10 CFR 50.73



NMP1L3305 August 2, 2019

> U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

> > Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-63 Docket No. 50-220

Subject: NMP1 Licensee Event Report 2019-003, Revision 1, Manual Reactor Scram Due to Pressure and Power Oscillations

The original NMP1 LER 2019-003 was submitted June 28, 2019. Enclosed is NMP1 Licensee Event Report (LER) 2019-003, Revision 1, Manual Reactor Scram Due to Pressure and Power Oscillations. This revision is to provide additional details on the cause of the event and the corrective actions following completion of the root cause analysis.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.

Should you have any questions regarding the information in this submittal, please contact Brandon Shultz, Site Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (315) 349-7012.

Respectfully,

Idd a. herney

Todd A. Tierney Plant Manager, Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Exelon Generation Company, LLC

TAT/DJW

- Enclosure: NMP1 Licensee Event Report 2019-003 Revision 1, Manual Reactor Scram Due to Pressure and Power Oscillations.
- cc: NRC Regional Administrator, Region I NRC Resident Inspector NRC Project Manager

JEZZ NRR

August 2, 2019 NMP1 LER 2019-003, Revision 1 Page 2

P. M. Orphanos T. A. Tierney J. Barstow bcc:

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- B. K. Shultz
- S. Brannan Cole
- D. P. Ferraro
- H. Apa

COMMITMENTS IDENTIFIED IN THIS CORRESPONDENCE

None ٠

Enclosure

NMP1 Licensee Event 2019-003, Revision 1 Manual Reactor Scram Due to Pressure and Power Oscillations

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit 1

Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-63

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION								APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020										
(U4-2U1/) هالمعند المعند المعن								Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.										
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)								Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 2055-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.										
	S. and		2 for require)	Resource	e@n	rc.gov, and to the	Desk Offic	er, Office	e of Informati	on and Re	gulatory Affairs,	
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form									used to it	NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the								
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3/) NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.										the information								
1. FACILITY NAME								2. DOCKET NUMBER 3				3. P.	3. PAGE					
Nine Mile Point Unit 1								05000220 1 OF 4										
4. TITLE													4					
Manual Reactor Scram due to Pressure and Power Oscillations																		
5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT D/								ATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED										
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUE	ENTIAL IBER	REV NO.	MONTH	DAY	~	YEAR		FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUM			KET NUMBER			
04	29	2019	2019		_	01	06	28	;	2019	╉	FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER						
9. OPE	RATING	MODE	11. 1	THIS RE	PORTIS	SUB	L. MITTED I	I PURSU	JANT	то тн	E F	REQUIREMENT	IS OF 1) CFR	§: (Check	all that	apply)	
			20.2201(b)			T	20.2203(a)(3)(i))		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 50.7).73(a)(2)	73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
			20.2201(d)				20.2203(a)(3)(ii			i)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
	Ν		20.2203(a)(1)				20.2203(a)(4)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)			
				20.2203(a)(2)(i)			50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)			.)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A))	50.73(a)(2)(x)			
10. POWER LEVEL			20.2203(a)(2)(ii)				50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A			N) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A))	73.71(a)(4)				
			20.2203(a)(2)(iii)				50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(B))	73.71(a)(5)				
			20.2203(a)(2)(iv)				50.46(a)(3)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(v)(C))	73.77(a)(1)				
	084			20.2203(a)(2)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)) 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D))	73.77(a)(2)(i)				
			20.2203(a)(2)(vi)				50.73(a)(2)(i)(B			3) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)				73.77(a)(2)(ii)				
	50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRC Form 366A											1 366A						
	CONTACT					12. L	ICENSE	CON	TAC	T FOR 1	ГНІ	S LER				(Instudio /	raa Cada)	
LICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) Brandon Shultz, Site Regulatory Assurance Manager (315) 349-7012																		
			13. COM	PLETE	ONE LIN	E FOR	EACH C	OMPO	NEN		UR	E DESCRIBED		REPO	ORT			
CAUSI	E	SYSTEM	COMPO	DNENT	MANU	J- RER	REPORTA TO EPI		-other address	CAUSE		SYSTEM	COMPO	NENT	MANU- FACTURE	R	EPORTABLE TO EPIX	
х		IJ	R	G	GE	<u> </u>	Y		5. 1 Sec. 4 al 1 al	N/A		N/A	N/.	A	N/A		N/A	
	14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED								15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION				MONTH	DAY	YEAR			
	YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)											ATE		N/A	N/A	N/A		
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)																		
On April 29, 2019 at 16:33, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 inserted a manual reactor scram due to pressure and power oscillations. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated, on low reactor vessel																		
water level, as designed. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as any event or condition																		
that resulted in a manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).																		
The cause of the event is the organization did not effectively incorporate appropriate learnings from previous																		
NMP events and operating history that would have provided adequate flexibility in the operating strategy to																		
												tive actions						
history	and e	events	into Spe	ecial C	perati	ng Pr	ocedu	res (S	SOF	⊃s)							I	
The ev	The event described in this LER is documented in the plant's corrective action program.																	

