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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

November 29, 1979

Docket No. 50-338

- LICENSEE: Virginia Electric and Power Company
- FACILITY: North Anna Power Station, Unit 1
- SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF NOVEMBER 16, 1979 PHONE CONVERSATION REGARDING LESSONS LEARNED IMPLEMENTATION

During a phone conversation on November 16, 1979 the NRC Lessons Learned Implementation Team discussed with the licensee, its October 24, 1979 response to our September 13, 1979 letter.

The team informed the licensee of those lessons learned items for which the licensee's proposed schedule for implementation is unacceptable. These items, along with the proposed and required completion dates, are listed in Enclosure 1.

The team informed the licensee of those items for which the proposed action does not appear to comply with the lessons learned requirement. These items and their associated deficiencies are listed in Enclosure 2.

The team also informed the licensee of those items for which further clarification of the licensee's commitment is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the lessons learned requirements. These items and the associated team questions are listed in Enclosure 3.

Items 2.1.3.b (Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling) (Procedures only), 2.1.7.a (AFW Initiation), 2.1.7.b (AFW Flow), and 2.1.9 (Accident and Trandient Analysis) were not discussed since these items are being implemented by the Bulletins and Orders Task Force.

By letter dated October 30, 1979 we provided additional clarification of the lessons learned requirements to all licensees. We also requested that within 15 days licensee's justify proposed actions not in complete agreement with the staff's requirements and improve the implementation schedule where it differed from the staff's requirements. During this phone conversation we informed the licensee that those items listed in Enclosure 1 and 2 should be addressed in their response. In addition, the licensee agreed to provide the information requested in Enclosure 3 in its response to our October 30, 1979 letter or as soon thereafter as possible.

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Leon Engle, Project Manager Operating Reactors Branch #1 Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures (3): As Stated

cc w/enclosures: See next page

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Me. ing Summary for Virginia Electric and Power Company

Docket Files NRC PDR Local PDR **ORB1** Reading NRR Reading H. Denton E. Case D. Eisenhut R. Tedesco G. Zech B. Grimes W. Gammill L. Shao J. Miller R. Vollmer T. J. Carter A. Schwencer D. Ziemann P. Check G. Lainas D. Crutchfield B. Grimes T. Ippolito R. Reid V. Noonan G. Knighton D. Brinkman Project Manager OELD 01&E (3) C. Parrish/P. Kreutzer ACRS (16) NRC Participants NSIC TERA Licensee Short Service List J. Olshinski (2) J. Burdoin J. Kerrigan N. Anderson C. Willis

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NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 1

LESSONS LEARNED IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE

1. SECTION 2.1.3(a) - Direct Indication of Valve Position

Vepco indicates that it may require several months to procure and install acoustic monitoring devices for the code safety valves. NRC position is that they be in place by January 1, 1930.

2. SECTION 2.1.3(b) - Instrur station for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling

Vepco states its intention to provide a subcooling meter by January 1, 1980, however Vepco does not feel it can be done by this date due to aleign and procurement lead time. NRC position is that the subcooling meter be in place by January 1, 1980.

Additional instrumentation to be evaluated and installed if necessary by January 1, 1980 must include a reactor vessel level indication. The licensee states that no additional plant instrumentation is identified at this time.

SECTION 2.1.6.a - Systems Integrity for High Radioactivity

The January 1, 1980 deadline is a requirement. At that time a summary description of the leak reduction program should be provided along with leak rate measurements. The program should include testing.

4. SECTION 2.1.6.b - Design Review of Plant Shielding

The shield revew and modification identification should be complete by January 1, 1980. Modifications are required to be completed by January 1, 1980.

5. Containment Pressure Monitor

The installation of the upgraded containment pressure monitor should be completed by January 1, 1981.

SECTION 2.1.8.(b) - High Range Radiation Monitors

By January 1, 1980 interim procedures must be implemented for quantifying releases of noble gases and radioiodines even if the existing instruments are off scale. Both incontainment and effluent high range instrumentation must be functional by January 1, 1981.

7. Reactor Coolant System Vents

Vepco should commit to installing the required vents by January 1, 1981.

8. Reactor Coolant System High Point Vents

Vepco should commit to installing vents by January 1, 1981.

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 1

PROPOSED ACTION DOES NOT APPEAR TO COMPLY WITH LESSONS LEARNED REQUIREMENTS

1. SECTION 2.2.1. (b) - Shift Technical Advisor

The licensee states that during 1980 it is its intention to assign the respondility for assessment of operating experience to the Operating Supervisor. The NRC is concerning that the individual assigned time to perform this extremely important function because of other high priority duties. Provide assurance and/or clarification that the individual assigned as Shift Technical Advisor has adequate time or resources to perform the required assessment of operating experience.

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION, UNIT 1

PROPOSED ACTION DOES NOT APPEAR TO COMPLY WITH LESSONS LEARNED REQUIREMENTS

SECTION 2.2.1 - Power Supply for Relief and Block Valves and Pressurizer Level Indications

The intent of the staff's position on energizing the PORV's and block valves from emergency power is to be assured of terminating pressurizer blowdown. To this end, a PORV and its block valve are to energized from redundant trains. Vepco's response does not address this issue. Clarification of this point is required.

2. SECTION 2.1.3 (a) - Direct Indication of Valve Position

Four (4) alarms are required in addition to position indication in the control room for both PORVs and safeties. The licensee should plan on providing alarms by January 1, 1981.

3. SECTION 2.1.4 - Containment Isolation Requirements

Provide a basis for the classification of each essential system.

4. SECTION 2.1.5 a - Dedicated Hydrogen Control Penetrations

- a. Provide information to demonstrate that the containment vacuum system penetrations are sized to satisfy the flow requirements of the recombiner system.
- b. Provide information to demonstrate that the external recombiner penetration is single-failure proof for containment isolation purposes and single-failure proof for recombiner operation.
- c. Discuss the length of time required to install the external recombiners.

SECTION 2.1.8.a - Post-Accident Sampling

The sample analysis capability must include determination of the hydrogen gas concentration in the containment atmosphere as well as the disolved gases $(H_2, 0_2)$ in the reactor coolant. If discussion with the NRC staff on this subject are desired, the licensee (or the Owners Group) should take the initiative.

6. SECTION 2.1.8.b - Increased Range Radiation Monitors

By January 1, 1980 procedures must be provided for quantifying releases if instruments are off-scale. The necessary instruments should be installed by January 1, 1981.

7. SECTION 2.1.8.c - Improved Iodine Instrumentation

By January 1, 1981 provisions must be made for flushing the cartridges with clean gas and for counting the cartridges in a low background area. By January 1, 1980 there should be provision for using an attached single channel analyzer to determine iodine in the presence of noble gases.

8. Containment Water Level, Containment Pressure, Containment Hydrogen Indication

The containment pressure, hydrogen concentration, and wide-range water level monitors should meet the requirements of regulatory guide of 1.97.

9. Containment Hydrogen Monitor

The current hydrogen analyzers do not appear to meet the intent of the staff position. The hydrogen monitors must be permanently installed to monitor the hydrogen concentration continuously. In addition, the monitors must give indication in the control room.

10. Containment Water Level Monitor

Provide information to demonstrate that the existing containment water level instrumentation satisfies the requirement for narrow range containment water level monitors as discussed in the October 30, 1979 Harold R. Denton letter to All operating nuclear power plants.