UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW

of Donald R. Miller, Auxiliary Operator A

Trailer #203 NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant Middletown, Pennsylvania

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NRC PERSONNEL: Mark Resner Anthony Fasano

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RESNER: This is an interview with Mr. Donald R. Miller. Mr. Miller is employed with the Metropolitan Edison Company at the Three Mile Island Facility, and his job title is Auxiliary Operator A. Present time is 3:15 p.m. eastern daylight time. Today's date is May 21, 1979. This interview is being conducted in trailer 203 which is located just outside of the south gate, Three Mile Island Facility. Individuals representing the NRC, present at this interview are Mr. Anthony Fasano. Mr. Fasano is an inspection specialist, Region I, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Presently speaking, moderating this interview is Marc E. Resner. an investigator with the Office of Inspector and Auditor, Headquarters, of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Prior to taping this interview Mr. Miller was given a two page document, which explains the purpose, the scope, the authority which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has been given to conduct this investion on. In addition to this document I apprised Mr. Miller that he was entitled to a representative of his choice to be present at this interview should he desire one. Also, I apprised Mr. Miller of the fact that in no way is he compelled to talk to us during this interview should he not want to. On the second page of the document, there are three questions which Mr. Miller has answered. I will state these for the record. Question No. 1, Do you understand the above? Mr. Miller has checked "Yes". Is that correct, Mr. Miller?

RESNER: Question 2, Do we have your permission to tape the interview?

Mr. Miller has checked "Yes". Is that correct MR. Miller?

MILLER: Yes.

MILLER: Yes.

RESNER: Question 3, Do you want a copy of the tape? Mr. Miller has checked "Yes". Is that correct?

MILLER: Yes.

RESNER: Alright. We will provide you with a copy of the tape at the conclusion of this interview.

RESNER: Now for the record, and for those who'll be listening to the tape in the future, Mr. Miller I'll ask you to provide us with a brief synopsis of your educational experience and job experience as related to the nuclear industry.

MILLER: Well I've got high school education in which I had a real good background in high school in the Mathematical field and physics field which was what Met Ed had required at the time, when I got the job, when I applied for the job here on the island. And I've worked for Metropol-

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itan Edison from 1970, March of that year, and in 1976, in October, I bid the auxiliary operator, auxiliary operator job here on the island and took a math test and those tests and they deemed me qualified in that respect and then I went through schooling here on the island for a nine-week schooling on the secondary side of the plant, and three weeks of on-the-job training and took a final written exam issued to me by Metropolitian Edison. And past that written exam and a walk-around by the instructors from Metropolitian Edison and then in one years time after that, took another written test on the secondary side of the plant and a walk-around by my shift supervisor and they deemed me qualified as would have been the C operator program. And after that one year, we went to the B operator program which we had six weeks of schooling on the primary systems and took a written test and walk-around from shift supervisors and the test from the training department here on the island from Metropolitian Edison. And then one year after that took another test and walk-around from shift supervisor and became qualified as an auxiliary A with Metropolitian Edison.

RESNER: Okay, what thank you very much. At this time Mr. Fasano has some questions that he would like to ask you.

FASANO: Don, what we would like to do is get information about the event on March 28, 1979. I understand you were on shift work at that time and what I'd like to know from you, if you can, the sequence, if

possible, the time sequence, what you remember happening at that time just prior to the occurrence say maybe an hour or two and then following.

MILLER: Well the whole evening of the accident, from the time I came on shift at 11:00 I was working at the condensate polishing system. We had resins clogged in the resin transfer lines between the vessel and what we call the regeneration tank on the condensate polishing system, where we transfer them over there to regenerate resins. I was working on that the whole evening.

FASANO: The vessel you mean the, of the condensate polishing system?

MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: Now that was just before, that was before 4:00?

MILLER: Up till 4:00, yes. I was there at the time of the trip.

FASANO: Okay, at the, how did you know there was a trip?

MILLER: Well when you work in the basement of the turbine building, there is a lot of pumps, motors and so on running and when the turbine trips everything gets quiet. You know all the pumps stop running and you no longer need your ear protection. So it is definitely quite clear.

FASANO: All pumps stop?

MILLER: All pumps stop in the immediate area. They really, they did here. The feedwater pumps tripped. The condensate pump had tripped but the booster pump did continue to run, but it just got that much quieter.

FASANO: Okay. Did, your memory now, the first pump that you realized had stopped was the ... which, the feedwater?

