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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 1000
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76012

November 16, 1979

In Reply Refer To:

RIV

Docket No. 50-382/IE Information Notice No. 79-27

Louisiana Power and Light Co.
ATTN: Mr. D. L. Aswell
Vice President of Power Production
142 Delaronde Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70174

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Information Notice provides information with regard to the sequence of events that followed incidents involving steam generator tube ruptures at two PWR units.

Sincerely,

Karl V. Seyfrit

Karl V. Seyfrit
Director

Enclosures:

- 1. IE Information Notice 79-27
- 2. Recently Issued IE Information Notices

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON D.C. 20555

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Date: November 16, 1979
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STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURES AT TWO PWR PLANTS

Description of Circumstances:

In recent months two incidents involving steam generator tube ruptures have occurred. In both instances, the units were cooled down and placed in the residual heat removal mode with existing procedures.

Event of June 25, 1979 at the Doel 2 Nuclear Power Plant in Belgium

The first event occurred on June 25, 1979, at the Doel 2 nuclear power plant in Belgium. The Doel unit is a 390 Mwe Westinghouse two-loop reactor. The event consisted of a rupture of several tubes in the loop B steam generator. The resultant leakage between the primary and secondary systems was estimated to be 125 gpm. The event started when the plant was heated up after a shutdown caused by a malfunction of the main steam isolation valve. At the time of the incident the primary coolant pressure was: 2233 psi and the temperature: 491^oF. The reactor remained subcritical throughout the event.

The first indication of abnormal behavior was a rapid decrease of the primary system pressure (approximately: 28 psi/min.). This was followed by the sequence of events listed below:

	<u>Time, min.</u>
1. Increase of charging flow demand, requiring startup of a second charging pump.	1.8
2. Automatic isolation of the CVCS letdown line.	2.4
3. Shut off of the pressurizer heaters due to low liquid level in the pressurizer.	2.4
4. Closing of block valves in the pressurizer relief line.	4.6
5. Rapid increase of water level The steam generator was isolated.	
6. Startup of the third charging pump all charging pumps from the tank.	

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