



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

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June 28, 1979

OFFICE OF THE
CHAIRMAN

The Honorable Leon E. Panetta
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Panetta:

Thank you for your mailgram dated March 30, 1979, requesting an immediate investigation of the circumstances surrounding the accident at Three Mile Island, assurance that steps are being taken to prevent a similar occurrence at other nuclear facilities, and a comparison of the designs of the Three Mile Island and Diablo Canyon Units to determine if there are any similarities.

Our Office of Inspection and Enforcement is conducting a detailed investigation to determine all pertinent facts associated with the Three Mile Island accident itself. The results of this investigation, which should be completed early this fall, will be made publicly available. Our Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has been temporarily reorganized into a number of Task Forces to facilitate a comprehensive review of the technical and operational implications of the Three Mile Island accident, not only for operating reactors but also for plants currently under licensing review. Our other major staff Offices are providing support to NRR in these efforts, as well as evaluating the changes which may be necessary in their own programs as a result of the accident.

In addition, the Commission's own special inquiry into the Three Mile Island accident is now established. The public announcement (Enclosure 1) of the appointment of Mr. Rogovin as director describes the scope of the inquiry. A copy of the report of the inquiry will be provided to you, per your request, when the report is completed. There are some 50 NRC senior staff members involved full-time, organized into eight task groups, and additional support is being provided by other NRC staff, and the services of contractors and consultants, where possible. This inquiry has been in progress under the direction of an interim director prior to the appointment of Mr. Rogovin.

As you may be aware, there are other groups investigating the Three Mile Island accident, including two Congressional committees and the special Presidential Commission. NRC is cooperating extensively with these outside investigations.

The Commission is also working to take every step necessary to ensure that the chances of a TMI-type incident occurring at another plant are minimized. We have underway a comprehensive review of the safety-related regulations and standards for nuclear power plants, the training and licensing standards for reactor operations, and the inspection and enforcement program for operating plants. We already have put those

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
elements of the staff who are not immediately involved in dealing with the situation at TMI to work on this essential and major effort.

The Diablo Canyon plants are PWR units designed by Westinghouse. As you know, Three Mile Island is also a PWR plant but was designed by Babcock and Wilcox. The NRC is reviewing Westinghouse PWR designs to assess the relative reactor system dynamic behavior that these designs would be subjected to as a result of an accident similar to the type which occurred at Three Mile Island, that is, a complete loss of main feedwater. The NRC initiated action in this area with the issuance of two bulletins which requested that licensees operating Westinghouse plants take certain specific action. Copies of these bulletins are enclosed for your information. In addition, the staff is meeting with representatives of Westinghouse to discuss related analyses, tests, and plant features dealing with small break Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA), anticipated transients, operator training and procedures, and reliability of the auxiliary feedwater systems including associated controls and natural circulation capability.

With regard to licensing reviews, the NRC staff is initially focusing its efforts on plants that are in the final stages of operating license review like Diablo Canyon. At a minimum, these plants will be reviewed in the same manner as plants already operating with regard to remedial actions. As the TMI-2 studies and investigations proceed, it is likely that additional actions that must be implemented in the short term prior to issuance of an operating license will be identified. The staff will complete the necessary reviews and report its findings related to whether such short term actions must also be implemented prior to a decision to issue an operating license for each plant. Although no formal moratorium has been declared, it is anticipated that it will take at least three months for such reviews to be completed and for the necessary pre-licensing changes to be implemented. The results of these staff reviews will be summarized in reports which will be available to the public.

I hope that the above preliminary information will be helpful to you.

Sincerely,



Joseph M. Hendrie
Chairman

Enclosures:
Public Announcement
Investigation and Enforcement Bulletins

344-270



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

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
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Enclosures:
Public Announcement
Investigation and Enforcement Bulletins

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Office of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20555

No. 79-104
Tel. 301/492-7715

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
(Thursday, June 14, 1979)

ATTORNEY MITCHELL ROGOVIN NAMED TO DIRECT NRC'S SPECIAL INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT

Mitchell Rogovin, senior partner in the Washington law firm of Rogovin, Stern and Hoge, has been appointed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to direct a special independent inquiry into the March 28 accident at the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant in Pennsylvania.

