

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

1 In the Matter of:

2 IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW

3 of Mr. James C. Deddens
4 Manager of Project Management Department
5 Babcock and Wilcox Corporation
6 Nuclear Power Generation Division

7 REPRESENTATIVE

8 Mr. Byron D. Nelson
9 Assistant Council
10 Babcock and Wilcox Corporation
11 Nuclear Power Generation Division

12 Trailer #203
13 NRC Investigation Site
14 TMI Nuclear Power Plant
15 Middletown, Pennsylvania

16 May 9, 1979

17 (Date of Interview)

18 June 29, 1979

19 (Date Transcript Typed)

20 189

21 (Tape Number(s))

22 NRC PERSONNEL:

23 James C. Creswell
24 Owen C. Shackleton
25

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1 SHACKLETON: This is an interview of Mr. James C. Deddens. Mr. Deddens is
2 presently Manager of Project Management Department of the Babcock and
3 Wilcox Corporation, Nuclear Power Generation Division, headquartered in
4 Lynchburg, Virginia. The date and time of this interview is May 9, 1979,
5 and we are beginning this interview at 10:44 a.m. eastern daylight time.
6 Present to conduct this interview from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
7 sion is Mr. James S. Creswell. My name the first name is Owen Shackleton.
8 I am an investigator assigned to Region V. Just prior to starting this
9 interview on tape I presented to Mr. Deddens, for his review, a two page
10 document from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which outlines the
11 scope and purpose of this investigation and explains the authority of the
12 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to conduct this investigation. In
13 addition, this document advises Mr. Deddens of his rights to refuse to be
14 interviewed and to refuse to submit any form of a signed statement. The
15 document further advises Mr. Deddens that he has the right to have someone
16 of his choosing present during the course of this interview. Present at
17 Mr. Deddens's request is Mr. Byron D. Nelson. Mr. Nelson is the Assistant
18 Council for the Babcock and Wilcox Corporation, the Nuclear Power Generation
19 Division, at Lynchburg, Virginia. On the second page of this two page
20 document are three questions all of which Mr. Deddens has answered in
21 writing to the affirmative. At this time I'm going to request of Mr. Deddens
22 to respond to these questions orally for record on the tape. Mr. Deddens
23 did you understand the text of this two page document?
24
25

1 DEDDENS: Yes.

2
3 SHACKLETON: And does the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission have
4 your permission to tape this interview?

5
6 DEDDENS: Yes.

7
8 SHACKLETON: Would you like a copy of the tape?

9
10 DEDDENS: Yes I would.

11
12 SHACKLETON: Alright sir that will be provided to you and I will send it
13 through the mail. This interview is being conducted in the offices of the
14 Babcock and Wilcox Corporation, the Nuclear Power Generation Division, in
15 Lynchburg, Virginia. At this time Mr. Deddens for the purposes to give
16 your background, for the understanding of those persons who will be listening
17 to the tape the information you are providing would you please give us
18 briefly your background as to education and work experience in the nuclear
19 field.

20
21 DEDDENS: I'm a graduate of the University of Louisville, Louisville,
22 Kentucky, with a Bachelors Degree in Mechanical Engineering which I obtained
23 in 1952, and a Masters Degree in Mechanical Engineering, which I obtained
24 in 1953 from the University of Louisville. I'm also a graduate of the Oak
25 Ridge School of Reactor Technology in the 1953-54 class. After completing

1 the year of schooling at Oak Ridge, I was employed by the Babcock and
2 Wilcox Company in September of 1954. Since that time I've held various
3 positions with Babcock and Wilcox starting initially on the design of the
4 Indian Point Unit 1 reactor. From there I progressed through a variety of
5 positions such as Project Manager for the Indian Point 1 reactor project, a
6 period of time as a Nuclear Marketing Specialist, Manager of the Nuclear
7 Service Department, later Manager of the Engineering Department and my
8 current position is Manager of the Project Management Department.

9
10 SHACKLETON: Thank you very much sir. And now I'll turn the interview over
11 to Mr. Creswell.

12
13 CRESWELL: Mr. Deddens who do you report to in the Nuclear Power Generation
14 Division Organization?

15
16 DEDDENS: I report to John McMillen the Vice President of Nuclear Power
17 Generation Division.

18
19 CRESWELL: And in relation to the Three Mile Island Unit 2 facility what
20 individual reports to you?

