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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF:

BRIEFING ON INCIDENT RESPONSE PROGRAM

Place - Washington, D. C.

Date - Wednesday, May 30 1979

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

BRIEFING ON INCIDENT RESPONSE PROGRAM

Room 1130
1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Wednesday, 30 May 1979

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 3:15 p.m.

BEFORE:

DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Chairman

VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner

RICHARD T. KENNEDY, Commissioner

PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner

ALSO PRESENT:

L. Gossick

J. Davis

R. Kenneke

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P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: All right. Once more into the
3 breach, here.

4 I think maybe I should just note for the record that
5 Commissioner Ahearne is not with us because he is ill today.
6 That leaves me with a reasonably straight face to remark that it
7 seems to me that at least one way I can influence Commissioners
8 is by diseasing them; infecting them.

9 (Laughter.)

10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Have a care. "Shoot a germ into the
11 air," and you know how that poem goes. Okay.

12 The next item on the agenda is a briefing on the In-
13 cident Response Program. Briefly, by way of background, this is,
14 I guess, the second of a series of about 6 briefings on major
15 elements of the I&E program.

16 Back about the first of May -- Well, memory falters;
17 but a while back, there was an update on the resident inspector
18 program. I remember that because I carried around the viewgraph
19 slides to an assortment of hearings, and was disappointed not to
20 be asked about the resident inspector program. So I now look
21 forward to carrying these viewgraph slides around to further
22 hearings, and probably won't be asked about incident response.

23 Okay. So let's see. This is number 2 in the series.
24 The enforcement program will come along in another few weeks.

25 MR. DAVIS: The Performance Appraisal Team.

1 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Oh; that's right. Okay. The
2 Incident Response Program.

3 MR. GOSSICK: Let me just say a few words to start it
4 off.

5 (Slide.)

6 As the Commission is aware, the Three Mile Island
7 accident was the first time that we had occasion to put into
8 effect, on a full-scale basis, the NRC's Incident Response
9 Procedures described in our manual at Chapter 502.

10 It is clear as a result of this experience that a
11 number of changes and additions to our response plans and capa-
12 bilities are needed; and indeed, some of these have already been
13 accomplished, or are underway.

14 The I&E briefing will review the manner in which our
15 response to an incident is planned for in our present manual
16 chapter; how we proceeded in the TMI accident; and some of the
17 more important steps that need to be taken to improve our re-
18 sponse capability.

19 The briefing will not deal, however, with some of the
20 broader institutional policy issues that have been surfaced in
21 connection with TMI. A number of such issues were spelled out
22 in the memorandum that Al Kenneke sent to you on the 18th, having
23 to do with our response planning.

24 (At 3:19 p.m., Commissioner Kennedy left the room.)

25 MR. GOSSICK: I will just mention 4 of these areas

1 very briefly that need to be addressed.

2 One, there is the question of NRC operational respon-
3 sibility; and as you know, questions have been raised concerning
4 NRC responsibility for the operations of the licensee during
5 incident situations. Planning for incident response did not
6 consider NRC being directly responsible for the operations. Such
7 direct responsibility would have certain far-ranging impact on
8 the Incident Response Program.

9 The second area is NRC on-site activities. Closely
10 related to the policy matter of operational responsibility is
11 the matter of on-site activities actually performed by NRC.

12 Traditionally, NRC has not been looked upon as a
13 source of resources in responding to an incident. Hence, NRC
14 provided only assistance, but rapidly withdrew to its regulatory
15 role as resources became available from the other agencies.

16 Thirdly, the NRC relationship to the total response.
17 Basically, here, the question is: Who is responsible for the
18 total response -- licensee, federal, state and local -- due to
19 an incident or accident? The limits of responsibility of NRC
20 must be clear, and I think there is room for additional clarity
21 in the present situation.

22 (At 3:20 p.m., Commissioner Kennedy reentered the
23 room.)

24 MR. GOSSICK: For example, under the IRAP, assistance
25 is requested. Does NRC direct that agency's activity, or does

1 that agency perform a predetermined function on which NRC re-
2 lies?

3 I think there is a fourth area that the Commission
4 may wish to consider, and that is the interaction role of the
5 Commission and the staff, in this case, as carried out by the
6 Executive Management Team, in responding to an accident.

7 We have made certain assumptions in our Manual chapter
8 about how that relationship is to work. I think any experience
9 we had in TMI might cause us to want to take another look at that
10 and ask yourselves whether that is the way you want it, or whe-
11 ther you want to, in effect, take the functions that the EMT
12 was carrying out, or whatever. I think that needs to be asked.

13 Perhaps another related part of it is the physical
14 and related aspects of the actions; and certainly the mode of
15 operation, under the Sunshine Act; whether it would be easier to
16 do it right there in the center, with the recorders on, I don't
17 know. That is something we probably ought to talk about.

18 With that, I'll ask John to go ahead and give the
19 briefing.

20 MR. DAVIS: Thank you. Just a couple of reminders.
21 We are going to talk about 2 aspects of the Incident Response
22 Program today. First we will talk about the Incident Response
23 Program planning as it existed predating the TMI accident.
24 Secondly, we will make some general comments on the implementa-
25 tion of the program during the Three Mile Island accident, and

1 some early impressions concerning this implementation.

2 We will be making comments on the program implementa-
3 tion, and our comments really speak to its implementation within
4 the confines of the plant; that is, was it implemented as pre-
5 planned?

6 Today, the staff has not planned to comment in detail
7 on the adequacy of this preplanning. As I am sure you know, the
8 Incident Response Program is defined and derived from NRC Manual
9 Chapter NRC-0502. That chapter makes it clear that the inci-
10 dent response program of the NRC is aimed at incidents which
11 occur as a result of NRC-licensed activities.

12 Our current guidance for national level emergency
13 planning is not a part of what we will be talking about today,
14 and it is not a part currently of 0502.

