

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

1 In the Matter of:

2 IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW

3 of William H. Metzger  
4 Foreman - Maintenance  
5 Nuclear Section

6  
7  
8  
9 Trailer #203  
10 NRC Investigation Site  
11 TMI Nuclear Power Plant  
12 Middletown, Pennsylvania

13 May 22, 1979  
14 (Date of Interview)

15 July 3, 1979  
16 (Date Transcript Typed)

17 243  
18 (Tape Number(s))

19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
*7908290133*

21 NRC PERSONNEL:

22 Bob Marsh  
23 Anthony N. Fasano  
24 James S. Creswell  
25 Gregory P. Yuhas

896 027

1 MARSH: The date is May 22, 1979 and the time is 3:05 PM and this is Bob  
2 Marsh and I'm an Investigator with the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
3 and we are currently in Room 119 of the Red Roof Inn on Eisenhower Boulevard  
4 in Swatara, Pennsylvania. We are here today to conduct an interview of  
5 William M. Metzger who up until April 9, Bill, if I remember right.

6  
7 METZGER: That's right.

8  
9 MARSH: Was employed by Met Ed as a Foreman - Maintenance in the Nuclear  
10 Section. Before we start Bill I want to indicate that we did discussed  
11 this two-page letter before I began the tape and I indicated that this  
12 letter does cover the purpose of our investigation to some degree, the  
13 authority and some of the goals and also indicated that in the body of the  
14 letter certain of your rights are discussed and one in particular is the  
15 fact that for the Met Ed employees, if they felt they wanted a Met Ed  
16 representative present we would go ahead and bring a man in. That does not  
17 really apply to you anymore unless you want someone from Met Ed present we  
18 can do that.

19  
20 METZGER: No.

21  
22 MARSH: Okay fine. There are three questions at the end which you responded  
23 to and I just like to make them a matter of record on the tape and that is  
24 one. Did you understand the two-page memo?

25  
896 028

1 METZGER: Yes.

2  
3 MARSH: And do we have your permission to tape this interview?

4  
5 METZGER: Yes.

6  
7 MARSH: And do want a copy of the tape and transcript?

8  
9 METZGER: Yes.

10  
11 MARSH: Okay. They will be provided to you then Bill. Before we get  
12 started I would like the other people present in the room to each identify  
13 themselves, spell their last name and identify their position.

14  
15 FASANO: Anthony N. Fasano, Inspection Specialist at Region I.

16  
17 CRESWELL: James S. Creswell. I'm a Reactor Inspector out of Region III.

18  
19 YUHAS: Gregory P. Yuhas, Radiation Specialist, Region I.

20  
21 MARSH: I thank you. Bill, to get us started if you would, give us a few  
22 words on your background, your experience and your duties with Met Ed if  
23 you would?

24  
25 896 029

1 METZGER: Okay. My only nuclear background was when I was a Shift Superin-  
2 tendent, stationed in Charleston Naval Shipyard. At that time I was a  
3 qualified Radiological Worker. It was a requirement that I have that  
4 qualification while employed there and that's my only nuclear background.  
5 I had quite a bit of experience with machinery, and repair machinery and my  
6 last duty station where I retired from I was an Assistant Repair Officer.  
7 When I retired there I happen to meet a gentlemen from Met Ed who gave me  
8 the opportunity to come up here and look over their plant and see if I  
9 would be interested in this type of work. Which when I came up for an  
10 interview and spent a day out at Three Mile Island I was quite enthusiastic  
11 then. The opportunity to look at the plant and maybe to work there. Well  
12 they made me an offer and I retired, I invested everything I had and I came  
13 up here. I worked first, well first off I had my training, my necessary  
14 training to be badged to enter radiation areas etc. to be able to escort.

15  
16 MARSH: Bill when did you begin? When is this, what date is this?

17  
18 METZGER: The 2nd of August, 1976 is my first day on the plant.

19  
20 MARSH: Allright. Thank you.

21  
22 METZGER: After my training I learned what my duties were gonna be to start  
23 off anyway. I took over processing of work requests for Unit 1 and in that  
24 task I assigned it to the various groups, mechanical, electrical, or IC  
25 Utility and I indicated whether it was nuclear safety related and QC and

1 this type of thing it goes on a normal work request. I did this work for  
2 quite awhile and I also was introduced to Capital Projects which I wrote  
3 justification for the funding, details, estimates for the job and of course  
4 in the estimate included how much money, how many man-hours etc. etc. When  
5 Unit 2, we started accepting systems from Unit 2, then I was transferred to  
6 Unit 2. And I picked up the same task in Unit 2 as I had in Unit 1.  
7 Worked several additions, I processed the work request which were fairly  
8 simply at that time since we didn't have a Met Ed QC right there, you know  
9 the work request at least didn't have to go through Met Ed QC. And it was  
10 all under construction. Again I worked Capital Projects, later on as my  
11 experience was gained in Three Mile Island I took on things like assisting  
12 with the budget for maintenance. Oh let me see, I wrote justification for  
13 additional personnel requirements. The first that I really got involved  
14 with radiation work, now most of the time you see I worked in the office.  
15 Very seldom I even go on the plant, except the first refueling of Unit 1  
16 that I was involved in was in 1977. At that time because my title was  
17 Maintenance Foreman - Nuclear, I moved over to Unit 1 to take over as  
18 Foreman in charge of valve repair for Leak Rate Testing, that's Containment.  
19 And then of course I was required to work in the Reactor Building somewhat  
20 and the Auxiliary Building. Part of the completion in the refueling and  
21 all tests satisfactory because I went back to my own job at Unit 2. I  
22 continued my work in Unit 2 the same as before and then when refueling for  
23 Unit 1 came about again I was once again assigned as Foreman in charge of  
24 valve repair for Leak Rate Testing. After that job was over, let's see  
25 that was in 78, after that job was over right back to Unit 2 again. I just

1 completed my third refueling of Unit 1 where once again I was Foreman in  
2 charge of valve repair for Leak Rate Testing. We started extended hours on  
3 the 5th of February, 1979. When I finished my work with Leak Rate Testing  
4 I went back to a normal workday which consisted of 8 to 12 hours or whatever.  
5 We were doing a refueling, we were compensated for our extra hours and I  
6 worked sometimes as much as 18 hours a day. I finish my job, then I'd come  
7 home in say in 12 hours the phone would ring and they'd want me to come  
8 back because there was a push to get certain valves passed and of course  
9 I'd go back in until the job was complete. I had gone back to the normal  
10 hours prior to this accident and then of course we were put back on long  
11 hours and shifts or whatever was necessary to do whatever we had to do.  
12 During the accident, on the first day I recall we were sent into the plant  
13 as was about 9 o'clock on the 28th, they called all Supervisors to go into  
14 the plant.