21
22 DEDDENS: Mr. Grant Ward is the Senior Project Manager for the Three Mile
23 Island Unit 2 contract.
24
25

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1 CRESWELL: Do you have, do you discuss issues regarding Three Mile Island
2 Unit 2 with Mr. Spangler also?

3
4 DEDDENS: Not as a routine...not as a routine basis but in the case of a
5 problem with the plant dealing with actual plant operations I would discuss
6 that matter with Mr. Spangler.

7
8 CRESWELL: Okay. Understanding that Project Management ususally deals with
9 contractual type of agreements...that is your main orientation in that in
10 Project Management is, it not?

11
12 DEDDENS: Yes.

13
14 CRESWELL: Toward the implementation of the contract?

15
16 DEDDENS: Yes.

17
18 CRESWELL: Who do you normally deal with in the Metropolitan Edison Organi-
19 zation or its parent company GPU regarding contractual agreements?

20
21 DEDDENS: The contractors administer primarily through a General Public
22 Utilities with Metropolitan Edison as the operating company responsible for
23 the operation of the plant and also Metropolitan Edison is the licensee for
24 the plant. Our dealings with GPU in the execution of this contract are
25 primarily with their project people in Parsippany, New York. Pardon me
Parsippany, New Jersey.

1 CRESWELL: Who would you customarily deal with in that organization?

2
3 DEDDENS: We would deal with ah with Mr. Bob Arnold who is Vice President
4 of operations at GPU, with personnel under him Mr. Dick Wilson. The Project
5 Personnel, I'd say someone in their legal department, Mr. Gordon Bond is
6 the Project Officer that we deal with in GPU.

7
8 CRESWELL: Okay thank you. At this point I would like to go back to the
9 date of March 28, 1979, and deal with your recollections during that day.
10 When did you first become aware that there had been an event at Three Mile
11 Island Unit 2?

12
13 DEDDENS: About 8:15 in the morning shortly after I had reported to the
14 office I was informed that there had been an occurrence at Three Mile
15 Island Unit 2 by Grant Ward who is the Senior Project Manager for this
16 project.

17
18 CRESWELL: What was the nature of the information that he related to you?

19
20 DEDDENS: Only that there had been a transient of some kind that there was
21 evidence of radioactivity released into the reactor coolant system which
22 may have indicated the possibility of core damage, and that there was going
23 to be a meeting taking place in about 15 minutes to discuss further what we
24 knew about the occurrence.
25

1 CRESWELL: That meeting would have been roughly 8:30 in the morning.

2
3 DEDDENS: About 8:30 in the morning.

4
5 CRESWELL: Who attended that meeting?

6
7 DEDDENS: I'm not sure I can remember all the names, there was a combination
8 of Project Management people, Engineering Department people and Nuclear
9 Service Department people. There were perhaps ah twenty people involved.

10
11 CRESWELL: I see. Where was the meeting held?

12
13 DEDDENS: It was held in one of the Nuclear Service Department training
14 rooms.

15
16 CRESWELL: Who, who assumed responsibility in the meeting...who directed
17 the activities in the meeting?

18
19 DEDDENS: Mr. Spangler had most of the available information cause he had
20 been contacted by our site representative, Lee Rogers, had phoned Mr. Spangler
21 about 7:45 a.m. on March 28th.

22
23 CRESWELL: What was the nature of the information that Mr. Spangler related
24 at that point in time?
25

1 DEDDENS: He described the...in fairly general terms...because at that time
2 we did not have a great deal of detailed information to go over, but he
3 described in general terms the nature of the transient that the plant had
4 gone through...the loss of feed water transient and information on the
5 current plant status at that time, was shut down condition of the plant.
6 General temperature pressure information which was relayed to him on the
7 phone by Lee Rogers.

8
9 CRESWELL: Do you recollect what any of those conditions were?

10
11 DEDDENS: No I don't specifically at that meeting.

12
13 CRESWELL: How long did this meeting last?

14
15 DEDDENS: About twenty minutes and it was adjourned pending a call back
16 from Lee Rogers which was scheduled for 9:00 that same morning.

17
18 CRESWELL: Were there any decisions made on your part as a result of this
19 meeting?

20
21 DEDDENS: Yes there was...there were decisions made not necessarily by me
22 alone ...but decisions made to dispatch to the job site technical personnel
23 who are familiar with this kind of transient who could analyze this kind of
24 transient when it had occurred on another reactor...they were sent to the
25 job site with a special chartered plane so that they could get there as
promptly as possible.