15 The Office of Inspection and Enforcement, under this
16 Manual chapter, maintains the overall program coordination with
17 specific functions assigned to other offices. Under 0502, we
18 have the following assignments:

19 The EDO is the director of the Executive Management
20 Team, and is responsible for the functioning of the NRC response
21 organization. The Office of Inspection and Enforcement, the
22 director is a member of the EMT; the office leads in development
23 and coordination of the Incident Response Program and maintains
24 an operations center, provides administrative staff for the
25 Incident Response Program, conducts drills, maintains procedure

1 for the operations center, maintains operations centers at head-
2 quarters and in the region, develops information sources, and
3 ensures response capabilities of the regions.

4 The 2 licensing offices, NRR and NMSS, the directors
5 are members of the EMT. They provide technical staff to the
6 centers. They establish licensee incident reporting requirements,
7 perform safety planning to supplement the Incident Response
8 Program, develop safeguards contingency planning, and develop
9 information sources and review the procedures of the centers.

10 Public Affairs provides staff to the center and state
11 programs provide staff to the center.

12 The basic concept behind the Incident Response Pro-
13 gram is that the offices assume their ongoing responsibility as
14 soon as possible.

15 I&E is responsible for managing the initial NRC
16 response until the Executive Management Team is available.
17 After that is available, that team assumes full responsibility
18 for the incident response.

19 The purpose of our planning, as the overall planning
20 is performed by I&E, is basically to move the office staffs into
21 a configuration or a physical location where they can carry out
22 their responsibilities most effectively in responding to an
23 incident.

24 (Slide.)

25 Now, Mr. Thompson will brief in detail on the

1 Incident Response Program.

2 MR. THOMPSON: The extent of NRC response to incidents
3 is predicated on a 4-level assessment of protection to public
4 health and safety, as set forth in the next slide.

5 (Slide.)

6 For Level IV incidents which do not appear on the
7 slide, there is essentially no threat to public health and safety.
8 For these types of incidents, there is no onset response by NRC
9 anticipated or required.

10 For a Level III incident, there is a remote threat to
11 public health and safety that needs checking. We do provide
12 regional response on the scene without headquarters response,
13 explicitly identified for a Level III incident.

14 For a Level II incident --

15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Could you give me an example
16 of a Level III incident?

17 MR. THOMPSON: Yes; radioactive spills on the highway.
18 There is a remote threat to public health and safety in most of
19 these, but for a variety of reasons --

20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That is Level III or II?

21 MR. THOMPSON: It could be a II, but most of those
22 that we see are Level III, for which we provide NRC response on
23 the scene, partly as a matter of reassuring the public and
24 partly as a means to provide further assessment of whether there
25 are more serious hazards involved than are apparent at the

1 beginning.

2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What would Oyster Creek have
3 been?

4 MR. THOMPSON: I would imagine III initially, with the
5 possible overtones of a possible II, but as it developed, I think
6 it would have remained a III. In those early stages on Oyster
7 Creek, we had such limited information it would have been diffi-
8 cult for us to say "III" or "II." I think we would have called
9 it a III to begin with, with the possibility of going into a II.

10 Now, in a Level II incident, we see no immediate
11 threat to public health and safety, but recognize a potential
12 hazardous condition, if degradation occurs in the conditions as
13 they are identified initially.

14 For a Level II response, we do have regional response
15 expected and required, plus headquarters alert, and a standby in
16 the operations center for more active involvement by headquarters
17 staff.

18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Can you give me an example of
19 a Level II, or a hypothetical example?

20 MR. THOMPSON: I think probably GE, Wilmington, would
21 be a good Level II example, to stay away from reactors. No imme-
22 diate threat to public health and safety, but the possibility.

23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Are you saying Oyster Creek
24 was a III, but GE, Wilmington, was a II?

25 MR. THOMPSON: At the time we got our initial

1 notification on Oyster Creek, I think we would have assessed it
2 as a III: No immediate threat.

3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: At the time you got it, the
4 reactor was shut down.

5 MR. THOMPSON: That's correct; and in a safe configura-
6 tion. There was no immediate threat. In the GE, Wilmington,
7 case we didn't know what was going to transpire. As you will
8 recall, we were going through quite an exercise on contingency
9 planning if the situation degraded.

10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But the fuel was uranium
11 oxide.

12 MR. THOMPSON: But you recall we were also concerned
13 about reassurance of the public on health hazards, and what would
14 we do in the event the threat was carried out.

15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I must say I am puzzled that
16 you would regard that as more serious than almost any event in
17 a reactor.

18 MR. THOMPSON. Oh, no. I wouldn't say "than almost
19 any event in a reactor."

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I know there are events that
21 you would regard as more serious, but I am saying that it seems
22 to me that almost any event in a reactor, which after all has
23 got a large inventory of radioactive material under high pressure
24 and high temperature and so on --

25 MR. THOMPSON: It is a judgment call on the potential

1 for degradation and the immediacy of threat, and there is a judg-
2 ment call.

3 If you want to go back in history a little further,
4 I believe that we probably would have assessed, at least ini-
5 tially, the Browns Ferry fire as a Level II, because there was
6 no immediate threat --

7 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I guess I find it odd that
8 you would put the Wilmington incident in the same category as the
9 Browns Ferry. Let me hear what a Level I is.

10 MR. THOMPSON: Level I is one involving an actual
11 hazard in existence, or an imminent threat of impact on public
12 health and safety.

13 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Now, did we start out with
14 TMI as though it were a II or a I?

15 MR. THOMPSON: We considered it a I right from the
16 start.

17 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What about Fort St. Vrain?

18 MR. THOMPSON: I believe we considered Fort St. Vrain
19 as a "I" to start out with, and then took it down.

20 MR. DAVIS: It started as a "I" and then degraded as
21 we got more information.

22 MR. THOMPSON: There may be a distinction without a
23 difference here on Levels I and II, inasmuch as in both Level I
24 and II cases, we anticipate response by headquarters staff. It
25 is the immediacy with which those forces are brought to bear

1 that distinguishes between a "I" and a II. Essentially, however,
2 the response of the staff is the same, with not quite the urgency
3 associated with a II.

4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Who assigns these levels?

5 MR. THOMPSON: Generally, the first person receiving
6 notification at headquarters makes an initial assessment of it.
7 Normally, that decision is made by the Director of I&E; and it is
8 really implemented in terms of whether to activate the center,
9 or to place it on an alert status.

