

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JULY 2 0 1979

Docket No. 50-133

Mr. John C. Morrissey
Vice President and General Counsel
Pacific Gas and Electric Company
77 Beale Street
San Francisco, California 94106

Dear Mr. Morrissey:

RE: HUMBOLDT BAY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

We are reviewing your submittal dated May 1, 1979 in response to IE Bulletin 79-08. We have determined that the additional information requested in the enclosure is necessary in order to complete cur safety evaluation.

We request that responses to the items in the enclosure be forwarded to this office within two weeks of your receipt of the enclosure, which was previously transmitted to you by telecopy. Please contact William F. Kane at (301) 492-7745 if you require additional discussions or clarification regarding the information requested.

Sincerely.

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief

Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure: Request for Additional Information

cc w/enclosure: See next page

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Mr. John C. Morrissey Pacific Gas & Electric Company

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Philip A. Crane, Jr. 31st Floor Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beaie Street San Francisco, California 94106

Mr. James Hanchett Public Information Officer Region V - IE U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1990 N. California Boulevard Wainut Creek, California 94596

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Dr. Perry Aminoto Department of Conservation Division of Mines & Geology 1416 9th STreet, Room 1341 Sacramento, California 95814

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Enclosure

# HUMBOLDT BAY

# REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

# IEB 79-08

#### Item No. 2

1. Your response is incomplete in that it does not indicate that you have reviewed all applicable procedures to assure that containment isolation initiation is in conformance with Item No. 2 of IEB 79-08. Verify that you have reviewed all applicable procedures and confirm that containment isolation of all lines (including those designed to transfer radioactive liquids and gases) is initiated on all automatic initiations of safety injection.

- State whether you have prepared and implemented procedures required for manual isolation of closed cooling water lines to the drywell air coolers.
- Provide a schedule for any action on Item No. 2 that has not yet been completed.

# Item No. 4

- Your response is incomplete. Describe all uses and types of vessel level indication for both automatic and manual initiation of safety systems.
- Describe other instrumentation which the operator might have to determine changes in reactor coolant inventory, e.g., radioactivity levels, containment high temperature, containment sump pump operation, etc.

### Item No. 5

 Provide a schedule for any actions on item 5 that have not yet been completed.

# Item No. 6

- 1. It is not clear from your response that safety-related valve positioning requirements werd reviewed to ensure proper operation of engineered safety features. Please supplement your response to provide a commitment to conduct this review and a schedule for completion.
- Please augment your response to indicate the extent to which position and locking device checks are performed for locked safety system valves.
- 3. Your response did not clearly indicate that all accessible safety-related valves had been inspected to verify proper position. Nor was a schedule for performing the position verification for all safety-related valves provided. Please supplement your response to provide this information.

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#### Item No. 7

- Provide a complete list of systems designed to transfer radioactive gases or liquids outside of containment and indicate whether these systems are isolated by the containment isolation signal.
- Provide assurance that resetting of engineered safety features instrumentation will not result in inadvertent transfer of radioactive gases and liquids outside of containment.
- Discuss the basis upon which continued operability is assured of the features designed to prevent inadvertent transfer of radioactive gases and liquids outside of containment.
- 4. Provide a schedule for completion of the study regarding an alternate vent path for the emergency condenser and for implementation of any system modifications resulting from that study. Confirm that these actions will comply with the requirements of Item No. 7 of IEB 79-08.

### Item No. 8

- 1. We understand from your response that operability is verified for redundant safety-related systems prior to removal of any safety-related system from service. Since you may be relying on prior operability verification within the current technical specification surveillance interval, operability should be further verified by at least a visual check of the system status to the extent practicable, prior to removing the redundant equipment from service. Please supplement your response to provide a commitment that you will revise your maintenance and test procedures to adopt this position.
- It is not clear from your response that all involved reactor operational personnel in the oncoming shift are explicitly notified about the status of systems removed from or returned to service. Please indicate how this information is transferred at shift turnover.

#### Item No. 9

 Provide assurance that your procedures stipulate NRC notification any time the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition of operation. In addition, provide the schedule for completion of these procedural revisions.

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