Mr. Rogovin and his law firm will direct the inquiry to determine actual events which occurred at Three Mile Island and their causes, and the actions of the licensee, Metropolitan Edison Company, and NRC personnel before and after the accident. The inquiry will also identify areas of deficiency revealed by the accident and areas in which further investigation is warranted. It is expected that the special inquiry will take about six months.

During the period that the Commission has been seeking a director for the special inquiry, a staff of NRC personnel and consultants headed by Dr. Kevin Cornell, Deputy Executive Director for Operations, has begun the initial phases of the inquiry. In addition, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement has been carrying out its staff-level investigation of the accident, and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation has formed a task force which is studying the lessons learned from the accident.

In announcing the appointment, NRC Chairman Joseph M. Hendrie said:

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"The Special Inquiry represents a major phase of the Commission's evaluation of the Three Mile Island accident and its implications. It is not intended to duplicate the efforts of the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Mile Island. Rather, it is designed so that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in order to fulfill its own regulatory responsibilities, will have the fullest possible understanding of the events at Three Mile Island, both from the technical standpoint and from the standpoint of how our regulatory processes functioned. The purpose of that evaluation is to permit the Commission to take whatever further steps may be necessary to prevent any similar accident in the future, and to improve the NRC's ability to respond to accidents."

Mr. Rogovin will have authority to designate a staff of his own choosing, including NRC personnel and consultants currently engaged in the interim inquiry, and staff and consultants from outside the Commission. Mr. Rogovin will have full independence in directing the inquiry.

Mr. Rogovin, both as Chief Counsel to the Internal Revenue Service and then as Assistant U.S. Attorney General, has had extensive experience in supervising large-scale investigations. Subsequently, while in private practice, he served as Special Counsel to the Central Intelligence Agency during investigations into activities of the intelligence community. Mr. Rogovin's partner, George T. Prampton, Jr., served for two years on the Watergate Special Prosecution Force, where he was one of a five-member team that conducted the grand jury investigation and the trial of the Watergate case.

In 1977-78, the Rogovin, Stern and Huger firm was retained by the U.S. Civil Service Commission to conduct an outside, independent, investigation of allegations concerning the equal employment opportunity and merit systems. The law firm also served as special outside counsel to a large bank holding company in conducting an extensive investigation of prior activities by the company's officers and employees.

The specific areas which the special inquiry will examine include the following:

--the sequence of events during the accident, what was happening to the reactor and the plant, including, where feasible, an assessment of important alternative sequences; the response of the operating personnel; radioactive releases and exposures; events at the plant before the accident that might be related to the accident.

--the history of the NRC review of the utility's application for a license to operate Three Mile Island No. 2; NRC license conditions on TMI-2 operations, including technical specifications; the operating and inspection history at TMI-2; the operating and inspection histories of other Babcock & Wilcox plants, focused on any indications of the types of problems that arose in the TMI-2 accident; a summary of NRC past consideration of such problems; the extent to which financial or tax considerations influenced conditions in the plant in any way that might have contributed to the accident; any other precursor events or analyses relevant to the accident.

--the susceptibility of Babcock & Wilcox plants to accidents; unique features of TMI-2 that may have increased or decreased the severity of the accident; other design effects related to the TMI-2 accident.

--TMI-2 operations, including training and qualifications of personnel, operating procedures and management overview; technical support to operating personnel and management.

--emergency response to TMI-2 accident by the utility, other utilities and utility groups, and industrial organizations, including coordination with NRC and other Federal, State, and local officials, and assessment and dissemination of information.

--emergency planning by, and emergency response plans approved by, the NRC; actual emergency response to the accident by NRC, including staff, ACRS and Commissioners, on site and at headquarters; NRC coordination with Federal, State, and local officials, the utility, industry sources, and the national laboratories; NRC assessment and dissemination of information; communications and chain of command within NRC.

The special inquiry will also assess the possible implications of the accident at TMI-2 (including design of the facility, operations, regulatory actions, emergency preparedness) for other nuclear power plants and identify areas where further study is recommended. Based on these assessments and recommendations, the Commission will undertake such additional investigations, analyses and actions as it considers appropriate in the discharge of its responsibilities.

Mr. Rogovin will keep the Commission informed on a periodic basis of the progress of the inquiry. Any information of immediate public health or safety significance will be reported promptly to the Commission. The Commission emphasized that it will take whatever regulatory action it deems necessary at any time, based on information available to it at that time. By instituting the special inquiry, the Commission said it intends no suggestion that it will withhold regulatory action with respect to identified deficiencies until the inquiry is completed.