1 CRESWELL: What other transients had these individuals been involved in
2 that were applicable to this one?

3
4 DEDDENS: Loss of...well specifically...loss of feed water transients at
5 plants such as Oconee...very similar in design to the Three Mile Island II
6 plant.

7
8 CRESWELL: So the decision to elect certain people was based on their
9 previous experience

10 DEDDENS: Yes.

11
12 CRESWELL: With similar events at other facilities.

13
14 DEDDENS: Yes.

15
16 CRESWELL: Were you involved in the selection process?

17
18 DEDDENS: They were recommended by the Engineering Department, personnel
19 and I concurred in their recommendation.

20
21 CRESWELL: Now the meeting lasted about twenty minutes, and after it was...
22 did you leave after the twenty minute time period?
23
24
25

1 DEDDENS: I left after the twenty minute time period I returned to Bill
2 Spangler's office at 9:00 to await the incoming phone call from Lee Rogers.

3
4 CRESWELL: What time did Rogers...did the call come in from Rogers?

5
6 DEDDENS: The call did not come in precisely at 9:00 and the meeting was
7 moved from Lee Rogers office to another location which was a bigger, larger
8 room. The call came in approximately 9:30.

9
10 CRESWELL: Who was present then at that point in time?

11
12 DEDDENS: Again a fairly large number of people and the occurrence had
13 generated a good deal of interest. I was there, Dr. Roy, who's Manager of
14 the Engineering Department, Dr. Womack, the Manager of Plant Design Section,
15 Bill Spangler was there, and a fairly large number of people who were
16 familiar with the various aspects of the plant.

17
18 CRESWELL: And this meeting at 9:30 took place in what room?

19
20 DEDDENS: In the Project Management Control Center...Project Control Center.

21
22 CRESWELL: What is the normal usage for this room?

23
24 DEDDENS: Well the usage of that room is to review data and schedules and
25 contractual information relative to our various contracts. It's equipped

1 with charts and graphs and things that you need most to properly manage our
2 contracts. Also equipped with communications equipment, speaker phones and
3 so on and so forth.

4
5 CRESWELL: Was it about 9:30 that you received Rogers call?
6

7 DEDDENS: We received a call at 9:30 but it was not Lee Rogers it was from
8 Greg Schaedel also a B&W representative assigned to the TMI-2 plant. And
9 Greg was calling from his home but he had in turn been in touch with Lee
10 Rogers in the control room.

11
12 CRESWELL: What was the nature of the information that Mr. Schaedel relayed
13 to you?
14

15 DEDDENS: Again he reviewed with us data that, concerning plant status that
16 he had received from a phone conversation conducted earlier with Lee Rogers
17 who was in the TMI-2 control room. And it was a report of plant status
18 involving temperatures and pressures around the reactor coolant system the
19 status of operating equipment high pressure injection pumps, reactor coolant
20 pumps, reported conditions such as the "A" steam generator being in service
21 but the "B" steam generator being isolated. I don't recall him having at
22 that time any significant information on radiation.

23
24 CRESWELL: For the information that he gave you what observations did you
25 make about the condition of the reactor coolant system?

1 DEDDENS: That the that the reactor coolant system was in an abnormal state
2 relative to what we had observed before on plants having gone through this
3 kind of transient. The temperatures and pressures were indicating super
4 heated conditions in the reactor coolant system.

5
6 CRESWELL: What were the discussions by the technical people that were
7 present about the abnormal conditions that it could have been caused by?

8
9 DEDDENS: Well the...the concern was that...that the core was not being
10 adequately cooled because the temperature and pressure conditions were
11 indicating super heated super heating in the reactor coolant system and the
12 presence of a possibility of steam existing in the reactor coolant system
13 loop. We also obtained information on intensify the plant operating personnel
14 to start reactor coolant pumps which were indicating low motor currents
15 which then was an indication of the pumps were not pumping very much fluid.
16 Again would indicate the presence of

17
18 CRESWELL: They were not pumping very much liquid.

19
20 DEDDENS: Liquid fluid right, which would again indicate the presence of
21 steam or gas in the reactor coolant system loop. That focused our attention
22 on status that could be taken to quench the steam bubble that might exist
23 in that loop and to provide more adequate cooling. Which then directed our
24 attention towards starting the high pressure injection pumps which at that
25 point in time had been shut down by the operating personnel. Starting the

1 high pressure injection pump and then provide a source of cooling water to
2 the reactor coolant system would serve to reduce the temperature of the
3 reactor coolant system and quench the steam bubble in existence. That was
4 the principal thrust of our thinking at that time.

