

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION V 1990 N. CALIFORNIA BOULEVARD SUITE 202, WALNUT CREEK PLAZA WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596

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| MEMORANDUM | FOR: | Ν. | С. | Moseley, | Director, | Division | of | Reactor | Operations |
|------------|------|----|-----|----------|-----------|----------|----|---------|------------|
| | | 1 | Ins | pection, | IE:HQ | | | | |

FROM:

J. L. Crews, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch, Region V

SUBJECT: COMMISSION ORDER 7590-01 DATED MAY 7, 1979 SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (DOCKET NO. 50-312)

The subject Commission Order required certain actions to be completed by the licensee prior to startup of the Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant. This facility was shutdown on April 28, 1979.

Region V inspection activities, subsequent to the facility shutdown, have confirmed as indicated below that the licensee has complied with requirements specified in the Commission Order. These inspection activities also confirmed the accuracy of the information contained in the licensee's letters to the NRC dated April 11, April 16, April 19, April 22, May 2, May 11, May 14, and May 21, 1979. These letters are responses to IEB 79-05A and IEB 79-05B.

The specific inspection activities performed by Region V for purposes of confirming licensee compliance with the Commission Order included the following:

- Verification of the installation and testing of hard-wiring control-grade reactor trips that are actuated by loss of both main feedwater pumps or an automatic turbine trip.
- A review of the revised procedures for responding to small reactor coolant system breaks and for initiating and controlling auxiliary feedwater independent of the Integrated Control System. Comments on these procedures were provided to the NRR B&W task force.
- Verification that an evaluation of transient behavior and small reactor coolant system breaks was prepared and submitted to NRR for their review and evaluation.
- 4. Verification that a sufficient number of plant operators have been trained at the B&W simulator, on the TMI incident, to assign at least one such operator to the control room and two such operators on each work shift.

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- Verification that Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFS) flow indicators were installed, calibrated, and successfully tested to demonstate flow indication in the control room of AFS flow to each steam generator.
- 6. Verification that licensed operators are knowledgeable of facility modifications, procedure changes, and system and equipment operation requirements resulting from the TMI incident. This verification was obtained by conducting oral interviews with plant operators on June 1-2, 1979 and again on June 17-18, 1979, after additional training was provided by a licensee contractor. Written operator examinations given by the licensee were also reviewed. A representative of the Operator Licensing Branch of NRR assisted with the operator interviews on June 1-2 and with review of the written examinations.
- 7. Verification that facility operating procedures were revised and/or developed to address the applicable items identified in Enclosure (i) of the licensee's letter to H. R. Denton, dated April 27, 1979. The NRR B&W task force reviewed and evaluated these procedures and procedure revisions for acceptability.
- Verification that tests were performed to assure AFS air-operated control valves fail to the 50% open position upon loss of electrical power to the electric-to-pneumatic converter and fail to the 100% open position upon loss of air.
- 9. Verification that a test was conducted to assure AFS flow capacity is in accordance with Technical Specification requirements.
- Verification that necessary modifications have been satisfactorily completed to provide annunciation in the control room of all auto start conditions of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

With regard to Item 2 above, it is our understanding that discussions are continuing between NRR and the licensee regarding the use of high pressure injection as it relates to the temperature-pressure limits contained within the Technical Specifications.

ews. Chief

Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

cc: E. L. Jordan, IE:HQ

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