

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

1 In the Matter of:

2 IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW

3 of William E. Potts, Superintendent of Technical Support - Unit 1
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9 Trailer #203
10 NRC Investigation Site
11 TMI Nuclear Power Plant
12 Middletown, Pennsylvania

13 May 18, 1979

14 (Date of Interview)

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20
21

22 NRC PERSONNEL:
23 Thomas H. Essig
24 Corenthis B. Kelley
25 Mark E. Resner

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1 RESNER: The following is an interview of Mr. William E. Potts. Mr.
2 Potts is employed with the Metropolitan Edison Company at the TMI facility
3 and is the Superintendent of Technical Support for Unit 1. The present
4 time is 4:08 p.m., EDT, and today's date is May 18, 1979. This interview
5 is being conducted in Trailer 203 which is located just outside of the
6 south gate to the TMI facility. Individuals representing NRC present at
7 this interview are Mr. Thomas H. Essig. Mr. Essig is the Chief, Environ-
8 mental and Special Project Branch, Region III, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
9 Commission. Also present is Miss Corenthis B. Kelley. Miss Kelley is
10 an Inspector and Auditor with the Office of Inspector and Auditor, the
11 U.S. NRC. Moderating this interview is Mark E. Resner, and I am an
12 investigator with the Office of Inspector and Auditor, USNRC Headquarters.
13

14 RESNER: Prior to taping this interview, Mr. Potts was given a two page
15 document which explained the purpose, the scope and the authority by
16 which the NRC conducts this investigation. In addition, it apprised Mr.
17 Potts of the fact that he is entitled to a representative of his choice
18 during this interview and that in no way is he compelled to talk with us
19 should he not desire to. On the second page of this document Mr. Potts
20 has answered three questions, which I will state for the record. Ques-
21 tion 1: Do you understand the above? Mr. Potts has checked yes. Is
22 that correct, Mr. Potts?
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1 POTTS: Yes.

2
3 RESNER: Question 2: Do we have your permission to tape the interview?
4 Mr. Potts has checked yes. Is that correct, Mr. Potts?
5

6 POTTS: Yes.

7
8 RESNER: Question 3: Do you want a copy of the tape? Mr. Potts has
9 checked yes. Is that correct, Mr. Potts?
10

11 POTTS: That is also correct.
12

13 RESNER: Okay. We will provide you with a copy of the tape. At this
14 time I will ask Mr. Potts if he will briefly give a synopsis of his
15 educational and job experience in the nuclear industry. Mr. Potts?
16

17 POTTS: High school graduate '59. I joined the U.S. Navy in 1960.
18 Served aboard the USS George Washington until 1966. Penn State Electrical
19 Engineering from 1966 to 70. Worked at Saxton Nuclear Experimental
20 Corporation as a Met Ed employee 1970 til 1972. Was transferred to TMI
21 as a supervisor of Quality Control. Started the Quality Control organi-
22 zation at TMI, was Met Ed's first QC employee. Worked until 1976, I
23 believe. I was transferred to Reading corporate office where I was a
24 supervisor of licensing. January this year was transferred back to TMI
25 as Superintendent-Technical Support. So far as education, nuclear: at

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1 Penn State I took a number of options in nuclear power, I have also
2 attended a number of schools, two of which come to mind, U.S. Department
3 of Health, Education and Welfare Radiological Protection and that's not
4 the exact title. There were two schools with titles I don't recall.
5 Had an SRO license at Saxton Nuclear. Been trained in 1972 on the B&W
6 simulator.

7
8 RESNER: Okay. Thank you very much. At this time I will turn the
9 interview over to Mr. Essig.

10
11 ESSIG: Mr. Potts, what we would like to do during the interview is to
12 go back to Wednesday the 28th of March, and as best as you can recall
13 relate for the record your involvement in the followup of the event of
14 0400 that day. We recognize that the trail is getting colder as time
15 goes on but we are hoping by interviewing a number of people such as
16 yourself that timing of certain events we can piece together, for those
17 things that weren't recorded by interviewing a number of individuals and
18 just meshing the stories. So what we would like from you is to let you
19 start, just give us as best you recall your involvement, what time you
20 came on site, and in what capacity you were functioning at that time and
21 just sort of sketch for us the whole three days. When you went home and
22 what your duties were for each day.

1 POTTS: You're quite correct. The trail is cold and I was unable today
2 to review any records. I had hoped to...that time would permit review
3 of some logs so I could fix some times, but I'll do the best I can. The
4 morning Wednesday, the 28th, Mr. Miller and I had scheduled previously
5 to attend a meeting at Oyster Creek in New Jersey. I was called early
6 in the morning by Gary. He informed me that we had had a turbine trip
7 on Unit 2 and that he was not certain that he would be able to go to
8 Oyster Creek with me to the meeting. He also told me that he had talked
9 to Don Hetrick and told him we would probably not be meeting him part
10 way for the trip. He'd call me back shortly. He called me back shortly
11 and said that yes indeed he would not go but I should go down to the
12 meeting. I made certain that there was nothing I could do to assist him
13 and drove to Oyster Creek.

14
15 ESSIG: Excuse me. Do you recall what time approximately that was?
16 Was it was fairly early in the morning?

17
18 POTTS: It was early in the morning. I would say...

19
20 ESSIG: Five or six o'clock?

21
22 POTTS: Earlier than six, certainly. Certainly earlier than six. We
23 had planned to leave Elizabethtown at six which meant I would be up at
24 five to meet Mr. Miller at six. And he called me before I arose, so my
25

1 guess is between 4:30 and 5:00 but it was probably 5:00 is the best I
2 can say, I guess, with certainty. I drove to Oyster Creek as I said;
3 arrived at Oyster Creek a few minutes after nine; the meeting was scheduled
4 for nine o'clock. About 9:30 I believe it was, Ivan Finfrock, Vice
5 President of Jersey, had me paged from the meeting and asked if I knew
6 what was going on at TMI. He said that he was besieged by newspaper
7 media with questions and he couldn't get a tie line into TMI. And I
8 tried a few phone numbers I knew, not attempting to go into the control
9 room. The reason I chose not to go into the control room is, if there
10 was a problem I didn't want to disturb control but I did try a number of
11 engineering numbers. And I couldn't get through to TMI so then I called
12 my replacement in Reading, as supervisor of licensing, John Hilbish.
13 John at that time knew that there had been a turbine trip and a reactor
14 trip and that there was some problem and he didn't know to the extent
15 what the problem was. He said he'd get back to me and then I relayed
16 the message to Ivan that we were working on it. Shortly after that, and
17 I really can't say what time it was, but I think it was about noontime --
18 John Hilbish got back to me and said that there was an emergency, an
19 emergency had been declared at TMI and there was a need for some partic-
20 ulate filter masks, would I pick some up from Oyster Creek and return to
21 the Island with them? I asked John if he wanted the iodine masks or
22 particulate masks primarily to determine the extent of the problem.
23 John wasn't certain so I told the HP at Oyster Creek we wanted iodine
24 masks and proceeded. I got a trunk full of those and returned. I
25

