



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JULY 20 1979

TERA

Docket Nos. 50-254
and 50-265

Mr. J. A. Jones
Executive Vice President
Carolina Power & Light Company
336 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Dear Mr. Jones:

RE: BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2

We are reviewing your submittal dated April 23, 1979 in response to IE Bulletin 79-08. We have determined that the additional information requested in the enclosure is necessary in order to complete our safety evaluation.

We request that responses to the items in the enclosure be forwarded to this office within two weeks of your receipt of the enclosure, which was previously transmitted to you by telecopy. Please contact William F. Kane at (301) 492-7745 if you require additional discussions or clarification regarding the information requested.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "T. Ippolito".

Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:
Request for Additional
Information

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

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550
908080314

JULY 20 1979

cc: Richard E. Jones, Esquire
Carolina Power & Light Company
336 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

George F. Trowbridge, Esquire
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
1800 M Street, NW
Washington, D. C. 20036

John J. Burney, Jr., Esquire
Burney, Burney, Sperry & Barefoot
110 North Fifth Avenue
Wilmington, North Carolina 28401

Southport - Brunswick County Library
109 W. Moore Street
Southport, North Carolina 28461

BRUNSWICK 1 & 2

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

IEB 79-08

Item No. 1

1. Confirm that the review of item 1 of IEB 79-08 by all licensed operators, plant management and supervisors with operational responsibilities has been documented in your plant records.

Item No. 2

1. Your response indicates that you reviewed the design initiation for containment isolation of all valves whereas the Bulletin refers to all lines. Confirm that your review considered isolation of all lines penetrating containment.
2. In your response you state that you reviewed the containment isolation design but not related procedures. Confirm that your review included all procedures related to the initiation of containment isolation.
3. Confirm that valve CAC V-16 and CAC V-17 are open only when a negative pressure exists inside containment. If such is not the case, provide for closure of these valves, either manually or automatically upon all automatic initiations of safety injection.
4. Provide a schedule for any actions on Item No. 2 of ICB 79-08 that have not yet been completed.

Item No. 6

1. It is not clear from your response that positive administrative controls have been implemented to assure that systems requiring retest are in fact retested prior to the need for their operability. Please clarify your response to provide assurance that safety related valves are returned to their correct positions following necessary manipulations.
2. Your response did not clearly indicate that all accessible safety-related valves had been inspected to verify proper position. Nor was a schedule for performing the position verification for all safety-related valves provided. Please supplement your response to provide this information.

Item No. 7

1. Your response is not explicit with regard to the effect of reset on valves in the Containment Atmospheric Control (CAC) system. Provide assurance that inadvertent transfer of radioactive gases will not occur through the CAC System on resetting of engineered safety features instrumentation.

Item No. 8

1. We understand from your response that operability is verified for redundant safety related systems prior to removal of any safety related system from service. Since you may be relying on prior operability verification within the current technical specification surveillance interval, operability should be further verified by at least a visual check of the system status to the extent practicable, prior to removing the redundant equipment from service. Please supplement your response to provide a commitment that you will revise your maintenance and test procedures to adopt this position.
2. It is not clear from your response that all involved reactor operational personnel in the oncoming shift are explicitly notified about the status of systems removed from or returned to service. Please indicate how this information is transferred at shift turnover.

Item No 9

1. Technical Specifications and other documents may not include all relevant notification criteria required by item 9 of IEB 79-06. We note that, at this time, adequate guidance cannot be given on what constitutes an event requiring one hour notification. We will require a general statement concerning reactor operation in an uncontrolled or unexpected condition until sufficient experience is accumulated to warrant issuance of a specific set of notification criteria. Further, you must commit to notifying the NRC within one hour and to the establishment of an open continuous communication channel.