 and varies for each specific reactor trip transient due to slightly different cold leg temperatures at time of minimum pressurizer level.

Figure 1 shows the profiles of seal injection makeup and letdown flowrates following the trip of the reactor on February 24, 1978. The lower portion of the figure displays the net makeup flowrate into the RCS based on these flowrate profiles. The total volume of fluid added to the RC system and corrected to 550F is 199 gallons which is equivalent to 8.3 inches of pressurizer level.

Figure 2 exhibits the seal injection, makeup, and letdown flowrate profiles after the reactor trip on April 2, 1978. Also shown is the net makeup flowrate profile determined from the individual flowrate profiles. Adjusting to a final temperature of 550F, the calculated final volume added to the RC system was 197 gallons. This volume is equivalent to 8.2 inches of pressurizer level.

Figure 3 also shows the seal injection, makeup, and letdown flowrate profiles as derived from the Post Trip Review log from the reactor trip transient of August 2, 1978. The lower portion of Figure 3 displays the net makeup flowrate profile in the time interval until minimum pressurizer level was reached. The total volume of fluid added to the RC system at 555F was 548 gallons and is considerably larger than the other calculated volumes for two reasons:

- (1) The operator turned on the second makeup pump about 15 seconds earlier than in previous reactor trip transients.
- (2) The time to reach minimum pressurizer level was at least thirty seconds longer than for other reactor trip transients.

The volume added to the RC system is equivalent to 22.9 inches of pressurizer level.

Figure 4 presents the flowrate profiles of seal injection makeup and letdown that occurred on the unusual reactor trip and station blackout transient of November 29, 1977. With loss of power, no seal injection flowrate and very little makeup flowrate existed until it was possible to re-start a makeup pump.

Shortly after four minutes beyond the time the reactor was tripped, pressurizer level dropped below a zero indication, therefore, the net makeup flowrate profile was integrated from 0 to 4 minutes rather than to the time estimated for minimum pressurizer level. In this way, measured and calculated changes in pressurizer level could be compared and the correction due to the added volume could be applied to the calculated change in pressurizer level.

The volume of fluid added to the RC system at a temperature of 529F was 352 gallons which is equivalent to 14.7 inches of pressurizer level.

#### Conclusion

Though the Post Trip Review log was available for each of the four reactor trips, the infrequent update time of every 30 seconds leads to a fairly inaccurate determination of flowrate profiles for seal injection, makeup and letdown.

An effort to define the net makeup flowrate profile was accomplished for the four reactor trips and the total volume of heated fluid added to the RC system was calculated. Since the primary source of fluid added to the system is that due to the makeup pumps, it was necessary to calculate (and verify with other previous calculations) the maximum makeup flowrate with valve wide open whenever one or two makeup pumps were operating. Figure 6 is included

86-2449 00

to show the sensitivity of makeup system flowrate with RC system pressure and the valve wide open condition is represented by the lines labeled  $K = 0.0050$ . Since all these makeup system flowrates exceed the maximum indication of the makeup flowrate indicator, there is no verification of the actual system flowrate at Davis-Besse 1.

For these two reasons, B&W recommends that this method of correcting calculated pressurizer level change following a reactor trip not be treated as an accurate or reliable technique for determining true minimum pressurizer level during any future reactor trip transients.

750222

RC SYSTEM FLOWRATES AFTER REACTOR TRIP ON  
FEB 24, 1978 AT DAVIS-BESSE 1





FIG 1

NET RC 5. STEM FLOW AFTER REAL OR TRIP ON  
APRIL 2, 1978 AT DAVIS-BESSE I




FIG 2

UU-L777 UU

JC-7140 UU

RC SYSTEM FLOWRATES AFTER REACTOR TRIP ON  
AUG 2, 1978 AT DAVIS-BESSE I






FIG 3

7-31-78

8n-2444 00

52-7745 00

RC SYSTEM FLOWRATES AFTER REACTOR TRIP AND  
STATION BLACKOUT ON NOV 29, 1977



CALCULATED MAKEUP FLOWRATES FOR EITHER 1 OR 2  
MAKE UP PUMPS VERSUS RC PRESSURE AT DAVIS-BESSE 1

380

NOTE:

$K_1 \cdot R \cdot K_2 = 0.0050$  IS THE DESIGN  
RESISTANCE FACTOR FOR VALVE  
WIDE OPEN CONDITION.

$$(k = \text{PSI} / \text{GPM}^2)$$




FIG 6

Babcock&Wilcox

T E L E C O P Y

Power Generation Group

P.O. Box 1260, Lynchburg, Va. 24505

Telephone: (804) 384-5111

September 8, 1978

BWT-1698

File: T1.2/12B

Mr. C. R. Domeck  
Nuclear Project Engineer  
Toledo Edison Company  
300 Madison Avenue  
Toledo, OH 43652

Subject: Toledo Edison Company  
PRESSURIZER PERFORMANCE DURING REACTOR TRIPS  
Davis-Besse Unit 1  
B&W, REFERENCE NSS-14

Dear Mr. Domeck:

Attached per your request is a report describing the dynamic performance of the pressurizer during reactor trips at Davis-Besse Unit 1.

Very truly yours,

R. C. Luken  
Project Manager

RCL/hj  
Attachment

cc: J. D. Lenardson w/a  
J. C. Lewis  
D. J. DeLaCroix  
M. Malcom/4 w/a  
E. C. Novak/l w/a

For A. H. Lazar  
Senior Project Manager

bcc: (with attachment)  
Ivan Green  
W. H. Spangler  
R. W. Winks  
A. H. Lazar  
Records Center  
F. R. Faist  
R. C. Luken

750228

DYNAMIC PERFORMANCE OF THE PRESSURIZER DURING  
REACTOR TRIPS AT DAVIS-BESSE 1

I. INTRODUCTION

During the reactor trip transient at Davis-Besse 1 on November 29, 1977, the pressurizer level indicator went off scale. This incident and subsequent reactor trip transients have raised a concern that the pressurizer will empty completely during a reactor trip from full power with simultaneous loss of station power. The reactor trip transients to date have occurred at partial power levels with either all RC pumps running or all four RC Pumps tripped.

The purpose of this report is to present the results of calculations indicating the minimum pressurizer level reached during the November 29, 1977 transient. Additionally, this report will present a calculational technique for predicting minimum pressurizer levels following a reactor trip transient and account for either tripped or running RC pumps. Actual reactor trip transient test data from Davis-Besse 1 has been used to support the calculational technique.

II. SUMMARY

The minimum pressurizer level that occurred on the November 29, 1977 reactor trip transient with loss of all four RC pumps is calculated to have been 32 inches below the low level tap. A fluid reserve equivalent to 43 inches of level existed in the pressurizer before makeup flow increased the volume of reactor coolant. Minimum main steam pressures were 610 and 730 psig for the two steam generators.

A calculational technique has been developed for predicting changes in pressurizer level during reactor trips which agrees very well with observed reactor trip transients at Davis-Besse 1.

The method has been used to predict the final minimum pressurizer level for two possible transients (both from 100% power): a reactor trip with simultaneous trip of all RC pumps, and a reactor trip with all RC pumps operating.

For the first transient above, the pressurizer level will decrease only 100 inches, provided that main steam pressure will not decrease below 950 psig. If main steam pressure decreases to 700 psig the pressurizer would become empty. *756229*

For the reactor trip transient with all RC pumps running, the pressurizer level will decrease below the lower level tap if the main steam pressure drops to 950 psig. Since a minimum main steam pressure of 980 psig is anticipated on future reactor trip transients, the predicted minimum pressurizer level will be a few inches above

the zero indication and nearly 80 inches above the bottom of the pressurizer. If steam pressure decreases to 840 psig on this transient, the pressurizer would become empty.