10 MR. DAVIS: That is a little general, of course,
11 depending on what the preliminary information is. The first
12 inclination, unless it is very apparent that it is a "I", is to
13 go into what we call "standby," which means that my staff moves
14 into the operations center and begins to operate the center, and
15 I call the other EMT members.

16 And then as new, additional information comes in, I
17 will recall them, and we will make a decision as to whether to
18 go into an activation alert, as opposed to a standby alert. But
19 the center is really working when you are in standby. The re-
20 corders are working, and my staff is there. But the support
21 staffs from other offices are not all there.

22 MR. GOSSICK: I can assure you that whoever on the
23 EMT assigns the highest evaluation, that's going to be the way
24 we'll proceed. We would rather go that way and then necessarily
25 degrade than start out lower, knowing that it is going up.

1 If Harold Denton says he thinks it is more inconve-
2 nient than gathering the EMT, then we will do that.

3 MR. THOMPSON: Before leaving this slide, let me
4 simply note that although we have indicated national level emer-
5 gencies, which are coordinated by the Federal Preparedness Agency
6 on the slide, today's briefing does not deal with those na-
7 tional level emergencies.

8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: What is FPA?

9 MR. THOMPSON: Federal Preparedness Agency.

10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That's when you take Charlie Team,
11 is it, and head south?

12 MR. THOMPSON: In passing, it's worthy of note that
13 the emerging organization of FEMA will involve FPA as well as
14 some other agencies to be put into it.

15 (Slide.)

16 On the next slide, I have listed the incident re-
17 sponse objectives which have served as the basis for the prepara-
18 tion of Manual Chapter 0502. The 4 functions identified as
19 objectives for incident response, I believe, are pretty clear
20 to most people who have been involved in recent incidents.

21 Our informing job involves a number of different
22 audiences, however. Not only does the staff feel an obligation
23 to keep the Commissioners and their staffs informed of the
24 status of the events, but increasingly, we find intimate interest
25 on the part of specific members of Congress, their staffs, the

1 White House, and a number of other agencies. Obviously, Mr.
2 Fouchard and his staff are nearly always involved in providing
3 information to the media and through them, to the public.

4 The evaluation function: We have been questioned on
5 this slide at other times on why the evaluation function doesn't
6 come first, before informing. To some extent that is, of course,
7 provided, in that there must be a decision made as to whether we
8 are going to exercise our information dissemination, such as PM
9 or telephone calls.

10 And that is a form of evaluation, but it is a rather
11 superficial evaluation to reach an initial decision on how
12 promptly we should proceed with our information dissemination.

13 The evaluation function, of course, is a dynamic
14 evaluation of data as it comes in. This was readily evident
15 throughout the TMI experience, as data came in and became clear,
16 that earlier assessments of the situation were changing, and re-
17 quired again reiterating back through the informing chain.

18 The assessment of the seriousness of an event changes
19 with time as more information is evaluated, and also affects, of
20 course, the determination of what alternatives might be exer-
21 cised to cope with the event.

22 In the "assist" function, we see a role, a very tempo-
23 ral role, associated with providing assistance on site to the
24 licensee and his staff, a continuing assist role of the state
25 and local agencies, and obviously, an obligation we have to the

1 general public.

2 The last item we have on this slide, indicating the
3 direction of activities on the part of NRC, is a "last resort"
4 item which is exercised, of course, under the authority vested in
5 the Commission in the Atomic Energy Act, and is brought to bear
6 in the event of licensee failure to provide proper protection
7 for public health and safety.

8 On the next slide, I have 2 points that I wish to
9 make concerning the role of NRC in responding to incidents as
10 we had planned for these incidents in the past.

11 (Slide.)

12 The first one is a rather general one, and it is
13 under that one that some actions that were taken in the TMI
14 case would most likely fall: To be sure that all the proper
15 actions are taken by the parties involved to protect public
16 health and safety, environment and property.

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1 And obviously to keep the public informed of
2 actual potential hazards to health and safety arising from
3 such incidents.

4 I have a series of slides now that show an
5 arrangement of the organizational structure in the incident
6 response organization.

7 (Slide.)

8 The first one I provide very quickly in passing
9 to identify those members of the staff who participate in the
10 various organizational segments of our response organization.
11 The executive management team involves the EDO and the
12 directors of I&E and the two licensing offices. They are
13 supported by the Incident Response Action Coordination Team
14 referred to demonically as IRACT.

15 It is not necessarily made up of all of these
16 members at any given moment, but from these senior staff
17 members. The appropriate responding organizational units are
18 pulled from their normal home and integrated into the
19 incident response organization. In the case of the Three
20 Mile Island incident, the leader of the IRACT team was Norm
21 Moseley, the director of the division of reactor operations
22 and inspection with participation, as you know, by Vic
23 Stello from DRR and NRR. NMSS involvement in this particular
24 event was very minimal and the support provided by other
25 senior members of the staff, NIE and NRR, was part of the IRACT

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1 support staff to the lower left of that large one.

2 The operations staff, which normally functions under
3 my direction, is the high paid goffers who provide the
4 operational capability of the center itself to see that it's
5 properly supplied to provide administrative and logistical
6 support to the IRACT support staff, IRACT and EMT.

7 I've omitted a discussion of the information assess-
8 ment team in this briefing, not because I consider it an
9 unimportant part of the organization, but because its
10 applicability in TMI was non-existent, for all practical
11 purposes.

12 The next slide --

13 (Slide.)

14 -- shows much these same boxes in a slightly
15 different format and provides the basis on which our planning
16 has proceeded in the past with each of the types of functions
17 for these various organizational units specified to the side
18 and above the boxes.

19 In this planning, we have forecast the role of the
20 commission proper and its immediate staff as to the
21 articulation of policy with decision-making and in response to
22 the incident vested in the executive management team housed
23 a. the center.

24 The implementation of the decisions reached by EMT
25 to be taken care of by IRACT and the support staffs that

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1 function under it —

2 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Is it right then that
3 research was not involved in this organization at the outset?