15  
16 CRESWELL: That was 9 o'clock in the morning of the 28th?

17  
18 METZGER: Yes. Approximately 9 o'clock. Then first going back at a little  
19 earlier than that I arrived at the gate at about 10 after 7 and the gates  
20 were closed and the guard came over to the car and he said we have a radia-  
21 tion problem on the island you can not go in. And apparently he knew me  
22 and knew that I was a supervisor out there and he said would you please go  
23 to the Observation Center and try to muster the people as they come in, so  
24 I did. To the best of my knowledge I was the first white hat there, the  
25 first supervisor. And at that point I did start a muster list so that the

1 people could muster in and we caught everybody as far as I know that came  
2 in. And then about 9 o'clock they asked the supervisors to go in, Mainten-  
3 ance Supervisors, so we went in, drove our private vehicles and we were in  
4 approximately an hour. Then I guess the radiation levels or air contamin-  
5 ation was getting so high until they asked to or told us to evacuate to  
6 leave the island. So on the way out they surveyed our car and our persons  
7 and so forth. We went back to the Observation Center and later that day  
8 they released us. The next day on the 29th, we came in and of course we  
9 met at the Observation Center and they just dismissed us, told us to go  
10 home and stand by the phone, if they needed us they would call. That was  
11 on Thursday I believe or maybe Wednesday I'm not sure. But anyway the 29th  
12 didn't go into the plant, did not work. On the 30th, I did go in and set  
13 up shift work and I was placed on the 3 to 11 shift and there was another  
14 foreman that was supposed to be on the shift with me that is Maintenance  
15 Foreman, well apparently he became afraid, his family was afraid and he  
16 didn't show. I had about 7 men I think at my disposal. Now I was shaky, I  
17 admit I was very shaky and the reason is I didn't have the confidence that  
18 I felt that I really needed or should have in that type of situation to  
19 control other men and direct their efforts when most of the time I sit  
20 behind a desk. I was just leary, very nervous. At the time I go into the  
21 plant and another shift was supposed to relieve me and in a couple of cases  
22 there the shifts didn't get in until a few hours later so I was putting 10  
23 or 12 hours out there. And we would do things like moving cinder blocks  
24 into the Fuel Handling Area to use for shielding. One night we had to do  
25 some work on an evaporator in Unit 1. We had to go some pipe rigging I

1 think to hydrogen recombiner, we actually didn't run any pipe but we had  
2 some connections to make. We had to run some hoses from the Fuel Pool in  
3 Unit 1 over to the Fuel Pool in Unit 2 so that we had the Borated Water  
4 available. And of course that was rigging pumps and so forth. Plus those  
5 other little jobs that we had to do, we had tank trucks out there, we had  
6 to rig hoses to them. But I don't think that it was but maybe two nights  
7 at the most that I worked without any support, another support from a  
8 Mechanical Maintenance Foreman. Then they did put another man on shift  
9 with me and all his time had been spent out in the plants so you know of  
10 course I relaxed to a certain degree and after they had adequate foremen  
11 out there they put me back in my old job and I worked with our QC people in  
12 trying to devise a way that we, we meaning Met Ed would have some type of  
13 control and know what's going on as far as modifications goes. So we had  
14 the tool in the work request but the way that they wanted to handle it, we  
15 wouldn't have any hold on, we really wouldn't know. So with the Manager of  
16 QC out of Reading we worked this out and submitted letters and so forth  
17 which was approved so that we, that it would pass through us and we would  
18 give it numbers so that we could always identify as what was going on.  
19 That's one of the tasks but anyway I was still on that shift and at that  
20 particular time my work was conducted more or less from Trailer City at  
21 that time. I did have to make a few trips into the plant to check out  
22 parts and materials whatever. But we had a company vehicle at that time so  
23 there was no problem going off and on. I guess what I'm really building up  
24 to is to why I resigned. And it's an opinion type thing and in my opinion  
25 I had no choice and I believe my supervisor had most of his people assigned



1 to working in the plant in Maintenance and I was left over more or less.  
2 You know I was pushing paper and this type thing which was important but  
3 they had the task and I knew it had to be done, it was very important and  
4 that was to change the charcoal filters in the Auxiliary Building. I was  
5 assigned as a Met Ed Coordinator to work with a Engineer from Duke Power  
6 Company and to coordinate our efforts along with his to, well more or less,  
7 to support him in the effort of changing these filters. But it got a  
8 little more detail than I expected as just being a Coordinator. I finally  
9 asked my boss, I said do you want me to be the Foreman on the job also and  
10 he said yes. That's when I started getting quite concerned. One thing Met  
11 Ed, in the Mechanical Maintenance Group we didn't have maybe forty people  
12 available or less and I was concerned where we would get the people to do  
13 the job and just what all was involved in this particular job. And then I  
14 was working quite closely with that engineer and a few other people from  
15 other companies, you know engineers. And the first job I had was to find  
16 out just what filters in the plant were charcoal and to see if we had them  
17 on hand so I done the research on that and found out that we did have I  
18 believe it was 98 charcoal filters on hand. The engineer from Duke Power,  
19 he didn't know anything about them either, that is where they were located  
20 other than by prints. And the same with me, now I've been assigned to Unit  
21 2 and I had the opportunity to walk all over the plant before startup.  
22 Since startup I have not, other than the Turbine Building and Control Room  
23 but I can not visualize where the filters were located and I knew that the  
24 Auxiliary Building was quite contaminated. In and out of discussion of the  
25 job we discussed using the air line hose mask, we'd get compressors and

896 035

1 we'd get the hoods and this type of thing so that we could work in there.  
2 The estimate at first was 3 days to complete this job. We estimated thirty-  
3 six (36) men so that we could work 12 at a time and having others standing  
4 by, not 12 at a time, but 12 on a shift and maybe work 6 at a time, 6  
5 standing by and shift off and the next shift would do the same thing. But  
6 what frightened me to a degree that really put me in, I don't know, a very  
7 nervous state, unstable to my say. There was a lot of stress, was due to  
8 the fact that we were gonna get people from Penn Elec to do the job. I was  
9 gonna be the only Met Ed employee there and in the past most of my experience  
10 had been behind a desk. I did not feel confident or capable to lead 36  
11 people into this Auxiliary Building to change these filters. Rather than  
12 saying no I'm not gonna do the job I simply submitted a letter of resignation.  
13 I was not gonna subject myself which we had estimated 6 to 10 rem to the  
14 job in a 3 day period but I think the job, my own personal estimate would  
15 be 10 days plus but again I wasn't a degree engineer. And again I wasn't  
16 familiar with the area or familiar with the units that contained the filters.  
17 So I was not going to subject myself and the people from Penn Elec who was  
18 not at all familiar with Three Mile Island period and never been around  
19 radiation areas although they were gonna get their training and we were  
20 gonna set up a mockup on handling the filters in which they weighed 130  
21 pounds each. There was 90 filters in each unit and if we would of changed  
22 both units, it would of been a 180 filters and I knew darn well that we  
23 were not gonna loosen the filters that were installed and build some type  
24 of scaffolding in that close area and replace 90 filters in three days.  
25 And under the working conditions that we were gonna be under, so I just  
resigned.

