Met-Ed GPU

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Writer's Direct Dial Number

July 26, 1979 GQL 0919

Mr. B. H. Grier, Director Region I Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Sir:

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50
Docket No. 50-289
LER 79-011/04T-0

Attached please find the subject event report, which concerns a sediment sample in which the level of Co-58 exceeded the control station level by more than ten times. This event is reportable per TMI-1 Technical Specification Appendix B, 5.6.2.2.a.(1). This report is being submitted late due to the circumstances described in the summary.

Sincerely,

J. G. Herbein Vice President Generation

JGH: DGM:ms

Attachment

C003/1

599020

LER 79-014/04T-0 Summary

On June 26, 1979, Metropolitan Edison Company was informed by their consultant, that one sample of river sediment showed Co-58 levels in excess of ten times the control station value. The indicator station isotope level was 1.19 ± 0.12 pCi/gm, dry; the control station value was no greater than 0.09 pCi/gm, dry. The sample was one of fifty-three sediment samples obtained since the accident, and one of ten samples taken from the sediment in an area directly downstream of the station discharge. This demonstrates that there is only a small area where the isotope level exceeded the reportability limit. The event is not considered detrimental to the health and safety of the public due to the limited quantities found.

The sample was taken as part of the increased radiological environmental monitoring program started after the accident at Unit II, and their Technical Specifications have no reporting requirements for Co-58. Therefore, it was not noted until after the ten day reporting time had expired that Unit I Technical Specification limits were exceeded.

All releases of liquid from Three Mi. Island have been less than levels permitted by the Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 20 limits. It is believed that the reason for the increased concentration was that, following the Unit II accident increased volumes of Unit I liquid radioactive waste were processed to make available space for Unit II water in the event space would be needed. Since the increased sediment activity is believed to be due to a unique situation, no corrective action is planned.