1 stopped for gas once, called the wife and told her to lay out my clothes,
2 pack a sandwich and a cup of coffee and ignore the radio. I got into
3 the house and changed clothes and changed cars and came to the Island.
4 I think I got here about 7 o'clock but I'm not certain as to the time.
5 It was about seven. I stopped at the north gate, gave the filters to
6 the guard who was dispatching filters to anybody who came into the
7 gate -- respirators, I shouldn't say filters, respirators. Talked to
8 him for a few minutes, he really didn't know the extent of the problem.
9 And about that time George Kunder appeared at the north gate. So I
10 jumped in the truck with George and came into the site. George gave me
11 a briefing of what he knew of the incident. I'm not absolutely certain
12 from this point whether I went to Unit 1 or Unit 2 control room first.
13 I do know that I thought I wanted to go to Unit 2 control room, that's
14 where the problem was, but I knew that my major responsibility was for
15 Unit 1 and I probably ought to stop by there and see that all my people
16 were working there. So I may have stopped at Unit 1 control room first.
17 In any case in the early evening hours I visited both control rooms and
18 got as much information from the people on watch as I could. Got in
19 contact with Jim Seelinger who is my boss superintendent. And for the
20 next several hours functioned as Jim's assistant or whatever Jim needed
21 for his assistant in assistance. Sometime before morning -- and I think
22 it was approximately midnight it may have been 1 o'clock, times are very
23 difficult to reconstruct, I just don't have the feeling for the times.
24 But Jim said that he needed some rest he had been up all day working
25

1 with the problem and he would like to go home, would I take his job as
2 the emergency center director. And for the next several days I functioned
3 there in the Unit 1 control room as emergency control center director.
4 Jim Seelinger relieved me for a day or two, I'm not certain how many
5 days even. Most of the time it was 16 or 17 hours on and 6 or 8 hours
6 off. That meant that both of us were available for a considerable
7 period during the day. As I said, a couple of days into the incident
8 then Lex Tsaggaris was brought in from Titus, who is senior supervisor
9 from TMI previously. He and I then rotated watches on the Unit 1 emergency
10 control center director. Shortly after that, this sounds stupid, but
11 shortly after that then I was removed from there and taken over to Unit
12 2 control room as a superintendent and got onto the watch bill there.
13 And without going back and attempting to reconstruct that through logs
14 and time sheets, I can't tell you what days the change was made.

15
16 ESSIG: You had mentioned logs and time sheets, such are available? You
17 said earlier that you didn't have a chance to review these logs and time
18 sheets before you came over. What was available to be reviewed at the
19 time?

20
21 POTTS: Lex Tsaggaris and I started a log book in the control room of
22 Unit 1 several days into the incident. The first day I kept notes on
23 paper and we passed them from one watch superintendent to the other. I
24 don't know that those notes are available anymore. I think those were
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1 destroyed each day as we completed items or as we passed information on.
2 But then perhaps two days, perhaps three days into the incident...I
3 don't recall the time...it occurred to us that we may want a more permanent
4 log book and we started one. That log book is available and I had
5 intended to review it and I did not have the time today to do that. I
6 wasn't here yesterday.

7
8 ESSIG: That log book probably would not cover the period of interest
9 here that we're looking at?

10
11 POTTS: I think not. I think you are interested up until the 29th at
12 12:00 noon.

13
14 ESSIG: No. Through the 30th. At midnight.

15
16 POTTS: Through the 30th at midnight.

17
18 ESSIG: Friday the 30th, so Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.

19
20 POTTS: There is a small possibility that Friday would be covered. I
21 believe Friday was the -- Friday or Saturday we may have started that
22 log and I am not absolutely certain without checking.

1 ESSIG: Okay I have in front of me a... some papers that we collected
2 that Bill Burley, our liaison man at Metropolitan Edison, has turned
3 over to us and some of these aren't very well labeled. And I'm just
4 wondering if I show one of these to you...I mean it's labeled to the
5 extent that it calls out some items to be done, types of surveys to be
6 made, but it doesn't give too much in the way of date or anything like
7 that. It has a number of pages which are numbered and a package is
8 stapled together. It consists of about seven pages. Let me show that
9 to you and ask if you...if that looks at all familiar? In one place it
10 does have a date I think, of the 29th. That's the page you're looking
11 at now.

12
13 POTTS: 07:21, 29, March 1979 hours done. This specific item does not
14 look familiar to me, however it is very similar to the type of logs that
15 were kept in Unit 1 control room and are available. Of onsite and
16 offsite readings.

17
18 ESSIG: Okay. I will show you another record then. I have in my hand,
19 for the record, this is a copy of the survey results -- offsite survey
20 results that were radioed back to the ECS. Is that the xerox of the
21 material that you referred to earlier?

22
23 POTTS: Yes. This is not the log that I referred to earlier. This log
24 was kept throughout. This log is the periodic readings of onsite and
25 offsite radiation doses.

1 ESSIG: Right.

2
3 POTTS: The log I referred to originally was one that Lex and I started.
4 We entered things such as "Informed the State of the last 15 minute's
5 readings," or "Talked to the NRC about some piece of information" or
6 "The status of the plant in Unit 1 and Unit 2 is" and "I now relieve Lex
7 Tsaggaris of the watch" or "He relieved me of the watch;" and then
8 indications that we had understood the plant status and what our job
9 was. That kind of a log. This is an information log.

10
11 ESSIG: Yes. Do you know if while you were in charge of the emergency
12 control center -- or should I have used the word station? You were in
13 Unit 1 control room, so that would have been the emergency control
14 station after it had been moved there from first the Unit 2 health
15 physics area. Then the Unit 2 control room, then the Unit 1 control
16 room as I understand it. Been moved twice in that first day.

17
18 POTTS: Yeah, well, by the time I arrived at TMI it was in Unit 1 control
19 room.

