



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

TERA

JULY 20 1979

Docket No. 50-155

Mr. David Bixel
Nuclear Licensing Administrator
Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, Michigan 49201

Dear Mr. Bixel:

RE: BIG ROCK POINT

We are reviewing your submittal dated May 4, 1979 in response to IE Bulletin 79-08. We have determined that the additional information requested in the enclosure is necessary in order to complete our safety evaluation.

We request that responses to the items in the enclosure be forwarded to this office within two weeks of your receipt of the enclosure, which was previously transmitted to you by telecopy. Please contact William F. Kane at (301) 492-7745 if you require additional discussions or clarification regarding the information requested.

Sincerely,

Dennis L. Ziemann

Dennis Ziemann, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #2
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:
Request for Additional
Information

cc w/enclosure:
See next page

500 293

7908080295*

Mr. David Bixel

- 2 -

JULY 20 1979

cc

Mr. Paul A. Perry, Secretary
Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, Michigan 49201

Judd L. Bacon, Esquire
Consumers Power Company
212 West Michigan Avenue
Jackson, Michigan 49201

Hunton & Williams
George C. Freeman, Jr., Esquire
P. O. Box 1535
Richmond, Virginia 23212

Peter W. Steketee, Esquire
505 Peoples Building
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49503

Charlevoix Public Library
107 Clinton Street
Charlevoix, Michigan 49720

500 294

ENCLOSURE

BIG ROCK POINT

REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

IEB 79-08

Item No. 2

1. Your response is incomplete in that it does not address whether your review included procedures for containment isolation. In addition you state that certain lines (in isolation category E) do not require isolation. However, Item No. 2 of IEB 79-08 explicitly requires that all non-essential lines be isolated. Further the response does not state explicitly that containment isolation is initiated prior to or concurrent with all automatic initiations of safety injection. Confirm that you have reviewed containment isolation initiation design and procedures to assure that all automatic initiations of safety injection will result in isolation of those lines not required for safety features or cooling capability including those designed to transfer potentially radioactive gases and liquids out of the primary containment.
2. Prepare and implement all changes necessary to initiate containment isolation of all lines discussed above and describe how they comply with the requirements of the Bulletin. In addition provide a schedule for implementation of the necessary changes.

Item No. 4

1. Your response is incomplete. Describe the types of vessel level indication for both automatic and manual initiation of safety systems. In addition describe other instrumentation which the operator might have to determine changes in reactor coolant inventory, e.g., radioactivity levels, high containment and equipment area temperatures, containment sump pump operation, etc.

Item No. 5

1. Your responses items 5a and 5b do not address operating procedures or training instructions. Amend your response to address this matter.
2. Your response to items 5a and 5b is incomplete. Your review of operating procedures and training instructions should assure that operators are provided additional information and instructions to (1) not override automatic actions of engineered features unless continued operation of engineered safety features will result in unsafe plant conditions and (2) to not rely upon vessel level indication alone for manual actions and to also examine other plant parameter indications in evaluating plant conditions. Amend your response accordingly.
3. Provide a schedule for any actions on item 5 that have not yet been completed.

Item No. 6

1. It is not clear from your response that safety related valve positioning requirements were reviewed to ensure proper operation of engineered safety features. Please supplement your response to provide a commitment to conduct this review and a schedule for completion.
2. Your response did not clearly indicate that all accessible safety-related valves had been inspected to verify proper position. Nor was a schedule for performing the position verification for all safety-related valves provided. Please supplement your response to provide this information.

Item No. 7

1. Your response contained no discussion regarding how you assure against inadvertent transfer when resetting engineered safety features. Amend your response to provide this information.

Item No. 8

1. We understand from your response that operability is verified for redundant safety related systems prior to removal of any safety related system from service. Since you may be relying on prior operability verification within the current technical specification surveillance interval, operability should be further verified by at least a visual check of the system status to the extent practicable, prior to removing the redundant equipment from service. Please supplement your response to provide a commitment that you will revise your maintenance and test procedures to adopt this position.
2. It is not clear from your response that all involved reactor operational personnel in the oncoming shift are explicitly notified about the status of systems removed from or returned to service. Please indicate how this information is transferred at shift turnover.