896 036

1 FASANO: Bill, did you talk to your supervisor?

2  
3 METZGER: No. I did not.

4  
5 FASANO: Did you have a reason why?

6  
7 METZGER: He knew and he told me he said I knew you were quite upset and  
8 disturbed about the whole thing. I did not discuss with him about using the  
9 Penn Elec people or working for an engineer that was not familiar with  
10 Three Mile Island. I just didn't want any part of it.

11  
12 CREWELL: Do you have any idea why Met Ed had to get an engineer from Duke  
13 Power Company to do this job?

14  
15 METZGER: The only thing I, I guess all these companies were offering any  
16 assistance that they can give Met Ed and what engineers we had I'm sure  
17 they had plenty of jobs for all of them. Especially the ones that worked  
18 at the island, I think they all were, they were employed quite well.

19  
20 CRESWELL: Do you feel that there was a Met Ed engineer that was familiar  
21 with the unit?

22  
23 METZGER: Oh definitely. And there was also some foremen that was familiar  
24 with the job, in fact they had removed some of these before. Now these  
25 were Utility Foremen that had actually been in there and they knew where

1 they were, they knew what it's all about taking these loose. This is  
2 normal: safety function, and not a Mechanical Maintenance function. My  
3 supervisor said that I was available. He was glad that I was available but  
4 I was just in no condition to be assigned that task.

5  
6 CRESWELL: What was your main concern about doing the task? What was the  
7 source of your anxiety about doing it?

8  
9 METZGER: I suppose the biggest thing was the experienced personnel and if  
10 I would of had Met Ed people I don't think I'd had anything else cause I  
11 knew that they were trained. They knew where the units were.

12  
13 CRESWELL: Was, I'm trying to get to a point in like, was your concern that  
14 some of these might get overexposed?

15  
16 METZGER: Yes and then I was responsible.

17  
18 CRESWELL: Okay.

19  
20 METZGER: I felt that that was my full responsibility for those people. I  
21 did not want that responsibility. I was more or less a desk man and very  
22 little experience out in the plant, particularly in a high radiation area.  
23 They assigned, in fact the last meeting that I went to my mind was pretty  
24 much made up there that I was gonna resign, that I wasn't gonna do this job  
25 and when I went into to see my supervisor I, and to give him a run down on

1 the meeting I gave him my letter of resignation. I didn't give him a two-  
2 week notice, I told him effective now. He called an individual to relieve  
3 me and for me to give him a run down on all previous meetings and what was  
4 planned and just what's going on. This individual was one that that when  
5 the accident started, he was frightened and he left the area. By a week  
6 and a half later or a week later he came back. He had not been assigned a  
7 task yet in a way he was gonna relieve me. From heresay, I understand that  
8 he refused to do the job, somebody else had to pick it up after all. But  
9 no, I suppose that was a mistake for me not to discuss this at length with  
10 my supervisor.

11  
12 CRESWELL: What is your supervisors name?

13  
14 METZGER: Dan Shovlin was the individual that I was talking to and I have  
15 nothing against Dan. He's a fine individual and he is a awful hard worker.

16  
17 CRESWELL: Do you have any idea of why Met Ed would use inexperienced  
18 personnel to perform a task like this?

19  
20 METZGER: Yes, because I didn't think Met Ed had the sufficient people to  
21 burn out that quickly.

22  
23 CRESWELL: So there ...

24 896 039  
25

1 METZGER: In other words, we had just completed a fueling in Unit 1 and our  
2 people were carrying a good many MR as it is. And to put them in this area  
3 would wipe them out in a day or less. And then we'd be, we'd still have a  
4 lot of tasks to do and we wouldn't have any people to do it with. So I'm  
5 sure you know, I don't criticize Met Ed for it, but I guess I do criticize  
6 them for assigning me the job, an inexperienced individual to supervisor  
7 inexperienced personnel.

9 CRESWELL: Do you feel Met Ed had an alternative way of doing things?

11 METZGER: As far as I'm concerned, they had one. I mean me personally.

13 CRESWELL: And that would be, what would the alternative be?

15 METZGER: To use one of the supervisors that was familiar with the area and  
16 familiar with the filters.

18 CRESWELL: And what about as far as the crew is concerned?

20 METZGER: I don't think they had any alternative there. I really don't but  
21 ...

23 CRESWELL: But they didn't have any alternative but to use the inexperienced  
24 Penn Elec?

25 896 040

1 METZGER: The people from Penn Elec I'm sure but with a supervisor that  
2 knew what it was all about I think that the job could of been done.  
3

4 MARSH: Just to clear up one area for the future, you indicate that some of  
5 these people may have been wiped out, which you're making reference to if I  
6 understand it right would be their bank or their allotment and li it of  
7 radiation that they can accur?  
8

9 METZGER: That is right. That is right.  
10

11 MARSH: So by having, so by filling up that allotment they would then not  
12 be able to be work in radiation areas.  
13

14 METZGER: Work in radiation areas. That's right. They'd be used to their  
15 maximum millirem.  
16

17 MARSH: Also, who was the individual that initially replaced you?  
18

19 METZGER: Al Conrad, he was a Maintenance Foreman - Nuclear. I guess way  
20 back in my mind another thing that really made up my mind, was that when I  
21 came to work for Met Ed they didn't have a position for what I was gonna be  
22 doing, the type work that I was gonna be doing. I was gonna be hired as a  
23 Maintenance Foreman - Nuclear until they wrote me a job description. Well  
24 hell that was three years ago and I was still a Maintenance Foreman and I  
25 felt that they were letting me do what they wanted and yet when they needed

1 somebody out in the plant, I was the Maintenance Foreman Nuclear, so away  
2 from the desk I went out to the plant. And most of the time my desk work  
3 just sat until I got back. They told me three years ago or nearly three  
4 years ago that they were gonna give me a title, well they never did. I was  
5 growing kind of impatient too and maybe this was a straw that broke the  
6 camels back. I did not feel qualified, I wasn't going to do the job.