4 MR. THOMPSON: Research is part of the IRACT support
5 staff in any incident response as is any portion of the NRC
6 staff. But Saul Levine, for example, is not a pre-identified
7 member of IRACT or of EMT, though he could be called upon
8 under 0502 to respond to any incident. And as you well know,
9 Saul Levine and his staff was very supportive throughout
10 this entire effort, as were a number of other portions of the
11 staff not explicitly identified.

12 Standards was a big supporter, for example.

13 MR. GOSSICK: IP and OCA and PA and the whole thing.

14 MR. THOMPSON: The manual chapter does identify the
15 available on call of all the other portions of the staff to
16 respond to a particular event on an ad hoc basis.

17 (Slide.)

18 The next slide elaborates a little bit further on
19 the functions of the executive management team in the initial
20 phases of response to an incident and as it proceeds over a
21 longer period of time.

22 I don't propose to read through these functions. You
23 have them in the handout.

24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What does policy coordination
25 with other agency mean?

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9sh 1 MR. THOMPSON: For example, we ran into some questions
2 on TMI on who provides coordination of environmental
3 monitoring at the site? And as you will recall, there was a
4 period of time where it was not completely clear, and it was
5 ultimately resolved with another agency involved in the
6 coordination function.

7 The function of EMT is to provide that kind of
8 liaison with other agency counterparts during the active phase
9 of the incident response.

10 (At 3:40 p.m., Commissioner Bradford leaves the room)

11 MR. GOSSICK: There were some other areas, too,
12 Commissioner Kennedy. We were working directly with the
13 military and control center at the Pentagon on such things as
14 airlift and so forth. As we got into it, though, we found that
15 FDAA really felt that that was their charter. They were able
16 to do it. All the people were just as happy to turn it over
17 to the guys in their center.

18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Coordinating policy with other
19 agencies -- I just wasn't quite sure what it means.

20 MR. GOSSICK: We're sorting out some roles under
21 whatever policies exist at that time in that case.

22 (Slide.)

23 MR. THOMPSON: The next slide provides similar
24 information concerning the IRACT function. This is the team
25 that is normally headed by division directors from the line

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gsh 1 offices involved in a particular incident.

2 In the case of TMI, Norm Moseley and Vic Stello and
3 the staffs that provided support for them.

4 This is the guts working portion of our instant
5 response organization which provides information to EMT for
6 their evaluation in reaching decisions.

7 (Slide.)

8 The next slide we can pass very rapidly. It's the
9 repeat of an organizational chart which shows the relationship
10 of support staff, operations staff, to IRACT and EMT.

11 (Slide.)

12 The next slide I put in here for one main purpose:
13 As I proceed a little further, I'm going to try to
14 characterize some other things that we experienced during the
15 extended response to the Three Mile Island incident.

16 In order to do that, I think it's important to
17 refresh ourselves on the physical layout of the operations
18 center. In particular, I would like to address your attention
19 to the executive room. This is the isolation box into which
20 we put EMT, so they can have quiet and contemplative
21 environments for them to make decisions.

22 You'll notice that there are three doors to that
23 room. We seriously had planned for a semi-isolated position
24 for EMT. One of the flaws in our planning involved the three
25 doors that are clear on this diagram.

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1 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: It's a hallway.

2 MR. THOMPSON: It became a hallway and a traffic
3 pattern in a spot where an awful lot of staff sightseers
4 would stop to see what was going on because it was the hub
5 of where the action was.

6 So it was a problem.

7 The final slide, I've identified a number of
8 different steps that are involved in any incident response.
9 What I propose to do is very hastily run through some of what
10 actually happened in each of these steps in the Three Mile
11 Island accident and some of the lessons that we've seen from
12 I&E's perspective.

13 I hasten to add that these are rather parochial
14 viewpoints that have not had prior explicit clearance with
15 other offices. We didn't seek them and we have let them know
16 what's going on here. And I believe we have representatives
17 of most of the other major offices that participated in the
18 audience.

19 I encourage them to challenge me when they have
20 concerns about what I have to say and to add anything that
21 might clarify things for you.

22 The notification process for TMI, apart from
23 questions that have been raised both here and publicly
24 concerning the promptness or lack of it of notification from
25 licensee to NRC proceeded very much as planned; that is, once

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1 the regional office was reached, and there were problems in
2 reaching the regional office even after the licensee had made
3 his decision to notify us, the notification from the regional
4 office to headquarters occurred punctually within a matter of
5 15 minutes.

6 Once the headquarters had been notified by the
7 regional office, within three minutes of the completion of that
8 call, the incident center was operational, the tapes were
9 running, and the staff was in place.

10 The EMT notifications -- that is, the notification
11 to the other members of EMT -- took place promptly and they
12 assembled in a timely fashion.

13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What was a timely fashion?

14 MR. THOMPSON: I don't have specific times right
15 now, Commissioner Kennedy. I can get them for you. But I
16 believe it was on the order of 10 minutes, 10 to 15 minutes
17 we had EMT.

18 MR. DAVIS: Whatever it took to come from the
19 other building.

20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That's what I wanted to know,
21 the order of time, yes.

22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Let me ask you here, putting
23 the accident aside for the moment, would you expect a
24 licensee to inform you after a transient of this sort if you
25 discovered that the valves to the auxiliary feedwater had been

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1 closed?

2 MR. THOMPSON: Today, certainly. I believe you're
3 asking, though, in the context of at the time that TMI
4 occurred.

5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Yes, just in general. Does
6 that rise to the level of something?

7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: You mean if the relief valve had
8 closed?

9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Just taking the fact —

10 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, we would expect to be notified.

11 (At 3:45 p.m., Commissioner Bradford enters the room)

12 MR. THOMPSON: Prior to the TMI accident, I would not
13 have expected that we be notified in a one- or two-hour time
14 period. The requirements in the guidance provided licensees
15 on the timeliness of reporting that type of event calls for
16 it within 24 hours by telephone.

17 And a written report, that is, the licensee event
18 report, follows up immediately with a 14-day definitive
19 report of what's involved, or a 30-day.

20 So, yes, I would expect we would have been informed,
21 but not with the timeliness that we now see as appropriate.

22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: And what will we require now?

23 MR. THOMPSON: One hour.

24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: One hour.