20
21 ESSIG: Okay. So you were the emergency control station director. That
22 would be the proper word, would it not? I think the emergency control
23 center, that would have been still in Unit 1 control room, but the
24 station -- I'm sorry -- that would have been in Unit 2 control room.
25

1 The station, the emergency control station would have been in Unit 1
2 control room where you were.
3

4 POTTS: That's correct. And I most probably earlier used an incorrect
5 term.
6

7 ESSIG: I think you did use the word "center." Okay. I just wanted to
8 try to since we haven't yet been able to locate the original survey
9 sheets which were filled out by the people running around in vehicles
10 and in helicopters and so on, we are trying to establish if the times
11 recorded on these sheets, the times in the left hand column there, were
12 actually the time that the person operating the radio in the ECS was
13 notified of the survey or if that was the time that the survey was
14 actually made.
15

16 POTTS: I'll give you a...
17

18 ESSIG: Will you be able to shed any light on that?
19

20 POTTS: I'll shed something on it. Perhaps confusion. When the onsite
21 teams radioed in times, on occasion the time is the time on the control
22 room clock that the radio communicator used. The helicopter on many
23 occasions took a series of readings, and those readings are the times
24 that he took using his watch. And a number of times the time was radioed
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1 in. When the site onsite and offsite ground teams were radioing readings
2 in, we were within a minute or so of those. On one occasion I did check
3 that for another reason, to see how much difference it would be in time.
4 The helicopter, when it was making the series of readings, the only way
5 to get the time that was meaningful there was to use... for him to
6 record the time that the reading was taken and then to radio the entire
7 data in. .

8
9 ESSIG: Relay it to you in one lump sum, sort of on a delayed basis
10 then?

11
12 POTTS: That's correct. That's the way it was radioed to us on occasions.

13
14 ESSIG: Okay, but back to the land based surveys, then. To the best of
15 your knowledge these times were pretty well consistent with the actual
16 time of the survey. I mean given the difference that the individual's
17 watch may differ from the control room clock.

18
19 POTTS: Yes. At one time, and I don't recall which day it was, I attempted
20 to verify whether or not a reading was immediately prior to an action in
21 Unit 2 control room or subsequent, and we did a watch check of everyone
22 and it was either one or two minutes difference total in the circuit
23 that could have occurred in these log times.

24
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1 ESSIG: Okay. You arrived on the Island about seven o'clock, you indi-
2 cated, seven o'clock p.m. on the 28th. And then about midnight that
3 night to 0100, somewhere in that area on the 29th, Seelinger asked you
4 to function as the ECS director.
5

6 POTTS: Yes, and when I think about that, that may be off as much as 8
7 hours. It may have been eight o'clock in the morning.
8

9 ESSIG: Okay. So you could have been on duty then...
10

11 POTTS: We could have shared, I could have been his assistant to as late
12 as 8 or 9 o'clock in the morning. I think it was more towards midnight
13 but I'm not certain.
14

15 ESSIG: Okay, I believe you indicated that he said that he was getting
16 tired and wanted to go home. Would that help? You stayed on an additional
17 eight hours...
18

19 POTTS: Well, really it's hard to say what time it was because I just
20 don't recall. And say that he said he was tired is not the complete
21 story. What the discussion centered around was that we would need to
22 have continuous coverage and relief and the way we were going to do it
23 was to set up a watch and he felt he was going to need some sleep, why
24 didn't he go home. I had just been attending a meeting and driving
25

1 which is relatively nonstrenuous and I was pretty fresh so I'd continued
2 the watch until he got a few hours sleep and then he'd relieve me and
3 then we'd get into a cycle of normal watch reliefs, was really what the
4 discussion was.

5
6 ESSIG: So then you and Mr. Tsaggaris were taking then, roughly 12-hour
7 shifts.

8
9 POTTS: That's what it is on paper but it doesn't work out to 12 hours.

10
11 ESSIG: There was probably some turnover time and...

12
13 POTTS: Two to three hours turnover. What we were using because neither
14 Lex nor I felt like walking into the control room fresh from a night's
15 sleep or a day's sleep or whatever it was and air in the tanks, water in
16 the tanks, I've got it if you know what I mean. Watch relief. What we
17 normally did was, whoever was coming on to the watch would spend at
18 least an hour or perhaps a little more than that reviewing status of
19 both units getting a feel for where we were. And then we'd start to
20 operate in parallel with the communications and the discussions with the
21 State, with the NRC that were in the office, communications between
22 control rooms. And it was usually 2-3 hours til the watch relief was
23 effective and then you repeat that on the other end.

1 ESSIG: Okay.

2
3 POTTS: At any time...and there were a number of occasions...there were
4 several occasions when there was great deal going on at the time you
5 expected to relieve watch and it just wasn't appropriate to leave right
6 away, so we didn't. It was reasonably informal is what I'm saying. It
7 was scheduled for 12 and 12.

8
9 ESSIG: Do you recall who the individuals were under your direct super-
10 vision. I believe supervision is the... we'll use it somewhat loosely
11 but in the context of an emergency organization which has been set up,
12 you are nominally an ECS director, you've got people that you're giving
13 instructions to. Do you recall who those individuals were in the early
14 days?

15
16 POTTS: I couldn't tell you which days which individuals were on, but
17 Bev Good, Gregg Landry, Charlie Hartman...

18
19 ESSIG: Gregg Landry or Lynn?

20
21 POTTS: Lynn Landry, I'm sorry I always call him Gregg. For HP support
22 I had Joe DeMan for awhile and I also had Fred Huwe. The shift super-
23 visor was, on some occasions were Craig Hitz, other occasions I don't
24 recall I guess. There were a number of other people. There was Dennis
25

1 McGetrich. So far as the team members, the offsite and onsite monitoring
2 team members, I couldn't recall their names.
3

4 ESSIG: I don't really need to know them at this time.
5

6 POTTS: Or the helicopter pilot.
7

8 ESSIG: Pardon me?
9

10 POTTS: Or the helicopter pilot.
11

12 ESSIG: Okay, so you had Bev Good, Lynn Landry, Joe LaMan, Fred Huwe,
13 Dennis McGetrich, now that name is new.
14

15 POTTS: Dennis McGetrich is an electrical engineer who works for me.
16 Normally as a I&C control engineer and he functioned for some period of
17 time as a communicator on the radio. The setup that we had was I had a
18 communicator on telephones to the State and we had a radio operator
19 communicating to all the offsite teams. I had a nuclear engineer which
20 was usually Howard Crawford, Mike Benson or Scott Wilkerson. They
21 handled air plots and dispersions. Source terms.
22

23 ESSIG: The communicator, Mr. McGetrich. The instructions that he gave
24 the teams, as far as those were concerned, was he merely acting solely
25

1 in that capacity, a communicator, just what the name suggests? Was he
2 required to make any judgments or decisions? He was given an instruction
3 and he was to relay that to the team?
4

5 POTTS: That is correct.
6

7 ESSIG: Is that a fair statement?
8

9 POTTS: Yes.
10

11 ESSIG: And he was given that instruction by you or one of the nuclear
12 engineers, or...
13

14 POTTS: Combination of both. The nuclear engineer and I worked very
15 closely to decide where the teams should be placed and what the strategy
16 of taking the readings would be. It was my responsibility.
17