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

IE Bulletin No. 79-06A
Date: April 14, 1979
Page 1 of 5

REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL ERRORS AND SYSTEM MISALIGNMENTS IDENTIFIED DURING
THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT

Description of Circumstances:

IE Bulletin 79-06 identified actions to be taken by the licensees of all pressurized water power reactors (except Babcock & Wilcox reactors) as a result of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 incident. This Bulletin clarifies the actions of Bulletin 79-05 for reactors designed by Westinghouse, and the response to this bulletin will eliminate the need to respond to Bulletin 79-06.

Actions to be taken by Licensees:

For all Westinghouse pressurized water reactor facilities with an operating license (the actions specified below replace those identified in IE Bulletin 79-06 on an item by item basis):

1. Review the description of circumstances described in Enclosure 1 of IE Bulletin 79-05 and the preliminary chronology of the TMI-2 3/28/79 accident included in Enclosure 1 to IE Bulletin 79-05A.
 - a. This review should be directed toward understanding: (1) the extreme seriousness and consequences of the simultaneous blocking of both auxiliary feedwater trains at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 plant and other actions taken during the early phases of the accident; (2) the apparent operational errors which led to the eventual core damage; (3) that the potential exists, under certain accident or transient conditions, to have a water level in the pressurizer simultaneously with the reactor vessel not full of water; and (4) the necessity to systematically analyze plant conditions and parameters and take appropriate corrective action.
 - b. Operational personnel should be instructed to: (1) not override automatic action of engineered safety features unless continued operation of engineered safety features will result in unsafe plant conditions (see Section 7a.); and (2) not make operational decisions based solely on a single plant parameter indication when one or more confirmatory indications are available.

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- c. All licensed operators and plant management and supervisors with operational responsibilities shall participate in this review and such participation shall be documented in plant records.
2. Review the actions required by your operating procedures for coping with transients and accidents, with particular attention to:
 - a. Recognition of the possibility of forming voids in the primary coolant system large enough to compromise the core cooling capability, especially natural circulation capability.
 - b. Operation action required to prevent the formation of such voids.
 - c. Operator action required to enhance core cooling in the event such voids are formed (e.g., remote venting).
3. For your facilities that use pressurizer water level coincident with pressurizer pressure for automatic initiation of safety injection into the reactor coolant system, trip the low pressurizer level set point bistables such that, when the pressurizer pressure reaches the low set point, safety injection would be initiated regardless of the pressurizer level. In addition, instruct operators to manually initiate safety injection when the pressurizer pressure indication reaches the actuation set point whether or not the level indication has dropped to the actuation setpoint.
4. Review the containment isolation initiation design and procedures, and prepare and implement all changes necessary to permit containment isolation whether manual or automatic, of all lines whose isolation does not degrade needed safety features or cooling capability, upon automatic initiation of safety injection.
5. For facilities for which the auxiliary feedwater system is not automatically initiated, prepare and implement immediately procedures which require the stationing of an individual (with no other assigned concurrent duties and in direct and continuous communication with the control room) to promptly initiate adequate auxiliary feedwater to the steam generator(s) for those transients or accidents the consequences of which can be limited by such action.

6. For your facilities, prepare and implement immediately procedures which:
 - a. Identify those plant indications (such as valve discharge piping temperature, valve position indication, or valve discharge relief tank temperature or pressure indication) which plant operators may utilize to determine that pressurizer power operated relief valve(s) are open, and
 - b. Direct the plant operators to manually close the power operated relief block valve(s) when reactor coolant system pressure is reduced to below the set point for normal automatic closure of the power operated relief valve(s) and the valve(s) remain stuck open.
7. Review the action directed by the operating procedures and training instructions to ensure that:
 - a. Operators do not override automatic actions of engineered safety features, unless continued operation of engineered safety features will result in unsafe plant conditions. For example, if continued operation of engineered safety features would threaten reactor vessel integrity then the HPI should be secured (as noted in b(2) below).
 - b. Operating procedures currently, or are revised to, specify that if the high pressure injection (HPI) system has been automatically actuated because of low pressure condition, it must remain in operation until either:
 - (1) Both low pressure injection (LPI) pumps are in operation and flowing for 20 minutes or longer; at a rate which would assure stable plant behavior; or
 - (2) The HPI system has been in operation for 20 minutes, and all hot and cold leg temperatures are at least 50 degrees below the saturation temperature for the existing RCS pressure. If 50 degree subcooling cannot be maintained after HPI cutoff, the HPI shall be reactivated. The degree of subcooling beyond 50 degrees F and the length of time HPI is in operation shall be limited by the pressure/temperature considerations for the vessel integrity.