MILLER: Condensate pump ...

FASANO: That's located probably to your, from facing the board, behind you?

MILLER: It would be behind and to the right.

FASANO: Did you notice any valve change on the condensate polishers?

MILLER: At that, the direct time of the trip, no. Within the first two to three minutes afterwards, yes, I noticed that my air operated valves on the polisher, the inlets and outlet valves, had failed shut.

FASANO: How long after the fact?

MILLER: I'd say within two to three minutes.

FASANO: Two to three minutes?

MILLER: Beause I left where I was. There are electrical overrides on all those valves so they will not fail shut electrically. And when the plant tripped, I had to close, you know, close them outlet valves and the inlet valves to all but two polishers just to get it ready to come back up on the line. And I was opening those electrical overrides and then came back to the panel and that's when I noticed those valves were failed shut.

FASANO: The, okay, so you did notice that they had closed, failed shut?

To your memory you was this prior to the condensate pump stop, or was it prior?

MILLER: I cannot really say. Because at the exact time of the trip I was behind the panel and had no real way of, you know, being able to be there at the exact time of the trip.

FASANO: Were you there alone?

MILLER: No, Fred Scheimann was with me, the shift foreman.

FASANO: Is he your immediate supervisor.

MILLER: Yes.

RESNER: How do you spell Mr. Scheimann for the records? You know how to spell it?

MILLER: I believe it's S-C-H-I-E-M-A-N.

RESNER: Thank you.

FASANO: The work you were doing on it on the condensate polishing system, you said you were unclogging resin? How do you do this?

MILLER: There is what we call fluffing air valve that is located under the vessel that you'll cut in and cut out, cut in and cut out, to try and free the resin up. At the same time you're trying to push resin through with steam and water pressure.

FASANO: So you're using water pressure, like to move, and air to fluff?

MILLER: Yes.

<u>FASANO</u>: Is there any precaution in this evolution? Is there a possibility of getting water into your air lines which could feed back to the other seven tanks?

MILLER: It would not feed back to the other seven tanks. But, now since the accident, I've found out that there are two check valves in that service air line that haven't been seating totally properly, and they have ... water gotten back into the air resevoirs in the past and had tripped the condensate polishing system.

FASANO: The way you understand this system is if you loose air or electrical the valves will either fail open or as is, is that correct?

MILLER: No. They fail shut.

FASANO: If you loose electrical or air?

MILLER: Yes. Now they do have electrical overrides on them, and then we put those into the open position, so if we would loose electrical power that they will stay open on loss of electrical power.

FASANO: That means that loss of air you ...?

MILLER: They fail shut. On a previous interview with GPU, I had stated to them too that, since the accident, I feel now that those valves should be "fail as is" to prevent us from losing flow possibly that way again. Although after talking to some of the control operators and so on they don't think that would have given us sufficient flow through there anyway because, you know we have lost the feed pumps. And we lose the feed pumps on a turbine trip or, and reactor trip

FASANO: The condensate pump ... the condensate pump is the first to go, right?

MILLER: Yes. According to, that is what I can remember because of the check valve on there and when they close they swing pretty hard and you can distinct that noise. And that is also confirmed by the computer printouts.

FASANO: Then let's go back now, you had heard the clang and the condensate pumps, as far as you knew, had stopped? Now what was the next ... did you hear on the announcer? How did you know there was a turbine trip and a ...?

MILLER: Like I said I knew the turbine tripped because you know the noise levels in the plant changed. But within 15 seconds from the time I noticed it there was an announcement over the page that we had a turbine trip and at the same time they said there was also a reactor trip.

FASANO: Okay. Now what do you do now that you have confirmation that the ... the having turbine trip and the reactor trip? What do you do with your system that you are in charge of? Do you ...?

MILLER: Well working with the condensate polishing system, I had explained to you about the electrical override on the outlet valves. So I went down along _____ the vessels themselves, on their control panels, and physically put those back in the auto position. That gave me control to go to the panel board and close the valves on all but two of the polishing units.

FASANO: Okay. But you said all valves had gone closed did you ... does that mean that you, on two of the units, you opened and put them in their proper open, open position, or ...?

MILLER: I tried to but they would not open directly. While I was there at that present time they hadn't opened it. Later on during the evening and I'm not sure exactly what time, but they had gone back to the open position.

FASANO: So when you left at that time you really weren't lined up to use the polishers?

MILLER: That's true. Yes.

FASANO: Okay. Did you check the status of your breaker? Where is your breaker located for the condensate pump? Did you check it?