7  
8 CRESWELL: What was your relationship with Mr. Shovlin before the event  
9 occurred? Did you have a good relationship, a good working relationship?

10  
11 METZGER: Oh yes, yes. Dan's a fine individual to work for, he really is.  
12 But the thing about Dan, he's so darn busy all the time, until you talk to  
13 him he don't seem to hear what you're saying and I told Dan twice, Dan I  
14 don't think I want to do this job. He did not respond to that on either  
15 occasion.

16  
17 CRESWELL: Could you give us, fix those in time force when you told Mr.  
18 Shovlin that you didn't want to do the job? Is that a week before you  
19 quit, a few days before you quit?

20  
21 METZGER: I think the first time, let's see the 9th, I don't remember just  
22 what day the 9th was on but it was a couple of days prior to that that I  
23 was assigned to the job and to the best of my memory I told him the day  
24 after my initial assignment to that task and the day after that so it was  
25 on two occasions I mentioned it to him but I got no response and he just



1 didn't seem to care what I had to say. He had a job to do and he wanted to  
2 get it done and I suppose if I'd of been in his shoes I may have done the  
3 same thing, I don't know that.

4  
5 YUHAS: I'd like to digress a little bit. I wonder if you could begin by  
6 telling me the health physics or radiation protection training that you  
7 were initially given on employment with Metropolitan Edison?

8  
9 METZGER: Okay. I had the four hours of video-tape, that was very first  
10 that was quite simply that was just to get badged that was not the RWP part  
11 of it just to get badged and I had the four hours. I was familiar with  
12 that because when I worked in the Shipyard as a Radiological Worker, we had  
13 basically the same thing. And the only thing at the Shipyard, we had it  
14 about every 6 months and we had better keep ourselves up on it due to the  
15 fact that Mr. Richover, he'd come into the Shipyard and I want this Officer,  
16 this Officer, and this Officer to be this spot at a certain time and he'd  
17 give you an exam and you better pass it. So everytime that our training  
18 center came out with a new hand out to study, boy we asked for it and we  
19 kept it and everytime we were sitting at our desk and we didn't have anything  
20 to do special, you'd see the officer there briefing themselves, update and  
21 you'd better have the answer or he would just throw one of the darnest fits  
22 you ever saw. Alright. After I was there a couple of days they had  
23 a class on what they call the Intermediate RWP Training and I went to that  
24 class. That was a full day or more, this is where they went to the suit  
25 up, just the whole works you might say, it was a full day but again I had

1 no problem with that because that was also in our Shipyard training which  
2 our Shipyard training by the way lasted more than a day, maybe even a week.  
3 That's really the extent of it other than your one half a day, it used to  
4 be a day and then they cut it down to a half day for general employee  
5 training where you were reviewed and all of this. Now one thing I did was  
6 I kept notes from when I did go to the classes. And occasionally, you know  
7 sitting back at a desk and not really subjected to a day after day like  
8 most of the people, I had to pull these out and review them. Even just to  
9 review how many MRs was I allowed quarterly and so forth. A week would be,  
10 these things you didn't use and you, they'd slip your mind.

11  
12 CRESWELL: Did you review those notes when you were given the task to  
13 replace these filters?

14  
15 METZGER: No I did not because I couldn't get to them.

16  
17 YUHAS: Did you participate in an annual retraining of health physics?

18  
19 METZGER: No no. The only retraining that I done was the, as I stated  
20 earlier the one day that they used to give general employee training where  
21 everybody was involved but retraining on health physics no.

22  
23 YUHAS: Did you participate in any of the HP training that was given to the  
24 Mechanical Maintenance Department throughout the year, and this would be  
25 like for emergency training?

1 METZGER: No.

2  
3 YUHAS: Did you have any assigned function within the emergency organi-  
4 zation?

5  
6 METZGER: No.

7  
8 YUHAS: I maybe misinterring you but I'm getting the general impression  
9 that you don't have confidence in Metropolitan Edison's health physics  
10 department for radiation protection department. Is that a correct assump-  
11 tion on my part?

12  
13 METZGER: Just from me personnally, and I'm observing the other people, the  
14 people that are subjected to radiation areas frequently. They seem to  
15 really know what they are doing and the HP people seem to be good. I've  
16 worked with them during refueling and I had no complaints with the people.  
17 You know when they surveyed an area and they said this is what you're gonna  
18 have I felt very confident with them.

19  
20 CRESWELL: During the course of the time of the event or between that time  
21 and the time that you left Met Ed, did you see certain things happen or did  
22 you discuss with fellow workers things that had happened that caused you  
23 concern about the exposures people were incurring or the contamination that  
24 they were receiving?

25  
896 045

1 METZGER: No. I didn't discuss with the levels of radiation with other  
2 personnel and I wasn't too highly concerned about it really until I was  
3 assigned that particular task and then I became very much concerned with  
4 it. You know 6 to 10 rems for an entire job which is supposed to take  
5 three days which ended up taking much longer and I figured it would and I  
6 figured we would pick up 12, 14, 20 rems.

7  
8 CRESWELL: That's total for all the people?

9  
10 METZGER: Yeh that's just total accumulation I think.

11  
12 CRESWELL: For everybody?

13  
14 METZGER: Which probably would of been to bad.

15  
16 FASANO: Bill, when you were doing your normal job you did take the work  
17 requests right and you did categorize them as to whether that you need HP,  
18 whether you need QA, did you feel confident in going down the check sheet  
19 and saying this requires so many men, this requires a procedure, this  
20 requires a work an RWP, this is what you did and did you feel confident in  
21 saying which ones were required for RWP and which weren't?

22  
23 METZGER: Allright. Let's break that up into two categories Tony. One  
24 would be where the work request was initiated by Mr. X out in the field or  
25 anybody in the plant and it came to me where I assigned work request number.

