UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

April 21, 1981

NOTE TO: Gus Lainas

FROM: Ashok Thadani

SUBJECT: ERRATA TO NOTE OF APRIL 21, 1981

Enclosed is a modified Table 1 of the subject note. Further consideration of the B&W (two-bus design) with a failure of a single bus has led us to revise downward the HEP. The original value of HEP only considered terminating the cause of the overcooling problem; however, the operator could still control primary system pressure. This modification does not alter the thrust of the original note.

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Enclosure:
Modified Table 1

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	Initiation Frequency	Operator HEP	Sequence Probabilities
LOCA (>2")	3×10^{-4}/RY	3×10^{-2}/D	10^{-5}/RY
Large steam/feedwater line break	10^{-4}/RY	3×10^{-2}/D	3×10^{-6}/RY
Small steam/feedwater line break	$10^{-2} - 10^{-3}$/RY	3×10^{-2}/D	$3 \times 10^{-5} - 3 \times 10^{-4}$/RY
Severe Overcooling transient caused by loss of control/instrument power			
B&W (one-bus design)	3×10^{-2}/RY	0.6/D	2×10^{-2}/RY
B&W (two-bus design)	3×10^{-2}/RY	$3 \times 10^{-4} - 3 \times 10^{-5}$/D	$10^{-5} - 10^{-6}$/RY
W & CE (three-bus design)	10^{-3}/RY	0.6/D	6×10^{-4}/RY

Expected to have lower probability of severe overcooling transients because of design differences compared to B&W.

TABLE 1.--SEQUENCE PROBABILITIES

(Revision 1)