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- c. Operating procedures currently, or are revised to, specify that in the event of HPI initiation with reactor coolant pumps (RCP) operating, at least one RCP shall remain operating for two loop plants and at least two RCPs shall remain operating for 3 or 4 loop plants as long as the pump(s) is providing forced flow.
 - d. Operators are provided additional information and instructions to not rely upon pressurizer level indication alone, but to also examine pressurizer pressure and other plant parameter indications in evaluating plant conditions, e.g., water, inventory in the reactor primary system.
8. Review all safety-related valve positions, positioning requirements and positive controls to assure that valves remain positioned (open or closed) in a manner to ensure the proper operation of engineered safety features. Also review related procedures, such as those for maintenance, testing, plant and system startup, and supervisory periodic (e.g., daily/shift checks,) surveillance to ensure that such valves are returned to their correct positions following necessary manipulations and are maintained in their proper positions during all operational modes.
9. Review your operating modes and procedures for all systems designed to transfer potentially radioactive gases and liquids out of the primary containment to assure that undesired pumping, venting or other release of radioactive liquids and gases will not occur inadvertently.

In particular, ensure that such an occurrence would not be caused by the resetting of engineered safety features instrumentation. List all such systems and indicate:

- a. Whether interlocks exist to prevent transfer when high radiation indication exists, and
 - b. Whether such systems are isolated by the containment isolation signal.
 - c. The basis on which continued operability of the above features is assured.
10. Review and modify as necessary your maintenance and test procedures to ensure that they require:
- a. Verification, by test or inspection, of the operability of redundant safety-related systems prior to the removal of any safety-related system from service.

- b. Verification of the operability of all safety-related systems when they are returned to service following maintenance or testing.
 - c. Explicit notification of involved reactor operational personnel whenever a safety-related system is removed from and returned to service.
11. Review your prompt reporting procedures for NRC notification to assure that NRC is notified within one hour of the time the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition of operation. Further, at that time an open continuous communication channel shall be established and maintained with NRC.
 12. Review operating modes and procedures to deal with significant amounts of hydrogen gas that may be generated during a transient or other accident that would either remain inside the primary system or be released to the containment.
 13. Propose changes, as required, to those technical specifications which must be modified as a result of your implementing the above items.

For all light water reactor facilities designed by Westinghouse with an operating license, respond to Items 1-12 within 10 days of the receipt of this Bulletin. Respond to item 13 (Technical Specification Change proposals) in 30 days.

Reports should be submitted to the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy should be forwarded to the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Reactor Operations Inspection, Washington, D.C. 20555.

For all other power reactors with an operating license or construction permit, this Bulletin is for information purposes and no written response is required.

Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7/31/80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.

LISTING OF IE BULLETINS
ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS

Bulletin No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued To
78-05	Malfunctioning of Circuit Breaker Auxiliary Contact Mechanism - General Electric Model CR105X	4/14/78	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construc- tion Permit (CP)
78-06	Defective Cutler- Hammer, Type M Relays With DC Coils	5/31/78	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construc- tion Permit (CP)
78-07	Protection Afforded by Air-Line Respirators and and Supplied-Air Hoods	6/12/78	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) all class E and F Research Reactors with an OL, all Fuel Cycle Facilities with an OL, and all Priority 1 Material Licensees
78-08	Radiation Levels from Fuel Element Transfer Tubes	6/12/78	All Power and Research Reactor Facilities with a Fuel Element Trans- fer Tube and an Operating License (OL)
78-09	BWR Drywell Leakage Paths Associated with Inadequate Drywell Closures	6/14/78	All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Per- mit (CP)

