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SUBJECT: HATCH UNIT 1, DOCKET NO. 50-366, NOTIFICATION OF REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE
NO. 50-366/1979-98

DATE: 9-A-79

NOTIFIED: Mr. G. Barber

DATE: 9-2-79
TIME: 6:15 PM

DESCRIPTION OF REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE

Initial Condition

At 1800 hours on 9-2-79, with the Unit 2 reactor at steady state power of 2350 MWt, plant engineering personnel confirmed NSSS supplier's comments of possible cable separation irregularities within the HPCI system.

Nature of Occurrence

The NSSS supplier contacted plant management about possible cable separation irregularities within the HPCI system after discovering a similar problem at another BWR plant. Plant engineering personnel reviewed wiring drawings and confirmed a problem with HPCI cable separation did exist. It was discovered that the control circuits for Unit 2 Division 1 2E41-FO02 HPCI Inboard Steam Isolation valve was routed with RCIC Division 1 valve control cable and ADS control cables. Routing of these cables together does not meet NSSS supplier design criteria for separation of the HPCI inboard steam isolation valve.

Immediate Corrective Action

Architect-engineer was notified of the HPCI/RCIC/ADS cable separation problem. They are currently in the process of formulating a proposed design change request (PDCR) to provide for proper cable separation by electrical division type.

Cause

Design error was determined to be the cause of this occurrence.

Supplemental Corrective Action

At this time, the architect-engineer is in the process of formulating a proposed design change request to provide for proper cable separation. Upon receipt of the engineering package, subject material will be reviewed and implemented as necessary.

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Status of Redundant or Backup Systems

All redundant systems were operable during the course of this occurrence and capable of performing their intended functions.


Impact to Other Units

Match Unit 2 cable drawings were found to have similar cable separation irregularities in that Unit 2 HPCI Division 1 cables were routed with ADS system and RCIC system cables. Architect-engineer was notified and is in the process of preparing a proposed design change request for Unit 2. Upon receipt of the engineering package, subject material will be reviewed and design change implemented as necessary.

Justification for Continued Operation

The mixing of RCIC isolation valve E51-F004 (1/2) Division II with HPCI system Division II cables could constitute a loss of both HPCI and RCIC systems. The operator could circumvent this loss by the use of the manually operated Division I ADS valves. He would then have Division I systems, such as Core Spray, Low Pressure Coolant Injection and RHR Shutdown Cooling, as well as the non-class 1E systems of Condensate Feedwater to aid in the shutdown.

The mixing of HPCI isolation valve E41-F002 (1/2) Division I with RCIC Division I and ADS Division I cables, could postulate the loss of HPCI, RCIC and ADS. This total loss could only occur inside the confines of the Cable Spreading Room at which time the operator would proceed to the Remote Shutdown Panel; transfer power and control, operate the two ADS valves (3 on Unit 2) and proceed to the shutdown mode, using established procedures. Outside the Cable Spreading Room, one area of concern exists for Unit 1. This is the section of tray that contains the HPCI, RCIC and two of the eleven ADS valves cables. With the use of the remaining ADS valves, an orderly shutdown could be accomplished. On Unit 2 outside the cable spreading, no ADS circuits mix with HPCI and thus ADS would be available for use in proceeding to an orderly shutdown of Unit 2.


M. Harry
Plant Manager

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