25 MR. GOSSICK: Not under control.

305 313

79.12.9

gsh

1 MR. THOMPSON: If it's not under control or not
2 readily clear to the status of plant within an hour. Beyond
3 that, a transient which was controlled for which the response
4 was as anticipated, we would expect the report to be within
5 24 hours.

6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Suppose it was discovered
7 that there be a violation of the technical specifications.

8 MR. THOMPSON: That would be a 24-hour report.

9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: That would still be 24 hours.

10 MR. THOMPSON: However, I believe that in today's
11 awareness, not only within the staff but within the industry,
12 I believe there is a generalized sensitivity -- now that's
13 a subjective kind of determination. How long that will
14 prevail remains to be seen.

15 As far as requirements are concerned --

16 MR. GOSSICK: I think that that's a question that
17 we have to look at.

18 MR. THOMPSON: As far as lessons learned about the
19 notification process, it is clear that we need to be more
20 readily available to licensees for notification, apart from
21 the question of whether the licensee notified us promptly
22 or not.

23 There was a period, you may recall, where they had
24 some difficulty reaching us. There was a period during which
25 we had some difficulty reaching certain senior members of the

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1 staff on that first morning.

2 We have taken steps to provide better availability
3 of our staff both in the regions and in headquarters by
4 24-hour coverage, both of our operations center and of each
5 of the five regional offices.

6 We had some difficulty reaching a few agencies —
7 difficulty, I say, in a relative sense. It took us slightly
8 over an hour to notify all the agencies that are on our call
9 list. There were a few agencies, three agencies, that we have
10 identified who have subsequently requested to be added to our
11 notification list on major events. They were FAA, the
12 National Military Command Center, and FDAA, the Federal
13 Disaster Assistance Administration we have added.

14 We believe it is appropriate to provide means for
15 fast dialing of key people and organizations in the
16 notification list and we will be added auto-dialing to our
17 phones in the incident center which will allow us to call a
18 limited number of key individuals or organizations by speed
19 dialing.

20 The next item on initial response, Region 1
21 immediately activated its center and dispatched a team as
22 quickly as it could be assembled and supplied. It departed
23 approximately 55 minutes from first notification received in
24 the region and arrived at the site about one hour and 20
25 minutes later.

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1 In headquarters, the operations center was
2 activated. I look back in my own memory and it seems to me
3 like it was activated in about ten seconds from the time that
4 Mr. Davis came out of his office. I suspect it was more
5 on the order of three minutes.

6 Calls were initiated at that time down the
7 notification list and EMT, as I mentioned earlier, assembled
8 in a matter of 10 to 15 minutes. All the notifications to
9 staff members and other agencies were completed in
10 approximately one hour.

11 With regard to the initial response of NRC staff,
12 we feel from a subjective point of view that the initial
13 response functioned very much as it was pre-planned, the
14 assembly of the staff. The notification lists was very much
15 as we had planned.

16 With regard to organization at the regional office
17 and at the site, we found, as everybody did, as the Three
18 Mile Island accident evolved over a long period of time, the
19 response was much, much larger than we had anticipated, both
20 in terms of manpower and resources applied.

21 A lesson we've learned out of that is that we need
22 to do a little more planning for site organizations ahead of
23 time. There was some lack of coordination at the site among
24 several organizations, particularly in the area of
25 environmental monitoring.

305 321

79.12.12

g- 1 We believe that steps can be taken through the
2 Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan and perhaps by other
3 means to improve that in pre-planning.

4 Within headquarters, the organization functioned
5 initially as planned; that is, the EMT members, the IRACT
6 members, the support staff, that were brought to provide
7 assistance to IRACT functioned initially as planned. It was
8 not very long into the Three Mile Island accident that it
9 became very clear that the number of inquiries received
10 directly into the center from outside parties, principally
11 members of Congress and their staffs and others who had
12 legitimate reason to come direct to the center, was
13 overwhelming.

14 And it became clear that it was appropriate to
15 designate a staff member to provide this kind of contact with
16 outside agencies, and particularly with members of Congress.
17 That position was established very early on Wednesday
18 afternoon and continued to function throughout the acute
19 phase of the response to TMI.

20 The EMT/IRACT split and division of responsibilities
21 and functions did proceed throughout this Three Mile Island
22 incident very much as it was planned with the addition of the
23 operations status officer.

24 However, it was clear that there were some lessons
25 to be learned with regard to organization. We believe that

305 322

79.12.13

1 there is the need for more training and discipline associated
2 with the functions of these two organizations.

3 In particular, we found that a considerable amount of
4 more or less raw information was being fed to EMT in a format
5 that made it very difficult for them to make any decisions.

6 Part of that was by the very nature of the
7 evolutionary process in the accident. Part of it was because
8 EMT was frustrated and hungry for facts and sought out
9 information as rapidly as it could get it.

10 There was some carryover of the pre-existing normal
11 organization of NRC into the EMT/IRACT organization. To the
12 extent that we found some evidence that NRR people would talk
13 to the NRR/EMT members, IE people would talk to the IE/EMT
14 member. There was some difficulty in bringing all the staff
15 to recognize both within EMT and within IRACT and the support
16 staff that EMT is now an organizational entity. And it all
17 goes into all of them together.

18 Fundamentally, we feel that one lesson that was
19 learned as far as pre-planning is concerned out of Three
20 Mile Island is that basically the relationship between the
21 executive management team and IRACT is a sound concept and
22 should be retained.

23 There have been a number of statements and judgments
24 reached in the public arena and elsewhere concerning
25 communications in the Three Mile Island incident. Mechanically

305 323

79.12.14

1 communications proceeded with a few glitches, much as it
2 had been pre-planned. We did have periods of time when we
3 lost contact because a line was dropped.

4 There was a period of time, a couple periods of
5 time, when saturation of the 717 exchange, the Pennsylvania
6 area code, wasn't counted. There was expansion provided
7 both by virtue of assistance provided to us by the White
8 House and the response from AT&T.

9 And there were a few mechanical problems associated
10 with communication. We were dependent on one mode of
11 communication. That was the telephone. In spite of the fact
12 that the Forest Service and the Department of Agriculture
13 responded with hand-held radios that were quite useful at
14 the site, when they were called upon, they were in position
15 on the 30th and actually in operation on the 31st.

