



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

ACRS 5m-0102
PAR 5/22/79

May 2, 1979

M. Bender
H. Etherington
L. Lawroski
D. Moeller

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ITEMS RECEIVED DURING THE APRIL 30 -
MAY 1, 1979 MEETING OF THE AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE TMI-2
ACCIDENT

The attached items, listed below, are being sent to those members who
did not attend the above meeting for their information.

- (1) Memorandum from P. Shewmon to D. Okrent, Re: Recommendations to
the Commission, April 18, 1979.
- (2) Memorandum for E. G. Case from D. F. Ross, Re: Summary of Meeting
with Combustion Engineering (CE) - Corrective Actions for Combustion
Engineering NSSS Plants as a Result of Three Mile Island Unit 2
Incident, April 12, 1979.
- (3) Memorandum for E. G. Case from D. F. Ross, Re: Summary of Meeting
with Westinghouse- Corrective Actions for Westinghouse NSSS Plants
as a Result of Three Mile Island Unit 2 Incident, April 12, 1979.
- (4) Memorandum for E. G. Case from D. F. Ross, Re: Summary of Meeting
With B&W Regarding Natural Circulation Considerations, April 18,
1979.
- (5) Draft set of Minutes, Re: Meeting between NRC Staff, B&W, Toledo Ed.
Davis-Besse 1, Duke Power-Oconee, SMUD-Rancho Seco, dated April 24,
1979.
- (6) Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Report - Evaluation of Long Term
Post Accident Core Cooling of Three Mile Island Unit 2. (This is a
Draft SER), dated April 1979.
- (7) A copy of the TMI-2 Emergency Procedure 2202-1.5, Pressurizer System
Failure is available for your inspection at the ACRS office.

Richard K. Major
Richard K. Major
Reactor Engineer

Attachments:
As stated

cc: R. F. Fraley
M. Libarkin
J. McKinley
H. Voress w/att.
P. Shewmon (2-5 only)

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April 18, 1979

TO: Dave Okrent, Chairman TM. Consequences, Subcommittee
FROM: P. G. Shewmon
SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMISSION

I won't be able to attend the Monday of your meeting on TMI, so let me put some comments and questions in writing.

I feel our response to the Commission has been too narrow. I am not too sanguine about the approach I will characterize as "if we are just clever enough and try hard enough we can design a plant which will cope with all accidents". We should try, but shouldn't limit our interest to pushing for more analyses of how to recover degraded plants from potential accidents.

We have completely avoided any talk with the operators involved or their supervisors. Since the operator will remain a vital factor in avoiding such accidents, what do we plan to do about learning their perception of the accident, and getting into what should be done to strengthen that line of defense? Are we in effect precluded from this by the need to hold public meetings on matters which may be litigated? If not I think its time we heard from Met. Ed.

We've touched two aspects of aid to operators - how to get the operator clearer indications of plant status, and clearer instructions on how to take a degraded plant into natural circulation cooling. These only address our perception of what we think would have helped the operator. I feel uneasy guessing at what a person's problems were.

Have we ever gotten into operator training and examinations, e.g., what are the philosophy and goals? Who will be looking at that? When?

A second general area is how the NRC organizes to respond to accidents. It's probably just as well to let this go for a month or two, but not too much more. They should be working on it, and we should ask and listen.

A part of the "response" question is the identification and organization of technical expertise. A division of this, yet indicative of a broader question is that of chemical expertise. A weakness that shows up in several

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