tic

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

Docket No. 50-346

Toledo Edison Company
ATTN: Mr. Richard P. Crouse
Vice President
Energy Supply
Edison Plaza
300 Madison Avenue
Toledo, OH 43652

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 79-27 provides information with regard to the sequence of events that followed incidents involving steam generator tube ruptures at two PWR units.

Sincerely,

James G. Keppler
Director

Enclosures:
1. IE Information Notice No. 79-27
2. Recently Issued IE Information Notices

cc w/encls:
Mr. T. Murray, Station Superintendent
Central Files
Director, NRR/DPM
Director, NRR/DOR
PDR
Local PDR
NSIC
TIC
Harold W. Kohn, Power Siting Commission
Helen W. Evans, State of Ohio

1435 325

7911280 079

SSINS No.: 6870
Accession No.:
7910250488

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON D.C. 20555

November 16, 1979

IE Information Notice No. 79-27

STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURES AT TWO PWR PLANTS

Description of Circumstances:

In recent months two incidents involving steam generator tube ruptures have occurred. In both instances, the units were cooled down and placed in the residual heat removal mode with existing procedures.

Event of June 25, 1979 at the Doel 2 Nuclear Power Plant in Belgium

The first event occurred on June 25, 1979, at the Doel 2 nuclear power plant in Belgium. The Doel unit is a 390 Mwe Westinghouse two-loop reactor. The event consisted of a rupture of several tubes in the loop B steam generator. The resultant leakage between the primary and secondary systems was estimated to be 125 gpm. The event started when the plant was heated up after a shutdown caused by a malfunction of the main steam isolation valve. At the time of the incident the primary coolant pressure was: 2233 psi and the temperature: 491°F. The reactor remained subcritical throughout the event.

The first indication of abnormal behavior was a rapid decrease of the primary system pressure (approximately: 28 psi/min.). This was followed by the sequence of events listed below:

1435 526 Time, min.

1. Increase of charging flow demand, requiring startup of a second charging pump. 1.8
2. Automatic isolation of the CVCS
3. Shut off of the pressurizer heat pressurizer.