16 The NEST team responded from DOE and it was
17 functioning on the 1st of April.

18 Nevertheless, we feel that the biggest problem
19 associated with communications was less mechanical than
20 qualitative, the ability to convey information on an
21 interpersonal basis and the diversion of manpower necessary
22 in early phases. For example, in Bethesda, when we would
23 seek information from the control room and it would require
24 the man who was holding the telephone to put the handset down
25 to go get the information and thus cut off communications

305 324

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gsh 1 effectively, even though mechanically, the line was still
2 sound.

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1 We think that on the interpersonal basis, the
2 amount of essentially unevaluated data provided to senior
3 staff members, I believe this occurred with Commissioners as
4 well as with EMT, was more than was appropriate. Under the
5 circumstances, I'm not sure we would do it any differently.
6 Nevertheless, there was a problem in communication because
7 those who were in a position of having to make decisions were
8 having to make decisions on the basis of raw data, or very
9 limited data, if they had any.

10 We've learned some things, obvious; some of them
11 are superficially obvious. We have moved, as I believe all
12 of the Commissioners are aware, for the establishment of
13 dedicated phones in all the control rooms, and some other
14 telephone communications.

15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Where do we stand with that?

16 MR. THOMPSON: I rather suspected you might ask,
17 Commissioner. Bert Kerr is here today and can give you a
18 status report as of 11:00 o'clock this morning.

19 MR. KERR: Yes, sir. I just happen to have a copy
20 of the 11:00 o'clock status report which we can pass out.
21 As of 11:00 o'clock, there are 13 locations installed and
22 operational. Also, there are five locations which are in
23 jeopardy as far as meeting the June 1 date is concerned. One
24 of them, as previously reported, is the Zion Power Plant.

25 We're still having a lack-of-cable problem out

1 there which Region III is in contact with the plant people
2 to try to resolve.

3 We have a similar facility problem at the Beaver
4 Valley Station.

5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: We could probably stand
6 that one, though.

7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I like the one with the gunfire,
8 Vern.

9 MR. KERR: Things are going hot and heavy there,
10 I understand, Mr. Chairman.

11 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Tell AT&T to get their armored
12 squads out.

13 MR. KERR: I really have been looking at the two-
14 strike situation -- one over in Tennessee and one at Vermont
15 Yankee. I suspect that if any one of these five do not meet
16 the June 1 date, it will be the Irwin, Tennessee, job, where
17 the licensee has essentially kicked people out of the plant
18 before they could install the job.

19 The Peach Bottom situation --

20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Why did they do that?

21 MR. KERR: Reportedly from the licensee, the
22 United Telephone Company management people who were doing the
23 job were causing a rucus at the gate. That's the unofficial
24 report I got as to the reason why they were asked to leave.

25 I expect AT&T resolved the last problem at Peach

1 Bottom, simply a matter of having to convince the independent
2 telephone company that they were going to do this job by
3 June 1.

4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It sounds good. I thought
5 the Zion problem had been cleared up.

6 MR. KERR: I got the report two days ago,
7 Commissioner, that it had been cleared, as I had reported to
8 you, and apparently the licensee had another thought. It
9 involves a \$30,000 cost for the licensee to install isolation
10 filters on the new cable facilities that are into the plant
11 before AT&T will activate the cable.

12 So the only other alternative that would permit us
13 to meet the June 1 date is for them to relinquish two of their
14 existing telephone circuits so we can put the emergency circuit
15 on these facilities until somebody decides whether or not they
16 are going to pay this \$30,000 and get the filters installed.

17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: That would be two out of
18 how many?

19 MR. KERR: There are 50 circuits in total feeding
20 that plant.

21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It seems like a reasonable
22 use to be putting them to.

23 MR. KERR: I'm very optimistic that we're going to
24 meet the June 1st date.

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You say there are 50 circuits

1 feeding the plant?

2 MR. KERR: Yes, 50 pair of cables.

3 And we're asking them to relinquish two cable pairs
4 so we can satisfy the termination of this hot-line circuit in
5 the plant.

6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: In another line of work,
7 you'd probably get the customer complaining to the Public
8 Utilities Commission that the phone company was being a little
9 intransigent, but it would be the first recorded complaint
10 of one utility against another.

11 (Laughter.)

12 MR. KERR: We have had some situations similar
13 to this which have been involving a power utility denied
14 access to the telephone company utility. Actually, fortunately,
15 we were able to resolve the two or three cases that did occur.

16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It sounds like you've been
17 pressing them pretty hard.

18 MR. KERR: Well, I've had the Vice President of
19 AT&T throwing all of his travel assignments, riding herd on
20 us and receiving status reports. I'm convinced they're going
21 to meet the June 1st date, possibly with the exception of these
22 five, and it depends -- two of them depend on the licensee
23 and the two-strike situation. I don't see how we can do too
24 much about that, unless they allow us access.

25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What is the cost of this?

1 MR. KERR: The FY '79 costs we're estimating for
2 the remainder of this year will be about \$455,000, and we're
3 projecting FY '80 costs to be about \$1.2 million.

4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: \$1.2 million?

5 MR. KERR: Yes, Commissioner.

6 MR. THOMPSON: Proceeding with another aspect --

7 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: With those telephones in place,
8 and with 24-hour coverage in the regional offices as well as
9 here, I've got a notion that we'd get a good deal of talking
10 with the licensees that hasn't occurred before.

11 MR. THOMPSON: I'm quite sure that will be the
12 case. I believe it's also reasonable to assume that even in
13 the absence of more stringent reporting requirements, the
14 likelihood of receiving a much lower threshold of event
15 reported to us because it's expeditious, easy to do, is quite
16 likely.

17 Nevertheless, the question of reporting requirements
18 will be addressed.

19 Other aspects of communications associated with
20 Three Mile Island, we were acutely conscious of our dependence
21 on the one mode of communications. That is, telephones. We
22 are examining other possibilities to enhance that dependence
23 in the future.

24 For example, the NEST Team did respond, as I
25 believe you heard in other forums. It's a very sophisticated

1 communications network involving both land lines and very
2 high frequency radio. It could have been used, but it was
3 not used within the NRC chain. It was used almost exclusively
4 by DOE in its own environmental monitoring and aerial
5 monitoring at the site. It could have been available to us
6 had we called for it. We did not call for it.

