



Commonwealth Edison  
One First National Plaza, Chicago, Illinois  
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, Illinois 60690

May 17, 1979

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Mr. James G. Keppler, Director  
Directorate of Inspection and  
Enforcement - Region III  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Subject: Zion Station Units 1 and 2  
Additional Response to IE Bulletin  
No. 79-06A (Revision No. 1) dated  
April 18, 1979  
NRC Docket Nos. 50-295 and 50-304

References (a): April 18, 1979 letter from J. G.  
Keppler to Byron Lee, Jr. transmitting  
IE Bulletin No. 79-06A (Revision No. 1)

(b): April 27, 1979 letter from Cordell Reed  
to J. G. Keppler responding to IE  
Bulletin No. 79-06A (Revision No. 1)

Dear Mr. Keppler:

Per Item 13 of Reference (a), Commonwealth Edison Company was requested to submit technical specification changes resulting from its review of the Three Mile Island Incident. On April 30, 1979 a technical specification change was submitted (See April 30, 1979 letter from C. Reed to H. R. Denton) to require actuation of safety injection based on 2 out of 3 channels of low pressurizer pressure, thus deleting pressurizer level from the safeguards logic. This request was reviewed, evaluated and approved by the NRC Staff on May 3, 1979 as Amendment Nos. 49 and 46 to the Zion Station Units 1 and 2 Operating Licenses (see May 3, 1979 letter from A. Schwencer to C. Reed).

At this time, Commonwealth Edison's reviews have not identified the need for any other technical specification changes. However, should additional requirements be identified from Commonwealth Edison's continuing review of the Three Mile Island Incident, such changes will be evaluated and submitted at that time.

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Mr. James G. Keppler:


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Per Reference (b), Commonwealth Edison indicated that two items, Items 4 and 12, were undergoing further review. Attachment 1 to this letter provides an update of these items.

Please address any questions that you might have concerning this matter to this office.

Very truly yours,



Cordell Reed  
Assistant Vice-President

attachment

cc: Director, Division of Reactor  
Operations Inspection

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ATTACHMENT 1Item 4

The following valves have been identified as having control switches which allow them to return to their pre-accident position after the safety injection signal is reset:

FCV-BD17	Steam Generator Blowdown
AOV-BD0001 thru 8	Steam Generator Blowdown
FCV-FP08	Fire Protection
FCV-IA01A, B	Instrument Air
AOV-RV0001 thru 4	Containment Purge
FCV-RV111 thru 114	Heating Water
FCV-SS-2 thru 5	Steam Generator Blowdown Sample
FCV-WD17A, B	Containment Sump Pump Discharge

With the exception of valves FCV-FP08, FCV-IA01A, B and FCV-RV111 thru 114, modifications will be initiated to change the control circuits of all the other valves such that they remain closed following reset of the safety injection signal. The valves exempted above serve systems within the containment that are not connected to the reactor coolant system or the containment atmosphere (closed systems) and that have fluid pressure in excess of accident pressure.

Item 12

The hydrogen recombiner units are to be used to remove hydrogen from the containment that is generated during a major transient. Shielding design and requirements will be pursued after the source terms applicable to the Zion units are identified. Any other modifications or changes will be implemented after applicable requirements become known.

As explained previously in Reference (b), the hydrogen purge fans will only be used to cope with events in which the containment activity is analyzed and the concentrations are known to be within the iodine removal capability of the charcoal filters. Furthermore, the system will not be used if any releases are calculated to exceed NRC approved limits as defined in Zion's FSAR and Technical Specifications for postulated accidents.

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