BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

GAS AND ELECTRIC BUILDING

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203

ARTHUR E. LUNDVALL, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
SUPPLY

December 5, 1979

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attn: Mr. Darrel G. Eisenhut, Acting Director
Division of Operating Reactors

Subject: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Units Nos. 1 & 2, Dockets Nos. 50-317 & 50-318
Follow-up Actions Resulting from TMI-2 Incident
(Lessons Learned Short Term)

Gentlemen:

In recent phone conversations with your staff, we agreed to clarify and/or modify some of our previous responses to Short Term Lessons Learned requirements, submitted to you by our letter of 11/20/79. These updates are as follows:

2.1.1 Emergency Power Supply Requirements

The third paragraph of our response should read as follows:

"The motive components of the power operated relief valves (PORV's) are supplied from safety related 480 V motor control centers which have a diesel backup. The control components of the PORV's are supplied from safety related 125 VDC battery buses. The motive and control components of the PORV block valves are supplied from safety related 480 V motor control centers which have a diesel backup. In each case the motive and control power for the block valve is supplied from a power supply train different from that which supplies the associated PORV."

2.1.3a Direct Valve Position Indication

Delivery is expected to be improved substantially on this equipment, to at latest February. Some installation will be done prior to receipt of equipment.

2.1.3b Subcooled Margin Monitor

Transmitters for temperature and pressure signals are critical path, with delivery approximately six (6) weeks from order. Installation could feasibly start by late February or early March.

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2.1.4 Diverse Containment Isolation

We are proceeding with the necessary modifications to the ESFAS reset circuits so that the resetting of containment isolation will not allow these containment isolation valves to reopen until the operator individually opens each valve. Final design, and delivery of handswitches and relays are critical path. Installation could feasibly start in mid-February.

2.1.6a Integrity of Systems Containing Radioactivity

As required by your letter of 10/17/79, we will include a review by 1/1/80 of our systems and procedures for processing radioactive material with regard to the North Anna Unit 1 incident and similar release paths. The review will identify any modifications deemed necessary and schedule completion of modifications, if any.

2.1.8a Improved Post-Accident Sampling Capability

All three places where "January, 1980" is mentioned should read "1/1/80". "An outline of resulting procedures", mentioned in each of the first two paragraphs, should read "resulting procedures".

2.1.8b Increased Range of Radiation Monitors

"January, 1980" in the second paragraph should read "1/1/80".

2.1.8c Improved In-Plant Iodine Instrumentation

We are procuring a new multi-channel analyzer which will be designated to be used only for air samples for respiratory protection. This will be available by 1/1/80. It will be located in the radiation control labs and will be used for processing samples from normally occupied areas located nearby, including the Control Room and Technical Support Center. Samples from more remote areas will be processed using single channel analyzers already on hand

2.1.9 Containment Hydrogen Indication

We will install the 0 to 10% hydrogen indication by 1/1/81.

2.2.2b Technical Support Center

Plans for staffing of the TSC will be complete by 1/1/80. NRC's plans for arranging for the extension of the NRC/Control Room phone will be carried out; installation date of this phone is dependent on the phone company.

The three items requiring outages listed in our 11/20 letter remain the most critical for us (2.1.3a, 2.1.3b, 2.1.4). We are optimistic that we will have some success in improving these deliveries, and based on

latest information are now planning to install these items in both units in the spring of 1980. This will involve a two to four week outage for each unit sequentially. The first unit will shut down roughly at the time when all three of these critical jobs are ready for installation (we presently foresee this to occur sometime around March); the second unit will shut down following return to power of the first unit. We will continue to evaluate our outage plans for installation based on new information as it becomes available, and will keep you informed of significant changes.

Very truly yours,

Richard F. Rosenbaum

cc: J. A. Biddison, Esquire
G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire
Mr. E. L. Conner, Jr.