7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: It was physically present?

8 MR. THOMPSON: It was physically present. It could
9 have been put into operation for us very rapidly had we needed
10 to go to it.

11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Why was it that we did not
12 call for it?

13 MR. THOMPSON: I don't have a ready answer for you.

14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think by the time it got there,
15 Dick, the Signal Corps was there on the 30th, and by the time
16 they got --

17 MR. THOMPSON: The difficulty we had with tele-
18 phones was primarily the 29th and 30th. By the 30th, we had
19 the augmentation from the White House and AT&T and we weren't
20 quite as acutely conscious of our telephone limitations.

21 So it was two days after that that NEST was there.
22 I should comment in that regard that this was characteristic
23 of the response we got from other agencies, and not repre-
24 sentative of any slowness on the part of DOE.

25 We requested assistance from a number of agencies,

1 including DOE, on a rather phased basis, as it became clear
2 to us that the problem was more severe than we had originally
3 anticipated.

4 Had we, on the morning of March 28th, said to DOE
5 "roll with everything you have, ARMS, NEST, and everything else
6 you can get there," we are quite confident, based on their
7 subsequent response, that they would have been there in full
8 force by the evening of the 28th.

9 Very quickly, running through some of the other
10 items on this last slide, the facilities that we had laid out
11 were used pretty much as planned. We had a much larger
12 staff response than was anticipated. As a result of that,
13 the population of the center was very high.

14 We had some ventilat n problems, some comfort
15 problems, some access control problems. I mentioned earlier
16 the traffic pattern involving EMT, and also the lack of
17 space. Feeding and housing was a problem. Then particularly
18 acute in the IRACT room was a noise problem.

19 We needed some insulation to provide a little
20 more clarity of telephone conversation and interpersonal
21 conversation.

22 Based on our experience at Three Mile Island, it's
23 quite clear to us that we need more space set aside to take
24 care of large events, and the possibility of having to handle
25 more than one at a time.

1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Are we capable of handling
2 more than one at a time? I'm not talking about space.

3 MR. THOMPSON: Well, Commissioner Kennedy, based
4 on prior experience at the time of the Browns Ferry fire, I
5 think we could. But we are not well-equipped to handle two
6 events. We could establish a satellite office in another
7 office and handle a second event, but to say we are ready to
8 handle two events would be unfair to characterize it.

9 Staff availability and facilities?

10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Yes.

11 MR. THOMPSON: Only on an ad hoc basis. We'd have
12 to ad hoc it and displace somebody out of their office,
13 which can work, but it's not very effective.

14 Information resources, we believe that there is a
15 need for better real-time data. I think this was abundantly
16 clear at Three Mile Island because of conflicting information
17 available from different sources.

18 We are looking now at the question of how real-
19 time data needs could best be met. Attempting to identify
20 what those data needs might be is a broad planning concept
21 that would cover a variety of different types of incidents.
22 One, the traps we were fearful of being caught in is that we
23 planned very well for emergency feedwater transients, and
24 overlooked other events.

25 It could be equally as debilitating to the public

1 and to us, so we wanted to be very careful to consider what
2 kind of data it is that we want, and what's the best way to
3 get it to us.

4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You also haven't gotten it.
5 What do you do with it?

6 MR. THOMPSON: When you have it, what's it going
7 to mean to you? If you get so overwhelmed with data that you
8 can't analyze and use it, you're better off having much less,
9 or at least not any worse off.

10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Prompt response to raw data
11 can cause catastrophes.

12 MR. GOSSICK: I think we might want to talk to
13 the German. Yes, that was the result of some incident they
14 had. I talked to one of the chaps over there just recently
15 and asked him what use they'd made of it, since they'd started
16 monitoring it. He just didn't have too much to say. He said,
17 "Well, we watch it to confirm whatever we might see with the
18 plant."

19 So it's little question as to really what is
20 provided.

21 MR. THOMPSON: We feel at this stage that one of
22 the things that's needed on information resources, as much as
23 anything else, is some further training of the staff on what
24 is available where.

25 We did have some limitations on the readily

1 available documents for TMI in the immediate vicinity of the
2 Operations Center. Access to the files was adequate and we
3 were able to retrieve it, but that was hampered somewhat by
4 a lack of understanding on the part of some members of the
5 staff on what was located where.

6 So there's some training called for in that regard.

7 Technical support, we were overwhelmed with how
8 much was available. I mentioned the phased involvement.
9 Particularly interagency, we found cooperation was excellent
10 from a number of agencies that we had not anticipated having
11 much support from at all.

12 And it turned out, for example, the Federal Disaster
13 Assistance Administration was tremendous in their support,
14 and that's not to downplay the support we got from any other
15 agency. I mention that because it surprised us a little bit
16 the extent to which they can provide support, and the willing-
17 ness with which they did provide it.

18 Other agencies that provided a lot of support, we
19 had a pretty good handle on what they could do, and they did
20 just about as we had anticipated.

21 There is more need for coordination of technical
22 support provided particularly by other agencies, particularly
23 in the on-site situation. We went through a period of time
24 where a number of agencies were doing their own thing -- not
25 that anything was wrong with what they were doing, but there

1 was no cohesiveness and no coordination.

2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Isn't that what the IRACT was
3 supposed to take care of?

4 MR. THOMPSON: Yes, it is. But one of the things
5 that isn't clear is whether the requesting agency should
6 direct and coordinate the activities of the other agencies,
7 or those supporting agencies should respond in a preplanned
8 fashion and simply go do what was preplanned. And then at
9 some later stage assemble it.

10 In the Three Mile Island event, it was clear that
11 we could have improved the on-site coordination. That's not
12 to criticize what was done at the time.

13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That is something that needs
14 to be resolved on an interagency basis. There needs to be some
15 sort of emergency agreement. The IRACT, for example, might
16 well be reinvigorated and restructured.

