

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

Report No. 50-266/79-05; 50-301/79-04

Docket No. 50-266; 50-301

License No. DPR-24; DPR-27

Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company  
231 West Michigan  
Milwaukee, WI 53203

Facility Name: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Point Beach Site, Two Creeks, WI

Inspection Conducted: March 2, April 2-6, 10 and 11, 1979

Inspector: *M. C. Choules*  
N. C. Choules

5/29/79

Approved By: *R. F. Warnick*  
R. F. Warnick, Chief  
Reactor Projects Section 2

5-29-79

Inspection Summary

Inspection on March 2, April 2-6, 10 and 11, 1979 (Report No. 50-266/79-05; 50-301/79-04)

Areas Inspected: Routine, announced inspection on April 2-6, 10 and 11, 1979 to review plant operations, procedures, surveillance testing, nonroutine event followup, reactor physics testing and independent inspection. On March 2, 1979 a special announced management meeting between NRC staff members, corporate management representatives of Wisconsin Electric Power, and Point Beach plant management to review plant performance was held. The inspection involved 50 hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in five areas. One item of noncompliance was identified in one area (Deficiency - failure to log axial flux difference with the flux difference alarm out of service - Paragraph 7.c).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted During Inspection on April 2-6  
10 and 11, 1979

\*G. A. Reed, Manager, Nuclear Power Division  
\*\*J. Greenwood, Assistant to the Manager  
F. T. Rhodes, Operations Superintendent  
R. E. Link, Assistant to the Operations Superintendent  
J. Zach, Reactor Engineer  
T. F. Deddins, Maintenance Superintendent  
J. Reisenbuechler, Instrument and Control Engineer  
\*F. Zeman, Office Supervisor

The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the operations and maintenance sections.

\*Denotes those attending the exit interview on April 6 and 11, 1979.

\*\*Denotes those attending exit interview on April 6, 1979 only.

2. Persons Attending Management Meeting on March 2, 1979

Wisconsin Electric Power Company

Sol Burstein, Executive Vice President, Power Plants  
D. Ivy, Corporate Security Director  
G. A. Reed, Manager, Nuclear Power Division  
J. Greenwood, Assistant to the Manager

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

J. G. Keppler, Director, RIII  
R. F. Heishman, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch  
J. A. Hind, Chief, Safeguards Branch  
R. F. Warnick, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 2  
N. C. Choules, Reactor Inspector, Reactor Projects Section 2

d. Special Orders and Operation Standing Orders

The current subject orders were reviewed and no discrepancies were noted.

e. Manager's Supervisory Staff Meeting Minutes

The subject minutes for meetings 79-02 through 79-07 were reviewed. No items of concern were identified.

f. Significant Operating Events

The inspector reviewed SOE's 50-301/78-05 through 07. No items of concern were identified.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5. Procedures

a. The following procedures were reviewed by the inspector.

(1) Operating Procedures

OP-1C, Low Power Operation to Normal Power  
Operation

OP-3B, Reactor Shutdown

OP-3C, Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown

OP-1A, Cold Shutdown to Low Power Operation

OP-5B, Blender Operation

OP-7B, Operation of Component Cooling System

(2) Selected annunciator alarm responses.

(3) Emergency Procedures

EOP-2A, Steam Line Break  
EOP-9C, High Lake Water Level  
EOP-9D, High Winds

3. Management Meeting (March 2, 1979)

In this meeting, inspections, enforcement history, plant performance, and nonroutine event reports for the past three years were reviewed with the licensee. The resident inspector program, security, management and plant appraisal program, quality assurance during major modifications, and proposed enforcement changes were also discussed.

4. Plant Operations

a. Plant tour

- (1) The inspector performed a plant tour accompanied by a licensee representative. The housekeeping was very good.
- (2) During the tour selected "danger" tags were reviewed for proper approval and the status log was reviewed to determine if the tags were properly accounted for. No discrepancies were noted.
- (3) Selected valves in the auxiliary feedwater, residual heat removal, and core spray systems were checked for proper alignment and no discrepancies were noted.
- (4) Shift turnovers were observed to verify continuity was maintained. No discrepancies were noted.
- (5) The inspector visually inspected the spent fuel pool and the spent fuel pool leakage detection area. Water level and water temperature were at acceptable levels. Water clarity was good. Radiation alarms in the area were in operation. Spent fuel assemblies were stored properly. Licensee records indicated the spent fuel pit boron concentration met the Technical Specification Requirement. The latest measured leakage from the pool was 4.3 ml/hour.

b. The jumper bypass logs were reviewed and no discrepancies were noted.

c. Log books, log sheets, and shift surveillance check records were reviewed for selected days during the past three months. No discrepancies were noted.

