U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Region I

Report No. 50-219/79-19	
Docket No. 50-219	
License No. DPR-16 Priority	CategoryC
Licensee: Jersey Central Power and Light Company	
Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road	
Morristown, New Jersey 07960	
Facility Name: Oyster Creek, Unit 1	
Inspection at: Forked River, New Jersey	
Inspection conducted: October 9-11, 1979	
Inspectors: L. Briggs, Reactor Inspector	10/30/99 date signed
L. Briggs, Reactor Inspector	date signed
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	date signed
Approved by: E.C. huch)2	10/30/79
E. McCabe, Jr., Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch	s date signed

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on October 9-11, 1979 (Report No. 50-219/79-19)

Areas Inspected: Routine, onsite, unannounced inspection by one region-based inspector (21 hours) of 5 inspection areas: independent effort; Organization and Administration; in-office review; LER followup; and IEB/IEC followup.

Noncompliances: None.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*J. Carroll, Station Manager

K. Fickeissen, Plant Support Superintendent*E. Growney, Engineering Supervisor (acting)

A. Hertz, Project Engineer, Generation Engineering

T. Johnson, I & E Supervisor

D. Jones, Engineer

R. Smith, Assistant Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

*J. Sullivan, Unit Superintendent

The inspector also contacted other members of the technical, engineering and operating staff.

* Present at the exit interview.

2. Organization and Administration

The site organization was compared to Technical Specification (TS) Ammendment Number 40, issued August 5, 1979, effective September 6, 1979. Organizational structure, personnel qualification and duties were verified to be as required.

The inspector had no further questions in this area.

3. In-office Review

a. NRC:RI in-office review of the following LER's has been completed with no unacceptable conditions identified:

LER	Dated	Subject
79-28/3L	September 6, 1979	Core Spray parallel isolation valve inoperable in the open position.
79-29/3L	September 21, 1979	One Source Range Monitor Rod Block setpoint found less than allowed.
79-30/3L	September 24, 1979	"A" Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Pump vent leaking.
79-31/3L	September 26, 1979	"B" Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Pump seal water nipple leak.

- b. In-office review of the following report has been completed with no unacceptable conditions identified:
 - -- August 1979 Monthly Statistical Report.

4. Onsite Review

The inspector performed an onsite review of selected License Event Reports (LER's) to verify that:

- The reports satisfy the reporting requirements of Technical Specifications;
- -- Events are accurately reported as to safety significance and actual occurrence of events;
- -- Corrective action taken was as stated in the report; and,
- Operations subsequent to the event were not in violation of regulatory or license requirements.

The following LER's were reviewed:

- LER 79-21/3L, High Drywell Pressure Sensor Trip Setting Found Greater Than 2 PSIG. This item was discussed with a licensee representative to determine corrective action to prevent recurrence. Instrument drift problems are infrequent but recurring events because installed instruments have a design tolerance which is less restrictive than TS limits. The licensee intends to replace existing instruments with a new line of Digital/Analog instruments. During the 1980 outage, 15 Barton 278 pressure switches are to be replaced with Barton 288 switches, primarily for seismic reasons. This is an interim measure. Total replacement is currently planned to occur in 18 months to 2 years. This item will be examined on a continuing basis.
- -- LER 79-25/1T, Torus Sample Valve Left Open, Primary Containment Degraded. This item was discussed in detail in I & E inspection report 50-219/79-17. One corrective action remained at that time, the addition of the 4 Torus sample valves to the Locked Valve List. This was accomplished and PORC approved during meeting No. 115-79, September 27, 1979.

The inspector had no further questions on this subject.

-- LER 79-13/1T, Analysis Did Not Support 4 Loop Full Power Operation. On April 27, 1979, the licensee became aware that the fuel supplier (Exxon) might not be able to support 4 loop operation under the existing LOCA analysis (TS Ammendment 33). On April 28, 1979, discussions between Exxon, GPU and JCP&L lead to the conclusion that Exxon analyses did not support 4 loop operation. The decision was made to reduce the MAPLHGR limits to the more conservative TS Ammendment 30 values. This was accomplished immediately after the decision was made that a problem did exist. The plant is operating within the TS Amendment 30 limits until a new analysis is performed or 5 loop operation is restored.

