

Commonwealth Edison One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois Address Reply to Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690

August 8, 1979

Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Operating Reactors - Branch 1 Division of Operating Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

> Subject: Zion Station Units 1 and 2 Additional Information on Steam Generator Water Hammer Evaluations NRC Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304

Reference (a): June 20, 1979 letter from Cordell Reed to A. Schwencer

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

Per Reference (a), Commonwealth Edison Company indicated that it would evaluate the advisability of raising the setpoint for steam generator water level actuation in order to reduce the likelihood of steam generator water hammers. This evaluation has been completed with the conclusion that no setpoint changed is warranted. The basis for this conclusion follows.

Commonwealth Edison's experience at Zion Station indicates that none of the thirteen water hammer incidents experienced over nearly six years of plant operation would have been prevented with the auxiliary feedwater initiation setpoint above the top of the feedwater ring. This is because the auxiliary feedwater flow rate is not sufficient to maintain the feedring filled with water after a reactor trip, primarily due to the rapid drainage that occurs through the existing discharge holes on the bottom of each sparger and to a lesser extent the drainage that occurs through the gap between the thermal sleeve and feedwater nozzle. However, with the installation of J-tubes these drainage holes are plugged, thus ensuring that auxiliary feedwater flow will maintain the feedring filled with water. Commonwealth Edison's experience does indicate that most, if not all, the water hammer incidents at Zion Station would not have occurred if J-tupes had been 5 1/1 installed. 342

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Although, to date, changes in the actuation setpoint would not have precluded any of the water hammer incidents at Zion Station, Commonwealth Edison's evaluation did indicate that raising the actuation setpoint after installation of J-tubes on all steam generators could possibly prevent future water hammer incidents in the following two situations:

- Hot standby or low power operation in which, with automatic auxiliary feedwater flow secured, operator inattention to steam generator level results in the level dropping below the top of the feedring; and
- Reactor trips from power ranges between 15 and 27% power may result in partial uncovery of the feedring, but the water level does not fall sufficiently to automatically actuate feedwater flow.

At Zion Station, both of these situations are very low probability cases. For instance, during low power operation an operator is normally assigned full time to monitor steam generator level control, thus ensuring that the feedring remains full of water. With regard to reactor trips from power ranges between 15 and 27% power, Zion Station is normally base loaded at full-rated power and encounters the subject range only for brief periods several times a year during reactor startups to full power. In addition, Zion operating procedures require manual initiation of auxiliary feedwater flow after any reactor trip, thus ensuring that the feedring remains full of water.

For these reasons, Commonwealth Edison has concluded that raising the actuation setpoint for automatic auxiliary feedwater flow after J-tube installation has been completed is not warranted. In addition, Commonwealth Edison's evaluation also indicated that the above situations are applicable to all Model 51 Steam Generators and hence, any changes to actuation setpoints should be approached on a generic basis.

Per recent discussions with the NRC Staff, additional information concerning Zion Station water hammer history was requested. The attached Tables 1 and 2 provide the water hammer history of Zion Units 1 and 2, respectively. As Table 1 indicates,

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Zion Unit 1 has had five water hammers in the last eight months, primarily on the 1C Steam Generator. As a result, during the Fall 1979 refueling outage J-tubes will be installed on this steam generator. J-tubes were installed on the 2C Steam Generator of Zion Unit 2 in March 1978. The remaining steam generators will be modified as outlined in Reference (a) which also includes a discussion as to why an accelerated schedule for J-tube installation is not necessary. Note that since the installation of J-tubes on 2C Steam Generator, there have been no water hammers on Unit 2.

Please address any additional questions that you might have to this office.

Very truly yours,

Cordell Reed Assistant Vice-President

attachments

TABLE 1

210N UNIT 1 MAYER HAMMER HISTORY

Date	LER No. (50-295/)	Rx Trip/S.I. (Time)	Plant Condition	Aux. Fw. Flow (GPF)	S.G. Affected	FW Ring	Damage	Comments
6/20/76	76-S-1	1427/1427	20%	N.A.	lD	Covered	None	Aux. FW Off
9/26/76	N.A.	N.A./1801	TO CSD	N.A.	10	Uncovered	None	Aux. FW Off
7/8/77	77-91	0033/0038	HSD	300	lC	Uncovered	None	Admin. Change to 100-105 GPM, Max, Aux. FW Per Pump
9/14/78	78-95	0817/0819	HSD	Within EOP-1 Limits	lD	Uncovered	None	-
12/5/78	78-130	N.A./0150	HSD	N.A.	lc	N.A.	None [Cooling
12/5/78	⁰⁰ 78-130	N.A./0428	HSD	N.A.	lC	N.A.	None 2	Cooling 1 LCV-FW520 \$\vec{v}\$ Condensate
3/2/79	79-12	0827/0827	N.A.	N.A.	10	Uncovered	1 MOV - FW0017*	Have Tape of Water Hammer
3/16/79	4- 79-19مى	0431/0524	HSD	150- → 200 ->`100	lA or 1C	Uncovered	1 MOV - FW0017**	Have Tape of Water Hammer
6/8/79	79-44	0629/0645	HSD	150->200	10	Uncovered	None	Have Tape of Water Hammer
N.A N	ot Applicabl	Le						

- Cracked printed circuit board

** - Equipment found inoperable, not due to Water Hammer

TABLE 2

ZION UNIT 2 WATER HAMMER HISTORY

	Date	LER NO. (50-304/)	Rx Trip/S.I. (Time)	Plant Condition	Aux. FW Flow (GPM)	S.G. Affected	FW Ring	Damage	Comments
1	12/30/74	3/7/75 letter to J.G. Kepple	1357/1424 er	HSD	N.A.	Suspected Water Hammer	Uncovered	None	First Docu- mented Water Hammer/S.I.
5	5/25/76	76-S-1	1053/1129	HSD	100	2C	Uncovered	None	High Ap on B&D Loops
(5/20/76	76-S-3	0103/0205	HSD	N.A.	2C	Uncovered	None	-
	7/10/77	77-S-3	1121/1149	H3D	N.A.	2C	Uncovered	MOVs FW0016, 17, 13**	Occurred when main FW by- pass opened

N.A. - Not Applicable

** - Equipment found inoperable, not due to Water Hammer