MILLER: That is located on the 305 level of the turbine building, which would have been one level higher than what I was.

FASANO: On your way up did you check it?

MILLER: No I did not. On my way to the control room I did not check the breaker.

FASANO: Who would normally check the reason for say a condensate pump failing?

MILLER: The control room operator would usually have one of the auxiliary operators check that. And I know we did check it later in the evening. I'm not positive but I believe that pump started back up for them. The control room operator, I believe, was able to start that pump back up again right away but I cannot swear to that statement.

FASANO: Someone did check the breaker board though?

MILLER: We had checked it later in the evening. I would guess, or try and estimate the time

FASANO: This would be on a motor control center?

MILLER: Yes the motor control center would have been on either 2-3 or 2-4. It was, I believe it was somewhere in the neighborhood of 5:00 that we checked that breaker.

FASANO: As an auxiliary operator, do you know what causes a condensate pump to trip? Do you have, is that within your realm of knowledge?

MILLER: Not totally, as far as I must know but I have some pretty decent ideas as far as you know just knowing the electrical systems in going over the things, that they will trip on over current. There is, I've looked, looked into it since the accident for a little bit more information on it. And there were no trips on say if you deadheaded the pump

FASANO: If you deadheaded the pump?

MILLER: In other words if you pump it against closed valves as we had in the polishing systems, the pumps would continue to run even though there is nowhere to pump the water.

FASANO: You say an over-current exists?

MILLER: Yes, there is one I know of for sure. And

FASANO: And if you have over-current what would expect to see if you went to the motor control center?

MILLER: I believe there is what they call a red flag that falls on a relay there and you would just have to manually reset it by taking your finger and just pushing up a small lever there to reset those red flags.

FASANO: If you had gone there you'd have known?

MILLER: We had gone there later in the evening but there were no flags.

FASANO: No flags? So it was completely wired and ready to go?

MILLER: Yes.

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FASANO: The circuit was there?

MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: I asked you that question mainly because I am interested in finding out what caused the condensate pumps to trip out. The logic doesn't seem to lend itself to ... you know, the cause is just not quite evident.

MILLER: ah certainly agree with you and have gone over electrical prints which I'm not really not that schooled on reading them. But I have gone over them with engineering people that are working on the same problem. And I believe now that pump motor has been I know it's been pulled out, if it's been sent somewhere check or if it's around here to be checked out and to find out what actually happened.

FASANO: You said the condensate pumps ... the booster pumps, I guess they're maybe ... what behind you?

MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: And you say they were running ... they continued to run?

MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: Were they still running when you left the area?

MILLER: Yes, they were.

FASANO: Did anything unusual happen as you were going ... anything unusual that normally doesn't occur, anything different?

MILLER: Not at the direct time I left then. But I went to the control room and they wanted me to go back down and double check and make sure I had everything lined up that I could. Even though the valves were failed shut I had the rest of it all lined up and squared away and when I was headed back up to the control room the second time, which would have been about approximately about 15 minutes after the accident, or after the turbine trip, that I noticed suction line on the A booster pump blew to approximately 2-1/2 to 3 feet. It was like a water hammer whenever it blew pretty good, and then the suction valve there was a leak there in the suction valve.

FASANO: In the valve like, in the packing?

MILLER: Well, I really tell that because the way it's insulated, but I know there was leak there. I called the control room and started closing

the valve and they sent ah Terry Daugherty and Dale Laudermilch down to help me get that valve shut.

<u>FASANO:</u> Was it a gross leak or just sort of you know ... a few gallons coming out, or ... quarts?

MILLER: It would have been in the gallons, but it wasn't really ...

FASANO: Gushing?

MILLER: Gushing, yes.

FASANO: When you isolated it, did it stop?

MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: So you thought there was a water hammer, now that was on the A pump?

MILLER: Yes, on the A pump. I believe I stated that wrong there as far as the I saw that pipe move when I went up the first time and when I came back down is when I discovered the leak.

FASANO: Okay, was it the same nips?

MILLER: Yeah, same pipe.

FASANO: Okay, so the, when you were on your way up the first time ...

MILLER: Is when I saw the pipe move.

FASANO: You saw a movment in the pipe. When you came back that pipe which now goes to, the valve would be ... in line with this pipe, you saw it leaking?

MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: Did you ah mention that pipe movement to anyone else?

MILLER: I believe I had mentioned it to the shift supervisor when I first went up stairs, yes.