18 ESSIG: Okay.
19

20 POTTS: And I got assistance or advice from the nuclear engineer.
21

22 ESSIG: In reviewing the data on these sheets here, and in going through
23 there I've noted just for my own information there with a blue A with a
24 circle around it, the times the collection of air samples which were
25

1 counted, I believe, in the field on a Sam-2. After going through the
2 entire log there that you have in front of you, it appears that there
3 were about 22 samples collected, at least that were collected...at least
4 that are recorded...in there during the first day. And in the second
5 and third days there appear to be something on the order of about 2 each
6 per day. Now I know that there were more samples collected the second
7 and third days because there are other records such as the analytical
8 sheets from your contractor, Radiation Management Corporation. And in
9 fact the NRC mobile lab analyzed some of the samples. I am just curious
10 if you know, were either the samples not recorded in there because they
11 were not measured with the Sam-2 then after the first day's experience?
12 And the first day's experience was that there was an awful lot of xenon
13 present on the ch. coal and this was interfering with the -- well, the
14 xenon was essentially being then counted as iodine. I guess what I'm
15 trying to establish is, during the second or third day, was the fact
16 that there were only about 2 samples recorded per day on these sheets,
17 was it recorded that way just because they weren't measured with the
18 Sam-2 but roughly just as many samples were collected? Had you -- I
19 guess -- let me phrase the question in a different manner. Had you or
20 had either you or someone else you are aware of -- had they been given
21 an instruction not to count the samples with the Sam-2 on the second and
22 third day?

1 POTTS: My recollection is that we were counting those with either the
2 NRC trailer or, very early in the game, Radiation Management came up
3 with a count trailer. That's why I believe that the samples were not --
4 the analysis results were not recorded here. Cause we took the air
5 samples to those trailers to count which meant there was a time delay.
6

7 ESSIG: Had you, when you first came in on the 29th and took over as the
8 ECS director, were you -- was it explained to you by Seelinger that
9 there had been a problem using the Sam-2 to count these samples and that
10 we, now that we've got a laboratory set up let's just have the samples
11 delivered to the laboratory and not even bother with the Sam-2. I'm
12 just trying to establish how that sort of evolved. It appears to have
13 evolved and I just wondered if you recalled anything of the development
14 of like that or was it already -- or did it just sort of happen?
15

16 POTTS: In answer to your question, no I do not recall Jim Seelinger
17 telling me of that evolution. And if I were to look into it I would
18 check with Sid Porter. That's about as helpful as I could be I think,
19 on that area. Sid Porter functioned as our consultant or advisor.
20

21 ESSIG: Yes.
22
23
24
25

1 POTTS: Very heavily in that area of his expertise.
2

3 ESSIG: Was he located in the Unit 1 control room a good deal of the
4 time that you were there?
5

6 POTTS: He spent significant portions of time there. As far as located
7 there, he worked out of both control rooms. He spent a lot of time in
8 my control room where he could be in Unit 1 control room when he was not
9 involved with the Unit 2 problem. And in the first few days of the
10 incident, as I recall it, his major involvement was with the monitoring
11 program; collecting of data, analysis of data, insuring that equipment
12 was proper, we had sufficient parts, and in fact arranging for Radiation
13 Management to proceed to the Island without further delay.
14

15 ESSIG: Okay. Would you describe what kind of interactions that you
16 had between Mr. Tom Mulleavy and Mr. Richard Dubiel during that period
17 of time? What kind of contact? Was it frequent contact, was it face to
18 face, was it over the phone, the radio or were they giving you instruc-
19 tions or asking for input from you?
20

21 RESNER: We'll give a little time to think about that one Mr. Potts and
22 take break to change the tape. The time is now 4:44 p.m. Eastern Daylight
23 Time.
24
25

1 RESNER: This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. William Potts.
2 The time now is 4:45 p.m Eastern Daylight Time. Mr. Potts is about to
3 answer a question.
4

5 POTTS: As I recall the question was to describe my interaction with
6 Tom Mulleavy and Dick Dubiel. One of the names I missed in the earlier
7 listing working in the Unit 1 control room, Tom Mulleavy did at some
8 time work in the control room with us. Tom spent I think a considerable
9 portion of his time in the Unit 1 control room the first few days func-
10 tioning as an advisor and HP supervisor. Dick Dubiel, I had frequent
11 contact with him by the hot line phone to Unit 2 control room. They
12 were available any time I needed them. Consistence if that's the point
13 of your question. I don't recall spending any time working with Dick in
14 the first couple of days.
15

16 ESSIG: Did you find that you had to call on Dubiel for assistance?
17 Were there any real thorny problems that you came across that you had to
18 discuss with him?
19

20 POTTS: I would not characterize it as real thorny. There were
21 several occasions when Scott air packs were unavailable for one reason
22 or another. Dick and I talked on those occasions and I undertook attempt-
23 ing to locate additional supplies for him. All of this data that I have
24 on this table before me, which is the radiation readings from the onsite
25

1 and offsite teams, was relayed to the Unit 2 control room almost on a
2 continuous basis as well as to the State. The NRC had a number of
3 inspectors there and it became obvious very early in the game instead of
4 me attempting to tell them all of this data, what we did was periodically
5 xerox it and give it to them.

6
7 ESSIG: I see.

8
9 POTTS: There was so much of it that it just turned out a lot easier
10 every half hour or so to xerox it and hand them the sheets.

11
12 ESSIG: Do you know, I think I alluded to it a little earlier but I'd
13 like to come back to it, these sheets that you have in front of you,
14 we'll call them ECS radiation survey summary sheets, they represent what
15 was taken down in the ECS from what was recorded in over the radio from
16 the field, I believe. Correct me if that doesn't agree with what your
17 understanding was that those sheets represent.

18
19 POTTS: I believe that's right...

20
21 ESSIG: Okay. That being the case, I also believe that there were some
22 surveys. Each survey that was made, there was a record made of it in
23 the field. The individual making the survey was probably noting the
24 radiation level, the date and time and so forth. And what I'm trying to
25

1 establish, there seems to be somewhat of a tricky problem because there
2 are a lot of pieces of paper that the whereabouts of which aren't precisely
3 known at this time and this appears to be one of them. Do you have any
4 knowledge of where those sheets of paper that were accumulated by the
5 survey teams might have ended up?
6

7 POTTS: I have no first hand knowledge to that at all. I just can't
8 shed any light on it.
9

10 ESSIG: We've talked to the individuals who made the surveys. I've
11 talked with a couple of them and their response was, well we left it in
12 the vehicle for the next...for the relief shift to be collected all in
13 one package. And we are just trying to establish when that package was
14 finally collected and where it is now just so that we can compare some
15 of the actual measurements made out in the field. One of the points
16 here, and I guess it happened before you -- I'm sure it happened before
17 you came on board because it was the first day it was on the 28th. But
18 I know that there was some -- from other information I have, I know that
19 there were some surveys made very early. "Early" being around 7:45 in
20 the morning. There are no records of those surveys on these sheets and
21 in fact the first -- this sheet starts at about 08:42 on the second page
22 there in Goldsboro. And there is no record of those early surveys that
23 were made on the island and so I just feel there are probably a few gaps
24 and there, things which didn't get recorded on this ECS summary sheet,
25

1 especially early on. It may not have been the case later, but I think
2 it would be helpful to get some of the original survey sheets assuming
3 they exist. It would be helpful in filling in these gaps. And that's
4 why I was asking if you had any knowledge of where those might have
5 ended up. That was the point we had behind that.

