

## UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

## JUL 27 1979

State of Illinois
Department of Public Health
ATTN: Mr. Gary N. Wright, Chief
 Division of Nuclear Safety
535 West Jefferse Street
Springfield, IL 62761

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 79-16 titled "Vital Area Access Controls" was sent to the following licensees on July 26, 1979, for action:

American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Power Company D. C. Cook 1, 2 (50-315, 50-316)

Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company Zimmer (50-358)

Commonwealth Edison Company Braidwood 1, 2 (50-456, 50-457) Byron 1, 2 (50-454, 50-455) Dresden 1, 2, 3 (50-10, 50-237, 50-249) La Salle 1, 2 (50-373, 50-374) Quad-Cities 1, 2 (50-254, 50-265) Zion 1, 2 (50-295, 50-304)

Consumers Power Company Big Rock Point (50-155) Midland 1, 2 (50-329, 50-330) Palisades (50-255)

Dairyland Power Cooperative IACBWR (50-409)

Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 (50-341)

Iowa Electric Light & Power Company
Duane Arnold (50-331)

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Northern States Power Company Monticello (50-263) Prairie Island 1, 2 (50-282, 50-306)

Toledo Edison Company Davis-Besse 1 (50-346)

Wisconsin Electric Power Company Point Beach 1, 2 (50-266, 50-301)

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Kewaunee (50-305)

Sincerely,

Delew Papple

Helen Pappas, Chief Administrative Branch

Enclosure: IE Bulletin No. 79-16

cc w/encl: Mr. D. W. Kane, Sargent & Lundy Central Files Reproduction Unit NRC 20b Local PDR NSIC TIC UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 26, 1979

IE Bulletin No. 79-16

VITAL AREA ACCESS CONTROLS

Description of Circumstances:

An attempt to damage new fuel assemblies occurred recently at an operating nuclear reactor facility. During a routine fuel inspection, the licensee discovered that a chemical liquid had been poured over 62 of 64 new fuel assemblies. Analysis indicates that the chemical liquid was sodium hydroxide, a chemical stored and used onsite.

The licensee stores new fuel assemblies in dry storage wells on the same elevation as the spent fuel pool within the Fuel Building, a vital area. Access to the building is controlled by use of a coded keycard which electronically unlocks the alarmed personnel portals. The licensee issues coded keycards to both licensee and contractor personnel after the successful completion of a background screening program. In addition, licensee site management certifies monthly that each individual has the need for a coded keycard in order to perform required duties. Further access within this building is not limited by other barriers or controls.

As a result of this incident, an initial licensee audit determined that several hundred licensee and contractor personnel had access to this area during the period when the attempt to damage the fuel was made. The audit also revealed that one coded keycard reader at a vital area portal was inaccurately recording access data at the alarm station. Also discovered during this audit were indications of frequent "tailgating" on access through the portals. Tailgating occurs when more than one person passes through a portal on one person's authorized access. Their passage is therefore not recorded, and unauthorized persons could gain entry in this manner. Tailgating does not include authorized access controlled by an escort.

Discussion of Applicable Requirements:

10 CFR 73.55(s) requires the licensees to protect against industrial sabotage committed by an insider in any position. 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) states that access to Vital Areas shall be positively controlled and limited to individuals who are authorized access to vital equipment and who require such access to perform their duties. Specific commitments implementing this regulation are described in each licensee's approved Security Plan.

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