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P.O. BOX 270 HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06101 (203) 666-6911

August 9, 1979 MP-1-1277

Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director, Region I Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference: Provisional License DPR-21 Docket No. 50-245 Reportable Occurrence R0-79-20/3L

Dear Mr. Grier:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence RO-79-20/3L required to be submitted within 30 days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

anello

J. F. Opeka Station Superintendent Millstone Nuclear Power Station

JFO/RHY:11m

Attachment: (LER R0-79-20/3L)

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control, (30)

Washington, D.C. (3)

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ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-20/3L NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21 DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

An instrument that initiates a primary containment was found to trip outside the allowable band established in the Technical Specifications.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to the occurrence, the unit was operating at 100 percent steady state power.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On July 11, 1979, at 1540 hours, while performing a routine surveillance (Reactor Vessel Low-Low Level Isolation Functional and Calibration), it was discovered that one of four level switches was tripping outside the corresponding allowable Technical Specification band. This Technical Specification band is 95.19 (+0-2.8) inches which corresponds to 79 (+4-0) inches of water above the active fuel. The setpoint of the subject switch (LIS-263-57B) was 95.5 inches.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The failure of the subject reactor low-low water level switch to trip within the allowable band was attributed to setpoint drift.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

These reactor vessel level switches are designed to cause a Group 1 isolation of selected primary containment isolation valves if a reactor vessel low-low water level exists. The setpoint of the switches corresponds to a Technical Specification limit of 79 (+4-0) inches above the active fuel. The four level switches are arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice logic system and failure of the switch in question to trip at the desired setpoint did not impair the system's ability to perform its intended function. The setpoints of the remaining switches were within the desired range and would have initiated the required action.

The switch that failed to operate at the desired setpoint is manufactured by the Yarway Corporation, Model Number 4418C, with a range of 100 inches.

CORRECTIVE ACTICN

All of the switches in this logic system were checked to ensure the correct setpoints. The switch which was found to have the incorrect setpoint and satisfactorily tested.

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