6
7 POTTS: I could only give you assumptions.

8
9 ESSIG: Okay. During the course of the -- following the event there is
10 a procedure on the emergency procedures which -- I'll give you a little
11 better reference here a minute... It's procedure -- Radiation Emergency
12 Procedure 1670.4, Revision 3, dated to February 15, 1978 entitled,
13 "Radiological Dose Calculations" and this procedure contains in it
14 several enclosures which detail how the source term or the release
15 calculations should be made and then how the atmospheric dispersion
16 factor should be applied and how one eventually then comes up with the
17 predicted offsite dose rate. Now it's my understanding that in the
18 first day these calculations were made much in the manner that's pre-
19 scribed in this procedure. I will show you Enclosure 3, which is the
20 dose calculation sheet, which you take the source term from the previous
21 enclosures; multiply by the atmospheric dispersion parameter; divide by
22 the wind speed and then using other figures in this procedure come up
23 with a dose rate and a dose for the particular offsite location. On the
24 first day this procedure, as I understand it, was used much in that
25

1 manner. But then later on it appeared to be used in a -- shall we
2 say -- a backwards manner in which the offsite dose calculation was --
3 the procedure was run backwards. Starting with the offsite dose measure-
4 ment in this case and then running the calculation backward to find out
5 what release rate for the given atmospheric dispersion conditions would
6 give you that measured dose rate. Were you aware that that was being
7 done?

8
9 POTTS: I know of a couple of times it was done that way to attempt to
10 determine what release rate in the way of curies per second might be
11 going up aux building stack. I also know we used it backwards on occasions
12 to see if we -- a number of the readings were with wind conditions
13 stable. Wasn't possible to calculate from. We tried several things as
14 a, I don't know how to characterize it. Howard Crawford and I looked
15 into it to see what was available to us or what information we could
16 gain from it but it didn't...

17
18 ESSIG: When you say when the wind conditions were stable, that ap-
19 peared to prevent you from doing what not. Could you elaborate a little
20 bit?

21
22 POTTS: I am trying to reconstruct those one or two occasions that
23 Howard and I had time to talk about it, with some difficulty. I can't
24 give you many of the details. I know that we were talking about doing
25

1 dose rate calculations and filling out these forms more frequently than
2 were being done and Howard was... The point of Howard's discussion was
3 to show me that the conditions were such -- the release was so slow or
4 in some cases it was no wind that it just -- it didn't give you meaningful
5 results. Which was why it wasn't done on a more frequent basis. I
6 don't remember to much more than that. I do know we had the book there
7 and the book being the manual it contains these HP procedures. And we
8 occasionally review it and most of the time that I recall being there,
9 the release rates were very low.

10
11 ESSIG: Now these would be release rates. Now from the...

12
13 POTTS: Let me say the "dose rates," not "release rates." The dose
14 rates.

15
16 ESSIG: Okay. The dose rates. Do you recall, or were you involved in
17 any discussions of the use of the HPR-219 as a predictor of release
18 rate? I'll just refresh your memory of how that's used as a predictor
19 in this particular procedure, 1670.4. It has a table for the HPR-214
20 monitor showing the monitor, indicated dose rate on the monitor, and
21 then a noble gas and iodine release rate in terms of curies per second.
22 Were you involved in any discussions with any of the nuclear engineers
23 or with Dubiel or Mulleavy, either one, to decide whether or not the --
24 to confirm that the monitor reading was not giving a realistic prediction
25 of the dose rate -- or, of the release rate?

685 099

1 POTTS: Your question is completely complex. It's got a number of
2 facets and I don't even know if I can recall them all.
3

4 ESSIG: I can take them a little at a time. Let me give you a couple of
5 statements in the way of background. On the first day, the 28th, it is
6 my understanding...because I've interviewed Mr. Crawford already...it is
7 my understanding from having talked with him that the initial prediction
8 that was made overestimated the dose rate in Goldsboro by about four
9 orders of magnitude, a factor of 10^4 . It predicted about 10^4 mR/hr,
10 that is 10 R/hr, and about an hour or so later when it was confirmed, it
11 proved to be less than one mR/hr, the wind still going in that direction.
12 So he, Mr. Crawford, discussed with Dick Dubiel at the time and Mr. Crawford
13 indicated that since that monitor, this table that we're looking at here
14 in Enclosure 2 of that procedure, is to be designed or was designed to
15 be used for containment pressures that might be realized after the
16 design basis loss-of-coolant accident. That is around 55 or 60 psi in
17 containment. And in fact the actual containment pressure at this time
18 was only about -- at the time that Mr. Crawford made his first calcula-
19 tions only about two psi. The leak rate from containment would be very
20 much less than that because of the difference in pressure. Because this
21 procedure assume 2/10% per day?
22
23
24
25

1 POTTS: Uh-huh.
2

3 ESSIG: So, what they did at that time then was to abandon the use of
4 that monitor as a dose rate or as a release rate predictor. Okay, now.
5 With that as background, my question -- and I'll restate it in slightly
6 different terms than I did earlier, are you aware of any situations
7 during the time that you were -- say on day number two and day number
8 three, the 29th and the 30th -- where there was a decision made to use
9 this monitor once again as a predictor of release rate and offsite dose
10 rate or when you were director of the ECS was that monitor just simply
11 not being used in that capacity?
12

13 POTTS: Originally you asked me if I had conversations or knew of any
14 conversations with Dick Dubiel and I don't know of any with Dick.
15 That's the part that made that complex.
16

17 ESSIG: Okay.
18

19 POTTS: Howard and I had discussions on this. There were a number of
20 discussions in the several weeks of the incident about dose rates and
21 all, and the Unit 2 instruments, whether or not they were indicating
22 correctly. But I can't give you the specific conversation with which
23 individual. Nor can I shed much light on when the decision was made not
24 to use the 214...
25

1 ESSIG: I think it may have been made on the previous day, the 28th.

2
3 POTTS: That's possible.

4
5 ESSIG: And I'm just trying to ascertain whether or not there was
6 eventually a scheme devised to correct for the lower containment pressure
7 and hence the lower leak rate from containment, and be able to correct
8 the values on that table to come up with a different source term. And
9 that was really the point of the question. I was trying to decide
10 whether or not that was the case.