17 MR. THOMPSON: Yes. When we were down a few weeks
18 ago to brief the Commission on IRACT, you'll recall that we
19 mentioned that we have been working -- been in close contact
20 with DOE, the Secretariat, for an early reassessment of IRACT
21 by all the signatory agencies, and solicitation among the
22 membership. That is continuing, although I can't tell you
23 at this time that a date has been set for such a meeting.

24 Administrative support within headquarters, we had
25 excellent response to all the administrative needs that we

1 identified in a very timely fashion, from Dan Donahue and all
2 of his staff, and those within I&E, as well. I think we can
3 do with some more preplanning for providing administrative
4 support to sites of incidents, although I believe that the
5 response provided by Region I and other agencies and the
6 administrative support to the Staff support at the site was
7 excellent.

8 I believe we could have made it a lot less
9 agonizing by some more preplanning.

10 Information dissemination, I believe all of you
11 who are in this room are familiar with the vehicles with which
12 we disseminated information in the TMI case.

13 Preliminary notifications, it became quite a
14 library before we were finished. Joe Fouchard and his staff
15 may want to have something to say about this. I have not even
16 consulted with him ahead of time. They were very active,
17 obviously, throughout the entire period.

18 There were briefings conducted of other agencies.
19 In particular, we had daily briefings of FDA and other support
20 agencies through them at a scheduled time every day, and I
21 would imagine on the other of a few hundred contacts by
22 telephone with various outside interested parties -- members
23 of Congress, their staffs, the committee staffs -- on a
24 frequent basis.

25 I believe the information dissemination, at least

1 from our parochial point of view at the Center went reasonably
2 well, although it could have been improved, and there are some
3 of us that might have been a little happier with some of the
4 reactions, but I believe the information dissemination was not
5 too bad in a subjective appraisal.

6 That completes the points I wanted to make. If
7 you have questions, we'd be glad to respond.

8 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Questions?

9 MR. GOSSICK: There's a long list of what
10 seemingly are kind of mundane questions, but just to give you
11 an example, "the taping of conversations."

12 The reason they were taped was for a quick playback.
13 If we wanted a report repeated, we found one. That's not all
14 that convenient to do -- although there is that capability.
15 There are two tapes going at one time. I don't think anyone
16 ever envisioned that this was to be considered an historical
17 record, and of course now with 13,000 cassettes or something
18 about to be distributed to how many tens of thousands of
19 places, but, you know, I think this is a question that
20 probably has to be addressed.

21 Do we tape everything? Should we have line mikes
22 that are capturing conversations that go on in there? Make sure
23 that every phone call that goes out of there is recorded?
24 Identification of callers? It's going to be hard to find out
25 on some of those tapes who's talking. That's just an example

1 of some of the nitty gritty kind of things that come out of
2 this.

3 MR. DAVIS: I think in Mr. Kenneke's memorandum
4 there are some policy determinations that at some point have
5 to be addressed, but I&E is not awaiting the addressing of
6 these policy matters. We are moving on an operational basis.

7 The policy matters that Lee mentioned -- like what
8 is the operational role of NRC? What is the role of the
9 Commissioners as one of these events unfolds? What is our
10 on-site responsibility? This type of thing, which will
11 really affect --

12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Are you going to give us
13 some options?

14 (Laughter.)

15 MR. DAVIS: Not today, Commissioner, but eventually
16 they will have to be addressed. But I would like to assure
17 you, we are moving on the operational level to take care of
18 those obvious deficiencies that we saw in ways in which we
19 can improve the operations center.

20 And that concludes the presentation.

21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Thank you very much.

22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE. Thank you.

23 (Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the meeting was
24 adjourned.)

**NRC
INCIDENT
RESPONSE
PROGRAM**

305 240

**NRC
INCIDENT
RESPONSE
PROGRAM**

305 341

PURPOSE

COMPRESS NRC STAFF INTO A CONFIGURATION
WHERE IT CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY
RESPOND TO AN INCIDENT

PROGRAM SCOPE

IE
RESPONSE

LEVEL III

NRC
RESPONSE

LEVELS I AND II

NATIONAL
LEVEL
EMERGENCY
(FPA)

INCIDENT SEVERITY



INCIDENT RESPONSE OBJECTIVES


- INFORM
- EVALUATE
- ASSIST
- DIRECT

NRC ROLE IN RESPONDING TO INCIDENTS


Assure: Proper Actions are Taken to Protect Health and Safety, the Environment, and Property From the Consequences of Incidents Which Occur as a Result of NRC-Licensed Activities.

Assure: Public is Kept Informed of Actual or Potential Hazards to Health and Safety Arising From Such Incidents.

NRC INCIDENT RESPONSE ORGANIZATION



MANAGEMENT




305 347

EMT FUNCTIONS


- Activate IRC
- Provides Guidance for NRC Actions
- Coordinates NRC Joint Activities
- Coordinates Policy with Other Agencies
- Approves Public Information Releases
- Notifies Senior Government Officials

IRACT FUNCTIONS

- Assures Notifications Disseminated Swiftly
- Performs Actions to Carry Out IR Functions
 - Inform
 - Evaluate
 - Assist
 - Direct
 - Coordinate
- Directs IRACT Support Staff
- Identifies Problem Areas
- Develops Alternate Solutions



305 350



NRC IMPLEMENTATION

NOTIFICATION

INITIAL RESPONSE

ORGANIZATION

COMMUNICATIONS

FACILITIES

INFORMATION RESOURCES

TECHNICAL SUPPORT

ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT

INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

305 352

NRC INCIDENT RESPONSE PROGRAM

PURPOSE

The purpose of this briefing is to provide the NRC Commissioners with information on the basic precepts in planning the NRC Incident Response Program; how it functioned during the Three Mile Island accident; lessons learned to improve the program; and activities initiated or planned to make appropriate modifications.

SCOPE

The briefing will provide initial staff impressions of the operation of the Incident Response Program. The discussion will be limited to the response of NRC once it learned of the accident and how the staff responded with the information provided. It is not the purpose of the briefing to evaluate licensee response, NRC decisions or the effectiveness of other agencies.

BRIEFING OUTLINE

- I. Planning Prior to TMI
- II. Implementation of NRC Incident Response Program
- III. Lessons Learned for Improving the Incident Response Program
- IV. Plans to Change the Incident Response Program