



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
1700 L. J. ROSS DRIVE, SUITE 1000
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011

M Service

April 19, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: R. L. Jordan, IC-110

FROM: G. I. Madsen, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch, RIV

SUBJECT: ARKANSAS POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY RESPONSE TO IE BULLETIN No. 79-05A - ITEMS 4c AND d, AND 5 - 12

Region IV has reviewed the licensee's response to IE Bulletin 79-05A, dated April 16, 1979. Since the plant is scheduled for cold shutdown refueling conditions until April 30, 1979, the implementation of the Bulletin action items will not be in place until prior to heatup above 2000F. Region IV will verify completion of corrective actions, procedure revisions and the associated training as these items are completed.

Region IV comments on the licensee's response are as follows:

Item 5 - Review of Safety-Related Valve Positioning Requirements

The licensee has included a supplemental response to item 5, indicating that they have reviewed the Reactor Building Cooling System, the Reactor Building Penetration Room Ventilation System, and the Hydrogen Purge System, as requested by Region IV.

Item 4c - Reactor Coolant Pump Operation

The licensee has responded to this item for three conditions: break size exceeding HPI capacity, break size within HPI capacity, and other (e.g., Main Steam Line Break). For break sizes within HPI capacity, the licensee proposes to keep at least one RCP per loop in operation until the system has been stable for 20 minutes and the hot and cold leg temperatures are at least 500F below saturation. This proposal should be evaluated by the NRC to determine if it is acceptable. For accidents such as a Main Steam Line Break, the licensee states that tripping of the RCP's is necessary to lessen the severity of the accident.

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Item 4d - Operator Reliance Upon Pressurizer Level

The licensee is revising plant procedures, placing emphasis upon assuring an adequate margin to saturation conditions. They are developing two methods to aid the operator in assessing core conditions relative to voiding. Both of the methods outlined appear to have merit. If other PWR licensees have not developed similar methods, it is recommended that they be informed of the AP&L methods.

Item 6 - Containment Isolation Initiation

Region IV agrees with the licensee's evaluation of which containment penetrations should receive an ES signal to isolate on low RCS pressure. However, the licensee does not believe that the necessary design change can be incorporated during the current outage and has committed to incorporate the design change during the first outage to cold shutdown conditions (after completion of the design change engineering) which is of sufficient length to accommodate the change but not later than the next refueling outage. If this timing is determined to be acceptable, Region IV will require that the licensee make emergency procedure revisions to include followup actions after a LOCA to verify that the valves listed in items 9 through 16 of the licensee's response are closed.

Item 7 - Emergency Feedwater System Valves

The licensee's response is considered to be acceptable.

Item 8 - Independent Emergency Feedwater Flowpaths

The licensee's response to this item and the proposed action statements are acceptable to Region IV, but the comments listed under Item 1 of our memo of April 13, 1979, still apply.

Item 9 - Transfer of Potentially Radioactive Gases and Liquids Out-of-Containment

The licensee's response to this item is acceptable to Region IV.

Item 10 - Maintenance and Test Procedures

The licensee's response to this item is acceptable to Region IV.

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E. L. Jordan, IE:HQ

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
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Item 11 - Operating and Maintenance Personnel Training

Region IV is continuing to follow the licensee's progress in completion of the training requirements of IEB 79-05A.

Item 12 - Prompt Reporting Procedures for NRC Notification of Serious Events

In accordance with Item III.B.5 of TI 2595/2, Region IV will require that all plant operators and supervisory personnel receive additional training in the provisions and directives for early NRC notification of serious events.


G. L. Madsen, Chief,
Reactor Operations and
Nuclear Support Branch

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