

IERA



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JULY 20 1979

Docket No. 50-409

Mr. Frank Linder
General Manager
Dainiand Power Cooperative
2015 East Avenue South
La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601

Dear Mr. Linder:

RE: LA CROSSE

We are reviewing your submittals dated April 27, May 2, May 23, and May 29, 1979, in response to IE Bulletin 79-08. We have determined that the additional information requested in the enclosure is necessary in order to complete our safety evaluation.

We request that responses to the items in the enclosure be forwarded to this office within two weeks of your receipt of the enclosure, which was previously transmitted to you by telecopy. Please contact William F. Kane at (301) 492-7745 if you require additional discussions or clarification regarding the information requested.

Sincerely,
Dennis L. Ziemann
Dennis Ziemann, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:
Request for Additional
Information

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

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Mr. Frank Linder

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cc

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P. O. Box 1583
La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601

La Crosse Public Library
800 Main Street
La Crosse, Wisconsin 54601

500 302

LACROSSE

REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

IEB 79-08

Item No. 2

1. Verify that initiation of containment isolation of the following lines or systems (reported in your response to Item 7) occurs simultaneous with or prior to all initiations of safety injection:

- Retention Tank Pump Discharge Line
- Decay Heat Blowdown Lines
- Main Steam System
- Reactor Building Ventilation System

Provide justification for not isolating these lines or prepare and implement the necessary changes to isolate these lines as required by the Bulletin.

2. Prepare and implement all necessary procedural and design changes required to conform to Item No. 2 of IEB 79-08 and provide the schedule for completion of these actions.

Item No. 4

1. Clarify your response to indicate whether operators have been instructed to utilize other available information to initiate safety systems. Provide your schedule for completion of this action.

Item No. 5

1. Your response to item 5a and 5b does not address training instructions. Amend your response to address this matter.
2. Your response to item 5a is incomplete. Your review of operating procedures and training instructions should assure that operators are directed not to override automatic actions of engineered safety features (e.g., vessel integrity). Amend your response to clarify this point.

3. It is not clear from your response whether your review of operating procedures and training instructions with respect to the actions directed by item 5b included additional information and instructions to operators to not rely upon vessel level indication alone for manual actions but to also examine other plant parameter indications in evaluating plant conditions. Amend your response to clarify this point.
4. Provide a schedule for any actions on item 5 that have not yet been completed.

Item No. 6

1. Your response did not clearly indicate that all accessible safety-related valves had been inspected to verify proper position. Nor was a schedule for performing the position verification for all safety-related valves provided. Please supplement your response to provide this information.

Item No. 7

1. Discuss how assurance is achieved for preventing inadvertent transfer of radioactive gases and liquids on resetting of engineered safety features.
2. Provide your schedule for completion of the study regarding the basis upon which continued operability of the features designed to prevent inadvertent transfer of radioactive liquids and gases from primary containment.

Item No. 8

1. We understand from your response that operability tests are performed on redundant safety related systems prior to removal of any safety related system from service. Since you may be relying on prior operability verification within the current technical specification surveillance interval, operability should be further verified by at least a visual check of the system status to the extent practicable, prior to removing the redundant equipment from service. Please supplement your response to provide a commitment that you will revise your maintenance and test procedures to adopt this position.
2. It is not clear from your response that all involved reactor operational personnel in the oncoming shift are explicitly notified about the status of systems removed from or returned to service. Please indicate how this information is transferred at shift turnover.