FASANO: Apparently operations had problems in getting the condensate water to flow. Were you involved in getting condensate water reestablished?

MILLER: When you say condensate flow reestablished, are you ... for normal ...?

FASANO: Yes.

MILLER: Normal condensate system, the problem we were having with getting normal flow started there would have been the condensate polishing vessel outlet valves being failed shut?

FASANO: Yes. Well ...

MILLER: You mean the emergency feedwater system problem we were had?

<u>FASANO:</u> No, not, I ... no I was thinking of your involvement in the, the condensate ... you went back down?

MILLER: Yes. I went back down ... back down to check to make sure we had everything all right there and I really don't know what the control room operator was looking for at the time, but I had everything lined up that we could except that those valves were failed shut.

FASANO: The two tanks you had ... you told me you still couldn't get the valves open so they really couldn't get water through the normal ...

MILLER: Normal flow path was blocked.

FASANO: Was blocked, yes Oh the other pumps ... the other condensate booster pumps ... did they continue to run? You had 2A that failed or had stopped?

MILLER: Yes. The others the others were running.

FASANO: They were still running?

MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: But the main feed had tripped out?

MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: Did you ... were you involved in setting up the bypass around the polishers?

MILLER: Yes. Later, sometime during the course of the ... of that morning Terry Daugherty and myself opened that condensate bypass valve, which for some reason would not open electrically.

FASANO: So what did you do, open it manually?

MILLER: We opened it manually, and when we first crawled up to do the job the handle was missing, but it was laying right there on top of the ventilation duct, that is directly below the valve. So it was, you know, we just had to put it on get it open.

FASANO: Is this unusual ... I mean to (1) have the handle off, and (2) have to unseat this by manual?

MILLER: Unseating them manually is pretty much normal. You know you usually have to break them off the seat because you have a ... the difference in water pressure across the valve.

FASANO: You don't have an equalizer across there?

MILLER: No.

<u>FASANO:</u> Alright go back to when you were clearing the ... doing your clearing operation, trying to unclog the resin, do you feel that this was possibly the cause of getting the air into your ... water into your air line?

MILLER: I do now, yes.

RESNER: What did you think it was at the time? You said you think it is now.

MILLER: At the time I didn't know, until, you know talking to a few more people, other people who have worked with this system and I found out talking to the other people that that check valve in that line do leak and it has happened before. And that with fluffing the air line open and then closed and demin water lined up to it that they have gotten air back into the system before.

<u>FASANO:</u> This problem is something that you got, right when you came in on the 7th ... at 11:00 that ... on the 27th I mean it was there at the time you arrived ?

MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: The prior shift? When you have a problem like this, do aux operators have to solve it themselves and try to get this unclogged or can you get maintenance assistance or how is that done?

MILLER: This is the first time I've been down there where the resins were clogged as hard as they really were. Normally through shooting air and running the demin water pumps we can clear them up. Now this is the longest I've been involved with any of them being clogged, but it's not

the first time, but we've never had to go to maintenance or anything else in the past, but we've always managed, been able to break them free, that way.

FASANO: In putting your demin pressure on the ... to do the unclogging ... what is this, putting a tube in or ...?

MILLER: No, there is a, there is, normal demin water is used for transferring resins normally, and all you have to is open the valve on the panel to allow demin water to get into the vessel.

<u>FASANO:</u> Were you doing anything differently this time? Because now you've been ... it's been plugging could you put another source of water to increase your pressure ...

MILLER: Well, I had started the second demin water pump, which I, we've used pretty much all the time when we are transferring resins. We'd get put the two of them on because they'll seem to move a lot better for you. The only thing it was doing different was the way it was operating with the air, trying to break them free.

FASANO: When you when you leave an area ... oh when you leave an area after an event like this, where you have a turbine trip, and you do have to do things with the condensate systems, do you have a check sheet

where you go through and see that all of the things that have to be done are checked off and sort of go through it as a step-wise sequence of checking your panel, checking the pumps, checking the valves, and I understand, as far as you are concerned, this was a ... pretty much at that point, a normal turbine trip and reactor trip. So did you?

MILLER: We don't. We do not have a checklist as such that you described there. Usually you just take care of the piece of equipment or whatever you're working on at the time, get that squared away to the way it normally is for being shutdown conditions, or in this case with the polisher, knowing I have to have two vessels ready to go when we come back up that's the way I was attempting to line it up.

FASANO: Yes, and then ...

