



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-518/79-10, 50-519/79-10
50-520/79-10 and 50-521/79-10

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Facility Name: Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units A1, A2,
B1 and B2

Docket Nos. 50-518, 50-519, 50-520 and 50-521

License Nos. CPPR-150, CPPR-151, CPPR-152 and CPPR-153

Inspection at Hartsville Site near Hartsville, Tennessee

Inspector: T. E. Burdette
T. E. Burdette

5/18/79
Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: A. R. Herdt

Approved by: A. R. Herdt
A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCESB

5/19/79
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on May 7-10, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 35 inspector-hours on-site in the areas of construction activities, previously identified items, 10 CFR 50.55(e) items, 10 CFR Part 21 items, IE circulars and preventive maintenance program.

Results

Of the areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

*R. T. Hathcote, Project Manager
*W. R. Brown, Construction Engineer, Plant A
*W. T. Quinn, Construction Engineer, Plant B
*B. F. Painter, General Construction Superintendent, Plant A
*L. H. Jackson, Assistant Construction Engineer, Plant A
*W. O. Brown, Assistant Construction Engineer, Plant A
*R. E. Young, Assistant Construction Engineer, Plant B
*H. S. Sheppard, Assistant Construction Engineer, Plant B
*E. O. Peoples, Assistant Construction Engineer, Plant B
*K. H. Stewart, Assistant Construction Engineer, Plant A
*G. A. Gonzalves, QA Supervisor
*W. K. Anders, OEDC QA Staff

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen and office personnel.

*Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on May 10, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The status of previously identified items, 10 CFR 50.55(e) items, 10 CFR Part 21 items, and review of the preventive maintenance program were discussed in detail. The licensee had no unanswered questions or comments.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Infraction (518/519/520/521/79-03-01): Failure to Control Deviation Requests. The licensee has responded to this infraction in letters dated February 8, 1979 and May 1, 1979. The licensee's response of May 1, 1979 reported details on the licensee's use of deviations. Region II has reviewed the licensee's actions in this matter and has no further questions. This infraction is closed.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Independent Inspection Effort

a. The inspector examined activities of Plants A and B to observe work in progress and to determine the overall construction

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status. The inspector also examined activities in the soils and concrete laboratory for Plants A and B and examined storage conditions for equipment in Plants A and B warehouses.

- b. The inspector also examined the licensee's preventive maintenance programs. TVA Construction Engineering Procedure (CEP) 13.02 is the controlling procedure for the preventive maintenance program. The inspector reviewed CEP 13.02 and computer input for the PREVENT program, which is the principal source of information on the preventive maintenance of items. The inspector selected five safety-related items in storage in order to determine if the PREVENT program requirements have been completed in a timely manner. The inspector also inspected two items in storage to determine if preventive maintenance requirements have been implemented. The inspector found that monthly preventive maintenance records had been completed and that preventive maintenance requirements had been implemented for items in storage.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Inspector Follow-Up Items

(Closed) Inspector Follow-Up Item(518/520/79-08-02): Verification of Hold Tag Attachment. The inspector reviewed Plant A documentation for hold tag verifications. The inspector determined that Plant A personnel were conducting hold tag verification as required by procedure. This item is closed.

7. Licensee Identified Items (50.55(e))

Prior to this inspection, the licensee had identified the following under the terms of 10 CFR 50.55(e):

- a. (Closed) Item 518/519/520/521/78-3-1: Lack of Procedures for Review of Certain Design Activities. Region II has reviewed the licensee's responses to this 50.55(e) item. Region II has also reviewed the current revisions to the engineering procedures noted in the corrective action proposed in the licensee's final report. The revisions provide for reviewing, identifying, documenting, analyzing repetitive deficiencies, and reporting to the NRC. The licensee's corrective actions have been completed. This item is closed.
- b. (Open) Item 520/79-10-01: Failure to Follow Cadweld Procedures. On April 20, 1979, the licensee reported that a basemat cadweld was tampered with by a cadweld crew. Rather than cutting out a defective cadweld, the crew diced off the defective area with a torch and remade the cadweld in the same location on the rebar. The licensee is investigating this matter. This

item will remain open pending receipt of the licensee's final report in this matter and review by Region II of the licensee's corrective actions.

- c. (Open) Item 518/519/520/521/79-10-02: Factor of Safety for Actual Design of Welded Anchorages. TVA Civil Engineering Branch review of anchors and plates revealed that if plates acted flexibly, cracking could occur due to stress concentrations in a zone of brittleness (heat affected zone). This item will remain open pending receipt of the licensee's final report in this matter and review by Region II of the licensee's corrective actions.

8. 10 CFR Part 21 Items

(Open) Item 518/79-10-3: Unauthorized Weld Repairs to Reactor Pressure Vessel Shield Wall Shell Plates. The licensee on April 17, 1979 notified Region II of a potential 50.55(e) item on unauthorized weld repairs to reactor pressure vessel shield wall shell plates fabricated by Industrial Engineering Works (IEW) in Trenton, New Jersey. On April 26, 1979 IEW reported the problem to Region I as a Part 21 notification on an error in weld preparation. This item will remain open pending receipt of the licensee's final report and IEW's final report in this matter and review by Region II of the corrective actions.

Status of Inspection and Enforcement Circulars (IEC's)

The licensee has received, reviewed, evaluated and is taking necessary actions on information contained in the following circulars:

- a. IEC 79-04, Loose Hacking Nut on Limitorque Valve Operators.
- b. IEC 79-05, Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Conductors.
- c. IEC 79-07, Unexpected Speed Increase of Reactor Recirculation MG Set Resulted in Reactor Power Increase.

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