1 I said this is a nuclear safety related, RWP required, a procedure for RWP,  
2 is it QC, is it nuclear safety related and so forth. I marked those and I  
3 done it to the best of my ability. Did I feel confidence on everytime I  
4 marked one, the answer is no. I did not and on many cases particularly  
5 whether it was nuclear safety related or not, now in Unit 2 I did have a  
6 guide SP-88 which is put out by Burns and Roe and this gave us a pretty  
7 good guide whether it was nuclear safety related or not. I used this and I  
8 marked it accordingly. Now I got a lot of guff from the supervisors in the  
9 instrument group maybe an electrical but usually a mechanical I didn't have  
10 any problems there but they'd say no, it's not nuclear safety related.  
11 Okay, well the nuc river system is nuclear safety related in accordance  
12 with SP-88. Allright but if it's a small valve that's say located in the  
13 Auxiliary Building it's not even a hot area maybe. They'd say, no, this is  
14 a little old superfluous valve, it's not nuclear safety related. My book  
15 says nuc river water is nuclear safety related period. It don't say valve  
16 umpty ump is not, it just says it is, so I marked them that way. As far as  
17 QC that was pretty much cut and dry. I had a list there that told whether  
18 it was QC or not. But again we would deal with some areas that would not  
19 mark it nuclear safety related well the engineer would say heh that is  
20 nuclear safety related, but how did I know it was nuclear safety related,  
21 my book don't say it's nuclear safety related. Allright, for example it  
22 may be a radiation monitor. My book says that there not even QC and there  
23 certainly not listed as nuclear safety related but in some cases they  
24 probably are.  
25

896 047

1 FASANO: So you followed your guidance, you followed what you had at hand.

2  
3 METZGER: That's right.

4  
5 FASANO: And even with what you had, you had question as to whether they  
6 were safety related or not safety related.

7  
8 METZGER: Yes.

9  
10 FASANO: Did anybody check your decisions on when you marked these other  
11 than?

12  
13 METZGER: Yes they did. Now if I marked an item as being QC, it's under  
14 Quality Control. Then if I marked it being no nuclear safety related,  
15 whereas I said it's not nuclear safety related but it is under a Quality  
16 Control. This Work Request had to go to the Unit Superintendent for his  
17 signature to concur that that was not nuclear safety related. Now if I  
18 marked it QC and nuclear safety related that told the supervisor in the  
19 Maintenance group that that had to have a station or unit approved procedure  
20 to go to work on. In other words, approved procedure I mean a PORC approved  
21 procedure.

22  
23 FASANO: So you had double checks?

1 METZGER: Yes. If it was just QC then didn't necessarily need a PORC  
2 approved procedure, but still the signature of the unit superintendent had  
3 to be on it.

4  
5 CRESWELL: Did you at any time have any of your decisions reversed regarding  
6 classification of nuclear safety related items?

7  
8 METZGER: Seldom. I did have some but very seldom. And usually it was  
9 done on the engineers level when the Work Request happen to get through to  
10 him.

11  
12 CRESWELL: Were these items that were on the SP-88 list?

13  
14 METZGER: No. If they had been in the SP-88 list and then they would of  
15 been listed under the nuclear safety related that's the way they'd of been  
16 marked. Now, I'm a human being and I'll make errors, agreed and I may have  
17 made some in that area. In fact I'm sure I did but ...

18  
19 CRESWELL: But you have been reversed on the classification of some nuclear  
20 safety related items. Do you recall any of those more significant ones of  
21 those?

22  
23 METZGER: No. No I don't recall any particular ones.

1 MARSH: Just a small point but before we get to far away from it. You used  
2 the term PORC approved, is that PORC, P O R C?

3  
4 METZGER: Yes.

5  
6 MARSH: You don't know the definition of that, do you?

7  
8 METZGER: Tony knows that. It's the Plant Operation Review Committee.

9  
10 MARSH: Allright. Thank you.

11  
12 CRESWELL: Okay. I'd like to go back in time to the day of the event and  
13 that was the time that you went up to the Observation Center. Were you the  
14 first one there on the plant side staff at the Observation Center?

15  
16 METZGER: I did not observe any other supervisors there but myself. I  
17 didn't say there was none there, I just didn't observe any but I did see a  
18 lot of the Bargaining Unit people there and they were beginning to get  
19 together, and talk and then I got some paper and starting passing it out  
20 and I asked for names, department and their employee number.

21  
22 CRESWELL: Now the Bargaining Unit people, is this a union type of thing?

23  
24 METZGER: Yes, that's the union people.  
25



1 CRESWELL: Did they have a meeting scheduled there that morning?

2  
3 METZGER: No no. They were told from the gate to report there, this is  
4 normal procedure in case of strikes, etc. you know we have to report to  
5 the Observation Center.

6  
7 CRESWELL: And there were some individuals already there by the time you  
8 got there?

9  
10 METZGER: Yes yes.

11  
12 CRESWELL: But you did take control of the Observation Center whenever you  
13 got there? And you stayed there until about 9 o'clock?

14  
15 METZGER: Yes it was around 9 o'clock.

16  
17 CRESWELL: Okay. Could you briefly describe what happened while you were  
18 there beyond your making out or passing around the list of names and so  
19 forth?

20  
21 METZGER: As they got some information from the plant on just what was  
22 going on, they did call the employees together and give us a brief of just  
23 what had happened. Well I don't know if it was just what had happened but  
24 they did tell us there was some contamination around. I don't want to go  
25 into details about that because I don't recall for sure.

1 MARSH: Gentlemen, I'm going to interrupt for a minute. The time being  
2 3:50 PM with 686 on the meter and I'm gonna terminate this tape and turn it  
3 over.

4  
5 MARSH: Okay. We are resuming at this time. The time still being 3:50 PM,  
6 May 22.

7  
8 CRESWELL: Do you recall who conducted the briefing in the Observation  
9 Center?

10  
11 METZGER: No I really don't.

12  
13 CRESWELL: Okay.

14  
15 METZGER: I don't remember who done that. It was one of several people but  
16 I'd hate to say for sure.

17  
18 CRESWELL: Did you get a phone call from someone to come on down on site?

19  
20 METZGER: The Observation Center did, they got a phone call and they asked  
21 for all Maintenance Supervisors to report on the island.

22  
23 CRESWELL: Okay. Then you went on down through the security check point,  
24 north gate or south gate?  
25

1 METZGER: We went through the North Gate.

2  
3 CRESWELL: Okay. Were you stopped there? Did you drive your car in?

4  
5 METZGER: Yes.

6  
7 CRESWELL: Okay. Were you stopped at the Gate?

8  
9 METZGER: Just for our normal type thing like giving our badge number.

10  
11 CRESWELL: Okay. And then you went on down to the Processing Center?

12  
13 METZGER: Yes.

14  
15 CRESWELL: What happen whenever you got to the Processing Center?