11
12 POTTS: I don't recall direct participation in that kind of a decision.

13
14 ESSIG: Okay. During your tour of duty as ECS director, were you aware
15 of any occasions during which the actual directing of the survey teams,
16 that is, telling them where to make surveys, was performed at a location
17 other than the ECS and the Unit 1 control room?

18
19 POTTS: Yes.

20
21 ESSIG: You do. Okay.

22
23 POTTS: There was at least one occasion, I think two occasions when an
24 NRC helicopter interfered with my helicopter which took perhaps five or
25

1 six minutes to straighten out and get priorities. As soon as my chopper
2 pilot moved out of the way, I explained to him that he had priority and
3 he wouldn't move for anyone. There was at least one occasion when the
4 personnel in the observation center directed a reading or two and I'm
5 not know certain whether you have the tape of the airways or not but I
6 informed them I was going to tell them where to go and if they had any
7 request I would entertain them.

8
9 ESSIG: Uh-huh.

10
11 POTTS: That was acknowledged by Mr. Arnold. So far as did I have any
12 difficulties with that, no. That sort of thing wouldn't get in my way.

13
14 ESSIG: Okay. So it was just a temporary problem at most.

15
16 POTTS: Very few minutes on one or two occasions when first the NRC and
17 second company management wanted some readings of a specific area and
18 directed them there and we got it understood that they'd clear those
19 with me.

20
21 ESSIG: Okay.

1 POTTS: Do you have the tape for those airways?
2

3 ESSIG: No I don't.
4

5 POTTS: Oh, okay. I've often wondered if anybody monitored that.
6

7 ESSIG: This morning I interviewed Mr. David Carl who functions as your
8 Metropolitan Edison Corporate meteorologist. He indicated to me that he
9 had made available to the ECS near the end of each day -- end of the day
10 being in the neighborhood of 5:00 p.m. -- end of his day, copies of
11 atmospheric dispersion estimates, so called x/Q values. That he had
12 made available the telecopy, I believe, of these x/Q estimates which had
13 been made by Picker, Lowe and Garrett, your radiological contractor. I
14 asked him to whom did he supply the estimates and the name that he gave
15 me... I have it here... I guess I didn't bring that folder with me but I
16 guess the name isn't so important. But the question I was going to ask
17 is, were you aware that those had been supplied and if so, did you
18 direct anybody to do anything in particular with those values?
19

20 POTTS: No, I was not aware of that.
21

22 ESSIG: Okay. These would not have been live time values. They would
23 have been values probably for the previous eight hours or so, or previous
24 24 hours, which could have been used in a retrospective manner to
25

1 per aps correct some assessments that you made of say, of source term
2 release rate. When you took the measured dose rate and ran the calcu-
3 lations backwards you used a x/Q value in that calculation. This might
4 have been used to just make a better estimate of that release rate. And
5 I was just wondering if there was any attempt to your knowledge to do
6 that?

7
8 POTTS: Since I wasn't aware they were available, the other part of the
9 question is moot.

10
11 ESSIG: Okay. There's a procedure, 1670.9. It speaks to training
12 which would be given and a person in your capacity, that is, I believe
13 your normal job title is Unit Superintendent - Technical Support is that
14 not?

15
16 POTTS: That's correct.

17
18 ESSIG: You're supposed to have training in the following items and what
19 I'd like to do is to list the items and have you let me know if you have
20 received training or which areas you may not have received training in,
21 in the event that you haven't. The types of emergencies...definition of
22 emergencies - local, site, and general emergencies...and I'll just read
23 through them and if there's one that you recognize as foreign, that you
24 may not have had training in, would you just stop me.

1 POTTS: Do you propose to define that training or....

2
3 ESSIG: No, I'm not proposing to define it. I just want to know if in
4 your opinion you have received training. That is, do you know what a
5 local or site or general emergency consists of? What criteria, or that
6 there are certain criteria that have to be met in order that one of
7 these be declared? I'm not asking you if you...if you can recite what
8 the criteria are, but do you know that in fact that there are criteria
9 that are detailed in a procedure and... received certain inplant radiation
10 levels?

11
12 POTTS: Yes.

13
14 ESSIG: Okay. Training in the emergency organization; what it consists
15 of?

16
17 POTTS: Yes.

18
19 ESSIG: Responsibilities, and actions required of an emergency director?

20
21 POTTS: That's difficult to answer. I went through extensive training
22 when the several years I was on the island, previous to this assignment.
23 And I knew that the material was available, in fact I sat down and read
24 most of it when I went to the control room the first day, then referred
25

1 to it periodically afterwards. That's what I referred to earlier as the
2 book which is the health physics book.

3
4 ESSIG: Okay. And that book would have included some of the procedures
5 that we were discussing a few minutes ago?

6
7 POTTS: Yes.

8
9 ESSIG: Offsite dose calculation monitor, and would it have also included
10 the offsite radiological monitoring procedure 1670.6?

11
12 POTTS: Yes.

13
14 ESSIG: Okay.

15
16 RESNER: For the record, could you speak a little louder?

17
18 POTTS: Yes, to both.

19
20 ESSIG: Okay, and I'll just quickly go through the other areas. And
21 available emergency communications?

1 POTTS: Yes.

2
3 ESSIG: Accountability; evacuation criteria?

4
5 POTTS: Yes.

6
7 ESSIG: On and offsite notification responsibilities?

8
9 POTTS: Yes.

10
11 ESSIG: Medical emergencies?

12
13 POTTS: Yes.

14
15 ESSIG: Available support services?

16
17 POTTS: Yes.

18
19 ESSIG: And the fire emergency plan?

20
21 POTTS: Yes.

22
23 ESSIG: Okay. Now that training you indicated would have been given...when
24 you used to be regularly...

1 POTTS: '72 to '76.

2
3 ESSIG: '72 to '76. Okay.

4
5 POTTS: And then I also updated my health physics course every year
6 since then while I was in the corporate headquarters, in Reading.

7
8 ESSIG: What I am doing here is going through collections of notes and
9 records and so forth that we have collected as a result of our request
10 for certain types of records. I'm just trying to see if there are any
11 in here which I think it would be appropriate to ask you a question
12 about so that we can maybe clarify if you have or have not seen that
13 particular record before and you maybe know a little about it to help...
14 Because some of these are kind of sketchy, some of the records and I
15 would just like to -- if there are any more details that we can add to
16 them it would be that much better. I have here in front of me about a
17 13, 14-page log of some sort. It's titled at the top "Site Emergency"
18 and it has alot of monitor HPR-219, HPR-220 fuel handling building and
19 so on, readings on it. And it has some other notes besides the monitor
20 readings. I'd just like to show it to you since you were involved in
21 ECS. I'm not even sure if that particular set of notes was generated in
22 ECS but I'm just trying to put an author's name on it if I can. Just so
23 that we can maybe talk to the individual and maybe add a few more details
24 that might not be there as best he can recall. Does that look at all
25 familiar to you?

