U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-546/79-06; 50-547/79-06

Docket No. 50-546; 50-547 License No. CPPR-170; CPPR-171

Licensee: Public Service of Indiana
1000 East Main Street
Plainfield, IN 46168

Facility Name: Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Marble Hill Site, Jefferson County, Indiana

Inspection Conducted: May 29-June 1, 1979

Inspectors: E. R. Schweibinz 6-13-79

for E. W. K. Lee 6/13/79

Approved By: C. C. Williams, Acting Chief 6-14-79
Projects Section 2

Inspection Summary

Inspection on May 29-June 1, 1979 (Report No. 50-546/79-06; 50-547/79-06
Areas Inspected: Licensee actions and procedures on IE Bulletins and Circulars; 10 CFR 50.55(e) reportable items; reactor coolant pressure boundary and safety related piping and welding procedures and observation of work. This inspection involved a total of 46 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

Persons Contacted

Public Service of Indiana (PSI)

*J. Coughlin, Vice President - Nuclear
*F. R. Hodges, Quality Assurance Manager
*W. E. Ward, Construction Manager
*T. L. McLarty, Quality Assurance Construction Supervisor
*W. T. Smith, Construction Field Office Supervisor
*R. Wooley, Construction Engineer
*D. L. Shuter, QC Engineer
*G. Westor, QC Engineer
*V. Berlin, QC Engineer
*R. Latronka, Senior Construction Project Engineer
*M. C. Linn, Construction Project Engineer/Mechanical
*J. H. Mansker, Construction Project Engineer

Newberg - Marble Hill

*C. E. Guy, QA Supervisor

Cherne Contracting Corporation

*G. A. Rosier, Quality Assurance Manager
*C. Jergens, QC Manager
*R. Horine, QC Supervisor
T. H. Francis, Principal Engineer

The inspectors also contacted and interview other licensee and contractor personnel including craftsmen, QA/QC, technical and engineering staff members.

*Denotes those attending the exit meeting.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Open) Noncompliance (546/79-02-02): Failure to have special storage instructions for safety related pumps and motors. The licensee requested an extension of two weeks for the date when full compliance will be achieved. Additional time was requested to resolve conflicts between the general headquaters and site procedures. The new date when full compliance will be achieved is June 14, 1979. This item remains open.

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Licensee Action on IE Bulletins

The licensee actions and related correspondance in regard to IE Bulletin No. 79-04, Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation, were reviewed as follows:

Bulletin No. 79-04, March 30, 1979
Velan Engineering Corporaton telegram to the Public Service of Indiana, April 5, 1979
Sargent & Lundy (S&L) letter to PSI, April 17, 1979
Velan Engineering Corporation telegram to PSI, April 24, 1979
PSI letter to S&L, April 24, 1979
Westinghouse letter to PSI, May 24, 1979
PSI letter to NRC, RIII, May 25, 1979

The above bulletin and related documents were reviewed to determine the adequacy and timeliness of the licensee's evaluation of the bulletin's applicability to the plant and corrective action commitments resulting from the licensee's bulletin evaluation. The following comments are a result of this review:

1. The following inconsistencies were noted:

   a. The RIII inspector noted that the telegram from Velan dated April 24 1979, indicated that the weight on one valve was incorrect and that the actual weight was 925 lbs. The inspector inquired as to what the original weight indicated on the drawing was. The licensee investigated this m ter and contacted Velan Engineering Corporation to determine that the weight of this valve as indicated on the drawing was 720 lbs. The licensee indicated that this was a globe valve and not a swing check valve as described in the bulletin.

   b. In the licensee letter to S&L, dated April 24, 1979, relative to NRC IE Bulletin No. 79-04, the licensee states "It is our understanding from the responses prepared on other projects, that the NRC's concern is on all Velan valves and not only on Velan swing check valves. Therefore, please provide a revised response to that affect on or before May 5, 1979."

   c. In the Westinghouse letter dated May 24, 1979, to PSI, Westinghouse indicates that two valves had an indicated weight of 180 lbs. where their actual weight was 285 lbs.

2. The licensee was requested by the RIII inspector to provide an additional response to IE Bulletin No. 79-04 to indicate those Velan valves which had an actual weight which differs from the indicated weight on the drawings. This response should include the three valves identified above and any valves identified in the research done by S&L as requested in the April 24, 1979, letter. This item remains open. (546/79-06-01; 547/79-06-01)

Functional or Program Areas Inspected

Details of functional or program areas inspected are documented in Sections I and II as follows.

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Section I

Prepared by E. R. Schweibinz

Reviewed by C. C. Williams, Acting Chief
Projects Section 2

1. Review of Procedure for Handling NRC Bulletins, Circulars, and Information Notices

Procedure No. PP-29, Rev. 1, May 17, 1979, was reviewed. This procedure for handling NRC bulletins, circulars and information notices contains some inconsistencies. These inconsistencies are in regard to what actions are required by PSI and its AE and vendors when a written response to the NRC is not required. The licensee agreed to correct these inconsistencies. The licensee also stated that an additional procedure, which would cover the actions of the Licensing Manager on this subject, is being prepared. These procedures will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection. This item remains open. (546/79-06-02; 547/79-06-02)

2. Licensee Action on Items Identified by 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports

a. Damage to Two Post-Tensioning Trumplets and the Surrounding Concrete in the Second Lift of the Containment at the 38° Buttress and the 158° Buttress

The damage was caused by 2500 - 3500° propane torch flames that were reportedly allowed to burn inside the trumplets for a period of 5-6 hours to heat the concrete. Damage to the trumplets was physically observed as well as the location from which core specimens were removed from the heat-damaged concrete. The RIII inspector identified a deficiency in the sketch that was attached to the letter April 16, 1979, from PSI to Newberg - Marble Hill. The sketch of the cross sectional area of the trumplet was incorrect in that it indicated that the cores would be removed from the areaof greatest damage at the 158° buttress, when in actuality they would be moved from an area of minor damage to the trumplet. The licensee stated that the sketch would be corrected and reissued to all effected parties. This item will be further reviewed after the receipt of the final report.