16  
17 METZGER: At that point we went out to a Machine Shop and then I attempted  
18 along with one of the other supervisors to go to the Unit 2 Control Room to  
19 try to find out was going on, what can we do and I didn't make it to the  
20 Control Room, there was a security guard there at the stairway leading up  
21 and I don't recall who came down the stairway but they said it's no use to  
22 go up in there. You're not gonna find out anything that their radiation  
23 levels were getting pretty high, airborne and so they told us to go to the  
24 Auditorium at Unit 1 and that's where we all went and then we finally got  
25 the word to get out.

1 CRESWELL: What was going on or what did you observe after you left Unit 2  
2 going over to Unit 1?

3  
4 METZGER: Absolutely nothing. There was nothing going on. A very few  
5 people, in fact I don't recall seeing anybody except the people that came  
6 in with me and security people.

7  
8 CRESWELL: Did you see any health physics technicians outside monitoring or  
9 anything like that? Did you notice a health physics technician up at the  
10 gate anywhere in that area?

11  
12 METZGER: Yes. Not when I came in. I'm not saying that he wasn't there  
13 but he certainly was there when we went out, in fact we were monitored, we  
14 were scanned before we went left the Service Building and went into the  
15 Security Building we were scanned. And that monitored if you prefer ...  
16 And then we were monitored, our vehicle was monitored and then we went from  
17 there to the 500 KV Substation where our vehicle and personnel was monitored  
18 once again.

19  
20 CRESWELL: And there was no contamination detected at either point?

21  
22 METZGER: No.

23  
24 CRESWELL: At the gate or at the 500 KV Sub?  
25

1 METZGER: No no.

2  
3 CRESWELL: Did you secure a TLD?

4  
5 METZGER: That's one point I did want to bring up but it's not a fault of  
6 Metropolitan Edison, it's a fault of myself. My last day that I worked in  
7 my office which was in a Trailer located on the East side of the corridor  
8 between Unit 1 and Unit 2. I left my TLD in my drawer, my desk, therefore  
9 when I first came in to Security Building where we're supposed to pick up  
10 TLD's I didn't have one and I wasn't the only individual that didn't. So  
11 we went out into the Machine Shop and I was concerned because I didn't have  
12 my TLD. So, anyway a couple of us were gonna walk down to the Control Room  
13 to find out what's going on and what we can what can we do to help them and  
14 I did stop by my office and picked my TLD at that time which was 40 feet  
15 off the corridors.

16  
17 FASANO: Bill, was it general practice for people to take their TLD home  
18 with them and also to leave them in their desk because they only had to put  
19 them in say once a month?

20  
21 METZGER: Well I don't know if was general or not Tony but I know a lot of  
22 people that did and a lot of them just forgot. In my case I always followed  
23 regulations pretty well I thought but that's just one time that I forgot  
24 and there it was and I needed it.

25  
896 055

1 FASANO: There was no general rack where they were kept, I mean there  
2 wasn't any system where you sorted of had to put them away before you left  
3 the site?

4  
5 METZGER: Yes.

6  
7 FASANO: There is?

8  
9 METZGER: Yes. It's located inside the Security Building.

10  
11 FASANO: But that would be voluntary?

12  
13 METZGER: Yes. More or less if you'd pick it up in the morning nobody  
14 checked it as far as I know that night to see whether it was there or not.  
15 There was no followup on it to the best of my knowledge. But everybody  
16 knew what they were supposed to do.

17  
18 CRESWELL: Let me make sure I understand that no guard or health physicist  
19 challenged you for not having a TLD?

20  
21 METZGER: No.

22  
23 CRESWELL: At any time while you were on the island?

24  
25 896 056

1 METZGER: No. But I was there just a few minutes and I went down and I got  
2 my TLD. In fact, I went through the Machine Shop and then we went directly  
3 to towards the Unit 2 Control Room and I just walked out of the door from  
4 the corridor into my office and picked the TLD up.

5  
6 CRESWELL: So how much time would you estimate that you did not have the  
7 TLD with you?

8  
9 METZGER: 8 minutes. Because that was very important to me to get that.  
10 Another thing that was not available to me when I went into the plant was a  
11 dosimeter, self reader. They were not available, it just so happens as I  
12 was walking down towards Unit 2, we saw an HP man, a HP Foreman and he just  
13 returned from the Unit 1 HP area and then this other fellow with me says  
14 heh, can we get a self reader, he said just a minute, he went back in, he  
15 came out with the self reader, so I had my dosimeter and that was probably  
16 a period of 4 minutes 4 or 5 minutes from the time I entered that area.  
17 And then about 3 more minutes I had my TLD so then I was satisfied at that  
18 point.

19  
20 YUHAS: Can you describe for me the medical significance of an exposure of  
21 3 Rem?

22  
23 METZGER: The medical significance, no I can't.  
24  
25

1 CRESWELL: What's the effect it would have on it?

2  
3 YUHAS: Do you have any idea of what effect an exposure of 3 Rem has?

4  
5 METZGER: Probably none to the average individual or at least immediately.

6  
7 FASANO: Bill, when you were doing the Work Request checks, we went through  
8 the categorization, quality assurance and/or safety related or not safety  
9 related. How about the requirement for a Radiation Work Permit RWP, did  
10 you have to check that?

11  
12 METZGER: Yes.

13  
14 FASANO: Okay. Once you on Unit 2 I understand you know during the Pre-Op  
15 there wouldn't be any.

16  
17 METZGER: No.

18  
19 FASANO: Now once it got, once Unit 2 got its license, did you feel confi-  
20 dent in putting requirements as it RWP as a necessity?

21  
22 METZGER: If I knew where the component was listed on a Work Request I felt  
23 confident due to the fact that I normally called HP and I said what areas  
24 in Unit 2 requires RWP and they'd tell me. As the plant went up in power  
25 and so forth I didn't make these phone calls every day because I got to



1 knowing more likely in the Auxiliary Building they will require an RWP and  
2 so on. I played it safe you might say as far as RWP goes and the Work  
3 Request because I marked quite a few yes and when the Work Request got to  
4 the people that were gonna do the work it was determined at that point no.  
5 Now just prior to me resigning from Met Ed we got into a discussion with QC  
6 and the discussion had to do with RWP markings on the Work Request. If I'd  
7 marked it yes, QC's telling me then every Tom, Dick and Harry don't have  
8 the authority to change that and make it a no which this was going on. You  
9 know the foreman and we would get the Work Request and they'd say you don't  
10 need a RWP or either he didn't change it or bother to get it changed, he  
11 just wouldn't put any RWP number on the Work Request and the Work Request  
12 has a place for the RWP number. So QC's saying if you don't have a RWP  
13 number and it's marked yes an RWP is required then we got to have it in  
14 writing and procedures somewhere giving people authority to change it  
15 saying no, then in the RWP number area on the Work Request can be put there  
16 and it would be legal. I had no problems with that so I wrote up a temporary,  
17 not a temporary but a permanent change notice on that TCN and everybody  
18 looked at it and we all agreed upon it and I left before that went to the  
19 PORC review.

