



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION III  
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD  
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

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JUN 20 1979


Docket No. 50-266  
Docket No. 50-301

Wisconsin Electric Power Company  
ATTN: Mr. Sol Burstein  
Executive Vice President  
Power Plants  
231 West Michigan  
Milwaukee, WI 53201

Gentlemen:

This Information Notice No. 79-17 is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time. If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular or Bulletin will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions. If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of this office.

Sincerely,

  
James G. Keppler  
Director

Enclosure: IE Information  
Notice No. 79-17

cc w/encl:  
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

June 20, 1979

IE Information Notice No. 79-17

SOURCE HOLDER ASSEMBLY DAMAGE FROM MISFIT BETWEEN ASSEMBLY AND REACTOR UPPER GRID PLATE

Description of Circumstances:

Recently, the NRC was informed of a problem at two Westinghouse PWR facilities resulting from an apparent misfit between secondary source holder assemblies and the reactor upper grid plate.

The misfit problem was first identified by Carolina Power & Light, licensee for H. B. Robinson Unit 2, who informed the NRC on May 6, 1979, of the circumstances. During the current refueling outage at H. B. Robinson 2, CP&L determined that two secondary source holder assemblies had been damaged during the previous refueling in February 1978, by a misfit between the assembly and the reactor upper grid plate. The misfit resulted from insufficient clearance (i.e. 1/2 to 3/4 inch) between the source holder assembly hub and the grid plate at the core locations containing thermocouple mixing vanes. This lack of sufficient clearance caused minor deformation of the upper grid plate components at the core location and of the source holder assemblies. The deformation also resulted in some bending of the fuel rods in the assembly, however, in no case did this bending result in fuel cladding perforation.

On May 16, 1979, the licensee of D. C. Cook Unit 1 informed the NRC that the present refueling outage would be extended 15 to 20 days to remove the reactor head, which had already been reinstalled following completion of refueling, to correct this misfit problem. They learned of the problem from Westinghouse. Subsequently, the licensee's inspection revealed that the source holder assembly hubs were in contact with the vanes. The source holder was removed from one assembly readily with no apparent damage while in the other the source holder was found stuck in the assembly. The problem was corrected prior to return to operations.

The secondary source assembly rods are normally inserted into rod cluster control assemblies and placed at symmetrical locations in the core. Each such assembly contains a symmetrical grouping of four secondary source rods and between zero and twenty burnable poison rods. Locations in the assembly not filled with a source or burnable poison rod contain a thimble plug. The lack of sufficient clearance for these rods is only at the core locations which con-

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