

FGE



Portland General Electric Company
Trojan Nuclear Plant
P.O. Box 439
Rainier, Oregon 97048

June 22, 1979
BDW-597-79

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V
1990 North California Blvd.
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the Trojan Operating License, Appendix A, USNRC Technical Specifications, attached is Licensee Event Report No. 79-10 dealing with the results of Containment Local Leak Rate Testing.

Sincerely,

B. D. Withers
Plant Superintendent

gd
BDW/SCP:na
Attachment

- c: J. L. Williams
- C. Goodwin, Jr.
- D. J. Broehl
- R. L. Sullivan
- S. R. Christensen
- S. L. Loy
- Plant Review Board
- Nuclear Operations Board
- Trojan Operating Committee
- L. W. Quinn
- D. F. Kielblock
- L. W. Erickson
- Shift Supervisors
- L. Frank, Director, DOE/EFSC
- Office of Management Information & Program Control
- NRC Resident Inspector
- J. H. Draggs, Bechtel
- File 93.24a

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REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE

1. Report Number: 79-10
2. a. Report Date: June 22, 1979
b. Occurrence Date: May 25, 1979
3. Facility: Trojan Nuclear Plant, PO Box 439, Rainier, Oregon 97048

4. Identification of Occurrence

The cumulative leakage through Type B and C containment valves measured during periodic leak rate testing exceeded the Standard Technical Specification limit.

5. Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was in Mode 5, cold shutdown.

6. Description of Occurrence

Local leak rate testing (LLRT) was being conducted to verify the integrity of containment Type B and C penetrations. The LLRT test equipment had flow indication with a maximum range of 11,000 cc/min; and as a result, the absolute value of leakage above this amount could not be determined. Two penetration valves were found to leak in excess of 11,000 cc/min. As a result, cumulative leakage for all containment penetrations and valves exceeded the Standard Technical Specification limit which is 23,615 cc/min.

7. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Both valves showed excessive leakage due to erosion or corrosion of the seating surfaces.

8. Analysis of Occurrence

The event had no effect on either plant or public safety since redundant valves in the affected penetrations did not exceed leakage limits. All valves were repaired prior to plant heatup.

9. Corrective Action

Each valve was repaired prior to heatup. See Table 1 for individual repairs. All valves were retested and found to be within limits.

TABLE 1

Penetration Number	System	Valve Number	Valve Type	Leakage Cause	Repairs
P-26	Refueling Cavity Drain Line	SF073	10" Gate Valve	Was not seating evenly	Lapped disc & seat
P-54	Gas Collection Header	CV4301	3" Gate Valve	Was not seating evenly	Lapped disc & seat