20  
21 CRESWELL: Did you say a TCN indicating a temporary change notice or?

22  
23 METZGER: No it's PCR. I'm sorry I probably did say TCN but it's a PCR, a  
24 Permanent Change is what I wrote up.  
25

1 CRESWELL: Okay. Do you have indications that on Work Requests that you  
2 noted that there should be a Work Permit issued on that the work was done  
3 without health physics monitoring? In other words, on the Work Request do  
4 you check that you need a Radiation Work Permit? Do you have knowledge or  
5 indication that work was done then without that Radiation Work Permit?  
6

7 METZGER: No, because in fact even though I marked it saying it needed an  
8 RWP one may not have been required. That could of been that it was an  
9 error on my part of not knowing where every particular valve was or every  
10 particular instrument but I played it safe. If I thought by looking in my  
11 books telling me what the instrument is, whether it's QC or not and its  
12 location, to me I said heh to go to that area you need an RWP. But when  
13 you really got down to doing the job it was not in a hot area at all so  
14 they didn't need HP.  
15

16 CRESWELL: So the Foreman would make the, the Maintenance Foreman would  
17 make the decision whether he needed an RWP.  
18

19 METZGER: More or less.  
20

21 CRESWELL: And this was a common type of occurrence.  
22

23 METZGER: Yes and I would have no hang ups with that because I don't think  
24 there's an individual out at that plant that could mark everyone of those  
25 things perfectly, I just don't believe that.

1 FASANO: On your Change Request your Permanent Change Request, was this to  
2 get within the system another check on what Work Requests required an RWP?  
3

4 METZGER: No Tony, it simply stated it gave the Supervisor authority to  
5 change the marking on the Work Request where if it was marked RWP required  
6 Yes, this PCR gave him authority to change that after he has investigated a  
7 job that a RWP is not required then he can change it and RWP number is not  
8 required on the Work Request.  
9

10 FASANO: You said investigate it. Who would he have to investigate with if  
11 you had marked it requiring an RWP?  
12

13 METZGER: An HP.  
14

15 FASANO: He would have to go to HP. So what you put, it sounds like to me  
16 that you put in the health physics people to get involved wherever there  
17 was a job a Work Request that which included a possibility for Radiation  
18 Work Permit.  
19

20 METZGER: No. In the PCR he didn't mention health physics at all. But  
21 it's a normal procedure that when they investigate a job that HP does get  
22 involved when the people have to go in and check out a job, investigate a  
23 job.  
24  
25

896 061

1 FASANO: But they would only go in there if there was a need for a Work for  
2 a RWP is that correct? If you'd had marked No, they wouldn't get involved?  
3

4 METZGER: That's right.  
5

6 FASANO: And in fact if you'd had marked No and it needed an RWP how would  
7 that get caught?  
8

9 METZGER: Hopefully by the Foreman that's gonna be in charge of the job.  
10 And they were good about that.  
11

12 FASANO: The PCR the Permanent Change Request, do you know a number on  
13 that, do you have a number do you recall?  
14

15 METZGER: No, it was not numbered yet.  
16

17 FASANO: Okay. So it's just in the ready for PORC to review.  
18

19 METZGER: Right. But my memory serves me correctly it was a change for  
20 Procedure 1401.7 or 1407.1 it's one of the two, it's a new procedure on the  
21 new type Work Request ...  
22

23 FASANO: Job Ticket.  
24  
25

896 062

1 METZGER: Yes, job ticket.

2  
3 FASANO: Oh it's still at the old 1201 there.

4  
5 METZGER: We got a four pager now. It's a good Work Request now I've  
6 worked with it I filled them out, I processed them and I physically worked  
7 with them on the plant, I had no hang ups with them.

8  
9 CRESWELL: Bill, correct me if I'm wrong but at one point during our conver-  
10 sation, you mentioned that during the accident there was a certain effect  
11 on your family is that correct?

12  
13 METZGER: Oh definitely.

14  
15 CRESWELL: Since you been involved in that accident type of situation and  
16 since this may of be a benefit in evaluating peoples performance under  
17 situations like that could you go into the effect that this accident had on  
18 your family?

19  
20 METZGER: Well my neighbors said, I'll talk about the neighbors first, they  
21 said when we see you packing up then we're gonna pack up too. But they  
22 never did see me pack up. When they started talking evacuation, we, my  
23 wife and I, just plain undecided you know, what action to take and the  
24 company was not telling the employees everything that was going on, we  
25 didn't know, we learned from the news media and after a few days some of

1 the Bargaining Unit went to some of management and said heh, we ought to  
2 know, we're out there working and so management said okay we're gonna get  
3 the word to you and they started publishing the Trailer City News, which  
4 still did not give us what we really wanted to know. So you know neighbors  
5 asking me, my family's asking me what's going on, I don't really know. You  
6 know I'd get upset, what about the bubble, in the Control Room. I don't  
7 think I ever found anybody who really told me anything about the bubble,  
8 you know what dangers involved out here, they didn't know so I couldn't  
9 tell my family. But yet I was going to work everyday in the every evening.  
10 And anyway it got down to the point they started evacuation, and the wife  
11 she was working downtown Harrisburg and me working at the island, they  
12 closed the schools. I have one girl in High School and one in Elementary  
13 School and we didn't want them to stay home all day alone because it may  
14 have been an evacuation, a major evacuation, then I'd of been there, she'd  
15 of been at work and the kids home alone so her mother and father live about  
16 120 miles away so we called them and her brother met us at about midway,  
17 met her because I was at work and they kept the girls for about 4 or 5 days  
18 till things slacked off and then we went down and picked them up. But the,  
19 it was an emotional thing, it was it's just like I really don't know how to  
20 describe it, like I was in a Science Fiction Movie, I was watching it on TV  
21 or something but yet was in it, it just didn't seem possible that something  
22 like that would happen to us.

23  
24 CRESWELL: It was an unreal situation.  
25

1 METZGER: It was just unreal. I've been in the Navy 21 years and when that  
2 Unit went down I said my ship just sank. You know I was so letdown but yet  
3 deep in my mind and I'm sure you guys being in the business and as many  
4 plants that's operating now the assumption that you just keep saying there's  
5 gonna be an accident somewhere and I know I was thinking about this seriously  
6 not over a week before the accident, I said this is gonna be one it's  
7 getting too many plants, it's bound to happen. And I said God I hopes it's  
8 not us. But it was.