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULAT		APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 315	50-0104	EXPIRE	S: 03/31/2020					
(04-2017))		Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported								
JUS # # # 0/642	1	esumated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request to indust. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear								
		Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocellects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,								
CONTINUATION S		NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control n								
(See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for a http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/	:ompleting this torm /staff/sr1022/r3/)	NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.								
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOC	CKET NUMBER	3. LER NUMBER							
Nine Mile Point Unit 1	05000220		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REV NO.					
	0000220		2019	- 003	- 01					
NARRATIVE										
I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT										
A. PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDIT	ΓΙΟΝS:									
Prior to the event, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMP1) was in the Power Operating Condition at 84.6% reactor power. Power ascension was in progress.										
B. EVENT:										
On April 29, 2019, at approximately 16:30, NMP1 experienced oscillations in reactor pressure, level and power during power ascension. A manual reactor scram was inserted when the procedural limits were reached.										
	The scram resulted in shrink of the water level in the reactor vessel and the low level set point was reached. This resulted in a HPCI initiation as designed.									
Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP:	Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) was unaffected by the scram at NMP1.									
	Operations performed the ENS notification (#54035) required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the reactor scram and specified system activations.									
This event has been entered	This event has been entered into the plant's corrective action program as IR 4244521.									
C. INOPERABLE STRUCTURES THE EVENT:	S, COMPONENT	S, OR SYSTEMS THA	T CON	FRIBUTED TO						
No other systems, structures	s, or components	s contributed to this ev	vent.							
D. DATES AND APPROXIMATE ACTIONS:	TIMES OF MA	JOR OCCURRENCES	AND O	PERATOR						
The dates, times, and major	occurrences an	d operator actions for	this eve	ent are:						
<u>April 29, 2019</u> 16:29—Control Rod 14-39 w 16:29—Operators observe re 16:30—Operator places the malfunction 16:30—Operators enter SOF 16:33—Mode switch placed 16:33—HPCI initiation due to	eactor power, pr feedwater flow o P for pressure re in shutdown	ressure and level oscil control valve in manua egulator malfunctions	llations	≥ck for controlle	۶r					
16:34-HPCI reset										