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78-10	Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Accumulator Spring Coils	6/27/78	All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Per- mit (CP)
78-11	Examination of Mark I Containment Torus Welds	7/21/78	BWR Power Reactor Facilities for action: Peach Bottom 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, Hatch 1, Monti- cello and Vermont Yankee
78-12	Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds	9/26/78	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construc- tion Permit (CP)
78-12A	Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds	11/24/78	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construc- tion Permit (CP)
78-12B	Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds	3/19/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construc- tion Permit (CP)
78-13	Failures in Source ² Heads of Kay-Ray, Inc., Gauges Models 7050, 7050B, 7051, 7051B, 7060, 7060B, 7061 and 7061B	10/27/78	All General and Specific Licensees with Kay-Ray Gauges
78-14	Deterioration of Buna-N Components in ASCO Solenoids	12/19/78	All GE BWR facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP)

79-01	Environmental Quali- fication of Class IE Equipment	2/8/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP)
79-02	Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts	3/8/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP)
79-03	Longitudinal Weld Defects in ASME SA-312 Type 304 Stainless Steel Pipe Spools Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Company	3/12/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP)
79-04	Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation	3/30/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP)
79-05	Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island	4/1/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP)
79-05A	Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island	4/5/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP)
79-06	Review of Operational Errors and System Misalignments Identified During The Three Mile Island Incident	4/11/79	All Pressurized Water Power Reactor Facilities Except B&W Facilities

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

IE Bulletin No. 79-06A
(Revision No. 1)
Date: April 18, 1979
Page 1 of 2

REVIEW OF OPERATIONAL ERRORS AND SYSTEM MISALIGNMENTS IDENTIFIED DURING
THE THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT

IE Bulletin 79-06A identified actions to be taken by the licensees of all pressurized water reactors designed by Westinghouse.

Item No. 3 of the actions to be taken, as stated in the original bulletin, was:

- "3. For your facilities that use pressurizer water level coincident with pressurizer pressure for automatic initiation of safety injection into the reactor coolant system, trip the low pressurizer level setpoint bistables such that, when the pressurizer pressure reaches the low setpoint, safety injection would be initiated regardless of the pressurizer level. In addition, instruct operators to manually initiate safety injection when the pressurizer pressure indication reaches the actuation setpoint whether or not the level indication has dropped to the actuation setpoint."

Information from licensees and Westinghouse has identified that implementation of this action would preclude the performance of surveillance testing of the pressurizer pressure bistables without initiating a safety injection.

In order to permit surveillance testing of the pressurizer pressure bistables, the low pressurizer level bistables that must operate in coincidence with the low pressurizer pressure bistables may be restored to normal operation for the duration of the surveillance test of that coincident pressurizer pressure channel. At the conclusion of the surveillance test of each pressurizer pressure channel, the coincident pressurizer level channel must be returned to the tripped mode defined in Action Item 3 of IE bulletin 79-06A.

As a result, Item 3 should be revised as follows:

- "3. For your facilities that use pressurizer water level coincident with pressurizer pressure for automatic initiation of safety injection into the reactor coolant system, trip the low pressurizer level setpoint bistables such that, when the pressurizer pressure reaches the low setpoint, safety injection would be initiated regardless of the pressurizer level. The pressurizer level bistables may be returned to their normal operating positions during the pressurizer pressure channel functional surveillance tests. In addition, instruct operators to manually initiate safety injection when the pressurizer pressure indication reaches the actuation setpoint whether or not the level indication has dropped to the actuation setpoint."

Item 13 of the actions to be taken, as stated in the original bulletin, was:

- "13. Propose changes, as required, to those technical specifications which must be modified as a result of your implementing the above items."

Long term resolutions of some of these required actions may require design changes. Therefore, Item 13 of actions to be taken should be revised as follows:

- "13. Propose changes, as required, to those technical specifications which must be modified as a result of your implementing the above items and identify design changes necessary in order to effect long term resolutions of these items."

For all light water reactor facilities designed by Westinghouse with an operating license, respond to Items 1-12 within 10 days of the receipt of this Bulletin. Respond to Item 13 (Technical Specification Change proposals and identification of design changes in 30 days.)

The other requirements of IE Bulletin 79-06A remain in effect.

Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.