- b. The procedures listed above were reviewed to verify that:
- (1) Procedures and changes to procedures were reviewed and approved in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
  - (2) Procedure changes were made to reflect Technical Specifications revisions.
  - (3) Changes made to these procedures were in conformance with 10 CFR 50.59 requirements.
  - (4) The overall contents of the procedures are in conformance with Technical Specifications.
- c. The inspector noted and discussed with the licensee that EOP-2A may have to be revised in light of experiences at the Three Mile Island plant. The licensee stated they have a task force reviewing the Three Mile Island accident and will make changes to procedures and operating practices as found necessary in light of experiences gained.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

6. Surveillance Testing

Unit 2 Integrated Safety Injection Test. The inspector reviewed the subject test procedure, ORT No. 3, Loss of Engineered Safeguards AC Simultaneous with Safety Injections, and verified it was consistent with regulatory requirements and the licensee's Administrative Procedures. Selected test prerequisites from the test procedure were reviewed for completion by the inspector prior to test performance. No discrepancies were observed.

The inspector witnessed the subject testing. The test consisted of initiating safety injection with a simulated loss of offsite power and observing that the required action occurred. A preliminary review of the test results following performance of the test indicated all systems responded as required. One discrepancy was found that apparently did not affect the test. One of the manual safety injection relays did not seal in properly. It was found that the relay needed some adjustment. The inspector observed portions of the removal and reinstallation of the relay.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Reportable Occurrences

The following reportable occurrences were reviewed by examination of logs, records, and through discussions with plant personnel. Occurrences were reviewed for completion of reporting requirements, compliance with Technical Specifications, investigation and determination of cause, proposed corrective measures, and/or completion of corrective action.

- a. RO 50-301/79-01<sup>1/</sup> Main Steam Isolation Valve failed to close.<sup>2/</sup> - This event was reviewed in a previous inspection.<sup>2/</sup> During the start of the March refueling outage these valves closed as required. This event is considered closed but the operation of these valves will be monitored in the future.
- b. RO 50-301/79-02<sup>3/</sup> Reactor trip breaker failed to close immediately. - This relay failed to close as a result of excessive plunger-to-sleeve friction resulting from sleeve deterioration and is similar to an event on July 5, 1978 (Inspection Report No. 78-08). As a result of the first event the licensee made a decision to replace all BFD 31 (DC) relays in the reactor trip system with an improved relay. This has now been accomplished for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. This event is considered closed.
- c. RO 50-266/79-05<sup>4/</sup> Failure to log the axial flux differential with the computer alarm out of service. - The licensee reported that as a result of an operator failing to initialize the control room computer properly the axial flux differential alarm was out of service from 0640 to 1540 hours on March 30, 1979. Since it was not recognized that the alarm was out of service, the axial flux differential readings were not logged as required by Technical Specification 15.3.10.B.2.f. This is an item of noncompliance.

A similar type event occurred on June 2, 1978 in which an operator failed to start the computer after it was out of service. This event was reported by the licensee as

- 1/ LER 50-301/79-01, WEP to RIII, dtd 2/23/79.
- 2/ IE Inspection Reports No. 50-266/79-03 and No. 50-301/79-02.
- 3/ LER 50-301/79-02, WEP to RIII, dtd 3/13/79.
- 4/ LER 50-301/79-05, WEP to RIII, dtd 4/5/79.

Licensee Event Report No. 50-301/78-06. At that time the re-initialization procedure for the computer was clarified. As a result of the latest event the computer program procedure has been further clarified.

The licensee corrective action given in his event report appeared to be adequate to prevent reoccurrence and no response to the noncompliance item is required.

8. Outstanding and Other Inspection Items

- a. Stem Mounted Limit Switches (IE Bulletin 78-04). The licensee has completed installation of the subject switches on Unit 2 containment isolation valves in accordance with his commitment to IE Bulletin 78-04.
- b. The inspector observed refueling activities in the Unit 2 containment and preparations for startup during the inspection and no discrepancies were noted.
- c. The inspector observed reactor physics testing in progress which included temperature coefficient measurements, boron end points and portions of the rod swap method of measuring rod worth. The licensee's preliminary evaluation of the physics testing results indicated all measurements were within established acceptance criteria.
- d. During the inspection, the licensee informed the inspector that during surveillance testing it was noted that one of three overcurrent protection time delay dashpots for the 2B03 safeguard supply breaker (a 480V Westinghouse DP-75 breaker) had exhibited a 5.50 to 5.12 second delay time, this being less conservative than the desired six seconds. An investigation disclosed a hairline crack approximately one fourth inch long on the inner surface of the dashpot's cap. The crack apparently allowed the pressure to decrease faster than normal which shortened the time delay.

A review of other spare end caps on hand showed out of 17 end caps, six had very fine cracks.

The licensee reported this event to the NRC and informed Westinghouse of the potential generic problem. Westinghouse has reported this event to the NRC. The event is currently under review by IE headquarters and DOR.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

9. Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee's representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on April 6 and 11, 1979. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.