Two graphs have been developed (Figures 2 and 3) which relate minimum  $T_{ave}$  to minimum pressurizer level for the two different reactor trip transients. These graphs can be used to predict pressurizer performance during any large transients at Davis-Besse 1.

### III. ANALYSIS OF NOVEMBER 29, 1977 TRANSIENTS

The following reactor trip transients have been analyzed to determine a realistic primary system cooldown profile for analyzing and predicting pressurizer performance:

TABLE 1

<u>Date</u>	<u>Initial Power Level</u>	<u>RC Pumps Running</u>	<u>Comments</u>
2/24/78	74	yes	Trip initiated by the failure of a flowmeter ΔP transmitter.
4/2/78	75	yes	Turbine trip test with unsuccessful runback of reactor power.
8/2/78	40	yes	Reactor trip due to divergent oscillations while in tracking mode.
11/29/77	40	no	Reactor trip and station black-out causing loss of RC pumps.

The response of the ICS and plant was adequately similar for these four transients to be able to characterize the relationship between  $T_{ave}$  and RC pressure following the trip of the reactor. Figure 1 displays this relationship. This curve was utilized in predicting minimum conditions in the reactor coolant system for calculating minimum values of level in the pressurizer.

The objective of our analysis was to compare the predicted change in pressurizer level with measured changes in level and verify that the mathematical model was sufficiently accurate to predict pressurizer level changes that dropped below the lower level tap.

The mathematical model used to represent the contraction of the RC system during these transients utilizes the following equation:

$$\text{Total mass of fluid in the RC system} = M_0 =$$

$$\frac{\text{Equivalent Volume of Hot Fluid}}{\text{Specific Volume of Hot Fluid}}$$

$$+ \frac{\text{Equivalent Volume of Cold Fluid}}{\text{Specific Volume of Cold Fluid}}$$

7562.30

Cont'd

+      Liquid Volume of the Pressurizer  
Specific Volume of Pressurizer Fluid

The equivalent volume of hot fluid consists of upper half of each steam generator, one half of the reactor vessel and all the hot leg piping.

Similarly the equivalent volume of cold fluids consists of the other half of both steam generators, the lower half of the reactor vessel, and all the cold leg piping. The sum of the hot and cold fluid volumes is equivalent to the total reactor coolant system volume excluding the pressurizer.

The calculational technique requires the determination of the initial and final pressures and temperatures of the reactor coolant system, an evaluation of the specific volumes for those conditions plus saturated conditions within the pressurizer, and the difference in pressurizer volume due to the calculated contraction of the constant mass in the RC system.

Table 2 below, presents a comparison of calculated pressurizer level changes with measured level changes at selected time intervals in the four reactor trip transients.

TABLE 2

Comparison of Measured and Calculated  
 Changes in Pressurizer Levels During  
 Reactor Trip Transients at Davis-Besse 1

Date of Rx Trip	Measured Δ Level - inches	Calculated Δ Level - inches	Time Elapsed - seconds
2/24/78	191	184	60
4/2/78	162	167	45
8/2/78	196	206	90
11/29/77	139	132	170
11/29/77	184	181	240

The test data from the November 29, 1977 reactor trip was examined to find the minimum RC pressure and temperatures that probably occurred while the pressurizer level was off scale and the values were determined to be the following:

At clock time 22:48:50, minimum RC pressure was 1625 psig ( $\pm 50$  psig due to oscillations). The corresponding value of hot leg temperature was 562.5°F whereas the cold leg temperature was off-scale (below 520°F) and was calculated to be 508.5°F.  $T_{ave}$  for Loop 2 was determined to be 535.5°F and the Loop 1 and 2 steam pressures indicated 610 and 760 psig respectively.

These values were used to specify the final specific volumes required

in the equation and revealed that the change in pressurizer level was 224 inches. Since the initial pressurizer level at instant of reactor trip was 192 inches, then the final pressurizer level was 32 inches below the lower level tap. There was another 43 inches of water remaining in the pressurizer at this time.

