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May 30, 1979

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Chairman Joseph M. Hendrie
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Joe:

Enclosed, as I promised, is a clean copy of the list of questions and topics concerning nuclear safety and related subjects being considered by the Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Reactor Safety Review. We greatly appreciated your invitation to meet with us, and for the forthright and candid way in which you, Dr. Denton, Mr. Dorie, and Mr. Russell responded to our questions and comments. This will be very helpful to our Committee in preparing its report to Governor Thompson. Your view that the safety of nuclear plants ultimately resides with the operators was particularly cogent.

Some of the insight provided will, I believe, lead to a more sound and effective interaction on nuclear matters between the NRC and the State of Illinois.

With best wishes and personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

P. F. Gustafson, Chairman
Ad Hoc Nuclear Reactor Safety Review
Committee

PFG:na
Enc.

cc: H. R. Denton
W. M. Dorie
W. T. Russell

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Topics Formulated by the Illinois Commission
on Atomic Energy to be Discussed in the Meeting
with Dr. Joseph Hendrie, Chairman of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission on May 29, 1979

1. The accident at TMI appears to represent not only a combination of design/component failure and operator error, but an inadequacy in institutional arrangements on the part of all parties involved during its initial phases. How does NRC propose to use the accident as a means for improvement in these three areas?
2. How does NRC view the adequacy of reactor operator training and competence? Are the appropriate kinds of people so involved? (For example, should they be engineering college graduates?) Are they adequately paid for their responsibility? Should they be union or management? Should there be a national institute for training reactor operators (and perhaps other categories associated with nuclear power) such as the U.S. Maritime Academy for the Merchant Marine?
3. How will NRC analyze and work into the regulatory process the individual nuclear station responses to IE Bulletin No. 79-06A?
4. How does NRC assure that the experience of other utilities in nuclear operating experience is incorporated into the knowledge or information-base, training and operating procedures of a specific utility? Essentially this embodies the incorporation of lessons learned into the entire nuclear utility industry.
5. Because of size should some utilities be discouraged from going nuclear?
6. How does NRC view multiple nuclear units at a single site?
7. What attention is being given to bettering the organization of control board information of a distinctly safety character? There appears to be an inefficient and confusing intermix of safety and non-safety parameters at present including the use of colored lights. As a people we are conditioned to regard red as stop (unsafe), and green as go (safe).
8. Who is in control during an emergency situation at a nuclear power plant? Who is the spokesman regarding the situation and its possible consequences? Do all parties know their role, and more importantly do they accept their role?
9. How seriously is NRC considering legislation or regulations which would permit or indeed require the NRC to assume the responsibility for the operation of a nuclear plant during an emergency? 55-208
10. When will all nuclear stations in Illinois have an NRC resident inspector? What are the responsibilities of such an inspector? What training is required? How long will their term of duty be at a specific plant?
11. What steps are contemplated for insuring a more effective NRC/state relationship in regard to both routine and emergency reactor operating conditions?

12. Might NRC consider assigning staff from the Division of State Programs to the Regional NRC Offices?
13. Does NRC have a nationwide reactor operator rating system similar to that developed and in use in Region III?
14. Who paid for the evacuation expenses at TMI? How much were the expenses?
15. What are NRC's views on continuous real-time monitoring of effluent streams having the potential for off-site release(s)? In the case of TMI such information would have been invaluable. The installation and annual operating costs of such a system are estimated to be about \$500K and \$70K respectively. Such costs seem small in comparison to those due to evacuating people, seriously disrupting the lives of additional people, and the fairly widespread loss of public confidence in nuclear power.
16. Does NRC evaluate its regulations in terms of their effectiveness in achieving technical goals? Does NRC evaluate the cost-effectiveness of its regulations?
17. In general, do the attitudes and procedures of NRC encourage vendor and operator suggestions regarding improvements in reactor design and/or operation? In other words, is NRC receptive to suggestions for reasonable change? In part, any such receptivity may be in initial conflict with the concept of standard plant design.

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