



UNITED STATES
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 REGION II
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-327/79-59

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
 500A Chestnut Street
 Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Facility Name: Sequoyah

Docket No. 50-327

License No. CPPR-72

Inspection at Sequoyah Unit 1 Site

Inspector: T. J. Donat

11/2/79
Date Signed

Approved by: J. A. Dyer, Acting Section Chief, RONS Branch

11/2/79
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on October 17-18, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 14 inspector-hours on-site in the areas of completed preoperational test package reviews and a review of revised engineer and safety feature surveillance instructions.

Results

In the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *W. F. Popp, Assistant Plant Superintendent
- *W. E. Andrews, Site Q/A Staff Supervisor
- *E. A. Condon, Preoperational Test Section Supervisor
- *W. S. Wilburn, Assistant Preoperational Test Section Supervisor
- *D. O. McCloud, QA Staff Engineer
- *D. J. Record, Assistant Operations Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included operators and office personnel.

Other Organizations

NRC Resident Inspector

W. T. Cottle

*Attended exit interview.

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on October 18, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors remaining comments concerning the plant's surveillance instructions.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

5. Review of Completed Preoperational Test Packages

The inspector reviewed the following completed preoperational test packages:

- W-8.3A, "ESF Actuation System Operational Test"
- W-8.3B, "ESF Actuation System Operational Test"
- W-11.1, "Nuclear Instrumentation System Unit 1"
- W-3.1, "Boron Recycle System Test"
- W-3.2, "Boric Acid System Test"

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W-3.3A, "CVCS Functional Test"
W-3.3B, "CVCS Functional Test" (HFT)
W-5.1, "Liquid Waste Receipt and Storage Test"
TVA-18A, "ERCW System Test"
TVA-19, "Auxiliary ERCW System Test"

The review consisted in part in verifying:

- a. that all test change notices had been properly generated and incorporated into the procedures;
- b. that all exceptions had correct bases, or had been subsequently signed. Also verified that all deficiencies had been resolved and retested or were being tracked by the licensee for resolution and retest prior to fuel loading;
- c. that approval signatures from construction, engineering design, and power production departments were recorded for all of the test record drawings;
- d. that all prerequisites had been signed and dated prior to the performance of the appropriate test section;
- e. that signatures and dates had been entered for each step in the procedure, each data sheet, and the temporary condition log;
- f. that the recorded test data was within the test's acceptance criteria.

The inspector had no comments on any of the test packages.

6. Review of Previous Inspection Findings

Closed-Inspector Followup Item 75-25-02 concerning comments on numerous surveillance instructions for the plant's engineered safety features. The inspector reviewed revisions to the ten procedures commented upon in the original item. The inspector's comments had been incorporated into seven of the ten procedures. The following procedures have not had their comments fully resolved.

- a. SI-15, "Engineered Core Cooling System, RHR Loop 4 RCS Isolation and Containment Sump", Revision 3

The procedure in step 3.1.3 establishes a plant pressure below 380 PSIG but high enough to provide at least 50°F subcooling with respect to the hot leg temperature. The RCS pressure is then increased until the Isolation valve 74-1 automatically closes. In step 3.1.9 the pressure is reduced to "< 380PSIG"; however, no lower bound is placed on the pressure so as to prevent void formation. The licensee agreed that instead, the pressure should be reduced to that established in step 3.1.3.

b. SI-31, "Accumulator Isolation Valve Auto-Open", Rev. 5

The revised procedure still only verifies that the existence of a safety injection signal results in the closure of relay contacts in the valve's control circuit. The technical specification surveillance requirement, 4.5.1.1.1.d, is to verify that the valves open on a safety injection signal. Showing that closing the K603 or K604 relay contacts does result in the valves opening has still to be provided in either this surveillance instruction or a different one.

c. SI-33, "ERCW and Auxiliary ERCW Valves Servicing Safety-Related Equipment", Rev. 4

This revision to the surveillance instruction still does not address the valves for safety train A or B instrument room coolers or electric board room air conditioning condenser loads.

The original item 79-25-02 is being closed but a new open item 79-59-01 is being opened to follow the resolution of the comment on these three procedures.

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