MILLER: And then we just go to the control room and whatever else the control room operators or shift foreman that are up there want done, then we go out on those jobs.

<u>FASANO:</u> Do you have a procedure that really that describes the things you do at that time and at that station?

MILLER: As per trip? FASANO: Yes. MILLER: For normal operating, yes there's a procedure there. FASANO: How about for a trip? MILLER: But for a trip there is no procedure right there at the panel. FASANO: Then you assume everything happens automatically and you take so many off line and you line up two resin beds for the return, is that correct? MILLER: Yes. FASANO: And that's the extent of ah your procedure? MILLER: For that condensate polishing panel, yes. FASANO: No checks on the pumps? The condensate pumps? 895 241

MILLER: No.

FASANO: What did you do after you ... how long did you stay? Did you continue to work in that area or did you report back up to the ... once you got bypass in ... did you stay in the control room for future responsibilities or for any specific job?

MILLER: Well, after we got that valve shut on the condensate booster pump, we went back up to the control room and I was up there around about 15 or 20 minutes and the shift supervisor, Bill Zewe, asked me to go down on the primary side and check what the pressurizer level was down there on some on two other, on another gauge. It's down in makeup valve alley, which is in the basement of the fuel handling building actually. And I checked that level, called them back with it was reading down there which was the 300 inches and I came back up to the control room. After we went down and well I didn't get back up to the control room I saw Terry Daugherty and he was headed for the condensate breaker so I went through that area with him. And that's why we didn't see anything tripped or anything, then we went back up then we went back up to the control room and I believe that's about the time during the morning that we were sent down to open CLD 12 which is the bypass around the polisher.

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FASANO: The when you ... is this normal to have you down and check the pressurizer level? This was unusual?

MILLER: This was unusual, yes.

FASANO: And did that match pretty much what was up in the control room? 300 inches?

MILLER: I don't really know if it did or not. I know I told him what I was seeing down there and he said okay, and I guess they went back to work.

FASANO: This is by telephone?

MILLER: Yes, page system.

FASANO: Page system. Who did you talk to?

MILLER: Bill Zewe.

FASANO: Alright, once you got the what was that the CLD 12?

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MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: That's your bypass valve?

MILLER: That's the bypass valve around the polisher.

FASANO: Alright, once you had completed that and finished working with the verification of the pressurizer level, what else did you do during that period? You're getting close to your relief, I imagine, at this time?

MILLER: Yes. Well one other job I had done during the night and I'm not even sure what time, and the only reason and I had totally forgotten it on any other interview or anybody else I'd talked to was I went down in the auxiliary building to open MUV 127 which was for emergency boration, and somehow another I was reading a sequence of events report and read that in there that it was done and that's when I finally realized I was involved with and worked on that one sometime during the morning also. And I imagine then it was up to around the time that we ... they announced the general emergency over the page system again.

FASANO: By emergency borate does the auxiliary operator have to go down and open MUV 127?

MILLER: The 127 is the one valve that the auxiliary operator has to open.

FASANO: Is that normal I mean do you always have to do this?

MILLER: Always emergency borate? No.

FASANO: Why in this case did you need someone to go down there, to open it?

MILLER: I really don't know. What was going on in the control room or with the reactor or anything itself.

FASANO: Alright, so you went to the aux building, auxiliary building, and you opened the 127, you reported back to the control room?

MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: About what time was this?

MILLER: I guess somewhere in the neighborhood of 5:30., is what I'm thinking. I'm not positive though on that.

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FASANO: This is a.m.?

MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: 5:00 a.m. Okay. Alright then did you get any other further assignments?

MILLER: At that time no then we had gone out to start you know to what we call AO central where the auxiliary operator meet where we give our turnovers and everything. And we were in the process of just starting out when assigned, when they announced the general emergency.

FASANO: About what time was this?

MILLER: Approximately 10 till 7.

FASANO: This was announced on the P.A.?

MILLER: Yes. And then we all went in the control room to ES station and then it was just little odd jobs here and there. Ah the only thing that I had got tem involved with was a feedwater pump for some reason or another the jack didn't seem to work that automatically turns the shaft over when the pump shut down, and we had to do it manually. So we were doing it about every every 10 minutes you would turn it half a turn.

FASANO: This is the main feedwater pump? 1B?

MILLER: I'm not sure which one it was, nonmenclature-wise.

FASANO: So this would be close to where your normal station is in terms of the turbine building, correct?

MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: Did okay, did anyone, did you wear any, did you need any clothing or any special clothing or was the area checked for any ... at this time? This was after 7 now. You had been called and before you went into different areas were you checked, or was the area checked in any way for any kind of radiation at this time?

MILLER: I don't believe the turbine building was. The auxiliary building was totally isolated. Evacuated and isolated, earlier. That would have been right before the general emergency was declared that they evacuated the auxiliary building.

FASANO: Would you have any indication that there may be some contamination in the aux and in the turbine building?

MILLER: I didn't know at the time. There is there is a alarm down there off the vacuum, off the vacuum pump system. A radiation monitor down there, but there was no alarm sounding off of that, as long as I was down there during the course of the morning.

FASANO: This was what, about what time?

MILLER: I would say it was along about 10:00 or 10:30 I guess I left that area down there.

FASANO: So 10:00 or 10:30 there was no indication of any kind of contamination in that area? Is that correct?

MILLER: No. That's correct.

FASANO: Alright, so you helped manually turn the turning gear on the feed pump?

MILLER: Yes.

FASANO: What then when you finished that you go back to the control room or back to your area?

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MILLER: When we had gotten relieved there by the incoming shift, which was around 10:00, 10:30 I imagine, and then we were told to go in the auditorium in Unit 1 because of the general emergency and then we were gonna be, you know be able to go home.

FASANO: This was about 10:00 or so?

MILLER: Yes this was between 10:30 and 11:00 that we went to the auditorium. From the auditorium they sent us up to the Unit 1 control room and then we were up there maybe 10 or 15 minutes and then we were released to go home. Then we went down and we were they had individual friskers and HP people checking us for any radiation or contamination that we might have had in any of our clothing or anything before we were okayed to leave the island. Then when we left the island we went to the 500 KV substation, across the river, and then over there they thoroughly checked the cars and checked us all again at a lower a considerably lower background reading.

FASANO: They you mean?

MILLER: HP Department personnel

FASANO: So they, before you left, they actually checked, you and your clothing. How were you, were you clean, or?

MILLER: Yes, I was what we considered clean or there was no contamination of anything I had on.

FASANO: And your car?

MILLER: Same, everything was clean.

FASANO: So, about ten thirty, eleven o'clock you then were free to go home?

MILLER: Well we left the, like I said we left the island around eleven o'clock until we got to the 500 substation and everybody, you know, you stood in line and they checked everybody again, had a lot lower background over there. The background was extremely high here on the island. And we went over to the substation where they checked the cars and that was approximately 1:30 until we finally left over there.

FASANO: You had turned in your TLD at that time?

MILLER: No, I had my TLD with me. My TLD went home with me that day.

FASANO: Is that normal?

MILLER: It's not really abnormal for an operator to carry it with him because under normal situations they must be in the rack at midnight on the last night of the month is when they're changed and read, but then through the incident there for the first month I imagine, they were reading them every day. That we'd turn them in, well they had different locations when we came to work the next night we went to the observation center and they had a, they were in the observation center one night, and then there was a trailer at the south gate and then there was, they set up this TLD area down here now.

FASANO: When you were going back to the control room did you notice people wearing masks during that time up to ten or eleven, about ten o'clock or so?

MILLER: No.

FASANO: They didn't have any masks on at all at that time?

MILLER: No. First I heard of the respirators is when we came back to work that evening.

FASANO: Well Don, do, now we'd like you to just state some of the things, if you have any opinions on how things can be made better, if we can learn from what we, from this experience. Do you have any sugges-

tions or any ideas? You can take this as an opportunity to let it be known and it will be given attention. I'm sure.

MIL!ER: Well the thing that I've told once to the foreman and I've stated it in all the other interviews that I would like to see those condensate polisher valve, outlet valves, be fail-as-is. That way if you had them closed and you lost electric, or air, they'd stay closed and if they were opened they'd stay open. And I imagine there ought to be something done to that bypass valve around the polisher. That, maybe an equalizer or something, you had mentioned, during the interview, that could equalize the pressure across there and that would work. Those were the two things there. Going back though, I still don't know everything about the accident and I guess none of us do, that's why we're still going through these interviews. But I'de like to really have the chance to go through that and really see exactly what happened all the way down the line and try and find out why.

FASANO: I have nothing more.

<u>RESNER</u>: Okay gentlemen, this concludes the interview with Mr. Donald Miller. The time now is 3:55 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time. On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission we'd like to thank you for taking your time Don and coming over here. That's it.