

POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

10 COLUMBUS CIRCLE NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019
(212) 397-6200



July 3, 1979
IPN-79-43

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Mr. Albert Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1
Division of Operating Reactors

Subject: Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant
Docket 50-286
Supplementary Information for I&E Bulletin No. 79-07

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the reporting commitment made by the Authority in its letter of May 31, 1979, the following is reported.

On July 3, 1979 at 11:05 A.M. the Authority determined that four backing plates and anchor bolt assemblies, when the flexibility criteria of I&E Bulletin No. 79-02 were considered, do not possess sufficient conservatism with respect to Design Basis Earthquake (DBE) loads.

These four assemblies are associated with the following snubbers on the feedwater lines indicated:

<u>Line No.</u>	<u>Snubber No.</u>
5	BFD-R-5-1-H
6	BFD-R-6-1-H
7	BFD-R-7-1
8	BFD-R-8-1-H

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While these supports are associated both with snubbers reportable as a Technical Specification matter and with seismic piping stress reanalysis efforts, and even though this matter was identified during the 79-07 reanalysis, it is more a matter of concern under 79-02 and not one reportable in accordance with the Authority's commitments. Nevertheless, the Authority is reporting it at this time rather than as a part of its 79-02 submittal.


A reanalysis using the absolute summation method of the piping with the snubber assembly omitted shows that the pipe stresses are less than the allowable limits for the Design Basis Earthquake (DBE). This indicates that the piping system will retain its integrity during a DBE even if the snubber supports were to fail.

The snubbers themselves are adequate for both OBE and DBE loads, but with the backing plate flexibility criteria and anchor bolt factor of safety of four of 79-02 applied, the anchor bolts have insufficient capability.

The modifications to increase the backing plate and anchor bolt capability above the conservative values are now being designed. A knee brace for line 5 and gusset plates for lines 6, 7 and 8 are considered likely solutions. Field repairs will begin as soon as possible. It is expected that these modifications will be completed expeditiously.

The Authority considers that its analysis and corrective actions already in progress support its determination that the Indian Point 3 plant may continue to operate without undue risk to the public health and safety.

Very truly yours,


Paul J. Early
Assistant Chief Engineer-
Projects

cc: Mr. Boyce Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pa. 19406

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79-001-03K
79-001-03L

IE MAIL

TELEPHONE REPORT

USNRC REGION
ATLANTA, GA

50-413
50-414

FACILITY: Catawba 1 and 2

13 JUN 22 10:00 AM '79

DATE: June 21, 1979

TIME: 8:57 am & 10:44 am

LIC. OCC. #:

SUBJECT: CDR - Control Panel Weld Deficiencies

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: Cracks have been observed in 1/4" welds of bracing

in prefabricated bare control panels supplied by Frank Electric Co.,

York, Pa. New weld design and procedures to repair are being

developed. Seismic analysis and model testing to be performed by

Wylie Laboratory.

10 CFR 50.55(e) report due 7-21-79

Wylie lab analysis to be performed within the next few months; Low-level

excitation tests to verify the computer model are to be conducted at

Catawba late 1979 or early 1980. Bare panels supplied by Frank Electric.

Seismic qualified items put on panels by Duke.

Inspector Hardwick on site has observed above item and report in
413/79-12)

10:44 am Applicable to both Unit 1 and
Unit 2

Part 21 info will be included in the
30 day report

SIGNATURE

[Handwritten Signature]

cc: R. Hardwick
U. Potapovs

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