1 POTTS: Yes, the spelling is definitely mine.

2
3 ESSIG: That is your...

4
5 POTTS: That appears to be my handwriting.

6
7 ESSIG: Okay.

8
9 POTTS: With the exception of on page one, the black ink, I don't
10 believe is mine. Starting with the blue ink appears to be mine. In
11 fact, this is part of the notes that I was taking while I was on watch
12 and would turn over to my relief, and explain at the time of relief.

13
14 ESSIG: Would you have begun, since that log appears to be undated, as
15 near as I can tell, that many of the entries in there are undated. Do
16 you know if that would have been begun? Or did you already say and I
17 didn't catch it? Did you begin keeping that log when you first took
18 over the ECS?

19
20 POTTS: The first evening I kept such a log but I think this one is
21 dated later than that period of time. For instance, you note the pages
22 are numbered, which is a habit of mine. And if you go to page eight
23 there is a note where NRC management called the State and recommended to
24 evacuate 10 miles down stream, downwind, excuse me. I won't read further
25 than that. I didn't ever anticipate this being read by anybody else.

1 ESSIG: So that log, we'll call it a log, that's basically what it is.
2 I guess, that appears that page eight probably would have been dated
3 about the 30th. That's Friday the 30th. A date which the State has
4 termed "Black Friday."
5

6 RESNER: For the record, you're nodding your head instead of indicating...
7

8 POTTS: I'm sorry I nodded my head. I didn't want to speak because I
9 had called it something other than "Black Friday."
10

11 ESSIG: Okay.
12

13 RESNER: At this time let's break to change the tape so we won't get
14 caught short. The time now is 5:18 p.m., eastern daylight time.
15

16 RESNER: This is a continuation of the interview with William E. Potts.
17 The time now is 5:24 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time.
18

19 ESSIG: Mr. Potts I'd just like to determine, in your capacity as an
20 ECS coordinator, did you occasionally make any verifications, for example,
21 if the right overlay was being used in the offsite predictions? Did you
22 feel compelled to do that or did you pretty much trust things to the
23 nuclear engineers that were on duty and sort of let them go their own
24 way? What kind of interaction did you have along those lines?
25

1 POTTS: I do not recall ever verifying that the correct overlay was
2 used:

3
4 ESSIG: Okay. These would be the stable, unstable and neutral.

5
6 POTTS: I understand what you're saying on the overlay.

7
8 ESSIG: Were you on duty in the ECS on the morning of Friday the 30th?
9 At...

10
11 POTTS: I was on duty... excuse me.

12
13 ESSIG: At approximately eight o'clock in the morning? Do you recall?

14
15 POTTS: I don't recall. I worked Friday the 30th...

16
17 ESSIG: Let me give you one other piece of information that might help
18 refresh your memory. At that time, around eight o'clock, there was a
19 helicopter survey -- one of the helicopter surveys measurements was made
20 at that time. And a dose rate of 1.2 R/hour was measured at an elevation
21 of 600 feet. That is, about 300 feet above containment. That one
22 number, there is now in retrospect to cause a lot of commotion at least
23 for outside. A lot of concern on the part of NRC headquarters; there
24 was an awful lot of action that was keyed to that or tied to that one
25

1 number. Now it appears that that one number came into NRC headquarters
2 at about the same time that some offsite dose calculations were made and
3 one number, for whatever reason, seemed to be consistent with the particular
4 calculations that were made. I don't know if the number was misused or
5 what, but at the time -- were you there at the time that that result was
6 radioed in?

7
8 POTTS: Yes sir.

9
10 ESSIG: And do you recall what action -- did you take any special
11 actions at the time other than relay this to the NRC and to the State as
12 you had previously done with the other surveys?

13
14 POTTS: The clearest recollection I have of that morning...and it
15 certainly was morning...was, I do recall the radio message on the 1200
16 mR/hour reading, I recall that we passed it on to the State and that the
17 NRC and Unit 1 control room was aware of it. And the next recollection
18 I have was being informed that the State had been advised by NRC management
19 to evacuate and if I may refer to the notes that we've talked about
20 earlier, page eight I believe it is, has some comments on that. When I
21 went -- From there I informed Mr. Miller in the Unit 2 control room and
22 he asked me if we had readings of concern and I did not have any offsite
23 readings of concern or onsite readings of concern. I then went into the
24 shift supervisor's office in the Unit 1 control tower. That was where
25

1 the NRC people were located at that time, in Unit 1, and talked to the
2 man in charge and I'm sorry but I forgot his name, and asked if he had
3 all the information that he needed. He said that he had. Did he have
4 any information that concerned him, he said he had not. Then I ask him
5 why was NRC management concerned and why were they recommending evacuation.
6 And at that time he was confused and he couldn't understand...that's not
7 an appropriate way to put it...he didn't understand why the recommendation
8 had been made, but he did promise that he would get to NRC management on
9 the phone and get back to me. I left there and went back to the State
10 and talked to the State and actually I did not personally talk to the
11 state. I had my phone talker...who happened to be Charlie Hartman I
12 believe...talk to the State and see if they had any concerns. The
13 statement that I got from the Department of Radiological Health in
14 Pennsylvania was that they were -- and I'm using other words,-- that
15 they were upset, that they had been recommended that they evacuate. I
16 checked with Unit 2 control room NRC to determine if anyone over there
17 had any reason to be concerned with conditions of either unit and I was
18 informed that Unit 2 control room NRC personnel were not concerned, not
19 upset. Then I went back into the Unit 1 shift supervisor's office where
20 the NRC man in charge at the time was in an excited manner screaming. I
21 would say, over the phone to the NRC management...I presumed in Bethes-
22 da...but that they were wrong, there was no need for concern, we were
23 going to start a panic of the public and there was no danger. That's
24 why earlier I said I'd have characterized it something other than "Black
25 Wednesday."

1 ESSIG: Black Friday.

2
3 POTTS: Friday excuse me. Black Friday. I was told by the NRC man
4 after his discussion with NRC headquarters that there apparently had
5 been some confusion in the use of that helicopter number and that it had
6 been interpreted or misinterpreted to be a ground level reading and the
7 population was being exposed to 1.2 R.

8
9 RESNER: When you say helicopter number you are referring to the reading
10 of the helicopter?

11
12 POTTS: Yes sir. The reading dose rate of the helicopter.

13
14 RESNER: Thank you.

15
16 ESSIG: Mr. Potts, do you recall at that time when Gary Miller asked
17 you if you had any basis for a concern offsite? Did you feel the need
18 to institute a more extensive survey in the event that there was really
19 something that you may have missed?