Enclosure:
List of IE Bulletins Issued
in Last Twelve Months

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LISTING OF IE BULLETINS
ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS

Bulletin No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued to
78-06	Defective Cutler-Hammer, Type M Relays With DC Coils	5/31/78	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
78-07	Protection afforded by Air-Line Respirators and Supplied-Air Hoods	6/12/78	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL, all class E and F Research Reactors with an OL, all Fuel Cycle Facilities with an OL, and all Priority I Material Licensees
78-08	Radiation Levels from Fuel Element Transfer Tubes	6/12/78	All Power, Test and Research Reactor Facilities with an OL having Fuel Element Transfer Tubes
78-09	BWR Drywell Leakage Paths Associated with Inadequate Drywell Closures	6/14/78	All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL (for action) or CP (for information)
78-10	Bergen-Paterson Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Accumulator Spring Coils	6/27/78	All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
78-11	Examination of Mark I Containment Torus Welds	7/24/78	BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL for action: Peach Bottom 2 and 3, Quad Cities 1 and 2, Hatch 1, Monticello and Vermont Yankee. All other BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL for information.

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LISTING OF IE BULLETINS
ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS (CONTINUED)

Bulletin No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued To
78-12	Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds	9/29/78	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
78-12A	Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds	11/24/78	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
78-12B	Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds	3/19/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
78-13	Failures In Source Head of Kay-Ray, Inc., Gauges Models 7050, 7050B, 7051, 7051B, 7060, 7060B, 7061 and 7061B	10/27/78	All General and Specific Licensees with the subject Kay-Ray, Inc. Gauges
78-14	Deterioration of Buna-N Components In ASCO Solenoids	12/19/78	All GE BWR Facilities with an OL (for action), and all other Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP (for information)
79-01	Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment	2/8/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL, except the 11 Systematic Evaluation Program Plants (for action), and all other Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP (For Information)
79-02	Pipe Support Base Plate Design Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts	3/8/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP

LISTING OF IE BULLETINS
ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS (CONTINUED)

Bulletin No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued to
79-03	Longitudinal Weld Defects in ASME SA-312 Type 304 Stainless Steel Pipe Spools Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Company	3/12/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
79-04	Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation	3/30/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
79-05	Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island	4/1/79	All Babcock and Wilcox Power Reactor Facilities with an OL, Except Three Mile Island 1 and 2 (For Action), and All Other Power Reactor Facilities With an OL or CP (For Information)
79-05A	Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island - Supplement	4/5/79	Same as 79-05
79-06	Review of Operational Errors and System Misalignments Identified During the Three Mile Incident	4/11/79	All Pressurized Water Power Reactor Facilities with an OL Except B&W Facilities (For Action), All Other Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP (For Information)

LISTING OF IE BULLETINS
ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS (CONTINUED)

Bulletin No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued to
79-06A	Same Title as 79-06	4/14/79	All Westinghouse Designed Pressurized Power Reactor Facilities with an OL (For Action), and All Other Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP (For Information)
79-06B	Same Title as 79-06	4/14/79	All Combustion Engineering Designed Pressurized Power Reactor Facilities with an OL (For Action), and All Other Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP (For Information)
79-07	Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety-Related Piping	4/14/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
79-08	Events Relevant to Boiling Water Power Reactors Identified During Three Mile Island Incident	4/14/79	All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL (For Action), All Other Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP (For Information)
79-09	Failures of GE Type AK-2 Circuit Breaker in Safety Related Systems	4/17/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP

ENCLOSURE 2

LIST OF LICENSEES RECEIVING IE BULLETIN
NO. 79-06A (REVISION 1) FOR ACTION

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company ATTN: Mr. W. G. Council Vice President - Nuclear Engineering and Operations P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101	Docket No. 50-213
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. ATTN: Mr. W. J. Cahill, Jr. Vice President 4 Irving Place New York, New York 10003	Docket No. 50-247
Duquesne Light Company ATTN: Mr. C. N. Dunn Vice President Operations Division 435 Sixth Avenue Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219	Docket No. 50-334
Power Authority of the State of New York Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant ATTN: Mr. J. P. Bayne Resident Manager P. O. Box 215 Buchanan, New York 10511	Docket No. 50-286
Public Service Electric and Gas Company ATTN: Mr. F. W. Schneider Vice President - Production 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101	Docket No. 50-272
Rochester Gas and Electric Company ATTN: Mr. Leon D. White, Jr. Vice President Electric and Steam Production 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649	Docket No. 50-244

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Enclosure 2

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Yankee Atomic Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. Robert H. Groce
Licensing Engineer
20 Turnpike Road
Westborough, Massachusetts 01581

Docket No. 50-29

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ENCLOSURE 3

SAMPLE LETTER (FOR ACTION)

Docket No(s).