5
6 CRESWELL: Do you recall who made the recommendation that high pressure
7 injection should be used to accomplish this?

8
9 DEDDENS: I believe it was jointly arrived at after, by the experts there.
10 After reviewing the data related to temperatures and pressures and motor
11 currents...I don't recall any specific individual who said this is what
12 ought to be done...but it was a joint recommendation of the technical
13 experts.

14
15 CRESWELL: Was this recommendation conveyed to any individual at GPU or
16 Metropolitan Edison Company?

17
18 DEDDENS: Yes it was. It was relayed to the control room by our group here
19 to to our people at the site, Schaedel and Lee Rogers. Also during that
20 time we asked that Lee Rogers call us directly right away rather than
21 calling Greg Schaedel calling us so we could have a more direct communica-
22 tion path to the control room. The information was relayed at that time to
23 the control room by that path.

1 CRESWELL: Was Mr. Floyd of the Metropolitan Edison Company present in this
2 particular meeting?

3
4 DEDDENS: I don't believe he was present at that particular meeting. He
5 was present later on.

6
7 CRESWELL: About what time would you estimate that he was involved?

8
9 DEDDENS: Oh 10:00 or 10:30.

10
11 CRESWELL: Was between the time of 9:30 and 10:00 to 10:30 were you involved
12 in this meeting continuously or

13
14 DEDDENS: Yes I was.

15
16 CRESWELL: When Mr. Floyd arrived what sort of discussions resulted from
17 his arrival?

18
19 DEDDENS: Mr. Floyd had been had been in Lynchburg to undergo refresher
20 training on our simulator and he had been in touch with the the Three Mile
21 Island plant by a separate communications path and had been spending some
22 time trying to duplicate the transient on our simulator here. When he came
23 into the room he relayed having knowledge that the auxiliary feed water
24 block valves were not opened until about 8 to 10 minutes into the transient.
25 They were supposed to be open but they were not. I recall him discussing

1 that aspect of the occurrence. He had some success in duplicating the
2 transient on the simulator. And so it was just a general discussion on
3 along those lines.

4
5 CRESWELL: You indicated that Mr. Floyd had some path of communication with
6 the TMI Unit 2 facility. Did he indicate what that path of communications
7 was?

8
9 DEDDENS: No he didn't. He just indicated that he had been in touch with
10 personnel at TMI-2.

11
12 CRESWELL: During these discussions was he advised by the B&W personnel to
13 make certain recommendations to the plant?

14
15 DEDDENS: My recollection is that we discussed with him increasing high
16 pressure injection flow into the reactor coolant system.

17
18 CRESWELL: Were there any other recommendations to your knowledge given to
19 Mr. Floyd?

20
21 DEDDENS: I don't recall...I don't recall any other specific recommendations
22 being made but that one was the was the principal recommendation that we
23 were making at that time and was the was the single most important recommen-
24 dation in our judgment.

1 CRESWELL: During the period of time of...or the day of March 28, 1979, did
2 you personally contact any official of GPU or Metropolitan Edison?

3
4 DEDDENS: Yes I did. I personally talked with ah with several individuals
5 at GPU, I contacted Mr. Bob Arnold, Vice President of General Public
6 Utilities who at that time was in his office in Parsippany.

7
8 CRESWELL: About what time would that have been?

9
10 DEDDENS: We had several conversations during the day. The first one, the
11 first conversation between myself and Bob Arnold, was I think about 2:00 in
12 the afternoon.

13
14 CRESWELL: What was the nature of your discussion with Mr. Arnold?

15
16 DEDDENS: The nature of that discussion was to review the situation as we
17 understood it to compare information that we had with him and to relay our
18 recommendation regarding steps that we ought to be taking specifically to
19 increase the high pressure injection flow to get more cooling in the reactor
20 coolant system.

21
22 CRESWELL: Did you discuss with him the startup of a reactor coolant pump?

23
24 DEDDENS: In a later conversation we did discuss that, not at the first
25 conversation we were concerned with getting water back in the reactor

1 cooling system, getting it cooled, punching the bubble, and getting the
2 system solid. And then a later conversation I had with him which was
3 perhaps between 4:30 and 5:00 we discussed starting a reactor coolant pump.
4

5 CRESWELL: During your discussions with Mr. Arnold in recognizing that you
6 in the course of your conduct of your business you deal with contracts did
7 you discuss contractual agreements relating to recommendations of work or
8 in general the definition of the B&W, GPU or Metropolitan interface regarding
9 the event?