20
21 POTTS: I don't recall if we instituted more extensive surveys. What I
22 do recall is reviewing a number of hours previous data and during the
23 next several hours as this played out, checking data over and over again
24 to see what I was missing. And periodically going into the NRC office
25

1 and the shift supervisor's office and asking them a number of questions
2 about was I missing something and to try to keep up to date on whether
3 or not we could really determine if it was possible to turn event that
4 around. But I convinced myself and feel certain that everybody who was
5 present in Unit 1 control room and Unit 2 control room were convinced
6 that there was absolutely no problem. That may have included additional
7 surveys; without going back to these logs, I don't know that I could
8 answer that.

9
10 ESSIG: Okay. At any time during your tour of duty as ECS coordinator,
11 did you get the feeling either from your own knowledge or something that
12 may have been relayed to you by one of the others under your immediate
13 supervision that you were unable to keep up with the -- where the plume
14 was going offsite? Were you always in a position where you felt on top
15 of things? Were you comfortable?

16
17 POTTS: I, of course, couldn't answer the question that I was comfortable.
18 You know, you're just are not "comfortable" in a situation like that.
19 But I think I had sufficient information. The only time you didn't know
20 where the plume was when there wasn't sufficient wind speed to have a
21 plume or when the wind died down and commenced to shift. Because there
22 really wasn't any wind speed. But I had wind speed and wind direction
23 information constantly and instantly available to me.

1 ESSIG: Was there an individual that you had assigned to read that
2 recorder or were you personally going over and reading the wind speed
3 direction recorder and relating that to the nuclear engineers or...
4

5 POTTS: Well the nuclear engineers were assigned to read it but I
6 frequently looked at it myself and discussed with them the wind, I
7 talked to the Unit 2 control room, if there was an evolution in Unit 2
8 control room such as the venting or opening of MUV -- the vent valve and
9 makeup tank, MUV-17. You'd look at the wind, you'd look over the last
10 hour or so and determine was it shifting. We used the wind constantly
11 to shift the location of the onsite and offsite teams and then we used
12 the wind to give the helicopter instructions to what position we wanted
13 him to monitor. So the wind speed and direction were just something you
14 checked either by looking at the graph in the control room or by looking
15 at what the nuclear engineers were writing down off of that graph.
16 Frequently.
17

18 ESSIG: Did you give the monitoring teams or did the nuclear engineers
19 give the monitoring teams independently of you, any instructions with
20 respect to the frequency with which air samples should be collected?
21

22 POTTS: Not independent of me. We set up -- we being with Sid Porter's
23 either advice or review and approval, I don't recall which -- but Sid
24 Porter and Lex Tsaggaris and I wrote out a list of sampling that was to
25

1 be taken -- that is a schedule and posted it near the radio operator and
2 gave it to the nuclear engineers and they participated in that. We also
3 included mundane instructions such as, you don't relieve until the other
4 team is on site, when you do relieve you will check your battery, your
5 radio, your instrument; and one of the things that I liked was to require
6 them to contact us on the radio every 15 minutes when they were making --
7 the offsite teams in particular, so that if you did have an occasion
8 were they couldn't reach you by radio then their instructions were to
9 report back to the last location that they were at when they had contact
10 on the radio. That list was available, I suspect, on the 29th... yes,
11 the 29th, that would be my guess.

12
13 ESSIG: Do you recall if that list called for a collection on a specific
14 frequency such as every hour or every two hours...

15
16 POTTS: Air samples once per hour.

17
18 ESSIG: Once per hour.

19
20 POTTS: Once per hour.

21
22 ESSIG: Wherever the plume happened to be at this time? Was that the
23 instruction?
24
25

1 POTTS: Yes.

2
3 ESSIG: Were you aware of the presence of an individual by the name of
4 William Graber from Electric Boat, a contractor? By "presence" I mean,
5 it's my understanding that he was located in the observation center and
6 as of a certain point in time -- and I don't know exactly when that
7 point in time is, because several people that we've asked this question
8 differ as to when it actually occurred,...but he was instructed to...
9 apparently by Met Ed management...to indicate to essentially all the
10 normally rad protection... normally rad protection people and then all
11 the people that were in a supportive role to rad protection or emergency
12 organization such as yourself...that he was instructed to tell them that
13 as of a certain point they were working for him. Do you recall having
14 been told that by Mr. Graber?

15
16 POTTS: No.

17
18 ESSIG: Okay.

19
20 POTTS: I'm rather certain I wasn't told that by Mr. Graber.

21
22 ESSIG: I believe, Mr. Potts, that I've exhausted my list of questions
23 I wanted to ask you about. At this time I'd like to give you the oppor-
24 tunity, if you'd wish to do so, to any personal observations that you'd
25

1 care to make with respect to the followup of this incident. The followup
2 either on the part of Met Ed and their contractors or the NRC or outside
3 agencies; the interactions between them; what you might have appreciated
4 having; and now that we have 20/20 hindsight, what you might have appre-
5 ciated having at the time either in terms of personnel, training, equipment,
6 that type of thing. If you care to I'll give you the opportunity now.
7

8 POTTS: One, I'm working with Met Ed management on a list of recom-
9 mendations for in house Met Ed changes, if you will. I have not completed
10 my understanding of the Unit 2 incident. I've spent considerable time
11 studying it so I don't know that I'm in a position to give you an all-in-
12 clusive list of recommendations or, for that matter anyone else.
13

14 POTTS: The one that will always be most difficult for me to understand
15 and impossible for me to do anything about curing is the dichotomy that
16 existed apparently in the onsite NRC support cooperation. And what I
17 presently understand is a lack of understanding on the part of NRC's
18 management of the situation. I'm told that within hours NRC personnel
19 were present in both control rooms and established communications. I am
20 personally aware that we had from anywhere from 6 to 12 NRC personnel in
21 the control rooms at all times with rather elaborate communications.
22 Worked very closely and helpfully with us and yet we had "Black Friday."
23 Apparently from what I read in some of the newspapers some misunder-
24 standing on the part of NRC management. And I hope someday to get a few
25

1 days vacation so I can check into a newspaper article that says the NRC
2 completed day four, a two-day computer study that came to the conclusion
3 there was relatively minor or no danger at Three Mile Unit 2, but didn't
4 put the information out to the public because they didn't want to appear
5 to be jumping to quick decisions, snap judgments. And I made a promise
6 to myself I'll look into that one. I want to find out if that actually
7 happened. I don't believe too much I read in the newspapers anymore.
8

9 RESNER: Okay. Do you have any more additional comments you'd like to
10 make, Mr. Potts?
11

12 POTTS: No.
13

14 RESNER: The time is now 5:43 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time. This con-
15 cludes the interview of Mr. William E. Potts.
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