



# Public Service Company <sup>of</sup> Colorado

16805 Weld County Road 19 1/2, Platteville, Colorado 80651

November 16, 1979  
Fort St. Vrain  
Unit No. 1  
P-79274

Mr. Karl V. Seyfrit, Director  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region IV  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
611 Ryan Plaza Drive  
Suite 1000  
Arlington, Texas 76012

REF: Facility Operating License  
No. DPR-34

Docket No. 50-267

Dear Mr. Seyfrit:

Enclosed please find a copy of Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/79-51/03-L-0, Final, submitted per the requirements of Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(b)4.

Also, please find enclosed one copy of the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence Report No. 50-267/79-51/03-L-0.

Very truly yours,

*Don Warembourg by [Signature]*

Don Warembourg  
Manager, Nuclear Production

DW/cls

cc: Director, MIPC

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REPORT DATE: November 16, 1979

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 79-51

OCCURRENCE DATE: October 17, 1979

ISSUE 0

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FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION  
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO  
16805 WELD COUNTY ROAD 19 1/2  
PLATTEVILLE, COLORADO 80651

REPORT NO. 50-267/79-51/03-L-0

Final

IDENTIFICATION OF  
OCCURRENCE:

On October 17, 1979, while operating at 5% reactor power, System 21 Loop 1 surge tank level decreased to the low level trip setpoint, which tripped the Loop 1 bearing water pumps, making Loop 1 circulators inoperable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specification LCO 4.2.1. This is reportable per Fort St. Vrain Technical Specification AC 7.5.2(b)3.

EVENT  
DESCRIPTION:

On October 17, 1979, reactor power was at 5% and being increased in preparation to put the turbine generator on line.

A clearance had been returned on the emergency feedwater system and it was recharged to approximately 1,700 psig. However, the backup bearing water system had not been returned to service, as it is not put in service until approximately 11% power.

See Figure 1. With the backup bearing water system not in service, the makeup water for the bearing water surge tank, T-2104, comes from the bearing water makeup pump, P-2105, which is run intermittently to maintain proper surge tank level.

The reactor operator turned P-2105 off and had become involved in an evolution at control panel I-05, when the surge tank low level alarm was received. It was acknowledged but P-2105 was not started immediately as the reactor operator returned to the evolution at I-05. Before he returned to the surge tank level situation, the level had decreased to the low level trip setpoint and tripped Loop 1 bearing water pumps resulting in Loop 1 being automatically shutdown. The plant protective circuits functioned as expected during this occurrence.

CAUSE  
DESCRIPTION:

The procedures that cover operation of System 21 surge tank makeup allowed the situation to develop where the surge tank level was low and the reactor operator

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CAUSE

DESCRIPTION: (Cont'd)

was occupied with another matter. The reactor operator's response to the bearing water surge tank level low alarm was inadequate as the recommended operator action was not carried out after the alarm was acknowledged. This allowed the bearing water surge tank level to decrease to the low level trip setpoint.

The procedure does not adequately address the current operating conditions of System 21 and allows intermittent operation when the bearing water system is required to be operable, and the backup bearing water system is not available to supply makeup.

CORRECTIVE

ACTION: \_\_\_\_\_

The surge tank was filled to the proper level and Loop I returned to service. The operating procedure has been revised to use backup bearing water (when available) as the normal surge tank makeup. If the bearing water system is required to be operable and the backup bearing water system is not available, either the bearing water makeup pump, P-2105, or the emergency bearing water makeup pump, P-2108, shall be in continuous operation. Personnel involved have been reinstructed in the proper response to control panel alarms. No further corrective action is anticipated or required.

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


FIGURE 1

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