10
11 DEDDENS: From a

12
13 NELSON: Excuse me sir, this is Byron Nelson, I don't quite understand are
14 you asking Jim to give an interpretation of the contract?

15
16 CRESWELL: No I'm not asking if he...to for him to interpret the contract
17 the question that I'm asking...could you identify yourself?

18
19 SHACKLETON: Yes he did.

20
21 CRESWELL: Oh I'm sorry. I'm asking him if contractual matters were discussed?

22
23 NELSON: Fine thank you.
24
25

1 DEDDENS: No they were not. Our discussions centered around the condition
2 of the reactor coolant system and the technical questions concerning that
3 and recommendations regarding what steps ought to be taken to bring reactor
4 to a safer shut down condition.

5
6 CRESWELL: So they ...how would you characterize B&W's position regarding
7 providing recommendations or support as you related it to Mr. Arnold?

8
9 DEDDENS: Well we were very concerned about the condition of the reactor at
10 that point, we were primarily concerned with achieving a cold shut down
11 condition and we were drawing upon our experience with the designer of the
12 reactor coolant system and our experience with the operation of similar
13 reactors and our capability to provide technical support to our customer as
14 required.

15
16 CRESWELL: So there was no reluctance on the part of B&W to provide

17
18 DEDDENS: No reluctance at all which I think was demonstrated by the large
19 number of people we sent to the site, the large number of people we had
20 involved in this occurrence, that from the very beginning of it and the the
21 unqualified support we had provided to the customer.

22
23 CRESWELL: Going back to the point in time which these people were dispatched
24 these basically three people earlier in the day Mr. Winks and Mr. Kelly and
25 Mr. Twilly, did you personally give them any instructions on what there
responsibilities would be when they arrived there?

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1 DEDDENS: I personally did not.

2
3 CRESWELL: Are you aware of any instructions that were given?

4
5 DEDDENS: Not directly.

6
7 CRESWELL: You had mentioned that you had a 2:00 or approximately 2:00 p.m.
8 discussion with Mr. Arnold and then about 4:30 to 5:00 you again had a
9 discussion about starting a reactor coolant pump. What were these forms...
10 these discussions were they in the form of a recommendation that they
11 perform certain operations?

12
13 DEDDENS: Yes the second phone call I had with Mr. Arnold was again to
14 emphasize our recommendation that high pressure injection be initiated. In
15 conversations with the control room, we had, we were given the information
16 that they had not yet started high pressure injection. So the second phone
17 conversation I had with Mr. Arnold was to further emphasize the importance
18 of that recommendation. And it was at that time that he reported to us that
19 pressure injection had been initiated. There was a time lag between our
20 last conversation with the control room and that conversation with Bob
21 Arnold. In the meantime, high pressure injection initiation had been
22 started. Then following that, we were back in touch with the control room
23 and the conversation...the main topic of conversation at that time was
24 placing one of the reactor coolant pumps in service. The principal thrust
25 of that conversation was how to proceed to get the pump in service, things

1 such as establishing seal injection flow and there was concern about the
2 presence of steam or gas in the upper leg of the reactor coolant system
3 piping...the hotleg piping and whatever not steam bubbles or gas bubbles
4 when starting a pump would be drawn down through the suction of the pump
5 and what possible effect that might have on the pump and so we did work out
6 a procedure with the control room on sequence to go through to start a pump
7 and what to look for and what to monitor in starting the pump. We, when we
8 had those worked out and agreed to I had another conversation with Arnold
9 relative to that evolution.

10
11 CRESWELL: About what time would that conversation have been?

12
13 DEDDENS: That would have been I would say about 5:00 in the evening. I
14 reviewed with Mr. Arnold the sequence of events that we had discussed and
15 relayed to the control room and basically that was initially to bump one of
16 the pump to start it for only five to ten seconds then shut it down,
17 observe the parameters and then if everything appeared to be normal then we
18 would start a pump and let it run. We reviewed those and Bob Arnold concurred
19 on the recommendation and then went back to the phone conversation in our
20 control room here and asked them to go ahead and start the pump, which they
21 did.

22
23 CRESWELL: You had earlier stated I believe that there had been a recommen-
24 dation to start reactor excuse me, high pressure injection and the later
25 conversation you had determined from Mr. Arnold that it had not

1 DEDDENS: With the control room...we determined with the control room that
2 it had not started.

3
4 CRESWELL: Okay.