The inspector had no further questions at this time.

IE Bulletins and Circulars

a. Bulletins

Licensee actions concerning the following IE Bulletins were reviewed by the inspector to verify that: the Bulletin was forwarded to appropriate onsite management; a review for applicability was performed; information discussed in the licensee's reply was accurate; corrective action taken was as described in the reply; and the reply was within the time period described in the Bulletin.

- -- IEB 79-05, Nuclear Incident At Three Mile Island.
 Applies to B&W PWR plants, response by the licensee was not required. The inspector verified that the bulletin was received and reviewed for applicability by appropriate licensee personnel. No unacceptable conditions were identified.
- -- IEB 79-06, 06A and 06B, Review of Operational Errors and System Misalignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident. Applies to all PWR plants except B&W design. A response by the licensee was not required. The inspector verified that the bulletin was received and reviewed for applicability by appropriate licensee personnel.

No unacceptable conditions were identified.

-- IEB 79-11, Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit
Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems. This Bulletin
specifically addressed Westinghouse breakers. The
licensee does not use Westinghouse breakers in any safetyrelated system. Equivalent General Electric breakers
were addressed in the licensee's response. A review of
the breaker overcurrent testing data, performed during
the 1977 refueling outage, verified the licensee's response.
The breaker overcurrent tests will be performed again
during the 1980 outage. If all data is acceptable, the
licensee plans to test breaker overcurrent trips every 5
years. Data from the 1980 outage will be reviewed and
evaluated by NRC:RI subsequent to the outage.

The following Bulletin responses and planned corrective actions were discussed with the licensee. No unacceptable conditions were identified relating to planned action which is scheduled for completion during the 1980 refueling outage. These items remain open pending completion of action and review by NRC:RI.

- -- IEB 78-14, Deterioration of Buna-N Components in ASCO Solenoids.
- -- IEB 78-01, Flamable Contact-Arm Retainers in G.E. CR120A Relays.
- -- IEB 78-09, BWR Drywell Leakage Paths Associated With Inadequate Drywell Closures.

b. Circulars

Licensee actions concerning the following IE Circulars were reviewed to verify that the circular was received by licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that action taken or planned is appropriate.

-- IEC 78-07, Damaged Components on a Bergen-Paterson Series 25000 Hydraulic Test Stand. The licensee did not have the subject test stand on site. A new test stand (Series 25000) is on order with receipt expected in the near future. The licensee stated that operating and surveillance procedures would be written to incorporate the recommendations of the vendor's manual and IE Circular 78-07.

This item will be inspected subsequent to the receipt of the test stand and procedure issuance.

of Fire Doors. The inspector verified, by a brief tour of the facility and recall from previous tours, that fire doors of the type in question are not used. Particular attention was directed at the operability of fire doors during the tour and no problems were observed.

No unacceptable conditions were identified.

IEC 79-07, Unexpected Speed Increase of Reactor Recirculation MC Set Resulting in Reactor Power Increase. Licensee Inter-office Memo dated May 30, 1979 addressed this item and provided a lesson plan of areas to be covered in a training lecture. Subjects to be covered included, but were not limited to, effects of fuse removal, lifted leads, circuit loading by test equipment and comparing prints and technical manuals to actual circuit configuration prior to working on circuits. Training lectures were held on June 12 and June 18, 1979 for the Instrument Department and the Electrical Department, respectively. In addition, a licensee engineer compared the Recirculation Pump MG Set print and manual to circuit configuration with no problems identified.

The inspector had no further questions on this subject.

The licensee is aware of this problem. Standing Grder (SO) No. 28, Diesel Generator Operation, was issued on July 13, 1979, to provide operator guidance. The SO addressed the problems discussed in Circular 79-12, and is an interim measure until the modification that Electro-Motive is developing is issued and evaluated.

This item will be reinspected subsequent to modification issuance and installation.

-- IEC 79-13, Replacement of Diesel Fire Pump Starting Contactors. The licensee's diesel fire pumps are the same model addressed in Circular 79-13. Action has been initiated by the licensee. New contactors have been ordered per circular recommendations with delivery expected October 29, 1979. The contactors will be installed when received.

This item will be examined subsequent to contactor replacement.

6. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on October 11, 1979. The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection described in this report.

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