

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: \_\_\_\_\_ (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 M E M Y P I 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 5  
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 37 CAT 58

CON'T  
0 1 REPORT SOURCE L 6 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 9 7 1 0 3 1 7 9 8 1 1 2 8 7 9 9  
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVLNT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During normal surveillance testing of the Reactor Protective System, it was determined  
0 3 that one set of relay contacts on each of three separate reactor trip matrix relays  
0 4 were not opening reliably upon deenergization of the relay. All other components of  
0 5 the trip matrix were tested satisfactorily. Therefore, the only consequence of the  
0 6 faulty contacts was a reduction in the degree of redundancy, in that if a trip signal  
0 7 had been developed by only two channels of the four channel system, one of the four  
0 8 sets of reactor trip breakers may not have opened. Since only two of these four  
7 8 9

0 9 SYSTEM CODE I A 11 CAUSE CODE E 12 CAUSE SUBCODE B 13 COMPONENT CODE R E L A Y X 14 COMP. SUBCODE G 15 VALVE SUBCODE Z 16  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20  
17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 7 9 21 22 SHUTDOWN METHOD Z 21 HOURS 0 0 0 0 22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y 23 NPRO-4 FORM SUB. Y 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N 25 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER C 3 4 5 26  
9 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The three C. P. Clare, Mercury Wetted Relay Modules, type HG2X-1011, were replaced in  
1 1 kind. A suitable dry contact replacement relay has been located and purchased. Pend-  
1 2 ing delivery and installation of these improved relays, the plant has instituted an  
1 3 accelerated surveillance testing program for the reactor trip matrix system, to provide  
1 4 additional assurance of the continued reliability of this system.  
7 8 9

1 5 FACILITY STATUS E 28 % POWER 0 9 7 29 OTHER STATUS NA 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY B 31 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Routine Surveillance Testing 32  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

1 6 ACTIVITY CONTENT Z 33 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE NA 36  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

1 7 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 37 TYPE Z 38 DESCRIPTION NA 39  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

1 8 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 0 0 40 DESCRIPTION NA 41  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

1 9 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z 42 DESCRIPTION NA 43  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

2 0 PUBLICATION ISSUED N 44 DESCRIPTION NA 45  
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

1472 22

7912040 328

NRC USE ONLY

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (continued)

breakers are required to open to affect a trip, the minimum degree of redundancy was maintained, and there was no affect on the public health or safety. Ref. Maine Yankee Licensee Event Report Nos. 79-022/03L-0, 79-002/03L-0, 78-026/03L-0, 78-010/03L-0, and 78-008/03L-0.

1472 23