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NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULAT	ORY COMMISSION	APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 315	50-0104	EXPIRE	S: 03/31/2020					
(04-2017)) LICENSEE EVENT REF CONTINUATION S (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs	SHEET	Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.								
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			YEAR	SEQUENTIAL	REV					
Nine Mile Point Unit 1	05000220		2019	NUMBER - 003	о. - 01					
NARRATIVE										
E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:										
This event was discovered by Reactor Operators when the reactor pressure, level and power oscillations were observed in the control room.										
F. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSI	F. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:									
All safety systems responde	All safety systems responded per design.									
II. CAUSE OF EVENT:	II. CAUSE OF EVENT:									
The organization did not effectively incorporate appropriate learnings from previous NMP events and operating history that would have provided adequate flexibility in the operating strategy to mitigate the risks of increased oscillations. The Nine Mile Point U1 operational strategy did not provide flexibility or incorporate an exit strategy from the oscillation region.										
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT:										
The reactor scram and specified system activation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), as any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic action of any of the specified systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).										
region during reactor startup tha greater than those allowed with	The non-optimal tuning resulted in EPR pressure control issues in the 80-90% power region during reactor startup that produced reactor pressure, level and power oscillations greater than those allowed without a backup pressure regulator available. A manual reactor scram was inserted per procedure.									
and power oscillations, remained loss of offsite power to the onsite	All other plant systems performed per design. Plant parameters, other than the pressure, level and power oscillations, remained within normal values throughout the event. There was no loss of offsite power to the onsite emergency buses, the HPCI mode of feed and condensate system initiated as designed on the low reactor water level signal.									
	Based on the above discussion, it is concluded that the safety significance of this event is low and the event did not pose a threat to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.									
This event does affect the NRC scrams per 7000 hours of critica		rsight Process Indicat	or for u	nplanned						
IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:										
A. ACTION TAKEN TO RETUR STATUS:	N AFFECTED S	YSTEMS TO PRE-EVE	ENT NO	RMAL						

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULAT	ORY COMMISSION	APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 315	50-0104	EXPIRE	S: 03/31/2020				
(04-2017)) LICENSEE EVENT REP CONTINUATION S (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for or http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/	COMPLET	Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20555.							
1. FACILITY NAME	2. DOC	CKET NUMBER	3. LER NUMBER						
Nine Mile Point Unit 1	05000220		YEAR 2019	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER - 003	REV NO. - 01				
NARRATIVE			2010	000					
Replaced bean valve and flushed/cleaned MPR sensing line. Tuning of the Turbine Control systems was completed prior to return to service. B. ACTION TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:									
N1-SOP-31.2, "Pressure Regulator Malfunctions" has been revised to allow margin for expected oscillations. SOPs that direct a unit to shutdown or derate will be reviewed and revised as needed to incorporate the lessons learned pertaining to providing appropriate operational flexibility.									
V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION:									
A. FAILED COMPONENTS:	FAILED COMPONENTS:								
Tuning of the EPR was not o	Tuning of the EPR was not optimal. There were no individual component failures.								
B. PREVIOUS LERS ON SIMILA	R EVENTS:								
 NMP1 LER 2017-002, submitted May 18, 2017, was due to pressure oscillations at 4% power. The cause of that event was a partial blockage within the MPR sensing line coupled with hysteresis found within the cylinder stroke of the Mechanical Hydraulic Control (MHC) Bypass Relay. The actions to prevent recurrence in 2017 included: 1. Implementation of a two-year preventive maintenance activity for routine flushing and filling of the pressure sensing bellows line and associated piping with contingencies to replace when required. 2. Revision of associated procedures to include steps to flush and backfill sensing lines. 3. Revised the Turbine Trip Test procedure. These actions do not ensure the EPR is optimally tuned and would not have prevented this event. 									
C. THE ENERGY INDUSTRY ID IDENTIFIER AND SYSTEM N IN THIS LER:)				
		IEEE 803 FUNCTION IDENTIFIER	<u> </u>	IEEE 805 SYSTEM DENTIFICATIO	<u>DN</u>				
Reactor Pressure Vessel Feedwater Level Control Sys	tom	RPV N/A		AD JB					
High Pressure Coolant Inject		N/A N/A		BJ					
Reactor Protection System	···· ····	N/A		JC					
Turbine Control System		N/A		JJ					
Electronic Pressure Regulate	זכ	RG		JJ					

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