#### IV. PREDICTED PRESSURIZER PERFORMANCE AT 100% FULL POWER

The extent of reactor coolant volume contraction following a reactor trip is primarily governed by the wetted surface area of the tube bundle and by the steam pressure maintained within both Once Through Steam Generators. It is also affected by the flowrate of reactor coolant through both steam generators, that is, all pumps running versus all pumps tripped.

Figure 2 was developed for the situation of a reactor trip from full power plus loss of all RC pumps. The minimum  $T_{ave}$  will be controlled by the steam pressure in each steam generator. By selecting decreasing values of  $T_{ave}$  and corresponding values of steam pressure, minimum pressurizer levels were predicted.

The intent is to be able to predict the total change in pressurizer level that will occur as  $T_{ave}$  changes from a normal 582F to a known or anticipated minimum temperature.

Figure 2 shows that  $T_{ave}$  has to decrease to 534F to empty the pressurizer for this reactor trip transient (no RC pumps running) and that this requires a minimum steam pressure in each steam generator to be equal to 665 psig.

By controlling steam pressure above 800 psig during this transient, the pressurizer level can remain above the lower level tap. The blowdown on all the main steam safety relief valves has been adjusted by Toledo Edison Company at the Davis-Besse 1 plant early in 1978. The values of minimum steam pressure after a recent reactor trip transient indicate that the performance of the steam pressure relief system is greatly improved over that observed during earlier reactor trip transients.

If the initial power level had been 100% on the November 29, 1977 transient then the calculated minimum pressurizer level would have been 58 inches below the lower level tap. Since the initial power level was only 40%, the amount of contraction in the RC system was only -32 inches. Both of these calculated values are less than predicted (by application of Figure 2), and demonstrate the conservatism of the method. The dependence of the contraction of reactor coolant on initial power level is exhibited in Table 3 below:

Table 3

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RC Contractions for Reactor Trips  
(With Station Blackout) From 40% and 100% Power Levels

Power Level: - %	40	100
Initial RC Pressure - psia	2138	2138
Initial $T_{hot}$ - F	592	605.5

Initial Level - Inches	192	192
Initial RC Volume - Ft <sup>3</sup>	11,264	11,264
Initial RC Mass - Lbs.	496,969	493,437
Final RC Pressure - psia	1640	1640
Final T <sub>hot</sub> - F	562.5	562.5
Final T <sub>cold</sub> - F	508.5	508.5
Final RC Mass - Lbs	496,969	493,437
Final Pzr. Volume - Ft <sup>3</sup>	122	37
Final Pzr. Level - Inches	-32	-58

Figure 3 was similarly developed for a regular reactor trip from full power (all pumps running). This transient is more severe than the previous situation in that the forced convection of reactor coolant quickly removes all stored heat in the primary system. Below a  $T_{ave}$  value of 550F,  $T_{ave}$ , cold leg temperature, and saturation temperature in the steam generators are almost all equal. Thus, much greater care must be exercised in maintaining steam pressure to avoid emptying the pressurizer. An expected main steam pressure of 980 psig should occur, as has been demonstrated on the August 2, 1978 reactor trip, and the pressurizer level will remain above the lower level tap.

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R.C. SYSTEM PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE DURING  
SPECIFIC REACTOR TRIPS AT DAVIS-BESSE 1

2400

2300

2200

2100

2000

1900

1800

1700

1600

POOR MATERIAL

FEB 24, 1978

AUG 2, 1978

NOV 29, 1977  
(W/O RC PUMPS)

APR 2, 1978

540 550 560 570 580 590

UNIT AVERAGE TEMPERATURE - F

PREDICTED PRESSURIZER LEVELS FOR A REACTOR TRIP  
AND LOSS OF R.C. PUMPS AT DAVIS-BESSEY




FIG 2

PREDICTED PRESSURIZER LEVELS FOR REACTOR TRIP  
FROM FULL POWER AT DAY 5-BESSE I




FIG 3