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b. Damage to the Containment Liner Which Occurred on April 6, 1979, When it was Struck by the Jib of a Crane

Observation of the damage from both sides of the containment liner plate was made. This item will be further reviewed upon receipt of the final report.

3. Site Tour

An extensive tour of the site was conducted and the general housekeeping of the plant was evaluated. The RIII inspector informed the licensee that housekeeping had improved, and that a continued effort on their part is necessary in order to continue improvement.

Section II

Prepared by E. W. K. Lee

Reviewed by D. H. Danielson, Chief
Engineering Support
Section 2

1. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping - Review of QA Procedures (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector reviewed eight Cherne Contracting Corporation (CCC) procedures, one Public Service of Indiana (PSI) procedure and two Sargent and Lundy Engineers (S&L) specifications relative to Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping work activities. The procedures reviewed included procurement document requirement and control; receiving inspection; identification; handling; storage; erection and installation; generation and record keeping. The inspector determined that the procedures met the PSAR commitments, QA Manual, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, and the applicable code requirements. It was further determined that procedure for review and approval of piping isometric drawings for use by CCC was unavailable. Upon discussing with CCC personnel, the inspector established that control for review and approval of piping isometric drawings does exist and CCC agreed to generate a procedure. The inspector stated this matter is considered unresolved pending a review during a subsequent inspection. (50-456/79-06-03; 50-457/79-06-03)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

2. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping (Welding) - Review of QA Procedures (Units 1 and 2)

a. QA Procedures

The inspector reviewed thirteen CCC procedures related to welding of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping. The procedures reviewed included control of weld data sheets including hold points; qualification of welding procedures, welders, NDE and inspection personnel; calibration of equipment; control of preheat and interpass temperatures; repair of defects and control of welding materials. The inspector determined that the procedures met the PSAR commitments, QA Manual, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B and the applicable code requirements.

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b. Review of Welding Procedures

The inspector reviewed CCC Welding Procedures No. 101BR11-0.50, Rev. 0, No. 808B021-1.0 (CT), Rev. 4, and their qualification records. It was determined that the WPS met the ASME Code, Section IX requirements. It was further determined that WPS No. 101BR11-0.50 does not specify the maximum allowable gap opening in a split backing ring and the root opening is specified as 3/16" nominal. It was the inspector's understanding that the WPS will be revised to indicate (1) maximum allowable gap opening in a split backing ring and (2) a definitive root opening will be stated. This matter is considered unresolved pending a review during a subsequent inspection. (50-456/79-06-04; 50-457/79-06-04)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

3. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping - Observation of Work and Work Activities (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector toured the outdoor piping laydown area. It was determined that: (1) Spools are identified; (2) spools are resting in dunnage; and (3) ends are covered.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

4. Safety Related Piping - Observation of Work and Work Activities (Unit 1)

The inspector observed the following safety related piping work activities:

a. Fit up and alignment of Containment Spray System Weld No. 1CSB-01006.

b. Handling and protection of Component Cooling Water System Spool No. 1CC03A-1628.

It was determined that work activities were performed in accordance with the applicable procedures and good construction practices were adhered to.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping - Welding Material Control (Units 1 and 2)

a. Review of Documents

The inspector reviewed the following documents:

(1) Cherne Contracting Corporation (CCC) procedure No. 10.4, Rev. 0, "Procurement Document Control."

(2) CCC Procedure No. 11.1, Rev. 3, "Receipt Inspection of CCC Procured Safety Related Items."

(3) CCC Procedure No. 11.10, Rev. 2, "Welding Material Control Numbers."

(4) CCC Procedure No. 13.4, Rev. 1, "Coated Electrode Handling and Storage."

(5) CCC Procedure No. 13.5, Rev. 0, "Bare Wire Storage and Handling."

(6) Receiving Inspection Report Material Certification and Purchase Order for E7018 electrodes with heats No. 422E5441, No. 11649, No. 411E6091 and No. 412E5301; E70S-2 welding rod with heat No. 065210; E309-16 with heat No. 386478; ER308 with heat No. 04630; ER309 with heat No. 12037; and E308-16 with heat No. 376375.

b. Control of Materials

The inspector toured CCC welding material issuing station located at elevation 364'-0" of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building. It was determined that (1) the welding materials are properly identified and segregated, (2) the temperature of the rod ovens is maintained, (3) records are properly kept, and (4) issuance and return of welding materials are controlled in accordance with procedure.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary and Safety Related Piping - Welder Qualification (Units 1 and 2)

The inspector reviewed CCC procedure No. 13.3, Rev. 2, "Qualification of Welders." It was determined that the procedure met the requirements of ASME B&PV Code, Section IX.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Documentation of Containment Penetration

The inspector reviewed documentation package of penetration No. 1PC77. It was determined that (1) Ultrasonic Test Report does not contain sufficient data, e.g. level of examiner, DAC curve, location of component examined and etc.; and (2) weld repair data. The inspector stated this matter is considered unresolved pending a review during a subsequent inspection. (546/79-06-05)

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are items about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Section II, Paragraphs 1, 2.b and 7 of the details section of this report.

Exit Meeting

The inspectors met with the site staff representatives (denoted in the Persons Contacted paragraph) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 1, 1979. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged the findings.