UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-366/79-23

Licensee: Georgia Power Company
270 Peachtree Street
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Facility Name: Hatch Unit 2

Docket No. 50-366

License No. NFP-5

Inspection at Hatch Site near Baxley, Georgia

Inspectors: B. W. Riley FOR — 6/29/79
D. G. Hinckley — Date Signed

G. A. Belisle — 6/29/79
G. A. Belisle — Date Signed

Approved by: H C Dance — 7/3/79
H. C. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch — Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection On May 30 - June 1, 1979

Areas Inspected

This special, unannounced inspection involved 44 inspector-hours onsite in the area of followup on IE Bulletin 79-08. Unit 1 is refueling and will be reviewed at a later date.

Results

In the area inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

   Licensee Employees

   *M. Manry, Plant Manager
   *T. V. Greene, Assistant Plant Manager
   *C. T. Moore, Assistant Plant Manager
   *S. X. Baxley, Superintendent of Operations
   *C. R. Miles, QA Field Supervisor
   *C. E. Belflower, QA Site Supervisor
   *G. E. Spell, QA Field Representative
   *P. E. Fornel, QA Field Representative
   *W. B. Thigpen, QA Field Representative

   Other licensee employees contacted included operators.

   NRC Resident Inspector

   *R. F. Rogers

   *Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

   The inspection scope and findings discussed in the details of this report were summarized on June 1, 1979, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

   Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

   Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 5.a.1.

5. Review of IE Bulletin 79-08, Events Revelant to Boiling Water Reactors During Three Mile Island Incident

   a. Onsite Inspection of Engineered Safety Features (ESF)

      (1) The inspectors reviewed valve, circuit breaker and switch alignment procedures and single line drawings for the ESF systems. It was verified by visual observations that the major components and flow paths were in the status required by technical specifications

and operating procedures. Specifically, the following systems were reviewed: HPCI, RCIC, Core Spray, RHR, ADS, Standby Liquid Control, Standby Gas Treatment, Plant Service Water, and Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems.

During the procedure and drawing review, it was noted that some instrument and minor system valves do not appear to be adequately identified for proper valve lineup. Specific examples of procedures and identified problems are listed below.

HNP-2-1125, Reactor Isolation Cooling System. The lineup of steam pressure instruments 2E51-N019D and 2E51-N019E does not include the instrument root valves.

HNP-2-1505, Standby Gas Treatment System. There are no provisions in the valve lineup for vent and drain valves.

HNP-2-1400, Standby Liquid Control System. The lineup of flow indicating control instrument 2RC41-R004 does not include the instrument drain line.

HNP-2-1120, Core Spray System. The lineup for pressure instruments 2E21-N011A and 2E21-N011B does not include the panel shutoff or panel drain valves. The lineup for pressure instrument 2EA1-N007B does not include the drain valve.

This apparent lack of identification of all valves in system lineup procedures is an unresolved item (79-23-01).

The licensee stated they would investigate the lack of identification of all values in system lineup procedures.

(2) By procedure review and discussions with operators, it was determined that independent verification is not normally done while performing system alignments following extended outages and after maintenance of test activities. However, independent verification is performed during instrumentation system testing and valve alignments.

b. Onsite Assessment of Operating Procedures and Practices

(1) It was determined through discussion with operating personnel that HPCI and RCIC may start during routine operation event induced reactor water level transients, especially from high power levels, but they are not required to assist in reactor water level control if the feedwater system is operable.

(2) The licensee's tagging practices were reviewed to determine if the potential exists for attached tags to obscure status indicators such as valve of switch position indicators. It was observed that information tags being used on the control panels could possibly cover position indicating lights. This was brought to the attention of site management for their review and resolution.