Date:

NAME AND ADDRESS

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 79-06A (Revision 1) which requires action by you with regard to your Westinghouse designed pressurized water reactor facility(ies) with an operating license.

Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

Boyce H. Grier
Director

Enclosure:
IE Bulletin No. 79-06A
(Revision 1) with
Enclosures

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ENCLOSURE 4

LIST OF LICENSEES AND CONSTRUCTION PERMIT HOLDERS
RECEIVING IE BULLETIN NO. 79-06A (REVISION 1)
FOR INFORMATION

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company ATTN: Mr. A. E. Lundvall, Jr. Vice President - Supply P. O. Box 1475 Baltimore, Maryland 21203	Docket Nos. 50-317 50-318
Boston Edison Company M/C Nuclear ATTN: Mr. G. Carl Andognini, Manager Nuclear Operations Department 800 Boylston Street Boston, Massachusetts 02199	Docket No. 50-293
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. ATTN: Mr. W. J. Cahill, Jr. Vice President 4 Irving Place New York, New York 10003	Docket No. 50-03
Jersey Central Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. Ivan R. Finfrock, Jr. Vice President Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road Morristown, New Jersey 07960	Docket No. 50-219
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company ATTN: Mr. Robert H. Groce Licensing Engineer 20 Turnpike Road Westborough, Massachusetts 01581	Docket No. 50-309
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation ATTN: Mr. R. R. Schneider Vice President Electric Operations 300 Erie Boulevard West Syracuse, New York 13202	Docket No. 50-220

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
ATTN: Mr. W. G. Council
Vice President - Nuclear
Engineering and Operations
P. O. Box 270
Hartford, Connecticut 06101

Docket Nos. 50-336
50-245
50-423

Philadelphia Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. S. L. Daltroff
Vice President
Electric Production
2301 Market Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101

Docket Nos. 50-277
50-278

Power Authority of the State of New York
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
ATTN: Mr. J. D. Leonard, Jr.
Resident Manager
P. O. Box 41
Lycoming, New York 13093

Docket No. 50-333

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation
ATTN: Mr. Robert H. Groce
Licensing Engineer
20 Turnpike Road
Westborough, Massachusetts 01581

Docket No. 50-271

Duquesne Light Company
ATTN: Mr. E. J. Woolever
Vice President
435 Sixth Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Docket No. 50-412

Jersey Central Power & Light Company
ATTN: Mr. I. R. Finfrock, Jr.
Vice President
260 Cherry Hill Road
Parsippany, New Jersey 07054

Docket No. 50-363

Long Island Lighting Company
ATTN: Mr. Andrew W. Wofford
Vice President
175 East Old Country Road
Hicksville, New York 11801

Docket Nos. 50-322
50-516
50-517

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation
ATTN: Mr. G. Y. Rhode
Vice President
System Project Management
300 Erie Boulevard, West
Syracuse, New York 13202
Docket No. 50-410

Pennsylvania Power & Light Company
ATTN: Mr. Norman W. Curtis
Vice President
Engineering and Construction (N-4)
2 North Ninth Street,
Allentown, Pennsylvania 18101
Docket Nos. 50-387
50-388

Philadelphia Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. V. S. Bover
Vice President
Engineering and Research
2301 Market Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101
Docket Nos. 50-352
50-353

Public Service Electric & Gas Company
ATTN: Mr. T. J. Martin
Vice President
Engineering and Construction
80 Park Place
Newark, New Jersey 07101
Docket Nos. 50-354
50-355
50-311

Public Service Company of New Hampshire
ATTN: Mr. W. C. Tallman
President
1000 Elm Street
Manchester, New Hampshire 03105
Docket Nos. 50-443
50-444

Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation
ATTN: Mr. J. E. Arthur
Chief Engineer
89 East Avenue
Rochester, New York 14649
Docket No. 50-485

Metropolitan Edison Company
ATTN: Mr. J. G. Herbein
Vice President - Generation
P.O. Box 542
Reading, Pennsylvania 19640
Docket No. 50-289

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ENCLOSURE 5

SAMPLE LETTER (FOR INFORMATION)

Docket No(s).

Date:

NAME AND ADDRESS

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Bulletin 79-06A (Revision 1) is forwarded to you for information. No written response is required at this time. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

Boyce H. Grier
Director

Enclosure:
IE Bulletin No. 79-06A (Revision 1)
with Enclosures

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