9  
10 YUHAS: Why did you have that feeling?

11  
12 METZGER: Because it's just more and more plants all the time and I don't  
13 know. Really I don't know.

14  
15 YUHAS: Is is because you lacked some faith in the engineered safety systems  
16 or the fact that things were inadequate?

17  
18 METZGER: Well I know. No. I felt very confident in the Safeguards Systems  
19 in the Nuclear Industry but I've been with machiney for 21 years and I  
20 don't give a damn how good it is, it can fail. If it's man-made it can  
21 fail but I never really thought that as many back-ups that we got that  
22 something like this would happen.

23  
24 YUHAS: To make the point clear then your anxiety was not based on pre-  
25 conceived notion as the funtion of your job description?

1 METZGER: No.

2  
3 YUHAS: At Metropolitan Edison.

4  
5 METZGER: No.

6  
7 CRESWELL: You did not know of safety defects in the plant?

8  
9 METZGER: I knew of some, at first of course they exposed themselves and we  
10 corrected it.

11  
12 CRESWELL: There were no safety defects existing that you were aware of?

13  
14 METZGER: None, no.

15  
16 MARSH: I've got a question for you. Was your previous experience with the  
17 refueling on Unit 1 and your experiences with the incident here at Unit 2.  
18 We've discussed a little about the importance of the exposure bank that  
19 these people work from and the management of their exposure. That's a  
20 fairly blunt question but at any time do you know of any games being played  
21 with dual counting being done in order to preserve a man his working capa-  
22 bility, if he began to approach his limits were in some matter his records  
23 were adjusted so that they could get more use out of him?

24  
25 896 066



1 METZGER: I don't know of a single case of that happening. In fact I  
2 haven't even heard of it being suggested. I know for a fact that in the  
3 Mechanical Maintenance group which the people I work with, that they tried  
4 to keep a very close tally on their people and when their individuals  
5 getting pretty high, reaching his maximum they would keep him out of the  
6 areas and put other people in there with lower. So maybe that's one of the  
7 things that my supervisor had in mind, you know I was pretty level. Said  
8 to this guy, you know heh, this man is pretty high.

9  
10 CRESWELL: You mentioned earlier you didn't feel like you were being apprised  
11 of the situation as well as you could, do you feel you were the only one  
12 that felt that way or were there fellow workers of yours that felt the same  
13 way?

14  
15 METZGER: I think the fellow workers felt that way too. But we were company.  
16 We watched our mouth, we didn't go up to a manager and said heh we demand  
17 to know, we got to know but the Bargaining Unit people did. They told men,  
18 we want to know, and I was standing right there and heard them talk and  
19 management said yes we're gonna give you some information. Soon they did  
20 but still I said maybe they were telling us all they knew. I don't know.  
21 But the news media knew a hell of lot more than we did if it was right and  
22 in most cases, alright some cases I don't think it was.

23  
24 CRESWELL: Well in retrospect from what you know now, were you getting  
25 adequately informed about the situation at the plant?

1 METZGER: No.

2  
3 CRESWELL: When you mentioned that the Bargaining Unit went to management  
4 and talked to them, who in management did they talk to?

5  
6 METZGER: Jack Herbein.

7  
8 CRESWELL: And the Bargaining Unit representative would of been what indi-  
9 vidual?

10  
11 METZGER: He was a First Class Repairman by the name of Charlie Moyer. And  
12 Jack agreed, he said yes you guys should have more information and I'm  
13 gonna get it to you.

14  
15 CRESWELL: Did the situation improve then?

16  
17 METZGER: Yes, it improved.

18  
19 CRESWELL: Was it sufficient to improvement as far as you're concerned?

20  
21 METZGER: No.

22  
23 CRESWELL: The main vehicle for this information was the Trailer City News?

24  
25 896 068

1 METZGER: Yes.

2  
3 CRESWELL: Nothing else?

4  
5 METZGER: No. Not to my knowledge, not while I was working in the plant.

6  
7 CRESWELL: Do you remember what day that meeting between the Bargaining  
8 Unit and management took place?

9  
10 METZGER: No, no I don't.

11  
12 CRESWELL: Could you roughly estimate how many days into the incident it  
13 was?

14  
15 METZGER: I'd roughly estimate 3 days maybe 4.

16  
17 CRESWELL: At this time, we'd like to ask you if you have any comments that  
18 you would like to make of any nature and that would include comments about  
19 Met Ed, comments about NRC or any other comment that you feel would be  
20 appropriate that might help other individuals or other companies to cope  
21 with a situation like occurred here.

22  
23 METZGER: Well in my knowledge of the nuclear industry, I think Met Ed has  
24 done a good job, I really and sincerely think they have and I think they  
25 had good procedures, I think they tried to follow procedures. I think the

1 NRC has done the utmost in making the plant safe but again I say it's  
2 equipment, machine-ies involved and individuals that man and I don't care  
3 how technical a person is, there can be mistakes. And you just can not  
4 have a mock-up that would, which you could subject to an instant like we  
5 had and get all the answers I just don't. As far as nuclear power I think  
6 we need it and I'm still for it but I'm just not gonna work there anymore.  
7 But I don't think that anybody or any individual is at fault. I certainly  
8 don't think the NRC is. I've had some dealings with them and they been  
9 more than helpful and Met Ed engineers, I think they're a top notch bunch  
10 of people I really do and most of the individuals that work out there I  
11 think they're very dedicated to their jobs, their position. It's just that  
12 I lived under pressure in the Navy for 21 years and I'll be darn if I was  
13 gonna do it if I didn't have to any longer.

14  
15 CRESWELL: I want to ask you a question and you really don't have to answer  
16 it if you don't want to. You mentioned that the particular job that they  
17 asked to do created some anxiety on your part, just to make sure that we  
18 cover all the bases and you don't have to go into the nature of these but  
19 did you have any personal problem beyond the job that would of contributed  
20 to your decisions or your anxiety?

21  
22 METZGER: None at all.

23  
24 CRESWELL: Okay. Thank you.  
25

1 MARSH: Okay if we have no further questions than that then I appreciate  
2 your coming in Mr. Metzger, that this is on your time and we appreciate  
3 your help and with that the time being 4:18 and reading 156 which would be  
4 1156 on the meter I am going to terminate this tape.

5  
6  
7 896 071  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25