

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

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M. C. JOHNSON

VICE PRESIDENT AND GROUP EXECUTIVE
SPECIAL SERVICES AND PURCHASING

July 10, 1979

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Director
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Subject: V. C. Summer Nuclear Station
Unit #1
Reportable Items in Accordance
with 10CFR50.55(e)

Gentlemen:

On June 14, 1979, SCE&G identified to Region II the apparent failure to implement Quality Assurance requirements on Namco limit switches by the manufacturer, Acme-Cleveland Corporation of Jefferson, Ohio. On June 27, 1979, a copy of a letter received by SCE&G from Westinghouse detailing a possible difference between actual and apparent steam generator water level indication was presented to our NRC Principal Inspector. Both of these items have been confirmed to have been reported to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR21 on June 14 and June 21, 1979, respectively. The purpose of this letter is to provide the SCE&G report relative to these matters and to update the status of previously identified items.

Namco Limit Switches - On June 16, 1978, SCE&G identified to the NRC a failure of a valve supplier's "subcontractor procurement control system", which resulted in contracts being placed with suppliers of valve attachment hardware without appropriate QA controls. As part of the corrective action to resolve the improper procurement control, SCE&G accompanied the valve supplier, as an observer, to several suppliers including Namco Controls. This activity confirmed that Namco did not have a Quality Assurance program meeting all the appropriate criteria of 10CFR50, Appendix B, and that no customer of Namco had ever imposed such a requirement by purchase order. Immediate effort was initiated by SCE&G to resolve the fact that the Namco QA Program failed to provide objective evidence of manufacturing repeatability of the limit switches. This concern is relevant to the IEEE qualification even though there appears to be a large margin of inherent design conservatism in the basic switch.

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Resolution of the above concerns were pursued on all SCE&G Namco switches by two parallel actions: 1) development and implementation of interim QA program measures which would assure repeatable new switches; and 2) inspection by Namco of a statistically significant sample of SCE&G switches already shipped to assess inherent (but not verifiable) existing QA Program control and determine significance to the hardware, were the condition to have remained uncorrected. This information was provided to Region II in our December 22, 1978 report.

The interim Namco QA Program was developed and approved by February 7, 1979. All suppliers of SCE&G hardware using Namco switches ordered replacement switches contractually imposing the interim program.

On June 12, 1979, SCE&G received information from one of the valve suppliers that Namco may have failed to comply with all of the newly imposed contractual requirements and shipped non-conforming replacement switches. This information was confirmed on June 14, 1979 by the President of Namco and three customers of Namco were indicated as having received non-conforming switches.

As immediate corrective action, Namco requested the return of all switches from the three customers. In addition, a 10CFR21 report dated June 14, was provided to NRC Headquarters by Namco.

As long term corrective action, Namco has committed to have all portions of the additional QA Program controls in place within 30 to 45 days of June 14. At this time, switches manufactured under this program will be supplied to all affected customers and ultimately to SCE&G.

Completion of Namco commitments and subsequent installation of the replacement switches which will be accomplished at the Site with normal QA controls, will complete action on this item. Accordingly, SCE&G considers this the final report on this item.

Steam Generator Level Indication - Since Westinghouse has reported this item directly as a 10CFR21 item and SCE&G has provided Region II with a copy of the letter describing the situation, (CGW 877 dated 6/25/79), the information will not here-in be repeated. As relevant information becomes available from Westinghouse, SCE&G will update the report.

Our update of previous reported items is as follows:

1. Pipe Support Loadings, Velan Valves - Re-evaluation of the piping system will be completed in two to three weeks and new support designs, where required, will be completed in about a month. Completion of the required field changes will depend on the availability of supports. When the re-design is completed, a final report will be issued.


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2. Electrical Support Splices - The reinspection program established to detect defective splices is approximately 30% complete. To date, the samples inspected have fallen within the acceptance limits of the established sampling plans. Three defective splices have been detected during this program which are documented for repair. The reinspection effort is estimated to be completed in late August; barring samples that fall outside the acceptance criteria which would predicate further inspection effort. A final report will be issued at the completion of this effort.
3. RT Film Deficiencies - No change in the June 18, 1979 reported status.
4. Emergency Diesel Generator Deficiencies - No change in the June 18, 1979 reported status.

Documentation associated with the above items is available for NRC review during inspections at the Site. If any additional information is needed, please feel free to contact us.

Very truly yours,



DAN/MCJ/jls

cc: C. J. Fritz
G. C. Meetze
~~Office of Director~~
of Inspection & Enforcement
Washington, D. C.

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