5
6 DEDDENS: And that prompted that call back to Mr. Arnold to get our recom-
7 mendation in at the executive level of GPU so that it we go to the control
8 room in a forceful way.

9
10 CRESWELL: Did Mr. Arnold indicate any reluctance about performing that
11 operation?

12
13 DEDDENS: No. No.

14
15 CRESWELL: That is to establishing high pressure injection. Okay. Did you
16 have any discussions with Mr. Arnold after 5:00?

17
18 DEDDENS: I had one additional discussion with him saying that this was
19 after the reactor coolant pump had been started and temperatures and pressures
20 around the loop had stabilized I called him back and reported that that we
21 felt the starting of the pump was a successful evolution and that the
22 reactor coolant system appeared to be in stable condition, that we were
23 satisfied with the conditions of the reactor at that time and I gave him a
24 series of names and phone numbers who would be available including my home
25 as we continued to monitor the operation during the night so that if during

1 the night he wanted to get in touch with me or his people wanted to get in
2 touch with our people here they would have communication path established.

3
4 CRESWELL: Were there any discussions with any other officers of an GPU or
5 Metropolitan Edison Company?

6
7 DEDDENS: Ah no, not by me personally. My contact with their offices was
8 with Bob Arnold.

9
10 CRESWELL: During the time period from say 8:00 in the morning of March 28,
11 1979 till approximately 5:00 did you have any discussions with your superior
12 regarding the events at Three Mile Island?

13
14 DEDDENS: Yes I did. I don't recall the exact time, he was on vacation at
15 the time, needless to say it ruined his vacation, and I believe he called
16 in.

17
18 CRESWELL: And that would have been?

19
20 DEDDENS: Sometime in the afternoon. I'm not sure I'm not sure when it
21 was. At one point my recollection is that it was on the 28th, it may have
22 been the 29th, but during during one of those calls he called in and I had
23 Bob Arnold on the phone at the same time and so I connected the two together
24 in a conference call and we all talked. I believe that was on the 28th I'm
25 not positive.

1 CRESWELL: What was the nature of those discussions?

2
3 DEDDENS: A review of the situation? I recall there was a discussion of
4 communication paths and the need to establish round the clock communications
5 and a general review of the situation.

6
7 CRESWELL: Was the matter of Babcock and Wilcox Company's posture relating
8 to providing of information, recommendations, analysis, discussed during
9 that discussion?

10
11 DEDDENS: In a general way it was. We did discuss the steps we were
12 taking here to establish round the clock coverage and attempts to improve
13 our communications both with the control room and with the GPU offices.

14
15 CRESWELL: During the course of the contact conduct of your business as
16 Manager of Project Management do you normally interpret contracts?

17
18 DEDDENS: Could you clarify what you mean by that in terms of the meaning
19 of the contract language or

20
21 CRESWELL: By that I would mean that you would review the contract and make
22 decisions based on your review of the contract.

23
24 DEDDENS: Well, the Project Management function is a function which is
25 responsible for the execution of the contract which we have in our customers.

1 That naturally involves familiarity with the contract provision and decisions
2 regarding administration of that contract. It also from time to time
3 involves contract interpretation. We may make those interpretations
4 ourselves within the Project Management Department or we may seek the
5 advice of our legal staff to help us interpret the contract provision. So
6 I think a general answer to your question is yes we would make contract
7 interpretations.

8
9 CRESWELL: Were your decisions that were made on March 28th conducted under
10 that type of situation?

11
12 DEDDENS: Our decisions on March 28th were I believe overridingly guided by
13 past experience on plant operations. We have a reputation and kind of
14 posture within B&W that we are very responsive to the needs of our customers
15 in a time of emergency. And this certainly was an emergency situation.

16
17 CRESWELL: This is Jim Creswell I'm going to turn the mike over to, oh I'm
18 sorry. Well...,

19
20 DEDDENS: Our actions that day were guided by providing the customer with
21 the assistance he needed to cope with this emergency.

22
23 CRESWELL: There was no reluctance.
24
25

1 DEDDENS: I told you there was no reluctance and we did not make our
2 decisions in an atmosphere of commercial consent.

3
4 CRESWELL: Okay, thank you very much. I'll now turn it over to Owen to
5 complete.

6
7 SHACKLETON: Thank you very much Mr. Deddens and Mr. Nelson. This will
8 conclude our interview. The time is now 11:29 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time,
9 May 9, 1979.

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